Security Promotion Seen from Below: Experiences from South Sudan

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Executive Summary

This report is based on seven weeks of field research in Jonglei, WES and EES, and was undertaken shortly after the results of the referendum for independence were declared. South Sudan was preparing for its official independence on 9 July 2011, after decades of cataclysmal conflict in which tensions within the south have been exacerbated, and development hardly took place. The focus of the report is on interventions aiming at security promotion in this context, specifically at DDR and SALW control, and to a lesser extent SSR. The point of departure for the research is the local security context. What are the security problems people face in the communities; what security actors are there available; and to what extent are these actors able and willing to deal with the security issues faced by communities? It is from this perspective that the research looks at the interventions taking place, investigating their contribution to the improvement of security at community level.

Security is broadly defined by Sudanese living in the various communities in South Sudan, and the particular security problems that are prioritized differ greatly between regions. Whereas in Jonglei en EES the most stressing problems are related to inter communal cattle raids, robberies and armed groups that defected from the SPLA, in WES the gravest issues are related to the LRA. Cattle raiding has been a long time tradition amongst pastoralist communities, but a number of issues exacerbated the problem. The proliferation of SALW have made the clashes deadlier, and raiding has at times also become linked to powerful political actors or military commanders. The war has created large numbers of disenfranchised youth, due to the devastating effect on development as well as forced displacements. In rural areas this exacerbates pressure for youth to raid cattle, as for many there are no alternatives to acquire the dowry required for marriage and achieve a sense of worthiness within the community. In urban areas, this disenfranchisement leads to anti-social and criminal behavior. Again, the availability of SALW complicates the issue, as with weapons traditional leaders, parents, as well as government forces may be overpowered. The lack of development and high levels of poverty are another concern among the Sudanese interviewed. The lack of roads limits economic activities and hinders state security providers to respond to an incident, a problem that is exacerbated in the rainy season. In the dry season, on the other hand, pastoralists clash with each other over scarce resources, or with agriculturalists when crops are destroyed by animals looking for pastures and water. Moreover, poverty makes the raiding of cattle or joining of a militia a viable alternative to cattle keeping, agriculture or business. SALW thus play a large role in security issues, but are part of a ‘bricolage’ of interconnected security problems. Hence, security should be addressed in an interconnected fashion.

The SPLA is the primary state security actor in South Sudan, but is severely limited to properly provide for the security desired by communities. The army is top-heavy with commanding officers, consists of a large variety of groups with different backgrounds and affiliations, and the loyalty of several elements within the SPLA is questionable. The SPLA is not only lacking proper training and equipment for transportation, also the motivation of SPLA battalions to provide security is at times limited, such as with regard to the LRA in WES. Another state security provider is the SSPS, which has many of the same problems. Most of the police consists of former SPLA, and with aged senior personnel ‘retired’ from the SPLA in the command of the SSPS, junior recruits with training are restricted in their work. Furthermore, the police remains poorly trained, underequipped, and most police can be found at headquarters rather than at payam and boma levels.
As formal state security actors are unlikely to be able to provide the security required at the community level, chiefs and communities themselves also remain important security actors. However, it should be noted in this regard that the power of chiefs has deteriorated in several places, whereas in other places chiefs still maintain certain levels of control. As state security actors lack the capacity to provide sufficient security, communities initiate their own community security mechanisms. These initiatives differ greatly in shape and form, with some communities just beating on drums for warning, and others calling on their youth to act as home guards. Particular in this regard are the Arrow Boys in WES, who are organized in defense of the LRA and are with limited means relatively successful in providing security. The home guard system is sometimes referred to by local actors as ‘community policing.’ This is strongly resisted by a number of international donors who imply a policing strategy by state police with the term. Community policing as a strategy is highly commendable and provides one way to increase and substantiate the social contract between the state and citizens in South Sudan. Yet, the fact that communities organize their own security provision, at times with support of the GoSS, cannot be neglected. To prevent such initiatives from spiraling out of control the oversight of such systems should be supported.

Addressing the multitude of interconnected security issues in Sudan therefore requires a long-term multipronged process, dealing directly with security but also development and cultural issues. Looking at SALW in civilian hands, the three visited states all have their particular experience and context. In Jonglei the SPLA took a strong stance and disarmed several communities. Others were not disarmed, causing insecurity for communities that had been disarmed and leading to rearmament. While arms are carried less in the open, the proliferation of SALW persists. In EES communities outgun the security forces present on the ground and resisted disarmament. Cattle keepers remain heavily armed, and carry firearms openly in rural areas. In both Jonglei and EES SALW proliferation is exacerbated by the influx of weapons from over the borders. In WES the presence of the LRA causes both communities and the state government to resist disarmament, as state security forces are deemed incapable to sufficiently address the LRA threat. With such different backgrounds and contexts for disarmament, a decentralized policy is required which allows for flexibility. At the same time, a decentralized approach should not translate into unintended uneven implementation like the past ad-hoc campaigns. To enable addressing the local differences, state level capacities of the CSAC office should be strengthened and leveled. Working with local civil society organizations, CSAC offices can enter into dialogue with communities on the control of SALW and security issues. Towards Juba, these state offices can provide input on security issues, locally relevant approaches to disarmament, and conflict mitigating development projects. Enabling such capacities in each state would empower the CSAC bureau in Juba in their efforts to promote their approach to disarmament in Sudan in relation to other actors, such as the SPLA.

The DDR programme in South Sudan has received much criticism. DDR is in theory a tool to deal with the potential threat of young armed men after a conflict, and policy-makers stress the DDR’s importance based on this argument. However, in Sudan the programme has been morphed by the GoSS and SPLA into a programme that helps to remove the weaker elements and modernize the army. If training and support are effective in enhancing the economic position of so-called SNGs, the programme does contribute to the improvement of human security of these people. But while perhaps contributing to security in a broader sense, it hardly contributes to security in a way DDR is designed to do. An open discussion between donors, the GoSS and the SPLA is necessary to come to agreed goals of what DDR in South Sudan intends to achieve. At the same time, such agreed goals should be clearly communicated, also among potential participants. Selection criteria and the vetting process for DDR participants should be improved, and oversight should no longer be solely in the hands of the SPLA. To complement DDR, inventive and alternative solutions should be considered to deal with the
large number of veterans, of which many consider DDR as an insufficient reward for their contributions during the war. The Veteran Security Services and agricultural projects are examples for this. Other possibilities would be specialized brigades involved in the construction of roads, bridges and agriculture.

Main points and recommendations include:¹

- Security provision is highly centralized, and mainly working at Juba and state capital levels. To adequately deal with the local security dynamics, decentralization in the geographic and responsibility level are direly needed;
- The role, mandate and function of the security actors (i.e. SPLA, SSPS, etc.) must be clarified, developed and communicated;
- The specific background and context for disarmament varies greatly per region in South Sudan, and disarmament therefore requires a decentralized policy that allows for flexibility. However, such a decentralized approach should not translate into unintended uneven implementation of disarmament initiatives;
- ‘Disarmament of the mind’ is a key process that needs more attention than overtly technical weapons collection programmes, such as sensitization and the stimulation of a cultural debate;
- Underdevelopment is directly linked to insecurity and problems with cattle raiding. Security promotion should therefore align with development at conflict prone issues, such as road development, water management, agricultural development, schooling and health care. Moreover, such development initiatives should also focus on youth;
- Clear criteria for eligibility for DDR must be set and followed. Such criteria must be based on an agreed understanding between the various stakeholders (i.e. GoSS, SPLA and international community) about the goals of DDR.
- Raised expectations of the benefits that DDR brings have to be addressed. At the same time alternatives to DDR have to be found, to complement DDR in dealing with the large number of veterans.
- Creative and relevant indicators should be developed that can not only adequately measure the impact of programmes, but can also be fed back into programmes and allow them to adjust to local circumstances and changes in the context.

¹ See the conclusions for a full list of recommendations
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### Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVR</td>
<td>Armed Violence Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>CSAC</td>
<td>Community Security and Arms Control</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>Eastern Equatoria State</td>
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<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of South Sudan</td>
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<td>GIZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUNDDR</td>
<td>Integrated United Nations DDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYDDRP</td>
<td>Multi-year DDR Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NSRRDDC</td>
<td>Northern Sudan DDR Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAG</td>
<td>Other Armed Groups</td>
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<td>PSD</td>
<td>Peace, Security, Development network</td>
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<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SSANSA</td>
<td>South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>SNG</td>
<td>Special Needs Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA/M</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>South Sudan Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSDDRS</td>
<td>Southern Sudan DDR Commission</td>
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<td>SSSPS</td>
<td>South Sudan Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMIS</td>
<td>UN Advance Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Uganda People’s Defense Forces</td>
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<td>WAAGF</td>
<td>Women Associated to Armed Forces and Groups</td>
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<td>WES</td>
<td>Western Equatoria State</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WUN</td>
<td>Western Upper Nile</td>
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Introduction: Security promotion in fragile states

Security promotion in fragile states is generally seen as a prerequisite for development and has developed over the last years through different programmatic initiatives such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control. Security promotion in general, and these programmes particularly, can take many forms as each context requires a unique approach. This research prioritizes analyzing the security context before turning to what outside intervention would be most appropriate, effective, efficient and sustainable. When a particular goal or programme is the point of departure, chances are the analysis merely aims for strategies that fit that goal or programme. The analysis thus may become clouded by the goals that the intervention aims to reach. Instead of a ‘blank’ analysis, there is ‘cherry-picking’ from the context into the desired strategy. Such an approach leaves the goal or programme itself unquestioned, and may leave out particular contextual factors that are not addressed by the programme. In contrast, starting with the local security context increases the scope of possibilities for programming as it broadens the realm of possible programmes and initiatives. In South Sudan, for example, development of water management and inter communal dialogue might promote security more than disarmament programmes can. The widespread availability of SALW is not by definition an indicator for violence as Switzerland and some Scandinavian countries prove. On the other hand, limited availability of SALW will not per definition indicate a lack of violence as the Mai-Mai in Eastern DRC prove.

This research departed with the following notions and assumptions. Disarmament is only the means to an end (security) and should not be taken as the end state, if sustainable security is the aim of the intervention. Initiating, increasing and substantiating social contracts should be part and parcel of security promotion as social fabric enhances conflict resilience and ultimately stability of the state. In South Sudan it is clear when looking into the issue of tribal clashes and cattle raiding, that an enhanced social contract would improve security both at the communal level and the national level. Consequently, this research will combine components of security promotion with the creation of inroads for social contracts to substantiate the recommendations made beyond overtly technical approaches. Lastly, this research takes community security rather than state security as point of departure. Community security in essence deals with collective security at the grassroots which enhances micro analysis of Southern Sudan’s many localized conflicts within their context. Ultimately, security in Southern Sudan must be built up from the bottom. In other words, “nobody can start growing a tree from the top to the bottom.”

This research aims to analyze the dynamic between community security and security promotion initiatives and in the case of South Sudan aims to analyze what interaction takes place between community security and specific programmes such as the DDR programme, community disarmament and, to the extent mentioned by respondents at the grassroots level, SSR. While community security and state security are far from mutually exclusive, for analytical purposes the distinction is made here

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2 The rate of private gun ownership in Switzerland is 45,7 firearms per 100 people, and in Finland 45,3 firearms per 100 people (Karp, 2007, annex 4).
4 Please see Annex 1 for the working definition of community security.
5 Interview, Paramount chief Nzara County, Nzara, WES, 5 April 2011
6 See Annex 1 for the working definition of state security.
between strategies prioritizing community security (internal security) and state security (external security). Increased community security improves stability at the community level, which in turn can improve state stability, and at the same time a stable state can lead to improved community security. However, security promotion focused exclusively on state stability may have adverse effects on community security as will become apparent in this report. Yet, the choice of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) to prioritize state stability is apparent when assessing their pre-referendum priorities in relation to security. The approach adopted for this research will specifically draw attention to the varying security perspectives at the national policy level and the local grassroots level. The distinction also relates to the logic behind forced and voluntary disarmament initiatives in the past and future as will become apparent in the chapter dealing with challenges in security promotion. The interaction between security promotion and community security will then draw attention to the programme design and its connection with local contexts. In ideal circumstances the programme design would be firmly rooted within the implementation context. This then would require a constructive connection between bottom-up and top-down initiatives; a connection that too frequently seems missing. This report aims to make visible these connections in order to find ways to improve these connections towards the future.

Background and methodology of the research

The Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) of the University of Utrecht and IKV Pax Christi (IPC) have explored the dynamics between community security and security promotion programmes in South Sudan. At the heart of the research were two questions: what are the linkages between community security and security promotion in Southern Sudan, and what lessons can be learned from these linkages for the effectiveness and sustainability of security promotion?

This research project was part of a multi-country research programme by the Dutch Peace, Security and Development (PSD) network into community security and DDR. The programme has included a desk study (Willems et al, 2009) into the theoretical linkages between community security and DDR, on the basis of which case studies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Rouw and Willems, 2009), Burundi (Willems, Kleingeld and Van Leeuwen, 2010), Colombia, (Derks, Rouw and Briscoe, 2011), as well as South Sudan were carried out. Starting from the principal questions cited above, the research aims to look at the contribution of communities to the success of security promotion in interrelated ways. It asks how security promotion programming, which tends to be a technical exercise run out of capital cities, can make better use of community participation and innovation in the process of achieving its objectives. As a result, this report looks at the way community involvement has been handled in South Sudanese policy formulation, and seeks out the voices of civil society actors, ex-combatants and local officials in order to establish what the role of communities has been in practice. Relative to the earlier reports drafted within the PSD working group this report shifts the focus from DDR to SALW control. The main reason for this shift is the large amount of SALW in civilian hands, the Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) initiative unique to South Sudan, and the limited practical progress of the DDR programme in South Sudan.

In South Sudan, the research took place in the following sections of states. The largest state Jonglei was visited to research greater Bor. Traveling further north was prevented by clashes between the

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8 See for reports and background of this network: [http://www.psdnetwork.nl/](http://www.psdnetwork.nl/)
9 See Annex 4 for a map of South Sudan
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the defected General George Athor in combination with a tight research schedule. Issues observed here related to cattle raiding and the developmental limitations in an area largely inaccessible during rainy seasons. In Western Equatoria State (WES), the research took place in Yambio and Nzara county. Here, the main factors were problems with the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), Ambororo and tribal clashes in Mvolo between agriculturalists from WES and pastoralists from Lakes state. In Eastern Equatoria State (EES) the research focused on Torit, Camp 15 (on the road from Torit to Kapoeta) and Kapoeta. In EES, the main security issues encountered were cattle raiding, cross-border insecurity and disenfranchised youth. Many interviews furthermore took place in Juba where several disarmament programmes, NGOs and other policy makers have their headquarters. Any factual errors or misinterpretations in this report are entirely our own.

Throughout the report, key quotations from respondents have been included to provide the reader with a sense of how people expressed themselves on the topics discussed, and to enliven and illustrate the analysis. Unless stated otherwise, these quotations recurred in other wordings in more than one interview, rather than those representing the perspective of particular individuals. Some quotes are moderately adjusted for purposes of brevity and clarity. As such, these quotations are used to illustrate the story of this analysis.

**Limitations**

The researchers made ample use of organized forms of civil society to find access to respondents and to enhance depth of the analysis. A bias towards organized initiatives might be a result which in limited form was countered by presenting preliminary findings to individuals outside organizations. The research team decided to dedicate available time to a limited amount of locations which resulted in a limited dataset on the states mentioned. In other words, depth was chosen over scope. This, however, means that the data presented is not representative for the entire states visited. The interviews, specifically the group discussions, were often conducted in the local language and translated on the spot into English. This inherently increases chances on misinterpretation. Lastly, while looking into the DDR programme it should be noted that the programme is in its initial stage as far as implementation goes, especially in the three states visited. The CSAC bureau is in the initial stage also and state presence and capacity varies through the areas visited. Hence, the findings with regard to reintegration are limited to the experiences of the few ex-combatants interviewed who are currently in the reintegration programme. Practical community disarmament through CSAC essentially only took place in Jonglei.

**Acknowledgements**

The research team would like to extend first and foremost warm gratitude to everybody who was willing to sit down with us and share insights. Without their patience and willingness this research could not have taken place. We hope to do justice to their words with this report and hopefully this report can at least partially fulfill their expectations. Our specific thanks go out to the South Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA) who were willing and able to provide us with the needed logistics and insights in the research areas. These are Geoffrey L. Duke in Juba, Simon Reat Mar in

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10 The administrative units in South Sudan beyond the national level are its 10 states, which are divided by **counties**. These **counties** then consist of **payam’s** (number of villages) which are a collection of the smallest unit which is the **boma** (a singular village).

11 See Annex 2 for more on the methodology used for the research.
Jonglei, Ramsey Sagamu Martin in WES, and Thomas Baba in EES. We are also grateful to the colleagues at IKV Pax Christi both in South Sudan and the Netherlands, especially Andrea Minalla, Florence Ropani, and Nico Plooijer. Thanks go out to Steward (our driver) who got us everywhere safe, in time and in good spirits. We would also like to thank the participants of the feedback session organized in Juba and our fellow members of the Working Group Community Security and Community-based DDR in Fragile States. Lastly, we would like to extend our gratitude to the people who dedicated time to comment on this paper during the writing process. Any factual errors or misinterpretations in this report are entirely our own.

Structure of the report

The first chapter analyzes what security constitutes and assesses what various actors’ capacities and limitations for security promotion at the grassroots level. Chapter one then looks at the peculiarities of the three areas visited in order to address its specific security dynamics and concludes with a brief summary of the key dynamics found. Chapter two analyzes security promotion in past, present and future and addresses particularities found in the three states in this research. Chapter two will also devote attention to various challenges for programmes as DDR, community disarmament and SSR related to contextual, political and institutional challenges. Chapter two closes with a presentation of the key findings. The conclusions then summarize the findings towards practical recommendations for local communities, security promotion actors, the GoSS and international donors. Major topics highlighted include:

- The cyclical pattern of violence in South Sudan within and between communities;
- The lacking capacity of formal security providers to provide in community security;
- The variety of community responses to the lacking capacity of the state to adequately provide security;
- The great variety in background and context for disarmament between the different regions in South Sudan;
- The diverging ideas between the GoSS and the SPLA on the one hand and the international community on the other about what DDR should do in the context of South Sudan.
History South Sudan conflict and security promotion

In 1954 an agreement was signed that provided for self-determination and self-governance for Sudan on 1 January 1956 after more than fifty-five years of colonization by the British. The British had ruled Sudan divided in an Arab North and African South until 1946, when it decided to reverse this policy and unite the country. Nevertheless deep disparities remained. When the government in Khartoum renounced promises to establish a federal system in 1954, it led to mutiny of Southern army officers in Torit in Eastern Equatoria. “On 18 August of that year, just months before Sudan was to declare independence, a locally-recruited unit of soldiers called the Equatoria Corps rose against the imminent government in Khartoum” (Schomerus, 2008: 18). Several groups emerged and gradually developed in the Anya Nya movement that spread from the Equatorias to Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. The war lasted seventeen years until the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement, which provided some autonomy for the South in exchange for the rebels laying down their arms.

“The clashes between the Arab-run state and the peripheries are rooted in marginalization in the economic development process and exclusion from power structures.” (Jok, 2007: 115). Dissatisfaction in the south persisted and increased autonomy of the South was again limited. In response to the abolition of the federal structure a rebel movement was formed in 1978 known as Anya Nya II, and started attacks from Ethiopia from 1980 onwards. Then in 1983 Colonel Gafaar Nimeiry, who had taken power in Khartoum through a coup d’état in 1969, instituted the Shari’a Islamic law in the whole country, including the South. This proved to be the final drop for the predominantly Christian South, which felt more and more oppressed by the predominantly Islamic North. After mutiny of a group of Southern soldiers in Bor and Pibor, John Garang was sent to deal with the problem, but he joined the Anya Nya II movement and formed the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), marking the beginning of the second Sudanese civil war. Soon thereafter, conflict grew between the SPLA and Anya Nya II and the latter joined the government.

In Khartoum a coup d’états in 1985 and various changes of government followed until in 1989 Omar Hassan al-Bashir took power and ruled the country through the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation. He allied himself with Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF) that had been influencing Khartoum politics since 1979. Al-Bashir was then appointed as president of Sudan in 1993 and the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation was dissolved. Exploiting the tensions between Southern groups, Al-Bashir used various proxy forces to fight within and against the South. Further complicating the conflict was the discovery of large oil reserves in the South in the late 1970s. Production was predominantly controlled by the north and formed an extra motivation for continuation of the conflict on both sides. Oil production was used to finance the conflict, oil fields became strategic targets, oil related development such as roads eased military movements, and foreign interests in oil not necessarily aligned with the promotion of peace (c.f. Switzer, 2002: ECOS, 2010).

The SPLA claimed to fight for John Garang’s vision of a federal Sudan with equal rights for all citizens. This, however, was criticized by some as an attempt to bring the south under SPLA – that is, Dinka – control. “In the early 1980s Equatorians supported the expulsion of Dinka and other Nilotic peoples from their region and, in response, a belief developed in SPLA ranks that Equatorians had never truly ‘supported the struggle’” (Schomerus, 2008: 20). SPLA-commanders Riek Machar (Nuer), Lam Akol (Shilluk) and Gordon Kong (Nuer) attempted a coup against Garang in 1991. Whereas Garang advocated for a united secular and democratic ‘New Sudan’, Machar advocated a politically
independent South Sudan. Machar broke away with the SPLA-Nasir faction after a failed coup. Machar’s Nuer militia attacked the Bor Dinka in Garang’s home territory in 1991. More than 100,000 people (almost all civilians) were estimated to be killed in this attack and the victorious Nuer looted and took cattle with them back North. This is one of the most raw and still persistent wounds in the South (and in Jonglei in particular) and still affects the relations between Dinka and Nuer today (Young, 2007a: 3).

Machar signed the ‘April 1997 Peace Agreement’ with the NIF, through which seven armed groups\textsuperscript{12} used by Khartoum as proxy were symbolically combined into the South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF). The alliance between Khartoum and the SSDF was maintained by providing resources, providing cash payouts to senior commanders, playing the ‘ethnic card’ and drawing upon popular prejudices against John Garang and the Dinka ethnic group as the SSDF was primarily Nuer (Small Arms Survey, 2006: 3). Within the SSDF Machar, unable to push for a referendum on southern self-determination in exchange for his cooperation against the SPLA, became frustrated and ended his alliance with the Government of Sudan (GoS) in 2000. He briefly formed the Sudan People’s Defense Force (SPDF) before re-joining the SPLA. Paulino Matieb took control over the SSDF forces, and “became a potent symbol for disaffected Nuer and other southerners who had rejected Garang’s leadership” (Young, 2007b: 17). Garang never entered full negotiations with the SSDF and always tried to lure individual commanders to defect, only to marginalize these defectors afterwards (Young, 2005, p. 88).

Then on January 2005, with much international pressure, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi, formally ending war between North and South. The CPA started a six year interim period which contained the possibility for an independent South through a referendum in 2011. During the 6 year period the South gained a large degree of autonomy and the country was ruled by a Government of National Unity consisting of the GoS and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS). The referendum started on 9 January in 2011, and the official results released on 8 February showed that 98,83 per cent voted for independence (SSRC & SSRB, 2011). The date set for independence is 9 June 2011 while many challenges remain. Creating a unified south proves difficult, as there is little trust between various groups within the South. Several ‘private armies’ within the SPLA remain loyal to their commanders whose authority trumps regular chain of command, and reportedly as little as 30 per cent of the SPLA is under control of the SPLA command (Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 30-31). Furthermore, tensions remain high and fighting has again erupted between the north and the south in Abyei, as well as between different tribes in the south as exemplified by the recent violence in Jonglei.

Security promotion

\textbf{DDR}

The basis for DDR in Sudan is the CPA signed in 2005, which explicitly calls for the “proportional downsizing of forces on both sides” (GoS & SPLA/M, 2005: VI, 1c). Troops of the SPLA and the SAF were to redeploy to their respective sides along the 1956 border, Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) were to be formed combining forces from both sides in preparation for a possible unified Sudan, and Other Armed Groups (OAGs) were to be integrated into either the SPLA or the SAF or enter DDR. The CPA

\textsuperscript{12}The signatories of the Khartoum Peace Agreement were the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army (Riek Machar); the SPLM/A faction led by Kerubino Kawanyn Bol; the South Sudan Independents Group (Kawac Makwei); the Equatoria Defence Forces (Thiopholus Ochang Loti); the Union of Sudanese African Parties (Samuel Aru Bol); and the Bor Group (Arok Thon Arok) (Mc Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 39).
also called for the development of a National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC) which oversees the work of the Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NSRRDDC) and the Southern Sudan DDR Commission (SSDDRC). These commissions in turn are mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR programmes in their regions. An Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) was drawn up and replaced in June 2008 with the Multi-Year DDR Programme (MYDDRP). International support is given through the Integrated UN DDR (UNDDR) Unit, which includes primarily the UN Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) and the UNDP, but also UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the UN Population Fund (Nichols, 2010: 10).

The IDDRP had a strong focus on human security (Saferworld, 2008: 8) and it has set the goal to make ex-combatants productive and positive members of society, rather than merely appease potential spoilers (Nichols, 2010: 13; Gebrehiwot, 2009: 43). In practice, however, the IDDRP has taken an individual approach to reintegration, rather than the community-based approach that was envisaged beforehand as the “suggestion that ex-combatants who reintegrate act as economic ‘catalysts’ for their communities appears overly optimistic” (Brethfeld, 2010: 10). The DDR programme in the South is currently being revised to be implemented after independence.

Community disarmament

The first civilian disarmament campaign after the signing of the CPA took place in Jonglei between December 2005 and May 2006. Problems emerged after Lou and Gawaar Nuer pastoralists requested permission from the Dinka Hol and Nyarweng from Duk County to graze cattle in their lands in December 2005, upon which the State (and predominantly Dinka) authorities requested the Nuer to surrender their weapons before grazing their livestock. (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 3; Young, 2007a: 3-4). The Nuer were hesitant to give up their arms, fearing to be left defenseless, and during clashes with the SPLA the Nuer ‘white army’ suffered great losses and retreated towards the north, looting from civilians. The pursuing SPLA, employed in the disarmament campaign, did not receive regular food supplies and took cattle and supplies from the local population. During the campaign an estimated 3,300 weapons were collected, and an estimated 1,200 white army soldiers, 400 SPLA soldiers, and 213 civilians were killed (Young, 2007a: 2-6; Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 4). In response to this violent campaign, a small UN contingent worked with local government and SPLA administrations to develop a voluntarily disarmament campaign in Akobo and Pibor in 2006 and 2007, during which more than 2,500 weapons were collected without casualties.

In an attempt to deal with the problem of SALW in civilian hands in a more constructive manner, the UNDP initiated its Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) programme, and a GoSS CSAC Bureau was established in 2006. The CSAC bureau is tasked to oversee community security issues and arms control in South Sudan, and to interact with international counterparts on the implementation of the Nairobi protocol, the UN Plan of Action on SALW, etc. However, when the SPLA considered it to be necessary, violence or the threat of violence was still used. In the 2008 disarmament campaign, “the coercive aspect of the campaign circumscribed the scope of the UN’s contribution” (O’Brien, 2009: 11). For example, in Eastern Equatoria State (EES), where ad hoc disarmament had begun in

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13 This paragraph partially draws from Willems (2008)
14 The white army is not a single army, but rather a collection of armed groups of youth which were formed for the protection of cattle, and occasionally raided cattle themselves. Initially the power over the armed groups was in the hands of the traditional authorities in the community, but over time it passed from the chiefs to the white army youth. Later on some white army factions became part of the SSDF. A more complete historical account of the development of the white army can be found in Young (2007b).
15 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
2007, the two villages Iloli and Oguruny in Hiyala Payam resisted. Eleven civilians and eight SPLA soldiers were killed, after which the SPLA burned down the two villages forcing 4,300 to flee (Mc Envoy & Murray, 2008: 33).

The level of disarmament activities varies greatly from state to state, depending on the interest of local GoSS and SPLA leaders. Most activities have been undertaken in Jonglei, while further disarmament in EES has been suspended. In Western Equatoria State (WES) no civilian disarmament was undertaken and no weapons were collected or registered due to the threat of the LRA. In the end, the disarmament campaigns did relatively little to the overall presence of SALW in South Sudan and initial evidence suggests it had little or no impact on armed violence among southern civilians (O’Brien, 2009: 11).
Local security perspectives

The point of departure of this research is community security, and hence this first chapter starts by investigating the security issues as they are experienced and perceived at the grassroots level. Following, it looks at the different actors involved in security provision in the South Sudan, particularly at the local level.

Before turning to specific areas and security issues it is important to assess what security can entail at the grassroots level in the South Sudanese context. The following insights are mostly derived from focus group discussions on this theme. Despite the war with the North formally ending in 2005, security is not commonplace in South Sudan. In WES for instance, locals even claim they were more secure during the war as “there was only SPLA, who maybe wanted some food […] violent ones would take it, but they would always leave you alive.”16 The widespread insecurity in South Sudan certainly is complex, dynamic and highly context specific. At the same time, insecurity oftentimes relates to similar causes such as poverty, cultural and economical reliance on cattle, external threats such as the LRA and nomadic pastoralists from other countries, and the wide availability of SALW in a highly traumatized and militarized context with large sections of disenfranchised youth. Both economic and social development in South Sudan is to a large extent dependant on security. In other words; “security covers everything”17 and “without security you cannot do anything and not go anywhere […] it’s like your hands are tied behind your back.”18

Open discussions about what security actually means lead to the insight that security ranges from the internal “something within yourself”19 to the externally globalized notion that “security is for everybody; not only the security of South Sudan but also the United States and other countries: this is the security we want to live in.”20 Notably, many respondents saw a broad range of issues pertaining to their security. The general sense of security includes “when you live freely, move freely, talk freely, nobody interfering with your life”21, “a situation with no war but peace and stability as security is the stabilization of the situation”22, and “economic growth in the country.”23 More particular issues include the notion of “security also means your children are going to school, you have facilities”24 and security can include having “a road to move freely to the market without fear at any time, even at night.”25 Others include food security which often relates to lacking physical security. Food security in WES was related to the seasons. “The rainy season is coming and people are afraid to come outside [to cultivate the land],”26 because during the rainy season the LRA can hide behind thicker foliage to move around without being seen. In EES food insecurity is in part caused by “some areas we fear to cultivate because of mines”27 adding validity to the notion that food insecurity is both a result of insufficient physical security and a cause for insecurity at the community level.

16 Interview, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
17 Youth discussion group, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
18 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
19 Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
20 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011
21 Ibid.
22 Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
23 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011
27 Ibid
A worrying phenomenon in some places is the notion that ‘men with guns’ who cause insecurity came to include “also police and soldiers in [the] market because if anything happens they start shooting.”

This corresponds with earlier findings indicating that “although SPLA soldiers are largely viewed as war heroes who liberated South Sudan, it is increasingly coming to light that many rank-and-file and senior SPLA officers have been involved in human rights violations, abuse of power and corruption,” both during and after the war (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani, 2009: 10). Although it is commonly agreed that “people are the reason why there are problems and violence,” some interviewees seemed to doubt that South Sudanese could be violent against each other just out of financial gain or retaliation. The insight that “innocent communities fighting themselves are instigated by others [Khartoum]” is a widespread and accepted notion. Others, however, maintain that the “North is probably involved by exacerbating but they don’t cause the problems […] the North doesn’t have capacity to cause these things, they just exacerbate.” It is clear that there are circumstances not strictly confined to South Sudan. Also, security providers sometimes are part of the problem rather than the solution. However, many conflicts are caused within South Sudanese society and only the outcomes of those conflicts can be addressed by security providers. In other words, solving these conflicts goes beyond professionally operating security providers.

Local realities: perspectives from the states

This section serves to highlight relevant local variations and to provide a more detailed analysis of the various contexts. It does not aim to cover the states comprehensively but serves to indicate local variations in the security contexts.

_Jonglei_

In Jonglei the dry seasons are too dry, making it difficult for pastoralists to find water for their cattle and the wet seasons are too wet, making most roads inaccessible. This obstructs security provision by state security forces, but also obstructs regular trade, economic development and social contact between the several tribes of Jonglei. In other words, “peace here requires roads to connect all the counties.” Communication furthermore is difficult as cell phone coverage is limited. The lack of irrigation and overflow during the rainy season hinders agricultural development. “The soil here is black cotton soil and this does not dispose of the water very easily. The Nile overflows and the rains have caused floods more often.” Although agriculture is said by some in government to provide an alternative to keeping cows the practice currently remains largely impossible. Land suitable for cultivation is rare and often located outside the villages where people grouped together for security. The catch-22 here lies in the notion that agriculture should steer pastoralists away from cattle raiding, but working the land outside the villages increases the chances on being robbed, raped and killed. Retaliation then takes over fueling once again the cycle of violence. In essence, this means a transformation of risk rather than a practical solution as long as peaceful agriculture cannot be warranted. Indeed, to pastoralists interviewed, the exclusive reliance on cows over viable alternatives.

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28 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
29 Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
30 Interview, SPLM State representative, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011
31 Interview, Security expert, Juba, 30 March 2011
32 Interview, Representative Jonglei State CSAC Bureau, Bor Jonglei, 21 March 2011
33 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011
in the agricultural sector, is very clear as “these situations have been there for a long time. When we have no cows we have no milk and no meat. We do not have enough food this way.”

Returning in each conversation on cattle raiding was the particular case of the Murle tribe in Jonglei. According to many, “the Murle have only two skills in life: to steal cattle and abduct children.” The attributed power of Murle to steal cattle in the greater Bor area goes to the extent that in one discussion it was claimed that the rumor of three Murle’s in the vicinity of a village will be enough to have that village flee. Commonly all cattle theft in this area is attributed to the Murle tribe, although it is admitted that one “cannot say that only Murle do that; all that keep cattle are raiders also.” What sticks with the pastoralists of the greater Bor area, however, is that the Murle “said we [the Dinka Bor] are their garden to take things from” during one of the peace conferences organized to reduce cattle raiding. A particular threat posed by the Murle are the abductions of children throughout Jonglei as the Murle have fertility problems and resort to abducting children from others.

Many interviewees attributed the idleness of many pastoralists to be one of the reasons why the cattle raids and the related violence persist. Development of roads, irrigation schemes, schooling, vocational training and job creation are said to be needed to divert people from only keeping cattle. On the other hand, interviewees mentioned that many pastoralists have little interest in schooling or alternative livelihood as this hardly provides in a culture where everything revolves around cattle.

The sobering results of a report on the security situation in Jonglei for the first two months of 2011 were provided by CSAC in Bor. “251 killed and 199 wounded, 3 children abducted, 14,276 cattle and 33 goats raided, with renegade general Athor being responsible for the killing and the wounded.” Athor is locally believed to be supported by Khartoum and is held responsible for the usage of anti-personal mines in northern Jonglei. The clashes between the SPLA and Athor resulted in many civilian deaths and caused thousands to flee. The rank and file of Athor’s rebellion are drawn from the local population which is possible because “people who joined Athor just want employment and we tried to have them come back but encountered the policy of Athor.” The view of poverty leading to violence is corroborated by the governor’s view that in Jonglei “security is not political, because [current violence] is due to the economic situation and created by the search for means of livelihood.”

The poor security situation in Jonglei is, according to the local population, hardly addressed by formal security providers such as the SPLA and the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS). Despite reporting to the government and the police when raids or abductions occur, “nothing has happened.” As a result some go as far as claiming that “currently the CPA is dying.” While these problems are an internal issue for South Sudan and is not addressed in the CPA, for these people the CPA is a symbol of the

34 Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
35 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011
36 Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
37 Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
38 According to others infertility is a problem, but arguably exaggerated and also caused by the young age at which girls marry. Moreover, abductions may be linked to cultural practices and the cattle economy (Young, 2010: 7-8)
39 George Athor is an SPLA general who defected in 2010.
40 Interview, Representative Jonglei State CSAC Bureau, Bor Jonglei, 21 March 2011
41 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011
42 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011
43 Conversation with chiefs, Anyidi, Bor County, Jonglei, 25 March 2011
44 Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
promised peace which they still do not see around them. The security situation in Jonglei thus is highly complex with renegade generals, cattle raiding based on lack of economical and cultural alternatives, irresponsible and incapable security providers that oftentimes do not respect human rights in their operations, roads largely inaccessible during rain and tensions among Jonglei’s various tribes.

**Eastern Equatoria State**

The prioritized security threats in EES stem from underdevelopment and limited alternatives to the widespread cattle keeping which forms the main traditional source of survival. Specific to EES are the porous national borders with Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia that allow for pastoralists SALW and ammunition to pass into EES.

Much like in Jonglei, the pastoralist culture entails features that reward and generate prestige for cattle raiding and related violence. “It is good to kill people. When you do, you become a man and it is dignified. Raiding cows also means you are a man.” As in Jonglei the cyclical character of cattle raiding is apparent and understood by locals as cattle keepers continue taking revenge when their cattle is stolen. “Here in this county we have Toposa, Boya and Didinga, and they raid each other and then the raided party takes revenge and so it continues.” Despite the commonly accepted logic among pastoralists that “we only raid when they raid us” it becomes apparent that most pastoralists do not really believe this sense of victimization but do not deem ways other than taking revenge feasible or attractive.

The results of porous borders with Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia are twofold in EES. On the one hand nomadic tribes are not concerned with borders as they pursue water and vegetation for their cows and the SPLA are not able to control the borders. Making things more difficult is the fear for disputes with the aforementioned bordering countries which rules out stopping foreign pastoralists forcefully on the foreign side of the border. On the other hand, the porous borders facilitate the flow of SALW and ammunitions into South Sudan. Besides retaining weapons acquired during the wars it is relatively easy to buy weapons in or from neighboring countries. As the Sudanese pastoralists “bought their arms for protection of animals and the countries surrounding [Southern Sudan] also have cattle raiders, they [South Sudanese] would be exposed to other countries” if attempts would be made to disarm them.

A problem for the whole of South Sudan but mentioned specifically in EES are groups of disenfranchised youth that pose security threats to the rest of the population. In other words, “the youth of these days, they are very difficult.” Both the rural areas and the cities suffer under these youths although in different forms. In rural areas there is “this mob justice by this group of youth, especially in Magui county, if you did something against the law they stone you to death, burn your house.” This statement refers to the *Monyomiji* which forms a unique indigenous institution for a

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45 Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
46 Interview, Police officer, Kapoeta, EES, 18 April 2011
47 Conversation with chiefs, Kapoeta, EES, 19 April 2011
48 Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011
49 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
50 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
51 *Monyomiji* are the ruling age grade that takes over power from its predecessors once in 10 – 25 year depending on the community. *Monyomiji* rule is practiced in the communities of EES that live west of the
dozen ethnic groups in EES. Due to trauma and the availability of SALW, however, the ruling generation claims the current youth are especially antagonistic and thus are seen by others as being out of control and executing mob justice. As perceived by civil society in Torit, the Monyomiji is a youth group from 17 to 40 who are very strong men in EES; they are the government in the community and they don’t listen to their elders. They are in the whole of EES.”

Many in EES connect the increased power of youth with the perceived decrease of respect for and power of traditional leaders. Within the city of Torit a specific problem with disenfranchised youth exists in the form of youth groups that call themselves ‘Niggaz’. This issue is prevalent in many urban areas in South Sudan, but was during the research specifically mentioned in Torit. As a result, many people feel “trapped inside [their] house, do not feel secure outside because they [niggaz] might steal things from you” and “there is this silent killing with many people assassinated last year.”

**Western Equatoria State**

In WES the security problems “are not internally, but there are problems with the LRA.” The incursions of the LRA are the main security threat according to the respondents with the Ambororo and tribal clashes between WES and Lakes State following in order.

The general view on security in WES from respondents at all levels is as follows. “After the war when the CPA was signed we didn’t have much insecurity, except for a few clashes that were resolved. Disarmament was on process when the LRA came […] and the government has not been able to provide security […] people have run to the towns.” Sources somewhat vary for the frequency and results of attacks in Southern Sudan, with Western Equatoria state bearing the brunt and Central Equatoria and Western Bar-el Ghazal states witnessing a limited amount of intrusions. The year 2009 saw around 220 deaths, around 150 abductions, between 48.000 and 150.000 IDPs, and around 20.000 external refugees residing in South Sudan. In 2010 between 27-35 people were killed, about 50 were abducted and 45.024 were registered as IDPs. LRA violence in South Sudan continued in 2011 in WES and Western Bar el Ghazal, where 14 attacks in the first three months resulted in 10 deaths and 29 abductions (OCHA, 2011).

In the vast territory of WES with long shared borders with CAR and DRC it is challenging for all security providers to prevent the LRA intrusions. According to local respondents the “soldiers that should protect us are handicapped: communication, transport food and logistics for food, all lack and

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52 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
53 This is a self-chosen title and not a derogatory term. This issue will be further elaborated on in the paragraph on disenfranchised youth
54 Group discussion, Youth, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
55 Interview, GoSS WES State Representative, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011
56 Interview, Church leader, Yambio, WES, 5 April 2011
57 International sources quote 48,000 IDPs in WES and Bahr el Ghazal (OCHA, 2011) whereas local sources quote 150,000 IDPs (taken from a 2011 document obtained from the governor of WES. Note that upon receiving the document it was assured the document was neither up to date nor comprehensive according to local actors). This large discrepancy might be attributed to refugees who do not register at an internationally recognized IDP camp, diverging criteria for ‘new’ IDPs or diverging capacity to register IDPs.
58 Local sources and OCHA figures largely correspond for this period, with again notable exception for the amount of IDPs registered.
59 The report obtained from the governor of WES relates 21 attacks in WES between February and April 2011, notably higher than the OCHA statistics for both WES and Western Bar-el Ghazal.
it is a vast area so they cannot be deployed everywhere.”

This notion is confirmed by the SPLA based in WES who admit that “we don’t have vehicles here,” and say this is the responsibility of the GoSS. The dependency on Juba portrayed in the last quote from the SPLA is perceived as typical by the local population. They find the SPLA not motivated for providing security to the local population, although they realize the SPLA has inherent limited capacity as the LRA “uses guerilla warfare with 5 to 7 people move in from the LRA […] they attack the civilians with small groups and abduct women and children.”

Complicating further the relationship between the local population and the SPLA is the sense that the SPLA remains on their base and does not patrol actively. According to the local population this is connected with their lack of motivation, which would have historical roots in the troubled relationship between the SPLA and WES during the liberation war. Lastly, the ethnic factor in the SPLA leads to many concerns in WES about the motivation of the SPLA to protect them from LRA incursions. Many people in WES claim that the SPLA forces “should be from WES as we believe now that most people in the security forces are on the side of the Dinkas” and if “WES can have its own army they might be able to protect themselves.”

Since the SPLA has been unable to protect the citizens in WES there was a definite need to promote security in different ways:

- People looked at how to address this issue. Local communities and elders and youth got together to resolve this issue. You cannot put the army everywhere. They came up with community policing idea, by letting forces know about the problems. But sometimes it was too late so they also introduced the youth called Arrow Boys.

Despite the Arrow Boys having many limitations such as a lack of ‘official weapons,’ insufficient food, raincoats, rubber boots and tents they are considered to be successful by the local population. The local population finds “the Arrow Boys are at least motivated to follow them [LRA] and at least attack them and try to get the abducted children back […] these boys are our only hope.”

The relative increase of security in WES over the last year furthermore is attributed to the combination of Arrow Boys and UPDF presence, rather than the SPLA forces present in the area. The SPLA however, attributes this success to themselves they “as we have actually succeeded because cases of LRA attacks are hardly around.” At times the SPLA gains information on LRA movements through the Arrow Boys although this relationship is described by both sides as tenuous.

Besides the LRA, the case of the pastoralist tribe Ambororo is mentioned throughout interviews in WES. The arrival of Ambororo in the past is surrounded by rumors as facts are difficult to acquire and the post-CPA violence is difficult to explain for many. According to some, the Ambororo “came from far, even from Niger, and others from the north, from Blue Nile and they just entered our territory without permission.” Another rumor is that they are Janjaweed from the Darfur region, perhaps caused by the fact the Ambororo, like the Janjaweed, ride on horses. The problems that are related to
the Amboro ring familiar as the combination of pastoralists and agriculturalists is strenuous throughout South Sudan, and Amboro also tend to be easily used as scapegoat.69

The last major phenomenon mentioned throughout interviews is the tribal clashes in Mvolo county between pastoralists from Lakes States and the agriculturalists from WES. Pastoralists are commonly perceived by the people of WES as “very aggressive and when you have cattle keeper and farmer, [there is] no understanding.”70 Others perceive these clashes as a “culture clash because it is not human beings clashing but cultures.”71

Particular, though not unique, to WES are the amount of rumors surrounding insecurity. Although evidence has never been found there is certainty for many that the LRA and Amboro work together, “because how can they be in the same bush and not fight with them?”72 Since it is very difficult to comprehend why the LRA is present and commits atrocities in South Sudan it is very feasible that the information gap will be filled with local insights which are not necessarily verified. It is rumored by many in WES that Riek Machar, the main negotiator during peace talks with the LRA and currently vice-president of South Sudan, would continue bilateral contact with the LRA. Supposedly, he moves around in WES without warning the local authorities, would have an economical stake in keeping the LRA in the border areas between DRC, CAR and South Sudan. Although researching these rumors goes beyond the scope of this report is clear that these rumors are counterproductive to creating social cohesion within South Sudan.

Security issues

The following security issues are a generalization of the three states and serves to give an insight into the local security conditions. This section will present an introduction to the issues pertaining to cattle raiding, availability of SALW, disenfranchised youth, poverty and its dynamics with security and external security threats.

Cattle raiding

In regions with a lack of agricultural possibilities and a lack of formal economic activities it is no surprise the traditional way of keeping cattle is seen as a viable option. “Cows play a central role in the culture of people. Peoples’ settlements and marriages are all done in cows and cows have become equated with life. The life of a cow has even become more important than the lives of people.”73 The importance of cows in dowry, gaining respect from peers by raiding cows, the traditional cultural practice of raiding cows as a passage into male adulthood and experienced problems between pastoralists and agricultural practices all carry security risks for local populations in South Sudan. Specifically the dowry system is a key component in cattle raiding as dowries can be anywhere between 25 and 200 heads of cattle.74

69 It should be noted, however, that while the Amboro are considered by many actors in Sudan (international, political and local) to pose an important security problem Schomerus and Allen (2010: 66) note that this sentiment may also be the result of scapegoating and an attempt to cover up the failure of the administration to deal with the LRA, rather than a large number of actual incidents.
70 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011
71 Interview, Representative local NGO, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
72 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011
73 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011
74 Feedback discussion Juba, 27 April 2011
For many pastoralist youth this means that “when I do not kill somebody from another village, they will think I am a woman.” Among pastoralist tribes, notably around Kapoeta, single life is often equated with a useless life, and men are pressured to acquire the dowry needed for marriage. For many youth interviewed on raiding cows it is as simple as “if I succeed I will marry and eat the rest and if I fail I die.” In essence, it easily becomes a back and forth between raiding cows yourself and being raided by others. “Cattle raiding is often accompanied by killings the people, because people don’t follow them after they raided the cattle.” The cultural component of cattle raiding, besides the limited economical alternatives and at times thrill seeking behavior of adolescents, is firmly ingrained in South Sudanese society. Highly educated and sensitized women from a women’s collective in Torit maintained, despite understanding the negative outcomes of the dowry system, that “it is a matter of prestige, as when you get married with a lot of cattle your husband is a hero because he was able to raid so many cows.” During interviews it was furthermore put forward that the elders in pastoralist communities saw the cyclical violence accompanying the cattle raiding as negative whereas youngsters in the same culture maintained it now was their turn to prove they can be brave by robbing cows.

It is important to note here that South Sudan does not exclusively exist of pastoralists. However, most South Sudanese outside the cities will be confronted with cattle one way or the other. Muiruri John Kimani (2010) of the ISS analyzed cattle raiding in Eastern Africa and found dependants of cattle raiding include politicians and security service personnel, making the phenomenon more intractable and difficult to address constructively. This phenomenon was found through anecdotal evidence in South Sudan during this research. Cattle raiding would to some qualify as the internal root causes for conflict. However, what IKV Pax Christi argues in the case of the Karamajong of Uganda might be true for South Sudan as well. “The most important causality in conflict is overlooked: the reactive character of conflict […] This causality is ‘circular’, not ‘linear’ as suggested by the image of ‘root’” (IKV Pax Christi and SOPA; 2011). The perceived necessity of revenge after being raided seems to play the leading role in instigating violence rather than a ‘inescapable need’ to raid cows. Breaking this cycle will require more than ‘simply’ taking away the weapons used during these cycles of revenge and violence.

Insecurity through poverty

Poverty and food insecurity are intimately connected with cattle raiding, and insecurity in general, since natural circumstances make agricultural alternatives to cattle raiding cumbersome. Physical insecurity can easily lead to food insecurity as for instance “people could not cultivate in Akobo last year because of attacks from the Murle who came to raid cattle.” Sheer poverty and food insecurity frequently lead to situations where “people don’t have enough to eat. When they see another person with plenty of cows they will raid them.” However, pastoralists commonly are relatively rich when assessed by what their cows are worth in the monetary sense. Poverty in this sense relates more to the limited amount of options in their context than monetary poverty. It is clear there is an intimate relationship between poverty and underdevelopment and security that goes both ways in South Sudan.
Sudan. The general lack of accessible roads, lack of communication capabilities and contact between security providers and the local population make for a situation where this lack of development fuels insecurity. The lack of security in turn makes it difficult to develop alternative sources for sustenance, build infrastructure and build social contracts beyond the home community.

**SALW availability**

The wide availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) increases the violence accompanying acquiring sustenance for families as “gun possession became a means to sustain people’s livelihoods. Weapons are used for cattle rustling, hunting, and robberies.” 82 This research and research from the Small Arms Survey (2007) also found that self-defense, revenge attacks, the threat of cross-border insecurity and expected disarmament benefits all are reasons in South Sudan to acquire and/or retain a gun. The usage of guns or threat thereof became intertwined with cultural practice of cattle raiding, a means of self defense as throughout many places in South Sudan there does not exist formal and adequate security provision, and as a way to acquire power. Simply put, “the power of the gun is overwhelming here [in South Sudan].” 83 The wide availability of fire weapons also decreases the space between irritation and deadly violence as with “small problems at home, they will shoot the wives when they talk bad about them.” 84 The availability of SALW make it easier for petty arguments and minor conflicts to spiral out of control into deadly violence, which during this research appeared not uncommon in South Sudan. However, tribal clashes and cattle raiding existed long before the introduction of firearms in South Sudan which should serve as a warning against viewing disarmament as a complete solution to tribal clashes and cattle raiding.

**Disenfranchised youth**

One of the main challenges for South Sudan’s security are the youth. In 2010, youths below the age of 20 made up 54.9% of the total population of Southern Sudan. 85 Youths are commonly caught amidst poverty, arguably a culture of violence, and a lack of schooling and employment. In cities such as Torit, the sources of insecurity are commonly youth, as they have “not enough facilities to keep them busy, they are idle and get up to bad things.” 86 Another peculiar aspect are the so-called ‘Niggaz’ in urban areas in Sudan. Originally referring to a style of dress, music and speech copied from the U.S. hip-hop culture and introduced by returnees in Juba as well as other Sudanese cities, it has become linked with anti-social and criminal behavior of some disenfranchised youth that adopted this style (Leonardi, 2010: 60). These are “thugs that go out on the street and they rape people and when the police is called they don’t do anything. So we feel very insecure.” 87 More generally, youth seem disappointed with their lack of influence as for instance in “parliament there are no youth there, only women.” 88 Disenfranchised youth thus can be found in many forms in South Sudan. Without engaging them in more constructive activities they will pose a serious threat to internal stability and the social fabric needed for conflict resilience. Specifically so considering the context of poverty and limited alternatives.

82 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
83 Interview, SPLM State representative, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011
84 Group discussion, Women, Kapoeta, EES, 19 April 2011
85 Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation. www.sscsce.org (last visited on 27 June 2011)
86 Group discussion, Youth, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
87 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
88 Group discussion, youth, Torit, EWS, 16 April, 2011
External threats

Beyond these largely internal security challenges there are a number of security issues referred to by respondents as external threats. The role of the North as destabilizing factor, alongside many rumors of proxy forces and instigating violence in the South, plays a role although the exact severity of this phenomenon is, as mentioned above, unclear. For many South Sudanese, nomadic tribes from other countries form a serious problem. “Insecurity is brought here by clans who come from outside our area. These are people as well, but their character makes that they bring violence. They do not have the same character as the people here.”\(^89\) An external security issue particular to WES are the intrusions of the LRA. “They are foreigners. They were proxy force of SAF, to fight the SPLA. They were supplied from Juba and Torit. They had no where to stay after the CPA, so they went back to the bush, now in DRC and CAR.”\(^90\) Lastly, the SALW and ammunitions that can cross through South Sudan many porous borders was frequently mentioned in interviews as an external threat.

Seasonal insecurity and times of insecurity

During the research it became clear insecurity is intimately tied with seasons and the time of day. In the dry season cattle keepers start to look for water and vegetation for their cows which can result in clashes with agricultural groups and other pastoralist groups that cross borders of both states and countries. Besides direly needed water the rainy season also brings thicker foliage which is used by groups like the LRA in WES to move without being noticed. This phenomenon results in widespread fear for the LRA in WES when the rainy season starts. The seasons thus form part of cyclical violence that marred South Sudan in the past and without inter communal dialogue and targeted action from

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**Box 1: A Gendered Perspective on Security**

Although some women maintained security conditions are similar for women and men, there are distinct differences in how women and men experience insecurity. Women are said to be a specific target, “because they don’t have guns. And those who come to abduct children target women to take their children. They also rape women and they cannot rape the men. And they know the men can fight back but the women are weak.”\(^91\) Men on the other hand, are responsible to protect the family and in that capacity risk to be harmed themselves. A prudent example would be the Arrow Boys who, based on anecdotal evidence, only consist of men. However, traditional division between men and women does task women with several chores outside the house. In Budi (EES) for example “they rely typically on natural resources in the bush; firewood, grass, farming, water. When nobody is escorting you, you have to go alone.”\(^92\) Rape has many consequences beyond the direct physical and mental suffering. “Due to pressure from society people even commit suicide because of it. The society is still at the traditional state. The society says this is a damaged person, so people then feel useless and kill themselves.”\(^93\) Lastly, many women also face insecurity at home. “We are not secured internally (family level, at family level they can beat you), also from men inside. You have to keep your mouth shut to survive.”\(^94\)

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\(^89\) Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
\(^90\) Interview, SPLM State representative, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011
\(^91\) Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
\(^92\) Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
\(^93\) Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
\(^94\) Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011
the GoSS will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Criminal groups and external intruders use the cover of night to move without being seen which diverges the sense of security for community members during night and day.

Besides these specific security threats there are many residual effects of a violent past. The current militarized context with high levels of trauma makes for what can be assessed a culture of violence. To change this culture and to decrease trauma will take a long time and serious and targeted action from the government and civil society is direly needed as “to bring somebody who has been in war to peace takes a bit of time, it’s like smoking; you don’t stop just like that.”\textsuperscript{95} This should function as a stark warning against the high expectations within and on the South Sudanese context. The needed social contract for conflict resilience will take long as reciprocal trust needs time and positive experiences to build.

**Sudanese actors and their capacity for security promotion**

The possibilities to have security issues resolved by formal security providers are limited in South Sudan for different reasons. Both formal and informal actors will be briefly assessed here on their general capacities and limitations for security promotion in context before turning to more detailed analysis in case studies at the end of this section. First, this section will look into what grassroots communities can do by themselves without security assistance. The role of traditional chiefs will be highlighted as they are often seen as potential security providers. The police and SPLA as formal, albeit sometimes contested, security actors will lastly be assessed in this section.

**Communities**

Conflict resolution traditionally starts at the community level in South Sudan although capacities to do so vary throughout. Common disagreement within the community can be resolved within the community, with additional help from traditional leaders and sometimes the police. Examples of security promotion by the community themselves include having “an alarm system that works with drums to warn people when danger is coming”\textsuperscript{96} and using “spears and clubs”\textsuperscript{97} Peace conferences are organized with outside assistance to address cattle raiding and conflict between communities. The lack of permanent success of these conferences is often attributed to lacking participation of the entire community rather than only chiefs and spokespersons for sections of the community. Moreover, Schomerus and Allen (2010: 76) found that such meetings according to some Sudanese even undermine the establishment of a strong rule of law, because people could reconcile without a justice component. However, in places where chiefs remain a respected and representative authority, inter communal dialogue rightfully remains an important feature in mitigating inter communal conflict. Moreover, dialogue should be accompanied with practical and contextualized follow-up to enhance the feasibility of sustainable and peaceful outcomes.

To enhance security promotion capacities of the community many propose systems of ‘home guards’, i.e. young men from the community, “as buffer for lacking police capacities”. While a system of home guards or even community policing is contested in both academic theory and practical implementation in post-conflict countries, to these communities the most viable solution is to “empower the home guards, because some chiefs have [already] been killed by armed criminals.”\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{95} Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
\textsuperscript{96} Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{98} Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011

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Specifically in EES, for instance, some communities do not want formal security providers in their vicinity as they deem themselves more capable of resolving insecurity, and they perceive state security providers as a threat. Perceiving the SPLA as a threat is linked to incidents like described below.

The SPLA took the daughters without paying and the SPLA got rough. The soldier was killed [by the community] and his gun was taken. They [SPLA] traced the corral where footprints came from. They came back at night and started shooting randomly. This was a provocation for people, [they] attacked the barracks as result and killed an officer. About one month ago.\(^99\)

Despite the potential problems with a home guard system, many maintain that “youth themselves can take care of it [security in the communities], that is a good move.”\(^100\) A potent example is provided by the Arrow Boys in WES, who, in a situation without adequate formal security provision, found that they were more capable of security promotion if they organized themselves as home guards to protect the population.

**Traditional chiefs**

Traditionally, the various chiefs at the local level (from payam to paramount chief) held much sway over dynamics within communal live. This phenomenon has led many donors to “talk about getting the strength of the chiefs and the traditional structures back.” Despite this having various positive and negative sides, “it is [also] something that is very much promoted by the GoSS.”\(^101\) One of the challenges brought forward by both respondents within the community and traditional chiefs alike, is the claim that many traditional leaders have lost respect in recent history. One reason for this loss is related, “to AKs in hand of the youngsters and in some cases chiefs were killed.”\(^102\) The extent to which authority of traditional chiefs has been eroded varies throughout South Sudan. Furthermore, the authority of a chief varies between the different cultures of South Sudan. Some cultures traditionally knew chiefs while in others chiefs were installed by the colonial government. And due to inaccessibility during the rainy season, some chiefs were more closely incorporated into the colonial system than others (Schomerus and Allen, 2010: 37). Furthermore, during conflict the SPLA tended to install chiefs in their areas of control that were loyal to the SPLA, bypassing the ‘proper’ procedures and community consultation. Chiefs were then more accountable to the SPLA than the community, which further deteriorated their standing within the community. This phenomenon might also in part explain why the current government of South Sudan is in favor of using these chiefs as intermediaries. In EES many respondents claimed youth in the country side executed mob justice rather than letting the chiefs deal with injustice whereas in WES the chiefs were respected for organizing local youth into self defense groups. Traditional chiefs are often seen by donors and actors within the GoSS such as the CSAC bureau as potential interlocutors for development interventions and weapon collection programmes. Yet, as some communities start to view their chiefs with less respect the interlocution function of the chiefs might become problematic. According to a group of chiefs in Kapoeta, “each and every parent should talk to the children first before they come to the chiefs so it is also the problem of the parents,”\(^103\) indicating that the chiefs cannot be held responsible for all matters in the community.

\(^99\) Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011

\(^100\) Ibid.

\(^101\) Interview, Representative International NGO, Juba, 29 March 2011

\(^102\) Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011

\(^103\) Conversation with chiefs, Kapoeta, EES, 19 April 2011
Specifically in relation to the previously discussed disenfranchised youth it is hard to imagine that traditional chiefs automatically will maintain their position of power and thus be a viable source for security promotion throughout South Sudan. However, chiefs remain to be seen by government and donors to be a practical way of bridging the apparent gap between traditional structures and the introduction of the formal state. When doing so, however, the varying degrees of capacity and legitimacy of chiefs have to be taken into account. More specifically, the level of equitable representation by the chief and the way potential benefits are allocated in the community should be leading in the assessment whether to work with specific chiefs.

**Police**

Problems surpassing the community and its traditional leaders are brought to the SSPS. The police is expected to “provide law and order in the community.” Law and order here refers to fights within the communities and between communities. Many communities find that “with any problem you can go to the police because everything needs to be brought to the police.” The range of issues the police can deal with is nevertheless limited. Cattle theft for instance is oftentimes declared with the police but when the raided cattle exceeds “more than 100 they cannot do anything.” The logic in taking security issues to the police is apparent to many communities, but the inherent limitations of an underequipped and small police force are also recognized. In Jonglei for instance, “the police don’t have cars and communication and so there is no confidence in the police because when they come, the raiders have already left.”

Adding to not trusting the police is the high median age of the police forces as many officers are former SPLA soldiers who are too old to fight. Another component adding to frustration with the police is when “the police are from the same tribe as the raiders, they will have contact with them and do not come until the raiders are gone.” These insights correspond with survey findings indicating that “although most people surveyed say they would report insecurities to the police, many remain unconvinced of the capacity and efficacy of the police (Lokuji, Abatneh and Wani, 2009: 6)

**SPLA**

Despite many complex challenges the SPLA is facing in transforming from a loosely organized factionalist structure into a professional army, the accepted discourse about the SPLA is a positive one that acknowledges their contribution to an independent South Sudan. However, there are also many bitter complaints about the functioning and conduct of the SPLA in certain areas of South Sudan. Most notably in WES, the local population does not “deny they try their best, but if they follow the LRA they follow at a distance and then don’t follow anymore,” indicating a lack of motivation to pursue the LRA. In EES, some communities are critical for different reasons as “the occupation of the barracks in camp 15 became an obstacle for their raiding and if they raid and the owners pursue, the army acts and attacks the village.”

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104 During the research it appeared many respondents initially mentioned they would report insecurity to relevant security actors. However, the question whether these actors actually did something constructive with their reports was commonly answered in negative terms.

105 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011

106 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011

107 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011

108 Ibid.

109 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011

110 Ibid.

111 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011

112 Group discussion, Women, Yambio, WES, 2 April 2011

113 Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
soldiers to get to the guns, uniforms, boots and so on.” An Ugandan officer based in WES remarked the following on the tactical behavior of the SPLA. “They should not have the culture of sitting and waiting until something happens. You find them in their defenses waiting for something to happen. I think maybe they don’t know what they’re supposed to do.” One of the frequently found claims is that the professional level of the SPLA can and should be enhanced before they become a credible security promoter.

A lack of initiative and motivation to actually promote security throughout South Sudan was lamented on by many civilians. The notion of lacking initiative might resonate with the answer received from an SPLA officer after asking if they were not frustrated with the lack of any mode of transportation in WES: “the problem of transport, we are not the ones to say bring us transport. It’s the government to think that transport is needed.”

Although this brief assessment of potential community security promoters in Southern Sudan identified several shortcomings, it should be noted that insecurity also stems from within communities. Even if the SSPS and SPLA would function perfectly it remains doubtful they would be able to provide an adequate answer to cattle raiding as this practice is engrained in cultural, economical and social practices. Furthermore, issues of development and dialogue seemingly play an equal role in security promotion as will become clear in the case studies that are presented next. Perhaps striking is the omission of the international community as security provider in for instance the form of UNMIS. However, the presented security providers are based on perceptions of and realities for communities at the grassroots level. Tellingly, none of the respondents in this research at the grassroots level considered UNMIS as a security provider. Rather, UNMIS seems generally considered by respondents to be the people who come to count the dead after violence took place.

Key findings

This chapter explored the local security dynamics and analyzed to what extent security providers are able to provide actual security. It is clear that insecurity knows many faces in South Sudan and that the lack of peaceful resolutions leads to violent retaliation in community disputes and cattle raiding. The proliferation and the retaining of SALW is rationally logical when looking into the prevalent circumstances in South Sudan. Since the economic, social, political and legal capacities are underdeveloped in South Sudan many find themselves in insecure situations in which it is easy and relatively cheap to acquire SALW. This combination leads to cattle raiding and conflicts turning violent with the available SALW, which again leads to retribution. As formal security providers are not able to secure people throughout South Sudan, people will acquire firearms for self defense which in its turn decreases of the space for strengthened governance in general, and access for security providers more specifically. This then has detrimental effects on both social contract between communities and political contract between communities and the formal state structures now being introduced. The acquirement of a firearm is considered by some as a personal security asset to break this cyclical process of insecurity, although people at the receiving end of those guns might beg to differ. A more general analysis of highly contextual security issues leading to cyclical patterns of insecurity and armament (or refusal of disarmament) is captured in the figure in annex 4.

112 Group discussion, Women, Kapoeta, EES, 19 April 2011
113 Interview, UPDF Field Commander, Nzara, WES, 4 April 2011
114 Interview, SPLA Officer, Nzara, WES, 6 April 2011
Judged on the distinct characteristics presented in the *perspectives from the states* section it is clear that security promotion can only start with analysis of and programming from within the context rather than transplanting (parts of) interventions that worked elsewhere on the continent. Besides these largely internal processes there are specific cases of external security issues such as the LRA in WES and cross-border conflicts as in EES. The many youths that do not feel represented in South Sudan or youths that turn violent for lack of alternatives and personal gain should furthermore serve as a stark warning for the future.

The following points can be distilled from this chapter, although these generalized notions do occur differently in each context and will need context specific approaches to be addressed:

- Personal armament is a rational choice in the absence of adequate security provision;
- Cycles of insecurity and armament are found throughout the researched states;
- Cattle raiding and its links to dowry, prestige, a rite of passing, and adolescent excitement seeking is rooted in social, cultural, financial and political dynamics and therefore relatively intractable;
- The power attributed to the gun is stronger than the current attribution of power to both traditional and modern forms of governance and justice;
- Security providers can only address the results of conflict and not the causes which oftentimes lies within or between communities;
- Formal security providers are insufficiently capable or willing to provide adequate security which opens the door for self-protection (Arrow Boys) and passing ‘justice’ (retaliation for cattle raids in EES and Jonglei) and mob justice (EES and throughout South Sudan);
- Without a keen understanding of local dynamics and respect for localized processes, sustainable security will remain illusive for most of South Sudan;
- The prioritization of state security over community security leaves many South Sudanese with their own devices in facing insecurity.
Security promotion and disarmament

The previous chapter has looked at security from a community perspective and at the capacities of the different actors in security to provide in or contribute to community security. Based on the security perceptions from below, the focus here shifts from the grassroots level to the outside interventions aimed at improving security in the post-conflict context. Particularly, this chapter investigates the extent to which interventions such as DDR, SSR and SALW control are able to improve security from a community security perspective, looking at the implementation, practical obstacles and relevance to the specifics of the Sudanese context. It finally concludes by discussing a number of general political and institutional obstacles hindering the relevance of these interventions to community security in South Sudan.

Civilian disarmament

This first section of the chapter focuses on the proliferation of SALW in the hands of civilians, and the different actions that have been taken in response by the GoSS and international actors. It first looks at past disarmament activities in the three states, investigates the various motivations for arms possession, and then analyzes the requirements for disarmament. Finally it looks at the current implementation of SALW control programmed in South Sudan, and the three states in particular.

The level of past disarmament activities varies greatly among the three states investigated in this report, and was generally motivated by state authorities’ interests in the respective states’ security rather than human security. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the first disarmament campaign after the signing of the CPA took place in Jonglei between December 2005 and May 2006 and was coupled with high levels of violence, with approximately one death for every two weapons collected (Small Arms Survey, 2007: 4). The following disarmament campaigns in Jonglei were more peaceful, but the threat of violence remained present as this comment by a state official in Jonglei shows: “If they fail to disarm, the army comes in to do it for them. And the army will eat from your cattle.” Another national round of disarmament started in 2008 after a decree was signed by President Salva Kiir which some judged to result from pressure exerted by Kuol Manyang Juuk, the governor of Jonglei State (O’Brien, 2009: 17). The campaign was poorly planned and lacked GoSS support and a legal framework, and in the end five out of ten states in South Sudan largely ignored the directive (ibid, 10). Most arms were collected in Jonglei, but with the SPLA not able to deploy and provide security throughout the whole state, several counties resisted disarmament or rearmed themselves. In EES some ad hoc disarmament had taken place from 2007 onwards and again during the 2008 campaign. Several villages resisted disarmament, leading to SPLA retaliations. Further disarmament was then suspended by the SPLA commander in Torit. A police official in Kapoeta explained the current obstacles to disarmament in EES: “They have weapons we don’t even have so if we use force they will attack us.” In WES no organized civilian disarmament has taken place and if it is up to the state authorities this will not happen until the LRA ceases to pose a threat to the region. As the Governor of WES explained, “Western Equatoria needs to defend itself first. When the LRA is flushed out we can do disarmament. We shall not accept disarmament before this happens”.

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115 Interview, Representative Jonglei State CSAC Bureau, Bor Jonglei, 21 March 2011
116 Interview, Police officer, Kapoeta, EES, 18 April 2011
117 Interview, GoSS WES State Representative, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
Disarmament initiatives were aimed at improving state security. Yet the reasons why people refused to disarm were related to their personal protection and human security. Moreover, forced disarmament undermines the relationship between the state and its citizens, also the trust that the state will provide in the security citizens require, creating more instability and hindering state security. Overall, clarity is lacking over what constitutes civilian disarmament and how it should be undertaken. Many disarmament initiatives have been ad hoc attempts of the GoSS to deal with groups that are considered a threat to the state and to gain and consolidate its power. Furthermore, disarmament will inherently lead to offset the balance of power which can lead to more violence if these power balances are insufficiently understood and addressed. The goal of improving security through disarmament generally referred to the improvement of state security. A comment about civilian disarmament by a GoSS official in Jonglei exemplifies this: “Civilian disarmament is very necessary. We don’t control them otherwise.”

Fewer SALW may also increase human security – security as it is experienced by communities – as SALW indeed do not only pose a security threat to the state. Yet, the demand of SALW is also created by security issues experienced by communities. Also communities acknowledge the problems caused by high proliferation of firearms, but at the same time are reluctant to disarm or only willing to do so if the other communities disarm first or at the same time. Opinions on the actual impact of disarmament on security differ greatly. Many people interviewed did feel disarmament could increase their security, while others demanded to be armed to increase their security. Similar mixed sentiments were found by Garfield (2007), Mc Evoy and Murray (2008), and Ashkenazi et al (2008). An extensive survey in Jonglei found that 22 per cent of the respondents claimed firearms to be the most pressing security concern, while 18 per cent said a reduction of firearms would make no difference at all to security. In Pibor county, 21.7 per cent felt they would be less safe as a result of a reduction of firearms, and outside Pibor 23.5 per cent said disarmament actually triggered more fighting (Garfield, 2007: 34-35). A similar survey undertaken in EES found that 67.4 per cent of respondents felt that a firearm made a person safer and only 27.6 per cent said it makes a person less safe. The same survey found that 40.8 per cent thought disarmament would decrease security, while 40.5 per cent said it would increase security (Mc Evoy and Murray, 2008: 49-51). Ashkenazi and his colleagues (2008: 28) found that the majority of their respondents in Maridi and Mundri counties in WES felt that people with guns stop them from agricultural activities and collecting resources in the bush. Nevertheless, and although in smaller numbers compared to other states in South Sudan, firearms do also circulate among Western Equatorians and arms trafficking occurs around several markets along the borders with the DRC and CAR (O’Brien, 2009: 39).

The reluctance to disarm must be attributed to a number of different factors, which all have to be taken into account when considering renewed programming for civilian disarmament. These factors directly relate to security, such as protection against cattle raids or cross border threats. Others are more related to livelihood, such as the competition over land, pastures and water, and clashes over the cattle of pastoralists destroying the crops of agriculturalists. Finally, and specifically in the case of pastoralist communities, weapons have cultural significance and are strongly related to ‘being a man’. Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.

Security provision is one of the most important requirements for civilian disarmament. Not only for civilians to feel protected against raids and attacks by neighboring communities, criminal gangs or militia, but also to deter communities to attack others. However, South Sudan is vast and state
security actors are currently incapable of providing adequate security to the population. As a result, communities are reluctant to hand in their weapons. For instance, a chief in Yambio expressed that, “nobody protects us, so we should protect ourselves.” And community members in Torit explained that, “disarmament must happen in the city, but not in the villages. There they need it for protection. Cows can be used for many things, it is their livelihood, so they must protect them.” Communities often organize their own security and cattle keepers can be seen carrying heavy machine guns. During one interview in Jonglei, it was even reported that the police at times hands out firearms to civilians when going after cattle raiders, “because there is not enough police and you cannot go after raiders unarmed.” And in response to the LRA in WES the Arrow Boys ingeniously fabricate their own firearms.

Related to the issue of security provision is the problem of unequal disarmament. When particular communities are disarmed, this leaves them vulnerable to neighboring communities. A chief in Jonglei explained,

The government came to tell us we could not have guns anymore. (...) That is why the others now come in to steal our stuff. Specifically when we try to cultivate the land. We now have our cows at the other side of the Nile [where they are safer from raiders] and not within our midst like we have normally.

This unequal disarmament is mainly the result from the vastness of Sudan and inaccessibility of many regions. This leads to an approach where the SPLA moves from county to county in order to collect the weapons (by force or weapons that were previously collected by the chiefs). Yet, particular communities have resisted complete disarmament in the past. Furthermore, according to interviewees, political motives are sometimes behind the disarmament campaigns and certain communities are deliberately not disarmed, manipulating the argument of inaccessibility to cover political motivations. Reasons mentioned for this by interviewees include: the responsible commander is said to have feared leaving a particular group vulnerable to attack; because a commander is from the targeted region; or because commanders have an agreement with raiders of communities that remain armed and share in the profit of raided cattle. The issue of unequal disarmament results in communities resisting disarmament, as well as communities rearming themselves when disarmament has taken place. Willingness to disarm requires security, yet unequal disarmament creates more insecurity for those that are disarmed. Complicating this issue are the porous borders with neighboring countries, of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Other pastoralist communities, such as the Turkana in Kenya, and the Teso and the Karamojong in Uganda, frequently conflict with those in Sudan. According to communities interviewed, groups of cattle raiders can walk for 30 days in search of cattle and do not concern themselves with borders. And apart from cross-border cattle raids, the porous borders with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, CAR and North Sudan allow for the trafficking of firearms.

Apart from the influx of weapons from the borders of Sudan, the lack of proper storage of the weapons collected during disarmament campaigns is also believed to lead to rearmament. Even GoSS officials claimed that “the weapons end up in storage of the SPLA and people just give the weapons

119 Interview, Paramount Chief WES, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
120 Group discussion, Youth, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
121 Group discussion, Youth, Bor, Jonglei, 22 March 2011
122 Conversation with chiefs, Paryak, Bor County, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
123 See Human Security in the borderlands of Sudan, Uganda and Kenya (Simonse, 2011) for a more detailed discussion.
back to relatives. That way they just end up in the communities again.”

Also political leaders with large numbers of cattle are sometimes believed to arm particular groups to guard their cattle, or in order to raid more cattle.

When asked about the reason people are armed, their first reaction is always that it is for their protection against others and cattle raiders. But other than just physical security, broader security issues are contributing factors to the motivations for people to acquire firearms. Not only do people desire to protect themselves, they also attack others for economic purposes. For the pastoralist communities of South Sudan cattle are their livelihood, and they go to any length to ensure their cattle have pastures and water, killing their adversaries if necessary. But as discussed in the chapter on security, raiding is not just undertaken for economic purposes but also has significant cultural importance. The cultures of many pastoralist tribes require large numbers of cattle for dowry, making raiding almost the only way that enables young men to get married. As such, raiding and carrying a weapon is also of symbolic importance as it emphasizes someone’s manhood, and worthiness of marriage (Hutchinson, quoted in Myrttinen & McInturff, 2008: 10). In a conversation with a number of chiefs in Bor, it was argued that when “you cannot carry a weapon, you are like woman,” indicating the inability to defend yourself effectively renders you a woman. Young men struggle with their limited opportunities and a firearm can provide wealth and respect that otherwise would be unattainable to them, as “ownership of a gun and membership in a local militia was very empowering to youths” (Arnold & Alden, 2007: 367). And after decades of conflict, most young men never knew anything else than war. As a UNDP official portrayed, “war is peace for them, and peace is war for them,” indicating the difficulties many youth have to adjust to the peace.

**Discussing disarmament in South Sudan**

The question then is how to go about disarmament in a context where security, livelihood and cultural issues all motivate people to hold on to their firearms. Disarmament from a human security perspective would require addressing these reasons and motivations. In reaction to the forced disarmament by the SPLA, the CSAC bureau has been set up (see below), and sensitization for voluntary disarmament is taking place to a certain extent, differing from state to state. Forced disarmament is nevertheless still on the table, when state security is considered to be threatened. A state official in Jonglei explained that they are willing to try peaceful disarmament, “but if they don’t listen then the SPLA is involved.”

According to the chairperson of the CSAC bureau, forceful disarmament is now mainly used by the GoSS when it feels that there is a violent situation that needs to be dealt with right away, but acknowledged that this approach has a very limited effect and that his bureau as well as others within the GoSS do prefer voluntary disarmament. In other words, the negative effects on human security of forced disarmament are realized, but when the GoSS perceives a direct threat to state security it still favors force nonetheless. Enabling voluntary disarmament then requires addressing the security, livelihood and cultural issues mentioned above. As emphasized by the chairperson of the CSAC bureau, “you cannot have security without development and you cannot have development without

124 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March, 2011
125 Conversation with chiefs, Anyidi, Bor County, Jonglei, 25 March 2011
126 Interview, UNDP, Juba, 12 April 2011
127 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
128 Interview, Representative International NGO, Juba, 29 March 2011
security. An integrated approach is needed that includes both disarmament and development.”

Important are also sensitization efforts and discussions among society about gun possession and related cultural practices. Such sensitization efforts about the problems that SALW cause do seem to have an effect on the willingness of communities to disarm. For instance, it was mentioned that during a meeting in Jonglei and Upper Nile where no foreigners were present people themselves said they wanted to have voluntary disarmament taking place.

Box 2: A Gendered Perspective on Disarmament

Gender cannot be left out of an analysis of SALW possession in South Sudan. Especially for pastoralist communities, gun possession is not just a means of self-protection, but also a symbol of manhood. Firearms are strongly related to cattle rustling practices, in which young men can show their worthiness for marriage through their ability to acquire dowry and protect and provide for their family. Women cheer their men in these practices and sing songs of praise to them. Dealing with SALW possession, therefore has to deal with the symbolic meaning of firearms and the practices they are used for. Such an approach has to be inclusive of both the men who carry firearms, and the women who cheer them on. Anecdotal evidence suggests that especially younger women are cheering for their (future) husbands – as their husbands’ actions also reflect on their status in society – older and more educated women acknowledge the problems of these cultural practices, motivated by fear for their sons’ lives. Women have an influence through their encouragement or discouragement of violence and gun possession. However, women also mentioned that in many cases they are unaware of the number of weapons their husbands and sons have, and that they often only learn about raids after they happened. As a woman in Torit explained, “because society is dominated by men, they should be on board the solution,” indicating men and women have their specific role in disarmament initiatives.

Chiefs were often mentioned by interviewees – both in communities and at national and international policy levels – as an important channel for sensitization and involvement of local communities in the process. As mentioned, however, the role and capacity of chiefs in South Sudanese communities differs greatly. Furthermore, chiefs may not always desire to work towards disarmament. For instance, women in Bor said that, “the chiefs know how many guns there are, but they won’t collect all of them. They won’t tell the authorities about them out of self protection.” This protection can relate to the entire community or the chief’s position within that community. Several interviewees also mentioned that some chiefs are themselves involved in cattle raids, by giving formal approval and sharing in the spoils. In other cases the chiefs have simply lost the authority to demand for weapons collection, “with the youth having weapons they no longer felt they needed to listen to the chiefs.”

Disarmament of the civilian population is thus clearly a complex and difficult undertaking, and needs to be approached as a process with an open-ended timeframe, and extensive sensitization should accompany the efforts to disarm the mind before attempting disarmament in practice. In other words, it is more about the end state than the end date. Furthermore, context specific issues have to be taken

129 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
130 Interview, representative International NGO, Juba, 29 March 2011
131 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
132 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
133 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
into account, such as threats of militia or neighboring communities. However, a decentralized approach should not translate into unintended uneven implementation, as has been clearly the case with the 2008 campaigns (O’Brien, 2009: 11).

**Implementing SALW control: the CSAC Bureau**

The first disarmament campaigns were implemented by the GoSS in an attempt to consolidate its power through disarmament of former and potential proxies of the North. After the disarmament of the ‘white army’ led to a large number of casualties, the UNDP, UNMIS and Pact-Sudan set up an urgently required pilot project in Akobo in Jonglei state to support local authorities in civilian disarmament. Similar operations were initiated and the UNDP began developing a structured CSAC programme for South Sudan, after which the GoSS established a CSAC bureau alongside it (Saferworld, 2008: 21). The CSAC Bureau first fell under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Vice-President of South Sudan, but moved in 2008 to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and got a new chairperson later that year. After these changes relations with the ministries and the SSPS have improved.\(^{134}\)

On an international level, the CSAC bureau cooperates with neighboring countries on regional agreements with regard to SALW control. On a national level, the bureau is currently working on a legal framework for arms control in South Sudan. This framework is likely to prohibit automatic weapons for civilians, but allowing non-automatic and semi-automatic weapons for self-protection, on the condition that they are registered.\(^{135}\) The registration and regulation of SALW in civilian hands is seen as the first step in a long term process towards SALW control. The bureau therefore seems to work with a realization that complete disarmament, be it voluntary or forced, especially in the short to medium-term, is very much an impossible ideal. And perhaps still optimistic at this point in time, registration of weapons may also provide a better insight in the sources and circulation of SALW in South Sudan. At the local level, tasks include the preparation for disarmament through sensitization and the dissemination of information to local communities, as well as the implementation of ‘conflict sensitive development projects.’ Consultations are organized to identify the communities’ most pressing security concerns leading to a proposed projects that can address these. The conflict sensitive development projects are then designed particularly for each county and range from the building of a number of police posts, court benches, peace centers, to tractors for agricultural projects and boats for transportation. The state offices are furthermore tasked with collecting information on security incidents (e.g. killings, cattle raids, etc.) on the ground and reporting them to the Juba level.\(^{136}\)

**Local realities: experiences in the states**

Experiences with disarmament are different per state. In Jonglei several disarmament initiatives have been undertaken, and while SALW still remain present they are carried less openly. In EES little initiatives were undertaken, and weapons proliferation is very high. Much less weapons circulated in the past in WES, and the threat of the LRA and the incapacity of state actors to deal with it lead to

\(^{134}\) Interview, representative International NGO, Juba, 29 March 2011

\(^{135}\) Civilians may not possess so-called military firearms that are fully automatic. Examples of this would include AK 47s, G3 Rifles and FNs. This approach is also in line with the provisions of the Nairobi Protocol that prohibits the civilian possession of light weapons. Civilians will be able to license handguns (pistols and revolvers), shotguns and rifles as long as they are not fully automatic. (information obtained by participant in drafting this framework).

\(^{136}\) Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
more armament. Also the security issues leading to SALW demand vary. Whereas in WES the LRA threat is the largest motivation for people to arm themselves, in Jonglei and EES protection of cattle, grazing land and water are main motivations. The security problems in both WES and are exacerbated by the unprotected open borders, making it easy for the LRA and cattle raiders to cross.

The capacity of the different security providers varies considerably from state to state. Overall, there are problems with transportation and communication, and in many cases the activities in the field are limited. Jonglei is a positive exception to this case as they had four people working on county level on top of the two people in the state office. While currently prohibited by a lack of funds, they expressed the ambition to have one person present in each county. The Jonglei office was also able to show detailed reports on security incidents, listing the numbers of people killed, children abducted and cattle stolen for each month, and provided picture evidence the recent massacre by General George Athor in Fangak. Moreover, they had good relations with the state government. The experience with the CSAC office in Jonglei stood in stark contrast with the experience in WES. Here, no current activities were identified and the CSAC representative was reportedly ‘sick’ and had not been around for at least six weeks without notice. While actual disarmament activities are highly problematic at this point with regard to the LRA, CSAC here could at the minimum be involved in the collection of data on security incidents as a start to the intended open ended disarmament process. In EES conflict sensitive development projects were being finalized, and a new focal person from outside the state had started three weeks earlier. Activities as well as ambitions appeared more limited also in EES.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

This section looks first at the implementation of the DDR programme South Sudan and the specifics of the three visited states. It then continues by investigating the differences between the ideas behind DDR and the practice on the ground in South Sudan. It concludes with a discussion on the definition of success, and the potential alternatives to traditional DDR in South Sudan.

The goals set out in the National DDR Strategic Plan are far reaching, aiming “to contribute to creating an enabling environment to human security and support post-peace agreement social stabilization across Sudan” (GNU, 2007: 5). Among other things, DDR was to reintegrate ex-combatants economically, socially, psychologically and politically in civil society and reduce and control the weapons in society. After many delays since the signing of the CPA in 2005, the DDR programme began its activities in 2009 and 90,000 candidates from the south were initially envisaged to enter the DDR programme. Half of these would be people with disabilities, people aged over 60, female combatants and Women Associated with Armed Forces and Groups (WAAFG), also referred to as Special Needs Groups (SNGs), and they would be demobilized in the first phase of the programme, before the end of the CPA period. When in May 2010 only 4,700 of the envisaged 45,000 SNGs had been demobilized, the number of intended beneficiaries was later reduced to 35,000 (Rands, 2010: 42; PwC, 2010), effectively altering the original goal to South Sudanese circumstances. Whereas the idea behind DDR programmes in general is to deal with one of the main security concerns in a post-conflict situation - i.e. the overabundance of young, unemployed, and armed people from armed forces and

137 Interview, Representative Jonglei State CSAC Bureau Bor Jonglei, 21 March 2011
138 Interview, Representative WES SSDDRRC office, Yambio, WES, 1 April 2011
139 Interestingly, all counties in EES had decided police posts were to be built for their conflict sensitive development project, which is remarkable for a region whose people often are not on the best of terms with the national government and its security forces.
140 Interview, Representative EES CSAC bureau, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
groups – the DDR programme in South Sudan has thus mainly concerned itself with a group that was unlikely to pose a large security threat.

The disarmament phase is completely in hands of the SPLA. There is no mandate in the CPA for international involvement in disarmament, and the weapons are legally owned by the SPLA. As the SSDDRC explained, “the international community wants to see 20,000 arms being burned, but this might not happen. It is a very different process here than for instance with the Mai Mai [in the DRC] who come from the bush and go home.”\textsuperscript{141} However, problematic remains the safe storage and registration of these weapons, which according to an UNMIS official currently do not exist.\textsuperscript{142}

With regard to the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into the communities, at first sight fewer problems occur than in other countries with DDR programmes.\textsuperscript{143} Communities are aware of the return of ex-combatants and in general it was understood that ex-combatants receive support. In most places, the SPLA is regarded as victor, resulting in a relatively easy acceptance of ex-combatants in communities, as well as of the support they receive in the DDR programme. As long as ex-combatants were not idle and contributed in their community, they were accepted. Many ex-combatants had been forced into the conflict, either by conscription or because the war simply had reached their region, bringing the choice to fight or flee, which is acknowledged by communities.

However, those who were involved in violence within their own region have more difficulties finding acceptance. An ex-combatant in Torit explained that, “some may have killed by accident in the community. So when they come back there is still that feeling. In that situation the welcoming is not good and you always feel isolated.”\textsuperscript{144} Psychosocial problems and trauma are also problematic for reintegration, as it can lead to violent behavior and substance abuse. Another important issue are ex-combatants who feel their efforts during the war should be rewarded. In EES the ‘Wounded Heroes’\textsuperscript{145} are found to cause problems because of this attitude. “When they have nothing, they want to grab things by force. They can put a road block and demand things by force. They say ‘I fought for this, I lost my leg for you, so I can take this.’ That is their spirit.”\textsuperscript{146} The role played by some former combatants in acquiring wealth for the community during the war can hinder reintegration after the war. “There is a difference for those who were able to amass a lot of cattle and wealth, because during the war you could get cattle from others. But now they can’t do that anymore they are seen as useless.”\textsuperscript{147} Disarmament and reintegration can then work very disempowering, as ex-combatants lose not only their social structure and status, but also their ability to provide for themselves and their families. As a representative of an NGO involved in the reintegration programme explained, “if they are disarmed its like they are castrated.”\textsuperscript{148}

The training provided to ex-combatants in the reintegration programme is expected to deal with this and enable ex-combatants to provide for themselves and their families. Communities and ex-combatants alike see the benefits of such trainings. Yet, the training is found to be too short to be truly beneficial. An ex-combatant in Torit explained for instance that normally a course to become a driver

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item [\textsuperscript{141}] Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, 12 April 2011
\item [\textsuperscript{142}] Interview, UNMIS, Juba, 29 March 2011
\item [\textsuperscript{143}] C.f. Rouw and Willems (2009) for the case of Eastern DRC.
\item [\textsuperscript{144}] Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
\item [\textsuperscript{145}] The wounded heroes are an organized group of combatants who have been wounded during the conflict. While they are no longer on active duty, they are still cared for by the SPLA.
\item [\textsuperscript{146}] Interview, Representative International NGO, Juba, 30 March 2011
\item [\textsuperscript{147}] Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
\item [\textsuperscript{148}] Representative International NGO, Juba, 30 March 2011
\end{thebibliography}
is six months, yet in the programme it has to be done in three months.\textsuperscript{149} Similarly, it was felt that one month literacy and numeracy training and three months on setting up a business was insufficient for most people, because many are completely illiterate and have no relevant previous experience. A Sudanese involved in the reintegration trainings, predicted that many students will sell their kit after the training\textsuperscript{150} because the amount of income generation opportunities with the kit is limited. Further problematizing the limitations of the training is the context in which ex-combatants reintegrate. Many have lost family members, return to find their land occupied by others, and many communities lack access to clean water, medical care and schooling.

**Local realities: experiences in the states**

Of the three states on which this research focuses, only EES had DDR activities on some scale ongoing at the time of research. In Jonglei no real DDR activities had started, which the local UN staff attributed to “technical and logistical issues”, such as the delay of registration and the compilation of the master lists, the absence of structures on the ground, the rainy season and difficult accessibility of the state.\textsuperscript{151}

In WES, just a few activities were taking place. Of the merely 100 ex-combatants that were demobilized and to be reintegrated in WES, only 68 reported to the SSDDRC office to be registered, and just 43 showed up for reintegration. The staff of the SSDDRC attributed this limited number to the fact that there was no DDR centre in the state and they estimated there were 3,000 to 4,000 ex-combatants in the state who had not gone through the programme.\textsuperscript{152} Different than in the rest of South Sudan, only ex-combatants were in the programme and no children or WAAFGs. According to the SSDDRC staff the limited number of ex-combatants had also resulted in cooperation with a smaller implementing partner. Big implementing partners such as GIZ and IOM could not justify the investment for operations based on the small number of recipients. Without the possibility to open farms and the small implementing partner not able to also provide the desired assistance in fishing, training in small business was the only option available. Many of the ex-combatants were illiterate, and the business training took only ten days. An assessment undertaken by the SSDDRC in cooperation with the UNDP and BRAC, the implementing partner, showed that many struggle with their businesses and a number have started farming on their own accord.\textsuperscript{153} Yet despite the fact that the contribution of reintegration programmes is very limited in regard to the estimated number of ex-combatants in the state, few problems between ex-combatants and other community members were reported. Nonetheless, according to people involved in the DDR programme, ex-combatants did struggle with economic and psychological problems.

In EES the programme was ongoing, with 1,077 ex-combatants demobilized in Torit, of which 501 were already being trained by GIZ. The rest was to be trained after the first group had completed their training. Several options could be chosen, such as agricultural activities, small business, tailoring, vocational trainings, etc. Business and agriculture were most popular among ex-combatants. The courses take three months, and are preceded by one month of literacy and numeracy training. Attendance is a requirement for attaining the reintegration kit. Those who expect they cannot benefit from the training – because of age or handicap – are allowed to have a ‘proxy’ (commonly a family

\textsuperscript{149} Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
\textsuperscript{150} Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
\textsuperscript{151} Interview, UN DDR, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011; Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
\textsuperscript{152} Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, WES, 1 April 2011
\textsuperscript{153} Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, WES, 7 April 2011
member of friend) to take their place. In EES more problems between ex-combatants and communities were reported than in WES, as some behaved aggressively. This behavior was generally attributed to their traumatic war experiences and their feeling of not being sufficiently rewarded for their contribution to the war.

**The objective of DDR: differences in perception and practice**

The previous paragraph discussed a number of problems and limitations of the programme looking at the different phases and regions visited by the research team. This paragraph will turn to the differences in the purposes and practices of DDR in theory and policy, as opposed to the way DDR is implemented in the practice of South Sudan. A difference that perhaps is more apparent in South Sudan then in other DDR programmes.

**The focus of the programme**

In the onset of the DDR programme in South Sudan, the focus has been the so-called Special Needs Groups (SNGs). This has been the primary focus for the first phase of the programme for a number of reasons. Child soldiers were quickly disbanded and handed over to UNICEF, as the SPLA was eager to become a professional army and preserve its good standing with western donors. Also the WAAFGs entered the first phase of the programme. Lessons learned from other DDR programmes on the continent had shown the need for specific support for women, including those who did not fight but who had been cooks, nurses, transporting equipment, and/or involved as ‘bush-wives.’ While generally having been treated well within the SPLA, women nonetheless were vulnerable and in need of support, especially when returning to their communities as widows, or with children without having married and received the related dowry. However, there are numerous doubts concerning their combatant status or eligibility on these grounds. As noted by the Small Arms Survey (2011: 7), the SPLA has rejected the term WAAFG as a donor term with the offensive implication they treated their female colleagues as bush wives or sex slaves. It is therefore likely that many women in the DDR programme have been classified as ex-combatants, even if they never held a gun.

And indeed, the term ‘combatant’ in the South Sudanese context is rather fluid. Many people perceive themselves as combatants, be it based on actual participation in combat or on the merit of being part of the struggle in much broader terms. As one UNDP official explained, “everyone fought, everyone is traumatized. What is needed is a whole societal transformation.” Yet, such a fluid notion of what a combatant is in the Sudanese context conflicts with the primary policy goal set for DDR – dealing with the threat of a surplus of armed combatants after conflict – and the related need for a clear definition of who is an eligible combatant for DDR. The question is thus what goals are to be set for DDR and what contributions DDR can be expected to make in the context of South Sudan.

**Selection and eligibility criteria**

The disarmament and selection of DDR candidates in South Sudan is the responsibility of the SPLA. The CPA explicitly states that the national institutions are primarily responsible for the DDR programme, and that the UN and international actors are to fulfill a supporting role. As such, the UN’s involvement in verification currently is limited to checking an ex-combatant’s ID with the names

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154 Group Discussion, Representatives EES SSDDRC office, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011
155 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011; Interview, DDR expert, Juba, 17 March 2011
156 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
on the list provided by the SPLA. Examining closer, some observers found that many ex-combatants currently involved in the DDR programme, had in fact not been combatants. It was mentioned that many in the programme were not physically fit to run 200 meters and had never held a weapon, that a great number had joined only after the peace agreement was signed in 2005, and that strangely enough a lot of ex-combatants had received the exact same discharge certificates by the SPLA stating they had handed in an AK-47 with exactly 30 rounds.

On the other hand, a large number of combatants did indeed join the SPLA after the Juba Declaration of 2006. It is no secret that many rebel groups boosted their numbers with civilians to increase their position in the negotiations. It is therefore understandable that the SPLA, aiming to professionalize the army, has been demobilizing these elements from its ranks first. This would explain at least part of the ex-combatants that joined after 2005 and the alleged ‘civilians’ in the DDR programme. Yet, it is clear that a part of those participating in the DDR programme are not eligible according to the programme’s own criteria. One UN official involved in the programme claimed that, “cousins, aunts and even second and third wives were invited into the programme.” Many of those involved realized the abuse, but did not react to it for various reasons. NGOs regarded themselves as contractors, passing along the message and waiting for directions. Similarly, the SSDDRC office in Torit explained its lack of reaction to the issue by stating that, “we are only here to do a specific job.” Furthermore, as the programme is a CPA requirement, donors were hesitant to pull out, fearing they would jeopardize the one practical implementation of the CPA and get in discredit with other donors.

DDR in theory a tool to deal with the potential threat of young armed combatants after a conflict, and policy-makers stress the importance of DDR based on this argument. However, in South Sudan the programme has been morphed by the GoSS and SPLA into a one that helps to remove the weaker elements and modernize the army. As one analyst explained, “a large part of those sent into DDR are those who are seen as dead wood within the SPLA.” Indeed, with ongoing conflicts within its borders, and high levels of distrust towards the north, the SPLA had little interest in demobilizing its stronger ranks.

**DDR, pensions and raised expectations**

DDR increasingly has become seen to be a sort of pension scheme or welfare plan, but one that is perceived to be insufficient to motivate the stronger elements of the SPLA to demobilize. After fighting for up to 20 years in the bush, in many cases by conscription, without having received any salaries, many combatants feel they are entitled to a salary or reward. DDR is often perceived to be a reward, and is sometimes mistakenly assumed to be a benefit on top of regular salaries. As a UN official explained, “they think salaries will be continued. They think, ‘we will get food and money, that everything will be addressed by DDR.’ (...) They view this as a humanitarian place where they get free stuff.” Furthermore, rumors are circulating that the SPLA will start paying out pensions. The responses of a group of ex-combatants when asked if during an interview any issues had been left unaddressed exemplify this: “One thing that is burning in our heads is the issue of pension. (...) We really want government action and want to know whether this pension is there or not. (...) Because

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157 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
158 Interview, DDR expert, Juba, 17 March 2011
159 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
160 Group Discussion, Representatives EES SSDDRC office, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011
161 Interview, DDR expert, Juba, 17 March 2011
162 Ibid.
163 Interview, UN DDR, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
we have earned it. We are still waiting for action. We have fought and we brought the peace after 21 years of war.”

The SPLA has fed such expectations of DDR to persuade combatants to demobilize. The SPLA has a desire to professionalize the army, improve its operational effectiveness, and at the same time limit expenditures. Yet, as noted by Rands (2010: 43) the promises DDR makes of reintegration and the potential for future employment are not taken seriously, and the three month reinsertion grant is equivalent to less than three months’ wages for a private soldier. The rumors about high benefits in DDR and pensions have therefore, in part, been created by SPLA commanders themselves, in an attempt to persuade their rank and file to demobilize. An ex-combatant in Torit explained that the information about pensions and other benefits, “came from the big people in the SPLA. They deceived us. They told us we would get pensions so we would stay peaceful.” Clearly, there is a danger in creating such expectations in an environment where renegade generals recruit among those that see no other opportunities for income. In Yambio the SSDDRC was confronted by a group of angry ex-combatants wanting to claim what they believed they were entitled to. And in EES members of the Wounded Heroes had blocked the road from Uganda to Juba for three days because their payments had not been made for several months.

Although the SPLA reportedly is coming to terms with the problem of exaggerated expectations, it remains a pivotal issue. It is unlikely that the GoSS will be able to afford to pay out pensions to all its former combatants. Moreover, as one specialist involved with the SSDDRC explained, “once you start with paying out pensions to the SPLA, you have to start with pensions for other GoSS employees as well. But you cannot,” as the budget does not allow for this. And not only the SPLA but the GoSS in general needs to be more realistic and open about the future to prevent backlash of mushroomed expectations about the post-independence situation. Several high ranking GoSS officials expressed that after independence more money would become available from oil revenues, World Bank loans, donor money, and tourism to be attracted by wildparks. While some increase in funding might become available, it is unlikely that GoSS expenditures will increase sufficiently to cater to all these needs.

In 2006 the SPLA has started paying its soldiers a salary, making a job in the SPLA a desirable position in a post-conflict country with high unemployment rates. Soldiers are therefore hesitant to leave the SPLA and opt for demobilization through a DDR programme. Arguably, “SPLA does not regard the current DDR programme as worthy of its real fighters and heroes” (Small Arms Survey, 2011: 4). It is also likely that the SPLA leadership does not demobilize particular elements from its ranks out of fear that dissatisfied troops will defect and pose a threat. Indeed, the SPLA command estimated it only controls about thirty per cent of its troops (Evoy & LeBrun, 2010: 30-31), and a number of generals

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164 Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
165 In 2010 ninety per cent of the SPLA budget was spent on salaries (Nichols, 2010: 14)
166 Interestingly, while in the process of demobilization, in April 2011 the governor of Unity State gave the order to recruit 6.000 men for the SPLA (Sudan Tribune, 2011b).
167 Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, Yambio, WES, 7 April 2011; Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, 12 April 2011; Group Discussion, Representatives EES SSDDRC office, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011
168 Group discussion, Ex-combatants, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
169 Interview, Representative WES SSDDRC office, Yambio, WES, 7 April 2011
170 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
171 Interview, UNDP, Juba, 12 April 2011; Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, 12 April 2011
172 Interview, DDR expert, Juba, 12 April 2011
have already defected to fight the SPLA, taking a number of soldiers with them.\textsuperscript{173} Pushing them into DDR indeed may create rather than negate the threat of former combatants in the post-conflict context.

\textit{Revision of the programme}

The DDR programme was designed at a time when unity was still perceived a realistic outcome at the end of the CPA period. As such, one national DDR commission was overseeing the work of both the southern and northern counterparts. The management of the programme from Khartoum was an eyesore to the GoSS and with the prospect of independence – as well as under pressure of donors after mismanagement – a revision of the DDR programme in South Sudan is currently ongoing. Although it is yet to pass through parliament, a number of changes in the programme are expected. An important improvement is a constructive involvement of the SPLA in the process. Together with the SPLA, clear criteria are to be set for who is to enter the DDR programme based on a desire to professionalize the SPLA, such as age, education and service record.\textsuperscript{174} A number of 150,000 ex-combatants to be demobilized in the second phase of the programme has been presented to donors by the SSDDRC and the SPLA. The reintegration training for these ex-combatants will be extended to nine instead of the current three months. Possibly, soldiers will also remain within the SPLA and receive salaries during the reintegration period. The reintegration assistance will for the largest part remain individually based, but will be supplemented by a number of community projects for reintegration support to WAAFGs. However, whereas the UNDP expressed high value to such additional community approaches to DDR, the SSDDRC seemed more critical about such projects.

But a number of issues remain pressing. First, while an increase in the amount of reintegration support and duration of the training is an important improvement in the second phase of DDR, this is likely to cause frustrations among the ex-combatants that passed through DDR in the first phase and received less. Another issue is that of combatants in the Nuba mountains in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile State, where violence has already reignited in the Nuba mountains of Southern Kordofan (Boswell, 2011). A further problem is the highly centralized organization of the DDR programme. State offices indicated that they were only able to send a report as input for the revision process, but were not involved in the discussion in any other way. In some cases, the organizational culture had also become one in which the state office saw themselves tasked to “just implement what is decided at the top level.”\textsuperscript{175} As such, little room is available to adjust the programme to the specific context of the particular states. Furthermore, the line ministries at state levels are insufficiently involved in the programme,\textsuperscript{176} and while the national level is well underway the SSDDRC office in WES had to explain the programme to county commissioners while ex-combatants had already returned to the community through the DDR programme.

\textsuperscript{173} For example, George Athor defected in Jonglei, later forming the South Sudan Democratic Movement, which also included other defected commanders, such as General Bapiny Minytuel, General Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol Captain Oliny and Colonel Gatluak Gai. General Peter Gadget formed the South Sudan Liberation Army, which included, Colonel Bol Gatkuoth Kol (Sudan Tribune, 2011a).

\textsuperscript{174} Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, 12 April 2011

\textsuperscript{175} Group discussion, Representatives EES SSDDRC office, Torit, EES, 14 April 2011

\textsuperscript{176} Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
Defining success and finding alternatives

A major challenge in the practice of DDR remains the definition of what constitutes successful DDR in general. The target currently remains focused on the number of ex-combatants that are going or will go through the programme. However, “DDR is part of a process, and you should not focus on DDR exclusively. Without a context, there is nothing to reintegrate into.” Success of DDR should thus be determined by the contribution it makes to security in general, and the human security of ex-combatants in particular, within the context of South Sudan. It is important to look for creative and relevant indicators that enable the measurement of such a contribution. For example, the extent to which conflicts between ex-combatants and community members are managed without violence, the amount of ex-combatants that after a longer period of time have managed to hold on their jobs or managed to use their reintegration training in another way, etc. Furthermore, the results of such indicators could be fed back into the programme, allowing to inform – and where necessary adjust – the implementation of DDR.

Furthermore, while reintegration benefits increase in the revised phase of the DDR programme, an expert involved with the programme admitted that “the majority will be worse off than with cash salary in the SPLA.” This will require intensive sensitization to mitigate frustrations among the demobilized ex-combatants. However, alternative approaches to demobilization and reintegration would be another way to deal with this problem. Though not referred to as demobilization, the SPLA has provided the Wounded Heroes with ten tractors to enable a number of them to be trained in agriculture and become self-sufficient. Another example is that of the Veteran Security Services, a public-private enterprise owned by the SPLA and a consortium of international companies. It is the only security company with licensed armed guards, and recruits exclusively former SPLA. This is specifically successful because ex-combatants are not only trained, but as opposed to regular DDR, are also employed. More of such alternative solutions should be found. Vital in this regard is finding a viable alternative for the SPLA salary to generate an income, while realizing that privatizing large sections of the SPLA will not benefit the ideal of more democratic oversight over the SPLA.

Security Sector Reform

Although not the main focus of the report, the data collected provide for a number of insights with regard to SSR interventions. These relate specifically to the capacity and willingness of the SPLA and police to provide security, and alternative ‘policing’ or community security mechanisms such as the ‘home guards’. As became clear from the insights provided above, provision of adequate security is prerequisite for development and disarmament.

The development of the security sector in South Sudan is still at the start of what is going to be a long and difficult process. Currently, the SPLA cannot be considered a capable security provider, as “the Southern army is not a unitary actor but rather a heterogeneous collection of soldiers from a wide range of ethnic groups with different histories, experiences, and understandings of the civil war” (McEvoy & LeBrun, 2010: 30). This has become painfully clear by the desertion and opposition of a number of SPLA generals. Furthermore, the army is increasingly top-heavy after various militia commanders are promoted to maintain their loyalty. In one interview it was even mentioned that

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177 Ibid.
178 Interview, DDR expert, Juba, 17 March 2011
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
SPLA currently has over 200 generals. Illiteracy rates are extremely high, with ninety per cent of the ranks and seventy per cent of the officers not able to read or write (Rands, 2010: 25). A state official remarked in jest that, “usually the literate rule the illiterate, but here in South Sudan it is the opposite.”

According to Saferworld (2008: 10-11), “No provisions were made for connecting DDR or SSR to plans for the post-conflict development of the civilian security services (police, prisons and wildlife) or the justice system.” There has been some progress in conceptualizing the reform of the security sector in South Sudan, but implementation remains limited. The state judiciary is barely functioning and, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) is undertrained and under-deployed. The majority of the police officers are recruits from the SPLA, and vetting remains very limited. “Moreover, 90 per cent of the police force is completely illiterate, making basic police tasks challenging” (Lokuji, Abatneh, and Wani, 2009). And while young recruits are being trained, their functioning and motivation is hindered by the lack of interest in security provision of many of their commanding officers. However, also young recruits are reported by the communities to be involved in criminal activities. The accountability of the police to the citizens of South Sudan thus remains an important issue that is yet to be properly addressed.

Another important issue is that the current division of labor between the different state actors – such as for example governors, minister of internal affairs, police and SPLA – on security issues is unclear, although steps are currently undertaken to address this. Clear baselines are lacking, and therefore the actual effect on security when the number of police is increased or whether response times are actually improved, remains unclear.

The debate on ‘community policing’ is exemplary for the different perspectives various actors have about the roles of security providers. Many in Sudan define community policing in terms of a civilian police force that works in support of the police or as armed youth protecting the community. Others stress that it should be regarded as a strategy of policing, in which the police enters into dialogue with the community to improve security provision. Often living in relative absence of state services, chiefs work with young men in their community to ensure the security within the community as well as along its borders. While there is a realization that this system can backfire, in recognition of a lack of security provision by state actors several state officials expressed the desire to use this traditional way of organizing security. The ways to organize such community security mechanisms differ there as well, with some wanting to arm such ‘home guards’ while others preferred to keep them unarmed and only give some training and uniforms. Interestingly, in Kapoeta, where the police said to be outgunned by the civilians, they themselves had adopted “community policing as a policy.” This meant “going in slowly, talking to the people, and trying to find ways to deal with the security problems.” Adopting community security as a policing strategy rather than the support of armed youth thus seems possible in the Sudanese context.

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181 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
182 Interview, GoSS WES State Representative, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
183 Group discussion, Women, Torit, EES, 16 April 2011
184 Interview, UNMIS, Juba, 29 March 2011
185 Interview, representative International NGO, Juba, 29 March 2011
186 Group discussion, Women, Bor, Jonglei, 21 March 2011
187 Interview, GoSS Jonglei State Representative, Bor, Jonglei, 23 March 2011; Interview, GoSS EES State Representative, Torit, EES, 15 April 2011
188 Interview, Police officer, Kapoeta, EES, 18 April 2011
Political and institutional obstacles

Apart from the specific issues of interventions that aim to promote security, a number of general political and institutional obstacles hinder intervention effectiveness. A known issue is the UN’s bureaucracy, described by a state official as ‘very nasty.’ This caused a delay of activities, as funds were available but not released. In one case, the computers that were ordered came after nine months and the projectors to accompany them had after one year not arrived. While the programmes and bureaus supported by donors are in principle owned by Sudanese, in practice they do not spend the money themselves. While possibly limiting corruption on the side of GoS, and although an alternative may not be readily available, it does lead to frustrations and delays. Another institutional problem is the lack of adjustment of programmes to circumstances and the changing post-conflict context. While the requirement of such flexibility is acknowledged, it proves to be more problematic in practice. Relevant indicators that feed into the implementation of programmes may be an answer to this.

Problematic were also the relations between the management of the UNDP and DPKO. While on paper the Sudanese DDR programme served as an example for the integration of the different UN agencies involved, “the DDR process in Sudan is widely felt to have not achieved as much as was initially hoped” (Saferworld, 2008: 2). Cooperation proved to be rather problematic, attributed by Nichols (2010: 20) to “institutional uncertainties, combined with clashing personalities.” Topics of disagreements were how to support the national DDR Commissions, what type of reintegration support to offer, and whether to implement previously agreed CSAC components. Problems were exacerbated by DPKO and UNDP regulations restricting direct line management by staff from another agency. “In Juba, UNDP computers are not permitted to connect to UNMIS networks and telephone connections do not link UNDDR Unit offices based on different UNMIS and UNDP premises” (Saferworld, 2008: 22-23).

A further critique with regard to the DDR programme has to do with the mismanagement of finances. An audit of the SSDDRC in November 2010 showed that senior staff is overriding control and financial accounting is lacking (PwC, 2010). A UNDP official noted that the commission lacks ethics and accused it of hiring family. But UNDP is accused of similar mismanagement. An internal document of the UNDP sent to the New York Times shows that much of the money for earmarked for reintegration support “has been spent on office equipment, staff vehicles and international salaries, many of which were never originally approved.” Furthermore UN officers failed to report over 450,000 US$ of purchases, and “the project’s 2009 annual report failed to mention that not a single former combatant had completed the reintegration program” (Kron, 2010). Donors have demanded answers to a specific list of questions on expenditures and made clear not to be prepared to provide further funding until the issues have been explained (Nichols, 2010: 23). Back and forth accusations have clearly deteriorated working relations. But the lack of financial accountability goes deeper than the problems with the DDR programme. Others complained that donors keep giving money to corrupt governments. Even when donors know that corruption prevents the lion’s share of the money from reaching the grass roots, funding continues without much verification of its spending. “Only when a country causes a lot of insecurity [to others] you freeze the money.”

189 Interview, Representative CSAC Bureau, Juba, 17 March 2011
190 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
191 Interview, UNDP, Bor, Jonglei, 24 March 2011
192 Interview, GoSS WES State Representative, Yambio, WES, 4 April 2011
Another – unfortunately common – problem is the desire of donors for short time frames and quick and visible fixes. A concern commonly expressed, both by Sudanese and international practitioners, was that short term investments will be lost if they are not part of a process with a longer time frame.

There has been war for twenty something years, firearms and explosive ethnic tensions everywhere. If you do not want to get involved now, you will become involved in humanitarian support in the future. Yes, we will be the first to suffer, but donors will come back and it will cost a lot more.\(^{193}\)

The lack of longer time frames and the failure of donors to address deeper issues of the democratization process have raised doubts with some about the actual motivations of donor interventions. Painting perhaps a grim picture, one Sudan expert felt donors are more interested in stability and trade, and “the first thing they trade off is democracy.”\(^{194}\) Similar observations have been made by Mark Duffield (2001; 2007). But even when the motivations behind interventions are not merely the promotion of business, the short time frames leave little interest to address the more difficult problems of democratization, of which the results may only appear in the long term. “So it is brought down to technical issues and security issues. (...) Training and equipping soldiers is done, but what does it bring? Shoot people better, kill better, torture better.”\(^{195}\)

**Key findings**

The violent disarmament campaigns starting from a state security perspective had few lasting positive effects and were problematic from a community security perspective. Not only did campaigns at times lead to direct violence but also did such campaigns leave the security issues that lead to armament unaddressed. Disarmed communities became more vulnerable, especially since disarmament activities have been limited to particular regions while others remain armed. Communities not only rearm as a result but also perceive state security providers as untrustworthy in providing community security.

The DDR programme in South Sudan, as part of a DDR programme for Sudan and a CPA requirement, was highly politicized. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the outcome of the referendum complicated the process, and the SPLA had a desire to maintain (if not increase) a strong force. Nonetheless, the DDR programme was approached in a very technical fashion by the international community. As a consequence the programme has been hijacked by the political reality in South Sudan, and little of the goals of DDR in a traditional sense – i.e. the disarmament and reintegration of armed combatants that pose a security threat – have been realized. Furthermore, the goals set for the DDR programme in Sudan range from a particular number of ex-combatants set to go through the programme, to “contributing to creating an enabling environment for human security” (GNU, 2007: 5) in the strategic plan, to interpretations of DDR as a pension plan or welfare scheme. The question is thus what goals are to be set for DDR and what contributions DDR can be expected to make in the context of South Sudan.

The following points can be distilled from this chapter:

- Forced disarmament had few lasting effects with regard to SALW proliferation and had a negative impact influence on community security;

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193 Interview, Representative SSDDRC, Juba, 12 April 2011
194 Interview, Security expert, Juba, 30 March 2011
195 Ibid.
• Voluntary disarmament is a long-term process, and requires addressing the motivations for people to be armed;
• The motivations for people to be armed are complex, and do not only relate to physical security, but also economic and cultural issues;
• DDR is highly political and a focus on the technical aspects neglects the context in which DDR inevitably takes place;
• While the requirement of flexibility is acknowledged, interventions still lack adjustment to circumstances and changes in the context.
Conclusions and recommendations

These conclusions will discuss briefly the security dilemma in South Sudan before continuing with concluding remarks and recommendations.

The security dilemma
It is clear that insecurity knows many faces in South Sudan and that the lack of adequate security provision leads to cycles of violence. The proliferation and retention of SALW during collection programmes is rational when looking into the prevalent circumstances in South Sudan. Many people find themselves insecure, since the economic, social, political and legal service provision is underdeveloped or non-existing in South Sudan. This lack of services and security provision leads to many localized conflicts turning violent through the use of SALW, effectively decreasing community security. The prevalent lack of social contracts which were eroded by war does not provide a dampening effect on conflicts turning violent. This situation again increases demand for SALW as formal security providers are not able to secure people throughout South Sudan. Central governance then will be less attractive to communities as governance cannot provide security and other vital services. Specifically the access for security providers is hampered as there is no trust between the communities and the security providers. This security dilemma is very real for many communities and its cyclical dynamics should be fully realized rather than moving around it with technical programmes that only address the results of insecurity rather than its causes.

Discussing inroads for security promotion
Sustainable security promotion should be a comprehensive and coherent approach in which weapons collection programmes are a means to an end. It includes analyzing and implementing in a decentralized fashion with state presence having the opportunity and capacity to influence central level planning and implementing as the context requires. It means looking at contextual security dynamics and including all (spoilers) in comprehensive programmes for security promotion. It also means bottom-up initiatives at the grassroots should be constructively connected with top-down initiatives from donors and the Juba level. Security promotion should prioritize community security rather than aiming for large amounts of weapons ending up on a pile to be burned. More attention should be devoted to conflict mitigating development, dialogues throughout society and enhancing social fabric among society and enhancing ties between central government and citizens throughout South Sudan. In order to achieve this, the following recommendations can be made. The recommendations are grouped per subject and related to the relevant actors that are involved or perhaps should be involved.

Security Provision:
At the birth of South Sudan as a new nation its state security actors lack the capacity to adequately deal with the security problems at hand. The SPLA can be considered a top-heavy and heterogeneous collection of groups with different affiliations and ethnic backgrounds, which leaves the loyalty of several elements within the SPLA questionable. To overcome these problems of loyalty to some extent, a number of battalions have been stationed in other regions than the origin of their soldiers. As a consequence, however, the interest of troops from ‘outside’ to deal with local security issues is perceived as too limited. A second security provider is the SSPS, of which many in its ranks are former
SPLA. Therefore, the civilian police often behaves still in a military fashion when dealing with crime. As formal state security actors are currently not able to provide the security required at the community level, communities themselves remain dependent on themselves.

**Police**

The function and potential effects of police as security providers is currently underused. Training facilities are currently inadequate and the mean age of the SPSS is too high. The SPSS is heavily underequipped and lacks modes of transportation, communication and a judicial system to hand over criminals to, while at the same time levels of motivation are low.

- Older officers coming from the SPLA should be subject to a stricter vetting process to prevent idle ‘pensioners’ in practice. This human component should receive more attention rather than relying exclusively on technical issues.
- The police is perceived to be lazy, corrupt and connected with cattle raiders and other criminals which warrants investing in democratic oversight at the local level and investing in connecting with communities.
- The training of recruits for the SSPS should be accompanied by development of the command structure of the SSPS, and talented recruits with training should be enabled to replace older incapable commanders.

  - **The GoSS** should enhance the vetting process to recruit capable police officers rather than providing former SPLA staff with a pension scheme in the form of a police position. Democratic oversight at the local level must be improved so that more guidance at that level can take place.
  - **The international community** should provide quality material such as communication, modes of transportation and make these materials conditional to appropriate usage (e.g. usage by the police for police tasks in the appropriate geographical area) Constructing police stations is one, but without proper communication devices and modes of transportation will remain impossible to use police station buildings to their complete potential.
  - **Civil society** should continue to report issues to the police and report on issues that can be improved in the modes of operation of the SPSS to both SPSS and governance authorities. Possible inroads to connecting better with the problems at community level should be actively pursued by civil society.

**SPLA**

Security provision in the form of SPLA is highly centralized, and mainly directed from Juba. This is a rational choice when favoring stability of the state over insecurity at the grassroots level. However, in the case of WES, the notion that the SPLA is the only legitimate provider of security, whereas they are not in practice, works detrimentally for community security.

- The SPLA should professionalize and train its officers to read and write. It is furthermore of essence that a culture is created in which information of deployed troops flow back to Juba while maintaining and respecting the command structure.
- The presence, mandate and modes of operation should be clearly communicated to civil society to decrease false expectations and the formation of rumors. Democratic oversight needs to be enhanced at the local level and platforms for lodging complaints when the military staff deviates from the mandate should be established.
The GoSS should facilitate the professionalization for reasons of effectiveness and fiscal austerity as pressure on GDP from military apparatus will be unsustainable towards the future. Democratic oversight and control should be substantiated at all relevant levels in South Sudan, while decentralizing the command structure of the SPLA towards the future. The deployment, mandate and rules of engagement should be clearly communicated to civil society beforehand. Directly approaching (in)formal governance structures in the area of operation and communicating these issues wider through Radio Miraya will dampen misunderstanding. Forms of reporting abuse of the SPLA and institutional ways of dealing with these complaints must be ensured to enhance the perception that SPLA is indeed a national army that protects everybody within South Sudan.

The international community should provide technical expertise in SSR and help train SPLA staff to professional levels with regard to civilian protection, dealing with ethnic diversity, civil military cooperation and communication within the SPLA.

Civil society should actively report on verified deviations from SPLA mandates than relying exclusively on verbal rumors and reports surrounding the interventions of the SPLA. Indeed, reporting, which should be enabled and facilitated by the GoSS, should happen in a more coherent and standardized fashion.

Communities: home guards, community-based policing, and self-defense groups

Communities have always been responsible for their own security provision, and the state proved unable to take over so far. Both because the state is often unable to sufficiently provide security, and because many communities do not trust the state to do so. Community strategies vary from beating drums to warn neighbors in case of danger, to unarmed and armed groups for community protection, or ‘home guards’.

- The presence of ‘home guards’ and what the term ‘community policing’ may or may not refer to (i.e. a strategy of state police or communities taking up policing) are a hotly debated topics which runs the risk of overlooking the simple fact that these are perceived to be the only functioning ways for security provision at the grassroots level. Creative ways must be sought to connect with informal security providers such as the Arrow Boys.

- The current role communities play in security provision should not be overlooked while introducing formal security providers as communities form the first line of defense and bear the brunt when protection fails.

- Systems of oversight should be supported and enhanced to make transparent the dynamics of security provision by communities and to link these systems with formal security providers in a constructive way that protects communities.

- The police should be supported to undertake community policing as a strategy in which the police engages in proactive communication with communities to address the security issues these communities identify. Such an approach to policing provides opportunities in which the social contract between state and society can be nurtured.

- When attempting to use chiefs as interlocutors between central governance and local communities, the varying levels of capacity and legitimacy among the community should be taken into account. More specifically, the level of equitable representation by the chief and the allocation of potential benefits for the community are allocated should be leading.

The GoSS should create constructive dialogues with community protection schemes such as the Arrow Boys, while realizing self-protection currently the only viable way. Connecting with these structures will be difficult in relation to the primacy of the state on
the monopoly of violence. Rather than excluding the communities as security actors a
gradual transition to formal oversight and, when future available capacities will allow,
formal security provision at the grassroots level. This gradual shift should include
monitoring systems through which civil society can put forward suggestions and
complaints. These monitoring systems should be open to all at the grassroots level and
move beyond consulting local chiefs exclusively.

- **The international community** should not lose track of the dire security situation at
  the grassroots level when discussing community policing and strategies to enhance
  security. In an ideal situation the state should provide security, but due to limited
  capacities relative to daunting tasks ahead for the GoSS, attention should include informal
  security actors.

- **Civil society** should attempt to connect with formal security providers wherever
  possible. Ways of providing protection within the local context combined with
  community requirements should be addressed beyond their own community to prevent
  the security of one leading to the insecurity of the other. Civil society must furthermore
  make sure they can voice collective priorities for protection by formal security actors.

**Disarmament:**

**Community disarmament**
The three states researched for this report have their own specific backgrounds and contexts for
disarmament, which requires a decentralized policy that allows for flexibility. However, a
decentralized approach should not translate into unintended uneven implementation like the past ad-
hoc campaigns.

- The disarmament of communities should serve as the means to enhanced security and not be
  seen as an end in itself. Attempting to register the weapons in civilian hands seems currently
  better suited than disarmament is. Disarmament often leads to insecurity on the short term, as
  it offsets the balances of power.

- Specifically the unequal disarmament proved detrimental in the past and not only decreases
  security directly afterwards but will hamper will to disarm in the future. A possible way to
  deal with disarmament in the vast and inaccessible hinterlands of Sudan would then be a
  clustered approach, in which rival communities are disarmed simultaneously.

- The reasons for retaining weapons should be analyzed and discussed. ‘Disarmament of the
  mind’ is a key process that needs more attention than overtly technical weapons collection
  programmes. Inroads can be sensitization and the stimulation of a cultural debate.

- To match community security demands, the activities of the CSAC bureau need to be
  embedded into existing structures, and require certain levels of autonomous flexibility to the
  context. Improving state representation of the CSAC bureau is therefore vital for its
  operational effectiveness.

- Adequate funds, political will and technical expertise must be made available to enhance the
  capacities of the CSAC bureau. This would primarily require the strengthening of state level
  bureaus, which not only means financial support but also attracting motivated personnel with
  strong political capacities;

- Technical support for the storage and control of weapons collected during civilian
  disarmament is direly needed to break or prevent the recycling of weapons after
  disarmament.
The GoSS should dedicate more priority to the approaches constructed by CSAC and finance them adequately. Motivated and properly trained personnel for CSAC at state level must be attracted in a system that allows for cycles of information and participation. This will enhance the available information at the Juba level and will enhance context-sensitive approaches to enhance security. The forced disarmament in the past did not enhance community security and the CSAC process should become the standard for security promotion at the community level. CSAC is potentially able to address security in a comprehensive way which can lead to more constructive circumstances for demobilized soldiers to return into. In essence, CSAC can form the nexus between community security, steering security enhancing development, fostering public participation and guiding these processes in a contextually appropriate way.

The international community should support the CSAC bureau with finances, equipment, technical advice and let CSAC guide the contributions to ensure appropriate usage within the context. Training can be provided by initiating South-South cooperation and exchange of lessons learned.

Civil society and community structures should actively engage in CSAC activities and take the initiative in dealing with community security issues. This not only strengthens the capacity of CSAC at the local level, but provides real linkages with community security interests.

**DDR**

DDR in South Sudan has mainly been used by the GoSS and SPLA to remove the weaker elements and modernize the army. If training and support are effective in enhancing the economic position of so-called SNGs, the programme does contribute to the improvement of human security of these people. But while perhaps contributing to security in a broader sense, it hardly contributes to security in a way DDR, in general, is designed to do.

- Constructive involvement of the SPLA and dialogue between all stakeholders (i.e. donors, GoSS, SPLA, implementing agencies, etc.) is necessary, and clear goals, timeframes and conditions for DDR should be agreed upon.
- It has been proposed to give training while combatants remain within the SPLA, currently a proposal in the revision of the programme. Another idea would be to specialize particular brigades in the construction of roads and bridges. The contracts for such road development projects could then provide for their salaries. Specializing brigades in agriculture and creating an internal food supply would also be an option.
- Clear guidelines of who is eligible for DDR should be followed, and monitored by an independent organ;
- Tackling the raised expectations of what DDR brings has to continue through sensitization with active involvement of the SPLA;
- The reintegration support in the revised phase of the DDR programme is likely to be larger than in the first phase, which may lead to frustrations and problems among ex-combatants from the first phase. This has to be anticipated and addressed;
- To complement DDR, inventive and alternative solutions should be considered to deal with the large number of veterans, of which many consider DDR as an insufficient reward for their contributions during the war;
- Creative and relevant indicators to measure the contribution of DDR to security should be developed, which can be fed back into the programme to adjust it to local circumstances;
Rather than overloading DDR programmes with goals and tasks, realistic goals should be set. Alternatives and complementary programmes should add to the wider goal of security promotion. This would make DDR easier to manage and implement than to devise a programme that in theory would address all security issues. Smaller and targeted programmes can furthermore be adjusted to the local variations and changes in the context more easily.

- **The GoSS** should maintain oversight over the DDR process and negate different perceptions on what DDR should constitute in a constructive way to attract and retain international donors. Unrealistic expectations raised by the SPLA about benefits to be attained in the DDR programme must be addressed to prevent resentment leading to renewed insecurity. Transparency of the DDR programme should be enhanced to prevent budgetary issues that occurred in the past. In order to decrease pressure on GDP and to professionalize the SPLA other ways than DDR might be more appropriate. Engaging former combatants in long-term development of infrastructure might prove an interesting alternative to short trainings with unclear job perspectives.

- **The international community** should come to terms with the fact that DDR is perceived differently in South Sudan than the ‘average’ DDR programme. However, if and when security promotion is the goal, more flexibility than DDR guidelines will be necessary. Maintaining, for instance, the phenomenon of WAAFGs in a context where this generally is deemed inappropriate will only lead to misappropriation of funds to fill the spaces made available for WAAFGs. The current tense situation between international DDR donors and the GoSS must be resolved to enhance constructive engagement. New methods of operation with South Sudan must be established based on dealing with an independent state.

**Key issues to increase security:**

While SALW play a large role in exacerbating insecurity, they are not the root cause for insecurity. Rather, SALW are part of a ‘bricolage’ of interconnected security problems. Hence, security promotion should address the possession of SALW as part of wider interventions, rather than seeing disarmament as the end goal.

**Development**

- Underdevelopment is directly linked to insecurity and problems with cattle raiding. Security promotion should therefore align with development at conflict prone issues, such as road development, water management, agricultural development, schooling and health care. Moreover, such development initiatives should include and focus on youth.

  - **The GoSS** should prioritize development connections with conflict prone issues such as infrastructure and water management in areas where they are most needed rather than favoring developments in and around Juba. The GoSS, through state governance structures, should consult civil society on appropriating money to the main development priorities that match needs from both grassroots and central authority.

  - **The international community** should work together with the GoSS while assuring conditionality is implemented to enhance distribution throughout South Sudan to counter centralization in Juba and misappropriation in general.

  - **Civil society** should analyze developmental needs beyond their own communities and formulate collective needs that match both local realities and national capabilities.
**Dialogue**

- Open dialogue is needed throughout society to address the cyclical character of violence and discuss the dynamics perpetuating violence such as the dowry amount, the possession of SALW and the participation of youth and women in political and economic life. Actors necessarily involved are civil society actors such as youth groups, women groups, church leaders, CBOs, traditional systems such as the Monyomiji, chiefs at all levels, local governance structures, formal and informal security providers, the Juba level, and international donors and NGOs. Security promotion is a process that requires open dialogue with these actors to move beyond overly technical approaches to security. Platforms and open spaces for all relevant actors should be opened to facilitate dialogue and the exchange of insights, and media such as Radio Miraya should be constructively engaged. Dialogue should be substantiated with practical interventions that address the conflict generating issues. In other words, agreeing about the problem is one thing, overcoming it will require practical action in conjunction with dialogue.

  - **The GoSS** should extend dialogue with formal and informal indigenous systems of governance based on analysis of capabilities and possibilities within the local context. Political and institutional space should be created for feedback of insights and lessons learned from local actors in order to collectively address persisting gaps between the formal state and daily life of many citizens in South Sudan. Political contract between citizens and the state should be substantiated to enhance stability of the state and to create local buy-in for the newly formed state.

  - **The international community** should shift focus from the national level to include local (in)formal actors as they are currently more influential for the daily circumstances of most South Sudanese. Substantiating connections with local (indigenous) actors would provide a more accurate picture of the internal dynamics which is needed to inform their interventions.

  - **Civil society** should aim to break the cycles of violence by discussing the propensity for revenge openly and constructively. Exclusive identities should be addressed and the perceived solutions at grassroots level should be communicated coherently to the Goss and the international community. It is important here to aim for discussions that move beyond narrowly defined community or even personal interests.

To conclude, a multitude of cumbersome, dynamic and time consuming processes are required if South Sudan is ever to transform into a secure and peaceful state. Quick results as counting the amount of weapons collected will not be sustainable if insufficient attention is devoted to viable alternatives to violence, adequate security provision from a community security perspective and sensitization of ‘violent minds’. South Sudan faces many complex challenges and these challenges should be taken on jointly with international actors and donors. Progress might be slow but when appropriate and context specific assistance is not generated now the consequences will be more dire in the future.
Literature

Arnold, M. and C. Alden (2007) “‘This gun is our food’: Disarming the White Army militias of South Sudan,” Conflict, Security & Development. 7(3): 361-385.


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Annex 1 – Key terms and definitions

Community security
Community security is defined here both as an end state and the process in and of itself, and is closely related to human security. Community security as an end state is the situation in which communities feel secure from threats exerted by violent conflict, arms proliferation, crime, and a lack of protection or direct threat by the state. Community security as a process means that communities participate in identifying and prioritizing their security needs, as well as in the development and implementation of appropriate responses for their security needs. (Willems et al, 2009: 6)

Human Security
Human security is concerned with the protection of people, rather than the protection of the state. The concept embodies a shift from security through armament to security through sustainable development. Human security then includes freedom from fear and freedom from want. In addition, the notion of human security implies people’s empowerment. Rather than treating people as helpless victims, a focus on human security brings out people’s agency to improve their own security.

State security
State security, or national security, refers to security needed for the survival of the state. The referent of security is the state, and the focus is on defending against external military threats, or internal destabilization and rebellion.

Security promotion
The collection of interventions aiming specifically to improve security, generally implemented in post-conflict environments. Generally accepted components are Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Armed Violence Reduction (AVR), including Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) control, whereas more innovative and at times appropriate paths might contain conflict mitigating development, water management, inter communal dialogue and so on.

Social contract
Social contract theory has different sources and interpretations (e.g. Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau), and can describe an implicit agreement between the state and individuals in society under that state, or an implicit agreement between individuals in society to abide by common rules, which are regulated by the state. The aim of social contract theory is to explain why rational individuals voluntarily give up their natural freedom to obtain the benefits provided by a political order such as a state. The social contract between state and society here then refers to an implicit agreement about the balance between individuals’ willingness to give up natural freedoms and the services provided by the state in return.
Annex 2 – Methodology

The research took place between March 11th and April 28th, 2011 in the Southern Sudanese states of Jonglei, Western Equatoria State and Eastern Equatoria. These states were chosen based on the expected variety in the contexts of these three states, as well accessibility relating to security, budget, time and local contacts. The research done in these areas was linked with insights from policy makers at the Juba level.

**Point of departure**

This research prioritizes analyzing the security context before turning to what outside intervention would be most appropriate, effective, efficient and sustainable. The choice for this approach is based on the notion that without an understanding of the security fabric at the local level it seems unfeasible to initiate security promotion through disarmament initiatives. When a particular goal or programme is point of departure, chance are the analysis merely aims for strategies that fit the goal or programme. The analysis may become clouded by the goals that the intervention aims to reach. Instead of a 'blank' analysis, there is ‘cherry-picking’ from the context what is fitting in the strategy. Such an approach leaves the goal or programme itself unquestioned, and may leave out particular contextual factors. Starting with the local security context increases the scope of possibilities as it is exactly an inversion of analyzing how best to fit, for instance, a DDR programme into the targeted context.

**methodology**

A variety of ethnographic techniques were used, such as focus group discussions, semi-structured interviews, key informant interviews and participatory observation. A semi-structured approach was taken in interviews to be able to adapt to local variation through changing the order of questions, an increased perception of speaking on their terms, and in general to have a structured conversation rather than extraction of knowledge that did not pertain to local circumstances. Individual interviews were held with policy makers, individual experts, governors, civil servants, police, traditional leaders, and church leaders. Group were held with youth groups, women groups, ex-combatants, SPLA, local chiefs of various levels and the Arrow Boys. These group interviews on average lasted between one and two hours, depending on the amount of information put forward by the interviewees, and again took a semi-structured approach. A total amount of 60 individual interviews and 15 group discussions were held for this research. Furthermore, informal talks and discussions were held throughout the research with experts, colleagues, facilitators, drivers and people on the street. Finally, a feedback session was organized in Juba at the end of the research period. Representatives of civil society organizations, the CSAC bureau, UN agencies and international NGOs were present to discuss the preliminary findings and brainstorm about relevant policy implications.

The work of the researchers was facilitated through SSANSA, a South Sudanese civil society organization involved in SALW control. In each state, a local SSANSA representative from that state facilitated the research agenda set by the researchers. This included contacting people to be interviewed, making appointments and providing the researchers with directions to offices, people and hotels. It also entailed providing the researchers with relevant background information on the security issues in the region and translating interviews when necessary.
Limitations

While discussing security at the grassroots the researchers made ample use of organized forms of civil society to find access to respondents and to enhance depth of the analysis. A bias towards organized initiatives might be a result which in limited form was countered by presenting preliminary findings to individuals outside organizations. The research team decided to dedicate available time to a limited amount of locations which resulted in a limited dataset on the states mentioned. In other words, depth was chosen over more superficial data with a larger geographical spread. This, however, means that the data presented is not representative for the entire states visited. The interviews, specifically the group discussions, were often conducted in the local language and translated on the spot to English. This inherently leads to an increased chance on misinterpretation. Lastly, while looking into the DDR programme it should be noted that the programme is in its initial stage as far as implementation goes, especially in the three states visited. The CSAC bureau is in the initial stage and state presence and capacity varies through the areas visited. Hence, the findings with regard to reintegration are limited to the experiences of the few ex-combatants encountered who are currently in the reintegration programme. Community disarmament through CSAC essentially only took place in Jonglei which limits practical insights to that state.
Annex 3 – Diagram on SALW and security

Diagram 1:
EXPLANATORY FACTORS FOR THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS

GOVERNANCE

- Economic: Resource Management; Development
- Social: Employment; Education; Youth; Health Care; Social Service;
- Political: Legitimacy; Transparency; Devolution; Participation
- Legal: Law; Judicial Organ; Security Sector Control
- Cultural: Ethnicity; Religion; Minority; Urban and Arid Life

↓ Weak

Social Insecurity
(e.g. poverty, unemployment, corruption, economical insecurity)

Availability of Small Arms
Flow of arms from countries in conflict

UNCONTROLLED Violence
* Conflict
* Looting
* Road Ambush/
* Cattle Rustling

↓ Reduced Opportunities to Strengthen Governance

More arms for Self-defense

Physical and Human Insecurity

Annex 4 – Map of South Sudan
Participating partners:

Center for Conflict Studies (CCS), Utrecht University
The Center for Conflict Studies (CCS) at Utrecht University comprises an interdisciplinary focal point that has a unique expertise in the emerging international field of conflict studies. The Center is working on a programme of cutting edge research themes that are closely linked to its educational programme comprising undergraduate and graduate courses. Its work reflects contemporary and innovative trends in academic thought. Its studies aim at contributing to intellectual debates with regard to current conflict and to prevailing policy practice in the fields of conflict prevention and management, and peacebuilding.

Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management (CICAM), Radboud University Nijmegen
The Center for International Conflict Analysis and Management conducts research and offers academic courses on the dynamics and transformation of contemporary, large-scale conflict, focusing in particular on practices of peace-building intervention and the role of international organizations, the state, and international and local civil society.

Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute (CRU)
The Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute conducts research on the nexus between security and development with a special focus on integrated and comprehensive approaches on conflict prevention, stabilization and reconstruction in fragile and post-conflict states.

European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP)
The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) is a non-governmental organization that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and actively supports and connects people who work for peace worldwide.

IKV Pax Christi
IKV Pax Christi works as a movement of concerned citizens and partners in conflict areas on the protection of human security, the end of armed violence and the construction of just peace.

Netherlands Ministry of Defense
The Ministry of Defense coordinates the military of the Netherlands. The Dutch armed forces have a threefold mission: to protect the integrity of the territory of the Netherlands and that of allied countries; to help maintain stability and the international legal order; and to help civil authorities enforce the law, control crises, respond to disasters and provide humanitarian assistance either in the Netherlands or abroad.

Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs promotes the interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands abroad. The Ministry coordinates and carries out Dutch foreign policy at its headquarters in The Hague and through its missions abroad. It is likewise the channel through which the Dutch Government communicates with foreign governments and international organizations.

PSO (Capacity Building in Developing Countries)
PSO is an association that consists of fifty Dutch development organizations. The association focuses on capacity development at civil society organizations in developing countries.

Dutch Council for Refugees
Dutch Council for Refugees defends the rights of refugees and helps them to build a new life in the Netherlands.