PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: SUDAN

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Summary

Sudan IDP crisis worsens

Over half a million people have been displaced in Sudan, aggravating the world's largest internal displacement crisis despite a peace deal signed last year. Since January 2002, some 550,000 Sudanese fled attacks by the Khartoum government in southern oil-rich regions, and at least 30,000 more fled fighting between government and rebel groups. While Sudan's internally displaced people (IDPs) have continued to suffer attacks from all sides and widespread hunger and disease, the government and the main rebel group have signed a peace deal and developed their IDP policies. Yet Khartoum continued to hinder humanitarian access for international aid agencies, who began planning for possible mass returns.

1. Half a million more displaced

Southern oil areas

Large numbers of people have been newly displaced in oil-rich regions of southern Sudan. During 2002, some 500,000 people were displaced in the oil areas of Unity State (Western Upper Nile) and Upper Nile State (ICG, 14 November 2002). And in January 2003, another 50,000 people were displaced in Unity State (USAID, 20 Feb 2003).

Some 100,000 people, the entire population of Mayom County, were displaced in a three-day attack in June 2002, according to the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)'s humanitarian arm (AFP, 30 July 2002). And by November, some 25,000 IDPs had arrived in Mayom from fighting in Mankien (UN, November 2002, p.39). Others were displaced by government offensives in Tam, Mankien, Leer and Leal (Sudan Focal Point, 31 Jan 2003).

Since December 2002, civilians in Unity have fled intensified air attacks by army helicopter gunships and ground attacks by pro-government militias. Some 50,000 people were displaced in Liech, Unity State in January 2003 by heavy fighting between the government and SPLA, fleeing to southern Blue Nile State (FEWS, 20 February 2003). These IDPs were scattered mainly in makeshift shelters close to their areas of origin.

The Khartoum government appears to be deliberately depopulating oil-rich areas, using violence and sophisticated weapons to assert control and enable oil firms to exploit new sites. The link between forced displacement and oil exploration in Unity State has been highlighted by successive UN human rights rapporteurs for Sudan and several NGOs. The situation in Unity and Upper Nile is further complicated by government proxy wars and divide-and-rule tactics, aimed at weakening southern-based opposition and sowing tension between Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups.

Southern towns

In other parts of southern Sudan, civilians have continued to flee as a result of fighting opposing government and rebel forces over strategic towns. In late 2002, some 11,570 people fled clashes between government forces and the SPLA over Torit town in Eastern Equatoria State, walking all the way to government-held Juba in Bahr al-Jabel State (ACT, 25 November 2002). The SPLA captured Torit on 1
September 2002, prompting the government to withdraw from the Machakos peace agreement, before the town was eventually re-taken by the government on 8 October 2002. The government has long used counter-insurgency tactics to increase its garrisons in SPLM/A-controlled southern areas.

The Southeast

In the far southeastern state of Eastern Equatoria, several thousand people have also fled attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Ugandan rebels based in Sudan. About 6,500 people were displaced in LRA attacks during 2002, according to the UN (UN, November 2002, p16). In addition, some 2,000 Sudanese people who sought refuge across the border in Uganda were forced to return to southern Sudan in November 2002 due to LRA attacks (UN, November 2002, p.3).

The number of people displaced and killed by LRA attacks increased steeply after March 2002 when the Sudan government gave permission to the Ugandan army to pursue LRA forces in southern Sudan. LRA responded by attacking southern Sudanese civilians, displacing, abducting and looting. LRA forces have displaced people in this area since late 2001, sometimes also attacking, burning and looting IDP camps. As a result of LRA attacks and clashes with government forces and rebel groups, about 20,000 people have been displaced around Juba, another 5,416 persons in Gumbo transit camp and another 6,412 IDPs in Liriya village (ACT, 25 November 2002).

The East

In the eastern state of Kassala, several thousand people have also fled new fighting. Some 12,000 people fled Kassala town when fresh fighting broke between the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) rebels and Sudan government forces in October 2002 (UN, November 2002). And there were already some 87,370 people displaced in the area, in August 2002, according to OCHA. Many IDPs walked almost 200 km spreading in an area stretching north of Kassala town towards Hamish Koreib. In October, NDA captured several government towns and advanced on key strategic sites like an oil pipeline, Kassala town and the highway between Khartoum and Port Sudan. Despite an October 2002 ceasefire agreement, the government described its actions as a response to 'Eritrean aggression' (ICG, 14 November 2002, p7).

IDP figures for Sudan*

IDPs in Sudan: 4.5 million
Total population of Sudan: 31.7 million
IDPs as percentage: 14.2%
Civilians killed in war: 2 million

IDPs in Khartoum State: 2 million
IDPs in SPLM/A territories: 1.4 million
IDPs in southern areas under government control: 300,000
IDPs in eastern and central 'transitional zone': 500,000
IDPs living in camps: 700,000

*all figures are estimates based on available information

Unsafe conditions

Many IDPs in Sudan have regularly been exposed to gross violations of fundamental human rights and the laws of war. Displaced people in camps have been attacked in several parts of Sudan, resulting in death and injury of IDPs. Displaced people told a UN assessment that they felt insecure in camps, and urgently wanted to move to safer areas (FEWS, 20 February 2003). Deadly attacks in Upper Nile from December 02
to January 03 were described as "the fiercest fighting and worst humanitarian conditions in the world over
the past decade" (ICG, 10 February 2003, p.1). Displaced people faced helicopter gunship assaults,
combined with ground-attacks by Baggara Arab horsemen militias, abduction, gang rapes, destruction of
relief sites, and burning of villages.

Overall, displaced people have faced increasingly frequent attacks by government forces. Since 1998, IDPs
have been bombed repeatedly in civilian areas in the south particularly in Equatoria, Bahr al Ghazal and
Unity states. Attacks have often hit relief centers, food aid drop-zones and IDP camps, according to rights
observers. The Nuba Mountains cease-fire in January 2002, led to a re-deployment of Sudanese troops in
Bahr el Ghazal and Unity states. And the rise in oil revenues reportedly enabled Khartoum to acquire
increasingly sophisticated and lethal weaponry. In August 2002, Sudanese government forces confronted
the LRA in Gumbo IDP camp in Bahr el Jebel, after LRA had already attacked the camp, thus forcing IDPs
to flee again (HRW, 29 October 2002).

In Mayom, government forces dropped bombs on the town even after granting humanitarian access to
IDPs. Up to 300 people were killed by helicopter gunship and Baggara attacks during the July offensive,
while others were abducted with their cattle (AFP 30 July 2002). During September 2002, displaced people
faced a serious escalation of aerial bombings and insecurity, according to rights and aid organisations.
Government bombs killed 11 people in a camp for IDPs in Western Equatoria State (HRW, 28 September
2002), while the conflict in Mayom County was the 'worst witnessed since 1983'. IDP camps were also
attacked twice during September 2002 in conflicts over cattle (OCHA, 17 Sept 2002).

Displaced people have also been victim of rights abuses by non-state actors. People in Eastern Equatoria
and Bahr el Jebel states faced attacks, looting, abductions and recruitment by the LRA (UN, November
2002,p.16). More than 470 people were killed in Imatong by LRA attacks, and 500 were displaced from an
IDP camp there in early May 2002, according to church officials (HRW, 29 Oct 2002).

Civilians continue to be abducted and forcefully recruited in Sudan. The UN Rapporteur on Human Rights
recently denounced the ongoing forcible recruitment of Nuer people and arbitrary detentions (UNCHR, 6
January 2003, par 41). Large numbers of children have also been forcefully recruited. The SPLM/A has
handed over 9,600 recruited children over the past two years, although about 17,000 children – including
girls – remained at arms away from their families (UN, November 2002, p.11).

Displaced women and children faced serious abuses in Khartoum. Countless displaced women in the
capital have been jailed without trial for brewing beer – often the only income-generating opportunity they
can survive on – and declared unlawful under Sharia law. Displaced women, who rarely have access to
legal representation, have been jailed for long or indefinite periods of time, leaving their children without
care. Some 25,000 'vagrant' children live in Khartoum, at risk of abuses, violence, and exploitation.

**Needs unmet**

Many displaced people are hungry in Sudan. Overall malnutrition rates ranged between 23% and 39.9% in
southern Sudan in August 2002, while around 30% of Sudanese have food intakes below minimum energy
requirements (UN, Nov 2002, p.102). The World Food Programme plans to deliver 197,000 tonnes of food
aid to 3.5 million people during 2003, but food will be insufficient in many areas where population
movements, drought and insecurity have undermined food security (OCHA, 23 December 2002). IDPs are
among the people worst affected by hunger in Sudan, and widely dependent on sporadic humanitarian aid
or host communities, often overstretching their meager resources.

Displaced people in Sudan's capital also have unmet needs. Of some 2 million IDPs taking refuge in
Greater Khartoum, only 260,000 were living in four official IDP camps by 2000 (UNCHR, 27 November
2002 p8). The remaining 740,000 people living in planned and unplanned settlements face a bleak
humanitarian situation, with regular outbreaks of disease, chronic food insecurity and poor access to
drinking water, according to several reports (UN November 2000 p143). Reports also suggest displaced people of Christian and southern origin had less access to assistance and land allocation than IDPs from Muslim areas. In addition, IDPs living in slums have been systematically expelled and their houses destroyed.

Southern oil areas

Displaced people in Bieh in Jonglei State faced high levels of malnutrition, the highest rate reported in Sudan, after fleeing oil-rich areas (OCHA, 17 September 2002). A malnutrition rate of about 30% was reported among 100,053 IDPs in the garrison towns of Bentiu, Rubkona, Pariang, Mayom, Kumagon, in November 2002. Acute malnutrition rates well above the emergency threshold were recorded in Rubkona town (38.4%), which hosts 25,004 IDPs; and in Bentiu (24%), where 26,575 IDPs arrived from oil-producing areas (UN, November 2002, p.36). Conditions for displaced people around Mayom, whose diet depends on cattle products, have deteriorated dramatically, due to insecurity and restricted grazing movements.

About 50,000 persons displaced by fighting in Liech in Unity State were reported to be selling their livestock in exchange for grain to survive (FEWS, 20 February 2003). Indeed, neighbouring areas were not able to provide for the 50,000 new IDPs fleeing fighting in Liech after they suffered their worst harvest since 1999 (FEWS 20 February 2003). Many IDPs in this area spend all day looking for food, struggling to survive on a diet of wild foods and water lilies.

Many displaced people have also died of preventable diseases in Unity State, which reportedly has no doctors. In Sudan about 670,000 children die of preventable diseases yearly. Diarrhoea is the first cause of death, often because families lack access to safe water sources. In government-held areas, infant mortality is at 68/1000 lives and maternal mortality at 509/100,000 per live births (UN, November 2002, p.14). Moreover, insecurity and inaccessibility have hampered interventions to build water supply facilities in Upper Nile State. Jonglei State, meanwhile, had the worst prevalence of Guinea Worm in the world (OCHA, 17 September 2002).

The South

Displaced people in other southern areas also faced risks of malnutrition. Many thousands of farmers had missed two consecutive harvests in Bahar el Ghazal and Jonglei due to displacement and insecurity (OCHA, 17 Sept 2002). Access to health facilities were also very poor: Equatoria had only one doctor for 100,000 people, and Bahr el Ghazal had none at all. Newly displaced people arriving in Juba town, in search of security from Torit and Kapoeta, ended up receiving no assistance after insecurity in Juba forced NGOs to withdraw. Some 600,000 people were left without assistance for ten days following the denial of aid flights in September 2002 (UN, November 2002, p.31). Some 8,500 IDPs were left in urgent need of food in and around Juba (OCHA 23 December 2002).

The East

Newly displaced people in Kassala State were in urgent need of food and other basic materials. Because IDPs were scattered over 200 kilometers, delivery of humanitarian assistance was severely complicated and water and cooking fuel were very scarce. In IDP camps malnutrition rates reached 19-26%, compared to 8% for local populations (UN, November 2002, p.32). IDP female-headed households and their children were reportedly the most vulnerable to food insecurity, with cultural norms restraining their access to employment outside the home.

Voluntary returns
Some displaced people in northern Sudan have returned to southern areas, especially to the central states of Southern and Western Kordofan. Between January and August 2002, an estimated 17,000 IDPs returned from Khartoum to the Nuba mountains in Southern Kordofan State, following a cease-fire agreed in January 2002 between the government and SPLA. The Nuba Mountains ceasefire, now extended until mid-2003, is monitored by an international commission and supported by a multi-agency programme, the Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation, which was initiated by the UN Resident Coordinator, and involves returned IDPs and host communities.

Displaced people have also been resettled in Western Kordofan. From January 2002, about 800 Dinka 'households' who fled violence 10 years ago were resettled in Abyei, following an initiative by the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, backed up with international support for community-based reconciliation between ethnic Dinka and Missereya Arabs. With international focus on conflict-transformation, however, returning Dinka were disappointed with the level of basic services and slow rehabilitation received. And worse, protection for returnees was inadequate and some had to be relocated following SPLA attacks in September 2002.

2. National neglect

Hindering access

National authorities have effectively blocked much assistance to displaced people. An estimated 3 million civilians, including many displaced people, were denied relief aid during 9 days of flight suspension between September and October 2002. More than 150 tonnes of emergency food could not be delivered, and over 500 humanitarian workers were stranded (USAID, 11 October 2002). In May 2002, the government blocked aid flights to 70 locations, effectively denying aid to 319,000 people in Unity State alone. Access denials and insecurity has significantly constrained UN humanitarian operations, forcing vulnerable populations to walk sometimes for four days to get food assistance.

The government has denied humanitarian flights in the southern state of Eastern Equatoria for over four years. Authorities briefly lifted the ban when the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, visited in July 2002, however, all flights were denied access over Eastern Equatoria from 27 September to 6 of October. This effectively cut off southern Sudan, Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains. It left some 800,000 people in the Equatoria region and 66,500 in Unity State without humanitarian aid (OCHA 14 November 2002).

The government maintained access denials in January 2003 in southern Sudan, preventing OLS-Southern Sector, based in Lokichokkio and Nairobi, Kenya to operate (HRW, 29 October 2002). This was in violation of tripartite protocols and the humanitarian principles of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) (UNCHR, 6 January 2003). Several Memoranda of Understanding on unimpeded access and cessation of hostilities were signed in October 2002 between the SPLM/A, the government and UN agencies, but have still not been fully implemented.

No protection

Apart from displacing and failing to protect people from displacement, the government has failed to adequately protect displaced people under its international humanitarian obligations.

In southern areas, the government has urged people to take refuge from fighting in its garrison towns. In Yabos in Blue Nile State, government planes reportedly dropped bombs along with leaflets urging fleeing civilians to seek safety in Ed Damazin, a government garrison town (SFP Oct 2002). Similarly, in response to LRA attacks during 2002, the government urged civilians to run to garrison towns. The government, however, did not attempt to protect civilians outside garrison towns, even in territory it controlled (HRW,
29 October 2002). In one case, the military prevented people from seeking shelter in Juba town in July 2002, fearing LRA infiltration (OCHA 29 July 2002).

Overall, the government's response to displaced people denies its own role in uprooting people and offers minimal humanitarian aid. The governmental Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) appears to take a 'natural disaster' approach to conflict-induced displacement with an early warning system focusing exclusively on natural phenomena (UN, November 2002, p.21). The government's relief role is limited to its partnership role in OLS; and despite an expansion of state oil production, has offered no visible benefits to southern populations (UNCHR 6 Jan 03).

Interest in return

The government appears to be interested in assisting displaced people in returning to home areas. Both the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A committed to the 'immediate voluntary return' of civilians displaced in Unity State and all others displaced after 17 October 2002, to be verified by a monitoring team (IRIN, 5 February 2003). In the event of peace and mass returns, local authorities proposed to set up 'transit camps' to receive and register IDPs before allowing them to return or resettle. But the UN fears this policy might succeed only in moving displaced people from camps in the North to new camps in the South (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p.20). Previously, the government had forced displaced people into 'peace villages' in Southern Kordofan.

New policies?

Despite its failures, the government of Sudan has agreed to revise its 1992 national IDP policy, and to establish a department within the HAC focusing on IDP issues. The IDP Unit at OCHA organized a workshop on the Guiding Principles, aiming to support the government to formulate IDP policies. In September-October 2002, the government also held a national workshop on IDPs in order to formulate its own policy, resolving to upgrade the HAC to a Federal Ministry and to set up an IDP Support Fund (GOS, 1 October 2002).

In SPLM/A-controlled territories the OCHA IDP Unit, with UNICEF and the Office of the Representative also organized a seminar on internal displacement, in September 2002. The main achievement was to develop an SPLM/A policy draft on internal displacement to address the needs of IDPs at all stages of displacement. This was one of the first efforts anywhere to engage a non-state actor to officially assume its responsibilities for protecting IDPs on the basis of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Peace talks

The Machakos Protocol, an agreement signed on 20 July 2002 by the government and SPLM/A, is expected to have a significant impact on displaced people in Sudan. The Machakos Protocol, signed under the auspices of the East African Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) with observers from the USA, UK and Norway, attempts to promote peaceful dialogue in Sudan. It provides for self-rule in southern Sudan under SPLM/A authority for an interim period of six years, at the end of which a referendum is to be held on secession or unity. The Protocol has been criticized for not including other warring parties like the NDA or civil society representatives.

3. International response

The ability of international humanitarian agencies to respond to the needs of IDPs in Sudan has been severely constrained by lack of access, insecurity and complex population dispersals. For example, agencies were unable to help newly displaced people arriving in Juba following the fall of Torit and Kapoeta, because insecurity had forced many NGOs to withdraw from the town.
Humanitarian aid in Sudan is provided through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) a mechanism of UN agencies, international and national NGOs coordinated from Khartoum, and from Nairobi for rebel-held areas. The OLS programme also negotiates access with warring parties to war-affected populations. But the mechanism's response to IDPs is weakened by the absence of an IDP focal point, and the location of senior decision-makers outside Sudan.

Focus on return

UN humanitarian agencies have shifted their main attention from meeting emergency needs to planning for large scale IDP returns, resettlement and reintegration. The UN estimates that about one million IDPs will likely return along with half a million refugees if the Machakos dialogue is effective (UN, November 2002, p.16).

The 2003 UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP) emphasizes conflict transformation, rehabilitation and improved coordination for IDP return. These are essential after 20 years of protracted conflict left basic services, institutions and infrastructure in a state of collapse. But emergency needs also remain overwhelming amid constant attacks on civilian populations.

New coordination

The UN has taken new measures to coordinate its response to IDP problems in Sudan. An inter-departmental Working Group on Sudan, which includes OCHA's IDP Unit, was established at UN Headquarters in New York to draw up contingency plans for peace in the country. Since August 2002, Monthly Monitoring Reports have been produced and a Humanitarian Information Center on IDPs is to be established under supervision of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in collaboration with the HAC and SRRA (Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association).

Donors wait

In general, humanitarian donors appear to be taking a 'wait and see' approach to helping IDPs in Sudan. Despite emergency conditions and large numbers of IDPs living in chronic need, the UN humanitarian appeal for Sudan has been under-funded during the past three years. By June 2002, only 18.4% of the appeal was funded, while in Afghanistan 48% was funded. By late 2002, however, the CAP was funded at 45%, with donors showing clear preference for food aid – covering 90% of the food aid budget. Water, sanitation and health sectors, however, remained dangerously under-funded at 33% and 14% (UN, November 2002). The UN, during its November 2002 mission, warned that international financing of return and reintegration would depend on the government authorities demonstrating realistic cost-sharing and resource allocation.

4. Suggestions

Government of Sudan

- stop displacing people arbitrarily in oil regions, and respect its international obligations to protect civilians by avoiding conditions leading to displacement especially in southern and eastern areas

- grant and facilitate the free passage of humanitarian assistance and allow international humanitarian agencies rapid and unimpeded access to all areas affected by displacement

Humanitarian agencies
• continue pressing for access and meeting the essential needs of IDP populations through a coordinated response

Donors
• exert pressure on warring parties to stop displacing people, and to respect ceasefires -- especially in oil areas
• provide adequate and predictable funding for humanitarian programmes

SPLM/A and rebel groups
• adhere to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, avoiding and preventing displacement and protecting people from arbitrary displacement
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

Background

Conflict between Dinka and Missiyira Arabs in Abyei 1965-2002

- While the Ngok are part of the Dinka tribes in the south, their leaders favoured to be administered by Central Government in order to be better protected
- By 1965 conflict spread to Dinka and men joined the southern rebel movement
- Post 1972 referendum for the Ngok Dinka to decide whether to remain in north or join the south was never held
- 1983 north-south conflict resumed and Ngok Dinka joined the SPLM/A
- Government’s Arab militias forced Dinka to flee to the north, leaving Abyei depopulated

“While the causes of the conflict are multiple and complex, they can be summed up as being rooted in racial, ethnic, cultural and religious differences characterized by gross disparities between the Arabized Muslim north, comprising one third of the country in terms of land and population, and the south, which is more indigenously African in terms of race, ethnicity and religion, with a mostly Christianized, modern elite. Cutting across this dualism are non-Arab Muslim groups in the north who feel as disadvantaged and marginalized as those in the south, some of whom have joined SPLM/A and other groups.

The Sudan was one of the countries the Representative of the Secretary-General visited in 1992 shortly after his appointment. That mission focused on visits to camps around the capital city, Khartoum, and in several areas in the country, including Abyei at the north-south border, where the indigenous Dinka population interact with the nomadic Missiriya Arabs who migrate seasonally into the area in search of water and pastures for their herds. Although the Ngok are part of the complex of Dinka tribes in the south, they have been administered as part of Kordofan Province and Western Kordofan State in northern Sudan. Their anomalous administrative position results from a decision made by their leadership to be associated with the north as a means of receiving protection from the Central Government. As a result, the area developed into a north-south bridge which the British administration had seen as a model of interracial, interreligious and cross-cultural peaceful coexistence and cooperation, somewhat comparable to what the Sudan was to symbolize for Arab North Africa and sub-Saharan Black Africa.

For more than 10 of the 17 years of the first conflict, the Abyei area remained peaceful as the respective leaders of the Dinka and the Missiyira Arabs, Deng Majok and Babo Nimir, offered their people a model of friendship and cordiality, which was emulated by them. By 1965, however, the conflict between north and south had spread into the area as young Dinka men joined the rebel movement in the south. Although the peace accord that ended the first conflict provided for a referendum to be held for the Ngok Dinka to decide whether to remain in the north or join the south, that referendum was never held. With the Abyei situation unresolved, local resentment and rebellion contributed directly to the increase in tensions and hostility that eventually contributed to the resumption of the north-south conflict as the Ngok Dinka joined the SPLM/A in large numbers and came to occupy significant positions in the leadership of the Movement. Meanwhile, the overall conflict was aggravated locally by the use of Arab tribal militias which devastated the Dinka and forced the people to move out of the area, leaving the land largely depopulated. Relatively few Dinka remained in Abyei town because most of the population had fled to the north.” (UNCHR, 27 November pp.2-3)
The National Islamic Front coup in 1989 and strengthening of SPLA led to increased displacement during the early 1990s

- Military offensive by Government in the early 1990s causes increased number of IDPs and refugees
- Intensified SPLA campaign in the late 1980s resulted in more civilian displacements as southerners fleeing the fighting sought refuge in the government-held regional capitals-Juba, Malakal, Wau-or in towns that had been captured by the SPLA
- Assaults on civilians in Bahr al-Ghazal resumed in 1992 when the army and the Popular Defence Force (PDF) reopened the railway linking north and south Sudan
- Government tactic to exploit ethnic rivalries by creating tribal militias
- Splits within the SPLM/SPLA and associated interethnic fighting among southerners cause new displacements in the 1990s

"The conflict in the Sudan is multifaceted and has deep historical roots. The conflict is depicted as regional: north (including east and west) versus south. It is religious: overwhelmingly, northerners are Muslims, and southerners are Christians or adherents to traditional African religions. It is racial, ethnic, and cultural, pitting northern 'Arab' against southern black African. It is about political and economic power: elite northerners have dominated the Sudan politically and economically since independence and continue to covet the south's natural resources; southerners seek their fair share of the political and economic pie (though some want independence); and political conflicts exist among various groups in both the north and the south. Also, even the geographic description of the conflict as north versus south is not fully accurate. People in some areas that are geographically in the north, such as the Nuba Mountains, Ingaesinia Hills, and Abyei, may be ethnically or culturally more 'southern.'

[...]

The southern opposition has been led primarily by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and its military wing, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which advocate political power-sharing within a unified secular Sudan. John Garang, a Dinka (one of the largest ethnic groups in the south), heads both the SPLM and the SPLA. The SPLM and SPLA participate in the National Democratic Alliance, which represents a wide range of opponents to the NIF government. In 1991 a split in the SPLM and SPLA led to the formation of new southern splinter groups and to deadly interethnic fighting among southerners." (Ruiz 1998, pp.139 - 140)

"The evolution of the civil war into a countrywide conflict, continued through 1988. SPLA [Sudan People's Liberation Army] tactics had evolved from localized ambushes in northern Upper Nile province to a full-blown capacity to threaten major district and provincial capitals. A successful SPLA offensive termed 'Bright Star' gave the SPLA control over large areas of the southern Sudan, including the towns of Torit, Kapoeta, and Kajo Kaji.

The campaign also resulted in more civilian displacement, however. Southerners fleeing the fighting sought refuge in the government-held regional capitals-Juba, Malakal, Wau-or in towns that had been captured by the SPLA. Almost overnight, the number of internally displaced in Juba increased from 50,000 to 90,000. (By early 1990, the number of internally displaced southerners receiving regular food assistance in Juba had doubled to 185,000) Their needs nearly overwhelmed the resources of almost a score of NGOs operating in the city." (Ruiz 1998. P.145)

"On June 30, 1989 [...]. a military coup deposed the elected civilian government of Sadiq al-Mahdi and brought al-Bashir and the NIF-backed National Salvation Revolutionary Command Council (NSRCC) to power. The NIF took significant steps to consolidate its military and political position. It purged the military and other security forces of many of their more moderate officers, banned almost all trade, professional, and labor organizations, and purged women from many government posts. It 'Islamicized' the judiciary and the universities. Many observers have argued that the NIF's fundamentalist leaders are intent
not only on maintaining northern Arab Muslim control but also on eradicating southern culture and imposing Arab culture and Islam nation-wide.

Within a few months of coming to power, the NSRCC/NIF leaders made clear their, more aggressive military intent. Within months, the NSRCC disbanded the RRC [Relief and Rehabilitation Commission], and appointed new, ultraconservative commissioners to head agencies dealing with the displaced. It then restricted the activities of NGOs and even forced some out of the north. RRC officials visiting Washington in December 1989 said that the government 'would not allow any humanitarian program in the southern Sudan that does not support our [the government's] military objectives.'

By 1992, the NSRCC/NIF's third year in power, the government had received arms from Libya, Iraq, and China and was ready to win back the territory it had lost to the SPLA. A rearmed Sudanese military went on the attack and powered its way up the White Nile

In 1993 the Sudanese military expanded its offensive in the south. Tens of thousands of Equatorians fled Kapoeta and Torit toward the frontiers with Uganda and Kenya. The government bombed SPLA towns and villages and was able to displace the SPLA from a number of areas. By June, the population of Juba, usually some 100,000, had swelled to as many as 250,000. An estimated 450,000 displaced were located elsewhere in eastern Equatoria, and 220,000 others were located at the 'Triple A camps' (Ame, Aswa, Atepi) and at Mundri, Yambio, and other locations. The government offensive created an additional 50,000 internally displaced in the Kaya/Morobo area in August 1993, most of whom headed toward the Ugandan border. Eventually, nearly 400,000 southern Sudanese fled to Uganda and Kenya.” (Ruiz 1998, pp.147, 151 & 152)

**War in oil rich areas**

- In 1999 UN Special Rapporteur Leonardo Franco reported that between April-July half of the population of Ruweng County was displaced by GOS attacks
- Strategy followed is first to displace the population second to build a new road third drilling can start
- Government's strategy to defend the oil fields has been to depopulate oil zones by sawing division among the local Nuer and Dinka populations, who traditionally had peaceful arrangements for herding
- Assessment commissioned by the Government of Canada in 1999 concluded that the security situation had worsened when the oil pipeline became operational: up to 75 percent population displacement were recorded in some districts in 2000
- Conflict especially intense around the oil fields in Unity State (Western Upper Nile, in the Nuba Mountains, in parts of Bahr El Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, and Southern Blue Nile (1999))
- Claimed that the growing oil revenues at $900 million per year (2001) has widened the strategic imbalance between the government and the opposition and reduced the prospects of military victory by southern insurgents
- Sudan Special Rapporteure and Christian Aid are unequivocal: oil exploitation is accompanied by systematic human rights violations
- Oil represented 41% of Sudan’s 2002 revenue and it hopes to double its oil production to 500,000 barrels per day by 2004

“Chevron first discovered oil in Heglig and Unity oilfields back in 1980. That was the beginning of the depopulation of Ruweng County through a scorched earth policy brutally implemented by the government of Sudan. Chevron was forced out of Sudan by the increasing hostilities between the government and the Southern opposition. However, oil exploration and production has recently resumed under the Greater Nile
Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). This is a consortium consisting of Talisman Energy (Canada), CNPC (China), Petronas (Malaysia) and Sudapet (Sudan's state oil company).

Talisman Oil joined GNOPC in 1998. From April to July 1999, more than half the population of Ruweng County, where the Unity and Heglig oilfields are found, was displaced by savage government attacks. This was confirmed in a report by the UN Special Rapporteur, Leonardo Franco, in 1999. Talisman and the other oil companies, however, say there have been no attacks, no depopulation. They claim that they found an 'empty landscape'. It is true. The county was empty, but not because it was never inhabited. A research team funded by the European Coalition on Oil met the people that Talisman Oil says do not exist. What follows is an account of the appalling human rights abuses that the government of Sudan still carries out against Southerners living in Ruweng County, in Blocks 1 and 2.

In Blocks 1 and 2, Ruweng County, the devastating effects of the oil war are all too apparent. Over three-quarters of the civilian population has been displaced. The areas around Heglig and Unity oilfields, the first to be opened up, have been wastelands since early 1999, when the government began forcibly removing the civilians in an effort to secure the area before oil exploration began. The most recent attacks were on the villages between Jukabar and Bal in October and November 2001. The entire area is the newest wasteland, devoid of civilian population. The Southerners of Ruweng County now huddle in two areas of swampland in the northeast and southeast corners of their county. There is nowhere else to run.” (Dan Church Aid/Christian Aid, 30 April 2002, p.11)

"Since the 1989 coup, the government has aggressively developed these reserves, persisting even though the major oil companies abandoned exploration out of security concerns when the civil war erupted. Indeed, the government has taken an approach to defending the oilfields never considered by foreign companies in the early 1980s: depopulating the surrounding territory.

[...] Also central to the government's strategy has been an effort to sow divisions within the ethnic Nuer members of the SPLA. Nuer comprise the largest ethnic group in the south after the Dinka and are mainly located in the Upper Nile oil fields, a region also populated around the periphery by Dinka. Both groups traditionally moved through the other's territory to get cattle to water. Although sporadic cattle raiding took place, the Nuer and Dinka avoided full-scale conflict in the border area until the civil war” (ICG, 1 January 2002, pp.132-133).

"[I]n October 1999, the Government of Canada decided to send an assessment mission to, inter alia, investigate and report on the alleged link between oil and human rights violations, in particular in respect of the forced removal of populations around the oilfields.

The findings of the mission, led by John Harker late in 1999, largely confirmed the observations of the Special Rapporteur and shed further light on the May/June 1999 offensive in Ruweng county, revealing that, from April to July 1999, the decline in population in the county seemed to have been in the order of 50 per cent, and that over the years, the series of attacks and displacements were leading to a gradual depopulation of the area, since only a percentage of people who fled returned after each displacement.

[...]

At the beginning of August [2000], the United Nations estimated that there were up to 40,000 internally displaced persons moving into Bentiu, most in an alarming nutritional state.” (UN GA 11 September 2000, paras. 19-21, 25-26)

"Violent conflict continues unabated around the oil fields in Unity State (Western Upper Nile). The humanitarian situation remains critical there as the conflict further factionalises and as human rights are systematically denied and violated. Humanitarian access to populations in the initial stages of displacement remains problematic on grounds of security and denial of access” (UN November 2000, p.7)

"Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining, Awad Ahmad alJaz, said that the country's oil production, which started at 150,000 barrels a day, had now reached 220,000 barrels a day, the Sudanese newspaper
'Al-Ra’y al’Amm' reported on Tuesday. At a price per barrel in the region of US $25, that delivers oil revenues in the region of $5.5 million per day, or over $900 million per year. According to the British-based NGO Christian Aid, exports of the Sudan’s estimated reserves of two million barrels are paying for the build-up of a homegrown arms industry as well as paying for more arms imports" (IRIN-CEA 11 July 2001)

The advent of oil has widened the strategic imbalance between the government and the opposition and made ever clearer that the prospects of military victory by southern insurgents and their northern allies are slim. In the past two years, Khartoum’s defense expenditures have doubled. The south’s moral cause and its ability to sustain a low-grade guerilla war will persist and enable it to deny Khartoum any full, final military victory. However, over time the south’s threat to the government’s core interests will steadily weaken. If the south negotiates now, in earnest, with adequate external backing, it will be in a stronger position to secure its political and economic interests than if it delays taking that step for several years”. (CSIS February 2001, p.4)

*Sudan Human Rights Organisation calls on oil companies to momentarily stop their activities for the peace process to restart:*

[Sudan Human Rights Organisation] also called on China, the Talisman oil company and others investing in the oil sector in Sudan "to stop their activities at the present time to help the process of peace-making and the comprehensive political solution of the political crisis of Sudan". Fighting around the oilfields has exacerbated the uprooting of people from their homes, and in the oilfields in southern Unity (Wahdah) state alone an estimated 36,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) now also require food assistance, according to the NGO Save the Children (UK).” (IRIN-CEA, 3 Jul 2001, pp.1-2)

“Sudan hopes to double its oil production to 500,000 barrels per day by 2004, according to Energy Minister Awad al-Jaz. Hassan Ali al-Tom, second-in-command at the Energy Ministry, said Sudan has so far only tapped 15% of its oil potential. The Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Corporation began producing oil in August 1999 with 160,000 barrels per day. Production jumped to 240,000 barrels per day earlier this year and is set to reach 280,000 barrels next year, according to Awad el-Karim Mohammed Khair, director of the energy ministry's oil discoveries department.” (SFP, September 2002, p.3)

“Oil revenues contributed US$ 527 million to Sudan's treasury in the first nine months of 2002, accounting for 41 % of total revenue, according to Finance Minister al-Zubair Ahmed Hassan.” (SFP, November 2002, p.3)

**Causes of displacement**

**Deliberate military actions against civilians cited as the major cause of displacement (1999-2002)**

- By late 1980s most displaced arriving in Khartoum were Dinka, Shilluk and Nuer pastoralists fleeing Arab tribes armed by the government to defeat SPLA
- Evictions practiced by all parties to the conflict, including militias engaged in factional or tribal warfare
- Attacks on civilians with increasingly sophisticated weaponry were recorded following cease-fire in Nuba Mountains and troops redeployment in Bahr el Ghazal and Unity State
- Forced regroupment of civilians to ‘peace villages’
- People forced into flight by looting and terror
- Civilians flee after being cut off from access to essential supplies and international aid
• 40 aerial bombings including on IDP camps between May-June 2001 alone

“Although the first great wave of displaced persons arrived in Khartoum from the western regions of Kordofan and Darfur in 1984 as a result of the drought, by the late 1980s the greatest number were members of southern pastoral ethnic groups - Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer - from the Provinces of Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper Nile who were fleeing the brutal war in the south. Their influx coincided with a deliberate government policy of heavily arming Arab tribes in the border regions to help fight the war against SPLA. Africa Watch reported that tribal militia, in a thinly disguised counter-insurgency campaign promoted by the “democratically elected” Government of the time, had by the late 1980s massacred hundreds of civilians. […] This campaign, in combination with a famine of unprecedented severity, devastated the south.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.9 para 17)

“The causes of the displacement in the conflict in Sudan are typical of the increasing trend to violence that is directed less between armed groups, and more by armed groups against civilians. The primary cause of the internal displacement in Sudan is direct armed attack, or threat of armed attack on civilian populations, rather than innocent populations finding themselves in the crossfire of military against military operations. In an environment where civilians are the target of armed attacks, displacement could be significantly reduced if combatants respected the essential elements of international human rights and humanitarian law.” (AI 3 May 2000, p.20)

A UN advisor on IDP issues summarized in September 1999 similarly the main causes for displacement in Sudan as follows:
"The causes for internal displacements are multiple and complex, as are the driving forces behind them. A typology might, among others, include categories such as:

Mass evictions: Displacement may be ‘simply’ a collateral effect of indiscriminate warfare. However, it is military action with the clear intent to displace civilians which has become a major cause of displacement in southern Sudan. As the example of evictions from Bor County during the early nineties illustrates, the practice is used by all parties to the conflict, including militias engaged in factional or tribal warfare. More recently, some sources suggest that systematic attempts are underway to evict the indigenous population from the oil-rich Western Upper Nile region.

The forced regroupement in ‘peace villages’, as undertaken by governmental forces in the Nuba Mountains. There is some debate whether or not civilians are actually retrieved by force in a systematic manner. But even if civilians are ‘only’ entrapped because the lack of supplies and the danger of being caught between lines forces them to regroup – there is a military strategy behind the process.

Forcing people into flight by looting and terror, as in January/February 1998 during the rampage of the Kerubino militia in Bahr El Ghazal. Another example for this practice are the raids along the Babanusa-Wau railroad, by Murahaleen militia accompanying governmental supply trains. More indirect forms of obliging people to leave their homes by attrition, as reported from the Nuba Mountains whose population, even if self-reliant in food production, is cut off from other essential supplies, such as medication, salt, etc. Continuous harassment, such as indiscriminate aerial bombings of rural towns.

The disruption of subsistence farming, and the cutting off of civilians from emergency supplies, denying them access to international aid. Compounded by drought cycles, this has resulted in dramatic hunger migration, often over great distances, as in Bahr El Ghazal 1988 and 1998.

The cumulative effect of all displacement factors is a state of chronic insecurity and poverty in the rural south. This in turn has led to a chronic population drain from the south towards the transition zone (southern Kordofan and Darfur), and further north to Khartoum. The northwards movement of the displaced has created other types of humanitarian problems. Thus, for example, the displaced in the transition zone are often exposed to economic exploitation by local landowners. In the Greater Khartoum area large numbers of displaced persons are considered illegal squatters. They are under the threat of forced
relocation to settlement sites lacking the necessary infrastructure. Without concerted and systematic efforts to create more stable conditions for them, they risk to remain in a state of vulnerability and dependency.

It is not always easy to determine if displacement in the Sudan is of a forced or a voluntary nature. Seasonal migration as well as emigration to the north in search of better opportunities have a long tradition. Thus, many people originating from the south have taken roots in the Khartoum area in spite of all adversities, and their status as ‘IDPs’ has been sometimes questionable. Both the ‘displacement tradition’ in the Sudan and the problem of ‘status-determination’ are topics obscured by today’s political debates. Yet they cannot be avoided. (OCHA 28 September 1999 paras. 7-9)

"Government planes continued to bomb civilian and humanitarian sites in southern Sudan, although reportedly less frequently than last year. Various sources reported that up to 40 aerial bombings occurred during May-July, including attacks against camps for displaced persons. The Sudanese government announced a bombing cessation on May 24 but proclaimed a bombing resumption on June 11." (USCR 24 September 2001 p2)

“At the beginning of September the Government of Sudan (GoS) withdrew from the Machakos peace negotiations, “because of the atmosphere created by the military operations and the occupation of Torit town” by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), according to GoS Foreign Minister Mustafa Uthman Isma'il. This is somewhat disingenuous. Since the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20th July, GoS forces have launched a major offensive in western Upper Nile in which hundreds of civilians died, have killed and abducted international aid workers in eastern Upper Nile, and have escalated their aerial bombardment of civilians. Even the fighting in Torit was apparently initiated by GoS forces which moved out to attack SPLM/A positions. GoS is demanding a cease-fire as a pre-condition for resuming talks; SPLM/A has always maintained that this should be the last step in the process. A cease-fire would be to the military advantage of GoS should fighting resume, as it would be difficult for SPLM/A to maintain an unpaid “popular army” during a period of peace, whereas GoS would be able to use the oil revenue to strengthen its own regular armed forces.” (SFP, September 2002, p.1)

“According to international human rights organizations, GOS aerial attacks against civilians have increased substantially since the GOS withdraw from peace negotiations in Machakos. From September 9 to 24, 21 separate attacks have been reported, primarily in western Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria. Full implementation of the agreement to protect civilians and civilian facilities from military attack, signed by both the GOS and SPLA on March 29, 2002, has been delayed due to GOS points of clarification on the establishment of a monitoring system.the aiia.” (USAID, 11 October 2002)

“In 2002, changes witnessed in the pattern of conflict were marked by an intensification of armed clashes, with increasingly sophisticated weaponry, especially in and around the oil- producing areas of southern Sudan i.e. Unity State/Western Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal. Conflict, widely believed to have escalated following the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains in January 2002 when troops were redeployed from Nuba to the above-mentioned areas, resulted in increased vulnerability for the population and an increasingly volatile and dangerous operating environment for humanitarian workers. Large-scale displacement was registered in areas such as Rubkona, Mayom and Gogrial due to the systematic clearing of the population through aerial bombings followed by the deployment of ground forces.” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

An analysis made in 1996 provides further details about how the strategies of the various armed groups have made civilians the main victims of the civil war and caused displacements:

"In the war zones affected by direct fighting, the Sudanese Army, the Popular Defence Force, the SPLA factions, and all of their allied militias, have repeatedly targeted civilian populations. During the early phases of the war (1984-1988) such activities were intended to deny the opposing side supplies or civilian support. Hence, the rural subsistence economy and its assets were the primary target for attack. Since 1991, interfacational fighting within the SPLA (SPLA, SPLA United, SSIA) has intensified the asset stripping character of such attacks. In addition, relief inputs have also become targets. Since 1994 especially, food drops, primary health care facilities and OLS agency compounds have invited attack.
All of these activities have produced widespread displacement, as specific populations have been denied
the opportunity or means to feed themselves, and as groups of people have fled areas of conflict seeking
refuge elsewhere. Both parties to the conflict have also organised forcible relocations of populations at
different times during the war. In the North, outside of the conflict zone, the demolition of displaced
settlements and the relocation of the populations involved continues to be a major source of disruption.

Whatever the broader political and military objectives of the waning parties, the civil war has been fought
on the ground as a resource war. Battles between organised armed groups, with the intention of seizing or
holding territory, are only one aspect of the fighting. Civilians have been systematically targeted in asset
stripping raids since the outset. The intention has been not only to seize whatever resources they possess,
but to deny these resources to the opposing side. Civilian populations themselves have often been treated as
resources to control. The pattern of this resource war has also expanded to include relief supplies, with the
various parties adapting their strategies either to secure relief items, or to interdict the delivery of such
items to their opponents.

The net effect of these activities has been massive population displacement. In some cases, individual
families as well as large groups of people have moved into more secure areas near their original homes. In
other cases, there have been movements of large groups of people out of the war zone altogether. For
example, the Dinka of Abyei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal have moved to sites in the Transitional Zone, or
to Khartoum, while other populations have moved out of Equatoria and across border to become refugees
in Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, and Central African Republic. Prior to 1991, the SPLA also organized
movements of people to refugee camps in Ethiopia.” (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 14, 62, 63)

Internal displacement in Unity State (Western Upper Nile), Upper Nile and Blue Nile
closely linked to oil exploration (1989-2003)

• As war between ethnic groups over who would defend the oil fields was faltering, government
  started depopulating the areas using heavy artillery and proxy militias
• Amnesty International reported in 2000 that government military tactics of gross human rights
  violations, destroying harvests and looting livestock were designed to prevent the return of IDPs
• Sudan Special Rapporteur and Christian Aid are unequivocal: oil exploitation is accompanied by
  systematic human rights violations
• Where roads to the oil fields are built populations are forcibly displaced as their villages are
  systematically razed to the ground and their crops destroyed
• Blue Nile contested area due to hydroelectric scheme, proximity to oilfields and gold deposits
• The Special Rapporteur reiterated once more that oil was fuelling conflict and appealed to the
  right to development while addressing the issue of the use of oil revenues (Jan 2003)

"While all parties are guilty of flouting Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law, what
marks the government out from the opposition forces is the extent of its attack on civilians living in and
around the oil rich areas. This is having a devastating impact on the life of the South’s two main tribes: the
Nuer, the main victims of the current oil war, and the Dinka.” (Christian Aid 15 March 2001, p.6)

"The government did secure a peace agreement in 1997 with SPLA-United (later renamed the South Sudan
Independence Movement), which allowed its consortium to move into oilfield areas with Nuer militia
protection.

Much of the fighting in the Upper Nile region after the 1997 peace accord resulted from clashes between
militias over who would defend oil areas.
With its efforts to pit the Dinka and Nuer communities against each other faltering, the government increasingly has tried to remove the populations from around the oilfields. According to a recent authoritative study funded by Canadian and British NGOs and undertaken by two respected human rights researchers, the government launched a strategy of "coordinated attacks on civilian settlements in which aerial bombardment and raids by helicopter gunships are followed by ground attacks from government backed militias and government troops. These ground forces burn villages and crops, loot livestock and kill and abduct men, women and children".

"These attacks have intensified in the Western Upper Nile in the past year, and at times troops and militia have been reported to use oil company facilities as launching areas. As this and many other reports concluded, and evidence collected during an October 2001 ICG field trip supports, the government strategy is designed to drive away the local non-Arab rural populations to make the oil fields easier to defend. Numerous human rights sources have documented the scale of the destruction in the oilfields of the Upper Nile, including three successive UN Human Rights Rapporteurs for Sudan.

The government has also utilized proxy militias in its military strategy in Upper Nile, including both Baggara Arab militias from Kordofan and breakaway Nuer factions. Again, impunity for crimes committed during these operations is standard government policy, as is encouragement of looting" (ICG 2002, pp.132-136).

Report by Amnesty International on human rights violations by the security forces of the Government of Sudan and various government allied militias during 2000:

"[V]iolations by government security forces and armed opposition groups are directed on the population living in oil fields and surrounding areas, and is an effort to control, protect or destroy the oil production capacity.

Tens of thousands of people have been terrorized into leaving their homes in Western Upper Nile since early 1999.

The military tactics of the government’s security forces of destroying harvests, looting livestock and occupying the area is designed to prevent the return of the displaced population.

In addition to the air attacks, government troops on the ground reportedly drove people out of their homes by committing gross human rights violations; male villagers were killed in mass executions; women and children were nailed to trees with iron spikes. There were reports from some villages, north and south of Bentiu, such as Guk and Rik, that soldiers slit the throats of children and killed male prisoners who had been interrogated by hammering nails into their foreheads. In Panyejier last July, people had been crushed by tanks and helicopter gunship.

Construction of the oil pipeline running from the south to the north of the country began in 1997; it finally became operational in August 1999.

Staff employed by these companies worked in an area where there were serious security concerns. The pipeline crosses territories that are or have been in the frontline of the armed conflict. In order to build the pipeline local populations were allegedly displaced without compensation.

A direct link between the nature of the war and guarantees for security for oil exploration by foreign oil companies became most obvious in intensified warfare in the beginning of 1999. Amnesty International has observed a pattern of gross human rights violations in the areas in which foreign oil companies have rights for exploitation, both those who are actively operating with staff and those that have withdrawn, leaving assets and retaining their rights to oil production." (AI 3 May 2000, pp. 5,7,8,11)
In 2000 MSF noticed 75 percent of the population was displaced in Padeah District in Western Upper Nile:

"MSF also discovered that recent armed conflict in Padeah has displaced almost 75 percent of the population. An astonishing 95 percent of the population have, for the same reason, also reported cattle losses - the main source of trade and livelihood. It was, moreover, found that Padeah has never received United Nations or other general food rations and that there has been virtually no NGO presence since June 1998." (MSF 6 July 2000)

The Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in mission to Sudan (March 2001):

"During my [the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Sudan] visit I gathered further evidence that oil exploitation leads to an exacerbation of the conflict with serious consequences on the civilians. More specifically, I received information whereby the Government is resorting to forced eviction of local population and destruction of villages to depopulate areas and allow for oil operations to proceed unimpeded. I was informed that all the villages around Nhialdui, in Nimne, south of Bentiu, have been burnt to the ground and crop has been destroyed. Similarly, all the villages along the road up to Pulteri, in the surrounding of the oil fields at Rier, have been razed. Often, the situation is further exacerbated by ongoing fighting between the SPLM and the SPDF, which causes more displacement with the result that the entire central section of western Upper Nile can no longer be accessed and needy civilians are now beyond reach of OLS for either insecurity reasons or denial of access by the Government. With a new road in the process of being constructed in relation to the drilling platform at the Nile, east of Rier, more villages are likely to be burnt. It seems that, under the conditions of the on-going war, oil exploitation is often preceded and accompanied by human rights violations, particularly in terms of forced displacement. On the other hand, Government officials informed me of the social benefits linked to the oil exploitation and assured me that displaced individuals are compensated accordingly." (UNCHR 29 March 2001)

Forced displacement and bombing of fleeing civilians in areas were oil roads are built:

"The process of building an oil road in the concession area of Sweden’s Lundin Oil has been accompanied by massive human rights violations. Government troops and militias have burned and depopulated dozens of villages along, and in the vicinity of, the oil road. In visits to Western Upper Nile in August and November 2000, Christian Aid found thousands of Nuer civilians displaced from villages along this road, hundreds of miles away in Dinka Bahr el-Ghazal. They all told the same tale. Antonovs bombed the villages to scatter the people. Then government troops arrived by truck and helicopter, burning the villages and killing anyone who was unable to flee - in most cases, the old and the very young.

A UN official familiar with the area said that all the villages that once existed along the road to Pulteri have been razed to the ground. "As one flies along the new oil road, the only sign of life are the lorries travelling at high speed back and forth to the oilfield…. Small military garrisons are clearly visible every five kilometres. The bulk of the population that once lived in villages along the road and within walking distance of OLS airstrips are now nearly beyond reach. Communities in need cannot be assisted." (Christian Aid, 17 May 2001, p.2).

Southern Blue Nile displacements:

“Twelve thousand internally displaced people (IDPs) in Kurmuk county in South Blue Nile, Southern Sudan are in desperate need of food. This is due to the current severe hunger brought about by a combination of factors such as the ongoing war between the Sudan government and the SPLA, and the successive dry season offensives in each of the last four years. The Southern Blue Nile Region is a hotly contested area and has changed hands between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA on several occasions during the last 19 years of the Sudan civil war. The area is strategically important for both the SPLA and the GoS because of its proximity to the Damazin hydroelectric scheme to the north and the Khor Adar Oilfields to the west. Extensive gold deposits also make it potentially rich in other respects.” (ACT, 12 August 2002)

The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reiterated the link between conflict and oil and calls upon the right to development for resource-sharing agreements: (2003)
“In his previous reports, the Special Rapporteur repeatedly stated that oil was exacerbating the conflict, insofar as the war in the Sudan is mainly the result of a fight for the control of power and resources.

93. The Special Rapporteur recalled the Declaration on the Right to Development, as well as relevant Commission on Human Rights resolutions. In view of the latest United Nations Development Programme, Arab Human Development Report, the Special Rapporteur wishes to highlight once again the link between development and governance, defined as “the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. Good governance is, among other things, participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and equitable and it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus in society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard in decision-making over the allocation of development resources”. *(UNCHR, 6 January 2003, p.18)*

Since early 2002 military offensives in the oil areas have intensified and escalated since merger peace agreement between the SPLM/A and SPDF rebel forces

- Government of Sudan's air attack on civilians in Western Upper Nile killed at least 30 during February 2002
- Sweeden's Ludin's oil company is suspending its activities for security reasons
- According to relief workers escalation of military activity in the oil fields risks to displace as many as 50,000 (February 2002)
- Government offensive in Unity State is displacing for the second time IDPs who fled western Upper Nile and who are now pushed towards Bahr el Ghazal where Dinka populations are food insecure
- UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights confirms that oil is fuelling war and displacing people
- GoS claims that displaced populations are being compensated and that oil revenues are used to develop the south but it alleges that being asked to show proofs about oil revenues’ spending violates its sovereignty 36,000 IDPs are believed to be uprooted in southern Unity State (July 2001)
- Mayom’s county entire population displaced over 127,000 people fled GOS attack in Western Upper Nile

"A recent [since November 2001] escalation in military activity in western Upper Nile (Wahdah, or Unity State) could be due to a major government offensive to gain control of oil production areas, according to humanitarian sources.

"An offensive which started around November has been increased in the last few weeks. We have reports that troops have come in from Kassala [in eastern Sudan] and from the Nuba Mountains [in Southern Kordofan, south-central Sudan] following the cease-fire agreement there."

[...]

Following a helicopter gunship attack on a relief centre at the village of Bieh on 20 February, in which at least 24 people were reportedly killed, the US government announced it was suspending peace discussions with Khartoum until a satisfactory explanation was offered.

The incident at Bieh was the second clearly verified air attack on civilian targets in the oil-rich region in February. The village of Nimne, also in western Upper Nile, was bombed by government aircraft on 9 February, killing five civilians, including an employee of the international health organisation Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF).

[...]
A "massive increase" in attacks originating in Bentiu, the main government garrison town in the area - and capital of western Upper Nile/Unity State - had been observed, with a number of bombing raids by government Antonov aircraft being launched from there, they added.

[...] The apparent increase in government-sponsored military actions appeared to be linked to the signing of a merger agreement in January between the two largest rebel groups active in southern Sudan - the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the Sudan People's Defence Forces (SPDF).

At the time of that agreement, the Sudanese government described the merger as a "negative step", saying it could adversely affect the country's peace process. Prior to the merger, SPLA and SPDF forces had often been in conflict in western Upper Nile, with the SPDF suspected of working with government forces to secure oil production sites against SPLA attacks, according to regional analysts.

[...] The merger] resulted in the government suddenly losing a useful lever with which to control the area, analysts said.

[...] The Swedish oil company Lundin Petroleum AB announced in January the suspension of its operations in oil concession area Block 5a "as a precautionary measure to ensure maximum security for its personnel and operation", as a result of the deterioration of security levels in the area.

The government has held that the attacks on Bieh and Nimne were unfortunate mistakes stemming from its response to rebel attacks. It has also claimed that rebel forces, and not the government, were responsible for targeting civilians.

[...] According to analysts, however, government forces could be aiming to secure the main road running from the town of Bentiu, a government-held oil producing centre, south to the government garrison town of Leer (Ler, 8.18 N 30.08 E), in order to facilitate access to oil concession block 5a.

SPLA Commander Peter Gadet's forces had reportedly repulsed several attempts by the government to advance out of Bentiu down the "oil road", according to humanitarian sources. "There is an ever-increasing offensive to open the road to Leer. We have reports of lots of tanks and other armoured vehicles moving in the area," they said.

An escalation of fighting would exacerbate the problems faced by thousands of displaced people in western Upper Nile, informed relief workers told IRIN this week. As many as 50,000 civilians could be expected to flee south from Bieh, Leer, Koch, Duar, Nhial Diu and Mankien Payam districts, they said.

The Sudanese government on 23 February claimed to have captured the airstrip situated at Nhial Diu, some 40 km southwest of Bentiu.

[...] Many civilians had sought sanctuary at Nhial Diu following previous outbreaks of fighting in western Upper Nile, humanitarian sources reported. As a result of renewed government offensives, they were now being pushed further afield; there was now a danger they could be forced into Bahr al-Ghazal, possibly putting pressure on Dinka communities there at a time when food security was "precarious" following a modest harvest. (IRIN, 28February 2002, pp.1-3).

"It is a fact that oil is fueling the war," it quoted Baum as saying. "It is not a religious war. Religion is misused... It is a power struggle." The US and Europe had a responsibility to press for an end to the fighting, according to Baum. "We must help the country come to peace," he said, criticising the approach of those who believed that Sudan should be isolated until the human rights situation improved. "They will not be able to establish peace from the inside." (IRIN-CEA, 3 Jul 2001, pp.1-2)
The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan, Gerhart Baum, presented his report to the UN General Assembly:

The Sudanese ambassador to the United Nations, Elfatih Mohamed Ahmed Erwa, said his delegation saw certain aspects of the report as fiction. He also considered that Baum's request for a breakdown of oil revenues spent on people in the south "violates sovereignty and is an unacceptable interference in matters within the jurisdiction of the government".

Baum told the General Assembly that internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, now living in camps, had fled from oil regions of the country, yet did not benefit from oil revenues. Since IDPs were part of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, it was appropriate to ask how such money was spent, he added.

In a war situation such as that in Sudan, oilfields attracted [military] attention, which resulted in civilian victims and left people with no option but to flee. In that context, he had the right to ask the government about oil expenditures, since it claimed to be using the money for development purposes, Baum added."[...]

According to reliable sources, oil revenue was insufficiently used to improve the social and economic situation of the population - especially in the south, Baum reported. Relevant sources agreed that the exploitation of oil reserves had led to "a worsening of the conflict, which has also turned into a war for oil", he added.

No matter what oil companies did in terms of providing social services in the areas in which they operated, they would continue to face international criticism by doing business in Sudan until military warfare ended there, he said.

The government of Sudan has denied that oil revenues are used to fuel the war, claiming instead that they are being spent on developing the south. Baum said he had seen little evidence so far to support that assertion, and remained interested in seeing some, but Sudan (and other countries which supported it in the General Assembly) maintained that the expenditure of government revenues was an internal issue for sovereign governments."(IRIN, 14 November 2001, pp. 1,3)

"The political and humanitarian discussions occurred against a backdrop of an offensive by governmentsupported militias since the end of December 2002 in Western Upper Nile that threatened to make a nullity of the cessation of hostilities agreement and put the entire peace process at risk. Western Upper Nile, which is home to most of the oil resources in the Sudan, has produced some of the fiercest fighting and worst humanitarian conditions in the world over the past decade. [...]"

"The pattern of the militia attacks was consistent with the government strategy of the past several years that has been directed at clearing civilian populations out of the oil rich areas of Western Upper Nile. [...] The offensive had two prongs. One, led by the militia of James Lieh Diu, pushed south from Bentiu along the road to Leer. When fighting began on 31 December, the road reached approximately sixteen kilometers north of Leer, and at least two SPLA - held villages, Reang and Kouk, stood between its southernmost point and that town.[...] The objective was to push the SPLA out of the way and extend the road eventually beyond Leer, southeast to Adok, along the Nile. The government would then be able to re-supply and transport its forces in Western Upper Nile first by barge along the river to Adok, subsequently by road north to Bentiu and west to Mankien and Mayom, all the while facilitating exploration for new oil reserves.” (ICG, 10 February 2002, p.1)

Gunship helicopters attacks over Mayom killed about 300 and displaced about up to 100,000 civilians (July 2002):

"Our sources on the ground estimate something between 200 and 300 were killed by helicopter gunships, ground forces, horsemen and militia" during a three-day attack on the county of Mayom, in Western Upper Nile, said Michael Chang, the regional coordinator of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, the humanitarian arm of the SPLA.
Chang added that Mayom's entire population, estimated to number between 80,000 and 100,000, had fled to neighbouring counties and that others had been abducted with their cattle.

The attack was across "the whole county", he said. Chang said there was no fighting late Tuesday as the SPLA had withdrawn following the attack which led government forces to take control of the area.” (AFP 30 July 2002)

“The cease-fire has broken down completely in the oil-fields of western Upper Nile, where GoS has launched major offensives in the areas of Tam, Mankien, Leer and Leal, with many villages destroyed and civilians killed or displaced. Leal was attacked shortly after a visit by a UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) aircraft, and OLS has noted that this is not the first time this month that a location in western Upper Nile has been attacked after such a visit. An NGO working in Mayom County reports that there seems to be a deliberate attempt to attack relief sites, thereby cutting local civilians off from humanitarian assistance. GoS claims that the attacks are just local militia activity but there is little doubt that these militia are under GoS control and are supported by regular forces, including helicopter gunships. It is thought that GoS garrisons along the “oil road” have been strengthened. Cdr Peter Gadet defected back to GoS with some of his senior commanders but few troops, and there are reports of forced recruitment in the Bentiu area.” (SFP, January 2003, p.5)

**Displacement in Unity State and Upper Nile areas related to fighting between rivaling rebel groups (2000)**

- Civilians in Raga target of government aerial bombing after SPLA recaptured the town on 2 June 2001
- Thousands displaced as Raga and Deim Zubeir fall to government troops (October 2001)
- Raids by government-allied troops in Aweil displace 4,000, kill 93 and enslave 85 civilians
- UNICEF reported that 80 percent of the 1338 IDPs arriving in Wau town are women and children

"Since the beginning of July [2000], more than 34,000 people have arrived in Bentiu and Rob Kona, towns under Sudanese Government control situated in the El Ouadha region, 800 Km South of Khartoum. These people, who lived within the 100Km radius around Bentiu, have fled violent fighting between rival factions, resulting in the looting and destruction of villages. In the few days between the 28th and 31st July, 19,000 displaced people, mainly women and children arrived. After several days walking, with the majority having nothing to eat, they are in an alarming nutritional state.” (ACF 10 August 2000)

"The [South Sudan Liberation Movement/Army] SSLM/A said the fighting, which has been raging for two weeks between the combined forces of Sudan People's Defence Forces (SPDF) of rebel leaders Riek Machar and Major-General Paulino Matip and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels commanded by Peter Gadet Yak in Bentiu and Fangak areas, was "senseless and unnecessary."

"Recent experience in southern Sudan has demonstrated that the fighting now [March 2001] in progress will provoke a new humanitarian disaster, unless immediately checked.

The Nuer are already conducting inter-Nuer warfare. In addition, the Nuer and the Dinka are currently poised to go to war against each other; the Dinka are the largest tribe in southern Sudan, and the Nuer, the second largest. They are neighbors and cousins, sharing many customs and beliefs. History has shown that peace in the south is impossible if these two tribes are fighting each other.
The way that inter-Nuer and Nuer-Dinka war have been conducted recently is in violation of both traditional Nuer and Dinka practices of war and international humanitarian law, namely: burning homes, villages, community structures, and grain, and killing women and children. These types of abuses have been the proximate cause of several famines in recent years.

One example was the famine that hit the East Bank of the Nile in 1993, where tens of thousands died in the “Hunger Triangle” (formed by Adok, Waat, and Kongor, villages straddling the Nuer/Dinka divide). This crisis was precipitated by Nuer/Dinka fighting (1991-93), also in disregard of tribal and international rules of war, which grew out of the 1991 split in the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) led by Riek Machar.

The fighting in 2001 is not traditional tribal conflict, because many other actors with their own agendas have inserted themselves. In addition to the government army, the other organized military players sharing the blame for this looming disaster are the government-backed Nuer militias, particularly the militias of Gordon Kong Chuol and Simon Gatwich; the Sudan People’s Democratic Front/Defense Forces (SPDF) of Nuer leader Riek Machar; and the SPLA.

In Eastern Upper Nile, the Nuer government militias and Sudan army are fighting against Riek Machar SPDF (Nuer) forces and the SPLA. Militia Cmdr. Gordon Kong of Nasir is active in trying to drive out these forces from areas adjacent to oilfields that are in development. In the process many civilians have been killed and forcibly displaced. His militia has even placed landmines in the compounds of relief organizations.

In Central Upper Nile, other SPLA (Nuer) forces have fought the SPDF (Nuer), with the result that government forces have captured towns not in government control for more than a decade. Cmdr. Simon Gatwich, another Nuer pro-government militia leader, joined the fighting, and reportedly threatened to lead a Nuer retaliatory attack on the Dinka.” (HRW March 2001)

**New displacements in Kassala state due to conflict along the Sudan eastern border (1997-2002)**

- Escalated insecurity caused displacement of approximately 40,000 persons in 1998
- Reported in March 2000 that 70,000 may become displaced as military operations continue
- Fighting between the NDA and the GOS over the town of Kassala in November 2000 resulted in significant population displacements
- New displacements in Kassala due to conflict between the NDA and GoS
- Immediately after 15 October MOU GOS striked on the Eastern front on the grounds of legitimate defence against Eritrean aggression

"Insecurity in the [Kassala State] region escalated in 1998 and is expected to continue in 1999, placing a greater number of people at risk of displacement and in need of humanitarian assistance. Prior to 1998, there were few needs in the region and little history of aid intervention for IDPs. The displacement of approximately 40,000 persons from the border in 1998 stretched the coping mechanisms of the State. Although difficulties in accessing the region continue, the State Governor recently requested an increased international presence. Years of drought have undermined food security, particularly along the border areas from where the newly displaced originate. Reduction in border trade and limited job opportunities in Kassala have also diminished the purchasing power of the newly displaced. Displacement and the consequent disruption of the planting season have created large food deficits for 1999 despite predictions of a good harvest. It is estimated that 30,000 targeted beneficiaries will face food deficits of up to 80 percent and require emergency food relief." (UN January 1999, "Kassala State")
"A mission from SRC to Wad el Hileau in mid-month reported the arrival of 2,000 people from Zehana. These newly displaced people are reported to be destitute and in need of humanitarian assistance. In Kassala town, the prices of essential commodities such as sorghum have risen by about 50% since the clashes intensified in mid-March. The SRC reported that the total number of people at risk of new displacement could rise to 70,000 as military operations continue. The coping mechanisms of the agro-pastoralist IDPs are based on security and mobility. The current insecurity has, therefore, severely affected these mechanisms. The IDPs are no longer able to collect firewood and sell charcoal or undertake cross border trade activities. Consequently, they have been forced to place greater reliance on food aid. " (WFP March 2000, sect. 2.3.1)

"In November 2000, an armed conflict between the NDA and the GOS over the town of Kassala had a negative impact on the humanitarian situation in eastern Sudan. The fighting resulted in significant population displacements and a lack of essential services and food sources. Emergency relief response to the area has been extremely limited." (USAID 20 April 2001)

“According to international media sources, in early October heavy fighting between GOS and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) forces in Kassala State forced thousands of civilians to flee. NDA forces are believed to have captured the towns of Hamashkhoreib and Shallob. The GOS has accused the Government of Eritrea (GOE) of backing the rebel movement, which the GOE denied.” (USAID, 11 October 2002)

“After a long break, fighting resumed on the Eastern Front. National Democratic Alliance (NDA) forces captured a number of garrisons, including Hameshkoreb, Shallob and Rasai, and threatened the main road from Port Sudan to Khartoum. GoS has alleged direct Eritrean military involvement, and has lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council against Asmara for “aggression”. Eritrea has denied this. Eritrean involvement in some form or other is not unlikely, although independent foreign journalists in the area could find no evidence of an Eritrean presence. The head of the Sudan Alliance Force (part of the NDA), Abdul Aziz Khaled, told a London-based Arabic newspaper that, “The region offers the shortest path to reach Khartoum and free it from the religious and totalitarian regime…. Our final goal is Khartoum and the Kassala road is one of the paths leading to the capital”. “ (SFP, October 2002, p. 4)

“After days of intense fighting, NDA forces captured a handful of government garrisons, including the symbolic hamlet of Hamashkoreib, which they had controlled for eight months in 2000. The assault positioned their forces within striking distance of several key government strategic sites: the city of Kassala, the highway between Khartoum and Port Sudan and the vital oil pipeline. Nearly simultaneously with entry into force of the 15 October cessation of hostilities agreement, the government struck back on this front. It asserts the right of self-defense and insists the region is outside the truce because it is responding to Eritrean aggression, not domestic insurgency.[…]” (ICG, 14 November 2002, p7 )

**Inter- Ethnic conflict in Darfur affected 55,000 people (May 2002)**

“Inter-ethnic conflict continued during the month with the destruction of villages resulting in death and injury to various populations in North Darfur (Kabkabiyya Province), West Darfur (Western Jebel Marra and Adilla province) and in South Darfur (Eastern Jebel Marra). Approximately 17 villages with a combined population of approximately 55,000 were affected.” (OCHA, 29 July 2002)

“Conflict was witnessed in South Darfur between the Rezigat and Mailla tribes. The Mailla forcefully moved 279 Households from settlements and villages around Adilla town to Ed Daien province as these HHs were believed to be Rezigat supporters. Initial assistance to the 279 HHs has been provided by the GoS. This conflict caused Dinka
IDPs living in settlements around Adilla province to also move to Adilla town.” (OCHA 31 May 2002)

**LRA has displaced southern Sudanese in Eastern Equatoria since 2000(October 2002)**

- LRA troops have displaced many southern Sudanese, burning and looting IDP camps since late 2001
- Post 9/11 has left LRA with no support from Khartoum who wanted to distanciate itself from the terrorist group
- Numbers displaced and killed by the LRA steeply increased since March 2002 when GoS gave permission to the UPDF to track LRA in southern Sudan
- About 20,000 people displaced due to LRA attacks in eastern Equatoria (Nov 2002)

“In recent months, the conflict between the northern Ugandan rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), and the Ugandan government has significantly escalated, with resulting serious human rights abuses against civilians not only in northern Uganda but also in southern Sudan. Displaced persons and refugees and the agencies assisting them are not simply caught in the crossfire of this war, but have become primary focuses of LRA attacks in both Sudan and Uganda. By September 2002, it was estimated that 552,000 Ugandans were displaced or at risk of having no harvest, at least 24,000 Sudanese refugees in Uganda had been forcibly displaced, unknown thousands of southern Sudanese were displaced inside Sudan, and refugee and displaced persons camps and supplies have been looted or burned. Tens of civilians have been killed in this conflict since March 2002 in both northern Uganda and southern Sudan.

From late 2000, the LRA had largely retreated to southern Sudan, where it maintained its headquarters and training bases and enjoyed the support of the Sudan government. Around the same time, however, the Sudanese government began to end its assistance to this rebel movement, under an agreement with the Ugandan government, which reciprocally agreed to end its support for the Sudanese rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Seeking food, and moving from its bases near Juba to the more remote Imatong Mountains in Sudan, the LRA looted food from and displaced hundreds of Sudanese families in attacks in southern Sudan in late 2001 and early 2002, causing casualties and destroying villages.

The Sudan government had supported the LRA in retaliation for the Ugandan government's support of the SPLM/A, which has been fighting the Sudanese government since 1983. The presidents of the two countries agreed in 1999 to end support of these two groups and to restore normal diplomatic relations. The Sudan government was also motivated, after September 11, 2001, to disassociate itself from the LRA, deemed a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department. By then, Khartoum had already started to cut off food, medicine, and other support for the LRA inside Sudan, even though the Ugandan government had not taken any visible steps to cut off aid to the SPLA. The LRA had largely retreated into Sudan after an outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever in Gulu, northern Uganda, in late 2000, and northern Uganda became relatively quiet.

The Sudan government's cutback of aid to the LRA weakened the rebel group but did not lead to its disintegration. To survive, the LRA attacked and looted southern Sudanese villages for food. Wary of the Sudan government's intentions, the LRA began moving from its bases south of Juba to Upper Talanga, a remote area of the Imatong Mountains on the Sudan/Uganda border, sometime in 2001.

In March 2002, the Sudan government gave the UPDF permission to enter Sudanese territory in order to capture and destroy the LRA. The UPDF, which had been saying in 2000 that it was "ready" to chase the LRA out of southern Sudan, called this "Operation Iron Fist." This brought the Ugandan civil war inside
Sudan, with several thousand troops from the LRA and more than ten thousand UPDF soldiers conducting operations to the detriment of tens of thousands of southern Sudanese civilians, who already had the Sudanese civil war to cope with.

On August 31, 2002, the SPLA, which was not a party to the UPDF-LRA fighting in its territory, captured the Sudanese government garrison town of Torit in Eastern Equatoria, southern Sudan, just north of the area of LRA and UPDF fighting. In late September, the Sudan government bombed the UPDF in Palotaka, southern Sudan, to the south of Torit. The Sudanese government later said the bombing of the UPDF was an "accident" and that the Sudanese pilots had been aiming at the SPLA. It questioned what UPDF troops were doing in such close contact with the SPLA. One Sudanese government spokesman said that "an unidentified neighboring country" helped the SPLA capture Torit. Despite this incident, another Sudan government spokesman maintained that Sudan-Uganda relations were in "good shape."

The LRA, in its attacks on Ugandan Acholi internally displaced persons camps, sometimes first warned the residents to evacuate the camps or else face the LRA. It did this in Palabek, Kitgum district, on July 20. On July 25, it attacked the Palabek Gem camp, looted some shops and the food supplies distributed by the WFP the day before, and abducted the headmaster of the school with all his family. In mid-August 2002, the LRA announced that all humanitarian agencies working in northern Uganda-most assigned to internally displaced persons camps-had to withdraw, or risk becoming targets of new attacks. Despite this warning, relief agencies continued operations, although with scaled back staff and assets and few trips to the camps.

The LRA also targeted Sudanese refugees in Uganda. There are some 180,000 refugees in Uganda, according to the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), of whom 87 percent or 156,500 are Sudanese, almost all in refugee camps in northern Uganda not far from the Sudan border. In Pader district, LRA forces raided the Achol-pii camp for Sudanese refugees on August 5, killing approximately fifty people in a confrontation with the Ugandan army, including four UPDF soldiers and two Ugandan policemen. Eleven LRA rebels were killed in the clash. The LRA also abducted five aid workers from the International Rescue Committee (IRC), releasing them after five nights of captivity; on the second day demands were made in exchange for their lives. The LRA looted all the relief food recently delivered to Achol-pii camp, and burned what it could not carry; it also burned dwellings, vehicles, and administration buildings, forcing the camp's 24,000 Sudanese refugees and relief staff to flee the site. Some refugees fled back to Sudan, but the majority fled to non-Acholi areas of Uganda. The UNHCR began to settle these displaced refugees into alternative sites in other parts of the country. (HRW, 29 October 2002)

"However when the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) entered Sudan with the consent of GoS to attack the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Uganda asked SPLM/A to refrain from attacks in the area while the UPDF was present (leading to suspicions that this was one of GoS' reasons for permitting UPDF activity in Sudan in the first place). Southern Sudanese frustration at LRA atrocities may have contributed to SPLM/A's attack on Kapoeta. Continued LRA atrocities against civilians (along with a widespread southern belief that GoS is still clandestinely supporting LRA), coupled with frustration at GoS offensives in Upper Nile and the continuing GoS bombing of civilians, may have precipitated this attack on Torit. SPLM/A forces continued from Torit to capture Liria, and explosions can be heard from Juba. SPLM/A captured large quantities of new weaponry in Torit. Reports are emerging of the Arabisation and Islamisation of Torit during the period of its occupation by GoS." (SFP, September 2002, p.3)

"In eastern Equatoria, activities by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) including attacks within Uganda led to the displacement of approximately 20,000 persons within Sudan and the return of approximately 2,000 Sudanese nationals from northern Uganda. These actions, including the laying of land mines on routes used to provide humanitarian assistance, caused frequent road closures, which impacted negatively on the provision of humanitarian assistance. Inter-ethnic conflict, rooted in regular dry-season cattle migration and consequent competition for pastureland, cattle and water, occurred in the transition zones and parts of northern Sudan. Banditry was also common in these areas.” (UN, November 2002, p. 3)
Civilians pay the price of continuous fighting over strategic towns in Bahr al Ghazal (2001-2002)

- Civilians in Raga target of government aerial bombing after SPLA recaptured the town on 2 June 2001
- Thousands displaced as Raga and Deim Zubeir fall to government troops (October 2001)
- Raids by government-allied troops in Aweil displace 4,000, kill 93 and enslave 85 civilians
- UNICEF reported that 80 percent of the 1338 IDPs arriving in Wau town are women and children

"At least 10 people have been killed, six of them at the weekend, in Sudanese government bombing raids on the southern town of Raga, which fell to rebels earlier this month, the Roman Catholic church said Wednesday.

A mother and her baby were among those killed in an air strike on Sunday, according to Bishop Caesar Mazzalori of Rumbek Diocese, his diocese said in a statement released in Nairobi.

Four other people were killed when a Russian-made Antonov plane bombed the town on June 6 to 7.

"This is really diabolical, considering that so far the Sudan government has continued to deny humanitarian agencies access to Raga," said Mazzolari, who on Tuesday visited the town, taken by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) on June 2.

The Roman Catholic cleric said that Sunday's air strike took place in the afternoon and involved between seven and nine bombs, which were dropped along a straight line on a strictly civilian section of the town.

He said the bomber aircraft had flew low over the town as if to identify its intended targets." (AFP 27 June 2001)

"Sudan's army said it retook the city of Raga in the southwestern state of Bahr al-Ghazal from the country's rebel forces on Sunday morning.

The rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) announced on June 4 that it had captured Raga, a strategic city which controls the border trade between the southwest and the neighbouring Central African Republic."(AFP 14 Oct 2001)

"The Sudanese government on Sunday [18 November 2001] claimed to have recaptured the town of Deim Zubeir (Daym Zubayr), Western Bahr al-Ghazal, after over five months of its occupation by the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).

"The recapture of Deim Zubeir (Daym Zubayr) is part of an operation which has been continuing since [the town of] Raga was recaptured by the government," deputy head of mission at the Sudanese embassy in Nairobi, Muhammad Dirdiery, told IRIN on Monday.

There has, as yet, been no independent capture of the town, which is located in an active military zone from which humanitarian agencies are banned, and SPLM/A spokespersons were unavailable for comment.

Thousands of civilians have been displaced in renewed fighting between the government and SPLA in Western Bahr al-Ghazal through October and November, during which government retook Raga in mid-October." (IRIN 19 November 2001, p.1)

12 villages north of Aweil raided displace 4,000 civilians:

"Christian Solidarity International (CSI), an NGO long at odds with the Sudanese government, on Wednesday cited civil authorities in the Aweil region of northern Bahr al-Ghazal in claiming that government-allied armed forces had killed 93 civilians and enslaved 85 women and children in a new offensive between 23 and 26 October."
Members of the regular army and the paramilitary Popular Defence Forces (PDF) raided 12 villages just north of the garrison town of Aweil, the NGO said. Over 4,000 civilians had been displaced and hundreds of livestock looted, it added.

The government is trying to create greater military stability around Aweil to allow less troublesome oil exploitation in the nearby concession area of the Canadian firm Talisman, according to CSI.

The government's military position in Bahr al-Ghazal was strengthened by the recapture of Raga town in western Bahr al-Ghazal in mid-October, and the arrival at the Aweil garrison of reinforcements accompanying the Khartoum-Wau military train, the NGO stated.

Christian Solidarity International was an organisation discredited by the United Nations itself, when it removed its consultative status at the Economic and Social Council, Muhammad Dirdiery, Deputy Head of Mission at the Sudanese embassy in Kenya, told IRIN on Thursday. "(IRIN 1 November 2001)

Arrival of Murahleen militias in areas around Wau town causing new displacement in Bahr Al Ghazal during first half of 2001:
"UNICEF reported the displacement of civilian populations from the surrounding rural areas to Wau town on 4 March 2001. From 10-30 March, the total number registered and verified stood at 1338 persons, of which 80% were women and children.

[...]
The reasons for displacement were reported to be insecurity due to the arrival in the area of about 3000 Murahleen, raids/attacks on their villages, and the drought situation. The villages affected are Achongchong, Lau, Pan Kout, Magai, Un-Kuel, Nyang, Apiem, Kuac, Apuk and Akoc. The Commissioner of Wau and Jur River provinces also reported an influx of about 750-1200 IDPs from the Jur tribe around Khor Ghana (63 miles West of Wau town). Significant deterioration is expected in the general health status of the IDPs if an immediate action is not taken to provide them with shelter." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

Conflict and conflict induced hunger behind displacements in the Nuba Mountains area/South Kordofan (1987-2002)

- SPLA concentrated troops in the Nuba Mountains in 1987 and began organising raids against a number of Government garrisons
- Arrival of Government made those who lived in the plains seek shelter in the mountainous areas
- Abduction of women and children are a major problem in the villages near the 'frontline'
- Reported that a Government offensive by the beginning of 2001 caused new displacement, but the Government view is that some 30,000 Nuba have voluntarily returned from SPLA areas to government controlled parts of the Nuba Mountains (April 2001)
- US Special Humanitarian Coordinator warns of war-induced famine in the once most fertile Nuba Mountains and condemns oil-linked military attacks which displaced up to 50,000 in May 2001

"Like the rest of Sudan, the Nuba Mountains have been the scene of much internal displacement because of the conflict, hunger, and conflict-induced hunger. The SPLA concentrated troops in the Nuba Mountains in 1987 and began organising raids against a number of Government garrisons in 1988. The following year saw an escalation of the fighting and the area under the control of SPLM became isolated from the rest of the country. The arrival of Government forces caused a major disruption in Nuba people's lives and a large number of those who lived in the plains abandoned their farms and their homes to seek shelter in the mountainous areas." (UNCERO 8 November 1999, p. 108)

"In several locations, women and community leaders also mentioned that abduction of women and children are a major problem in the villages near the 'frontline' [around the Nuba Mountains]. In a couple of
occasions in Heiban County, the Mission was provided with names, locations and dates of alleged abductions. Abductions of women and children were also reported in Nagorban County especially in the villages at the foot of the mountains that are sometimes raided by combatants and other armed groups. They also seem to occur when women and children are ambushed while fetching water or collecting wild fruit.

These abductions were alleged to happen in the following ways:
- Shanabla and armed Arab militias are said to regularly raid the lowland plains and abduct women and children as well as take cattle and goats. The families of the abducted people subsequently have no information on the whereabouts of the victims.
- Soldiers allegedly often ambush women at water points and very frequently rape them and leave them for dead. Relatives or community members have found the women in many cases. In other cases, the soldiers are said to take the women with them to their garrisons. Unless they escape, the whereabouts of these women are usually not known.
- Involuntary displacement to peace camps in southern Kordofan - GOS forces allegedly come into the SPLM-controlled areas where they uproot entire communities to relocate them to the GOS-controlled Peace Camps. In many cases, the presence of these people in the peace camps is known through various communication networks or from reports of those who manage to return to their communities.” (UNCERO 8 November 1999, p. 101)

By the beginning of 2001 it was reported that:

"Thousands of people have fled rebel-held areas in Sudan's Nuba mountains and sought sanctuary in government-controlled territory, a Sudanese government official said on Wednesday. State-run Sudanese television on Tuesday night showed thousands of civilians, mostly women, naked children and elderly people, in the Nuba mountains town of Kaduqli, about 900 km southwest of the capital Khartoum, Associated Press (AP) said. The television report said about 30,000 such people had fled to Kaduqli and its surrounding areas after the army defeated a rebel force in the Nuba mountain area. Muhammad Harun Kafi, a former member of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), told AP that more people were expected to follow after the government victory: 'These people have been under check by the rebel movement, not allowing them to move outside and... and not provided with any services.' Kafi is now a minister of state in the Khartoum government.

A statement by the SPLA received by IRIN on Thursday denied that government forces had scored recent victories, including in the Nuba mountains. It said the government had started a dry-season offensive before the end of December when civilian targets were bombed at Kawdah and neighbouring villages: "The few ground attacks that were staged by the GOS [Government of Sudan] army and the Popular Defence Force [PDF] have been repulsed with heavy casualties," the statement said. The SPLA said 'claims by GOS that its forces have "liberated" 30,000 Nuba civilians from rebels are... ludicrous.' (IRIN 19 January 2001)

"A government military offensive picked up in December and moved into Western Kaduqli County, Nubah Mountains, said one humanitarian worker with experience in the area. 'What we see is the government attacking farms and homes, and forcing people to come to the government-controlled areas,' said the source." (IRIN 16 February 2001)

"Renewed fighting between the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) started in January 2001 in the Nuba Mountains. Eleven villages that have 4,283 families with a total of 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas to areas around the town of Kadugli. The IDPs are mostly women, children and elderly. The expected dry season's offensive by the warring parties is likely to displace more people." (ACT 21 March 2001)

"Since December last year, rebel forces in the area have experienced a series of defeats. As a result some 30,000 Nuba have returned to government controlled parts of the Nuba Mountains. "Voluntary returnees" according to the local government, which is busy resettling these people in villages within their control." (ACT 5 April 2001)
Forced displacement into "peace villages" as government troops systematically destroy 2500 households in the Nubah Mountains:

"The last fortnight had seen the biggest government offensive in the Nubah Mountains since 1992, when the Islamist regime in Khartoum declared a jihad, or holy war, the British 'Guardian' newspaper reported from Kawdah (11.06N 30.31E) in the Nubah Mountains on Monday. More than 7,500 government and allied militia troops launched the offensive on 17 May, closing all the airstrips that had been used to bring food and medical supplies into the blockaded mountains, it said. Thousands of Nubah were forced to flee the army advance, as soldiers destroyed almost 2,500 homes and systematically burned food stores in an apparent effort to force the Nubah people into government "peace villages", the report stated. On 26 May, the day after Khartoum announced it was halting aerial attacks on rebel bases in the Nubah Mountains, it dropped eight bombs on the Limon Hills, west of Kawdah, it added. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) had halted the government attack on 27 May, but expected another offensive, the 'Guardian' reported. It quoted the NGO Justice Africa as saying that the government was trying to seal off the area by taking all the airstrips, and that dozens of Nubah civilians had been abducted during the offensive." (IRIN-CEA 4 Jun 2001)

"US Special Humanitarian Coordinator Andrew Natsios on 21 July warned that a failed harvest in Sudan could result a humanitarian disaster such as that in the mid-1980s, when about a quarter of a million people died from drought, starvation and disease. Natsios said failed rains threatened starvation in parts of the north, while government attacks were exacerbating hunger in the south, Reuters reported. Natsios said he had raised as a particular concern the issue of government attacks on the Nubah Mountains in the south. He cited reports from aid workers, who had alleged that the army was displacing populations to clear the way for oil drilling, and said military attacks in May had displaced 40,000 to 50,000 people, Reuters reported. Natsios said the lowlands in the Nubah Mountains, one of the most fertile areas in Sudan, had been turned into a "no-man's-land", with fields lying fallow as people sought shelter in the hills, the report said. "There are people dying, not in large numbers at this point, but if there is no humanitarian access, the analysis that has been done indicates there will be a rapid deterioration in food security, and the death rates will go up," Associated Press (AP) quoted him as saying. (The government has severely restricted access to the area for military reasons and relief agencies are rarely able to deliver food or non-food assistance to the vulnerable people.)" (IRIN-CEA 23 July 2001).

Abductions, and enslavement of civilians are a serious cause of displacement

- Up to 14,000 Dinka and Jur Luo children abducted by militias since mid-1980s
- Among the 15,000 Dinka abducted at least 12,000 remained abducted by end 2000
- End 2000-beginning 2001 militias escorting military convoy abducted up to 400 children and women in Wau
- In 1999 the Government formed the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC), which retrieved 940 abducted children by November 2001
- Murahaleen militias recruited by the Government to guard the train to Wau against SPLA attacks, systematically raid potentially pro-SPLA villages, killing and capturing cattle, women men and children

"Another serious war-related protection concern is the abduction of children and women. In northern Bahr al-Ghazal, community sources estimate that militia from western Sudan abducted approximately 14,000 Dinka and Jur Luo children and women in raids since the mid-1980s. Many abduction victims are subjected to severe and multiple human rights violations, ranging from murder, injury, rape, forced pregnancy, forced labor and female genital mutilation. The number of abduction victims still held in captivity today is difficult to determine. Many remain missing, others have found their way back to freedom over the years."
In late 2000 and the first half of 2001, militia escorting a military train convoy were responsible for killings in villages north of Wau, the theft of thousands of head of cattle and the abduction of between 200 and 400 children and women for forced labour. In 1999, the Ministry of Justice established the Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC). So far 940 children and women have been retrieved from abductors of which 670 have been reunified with their families. In Upper Nile, members of the Murle tribe from the Pibor have abducted hundreds of Nuer and Dinka children, most of whom remain missing. (UN November 2001 p. 82)

"There were [during 2000] reports that during raids on civilian settlements, government forces abducted persons, including women and children [...] In the last 15 years, between 5,000 and 15,000 Dinka women and children have been abducted; between 10,000 and 12,000 persons, most of whom are Dinka, remained abducted at year's end. Observers believe that some of the abductees were sold into slavery, while others were used as forced labor or drafted into the military. In some cases, observers believe that the abductees escaped or eventually were released or ransomed, and that in other cases some were killed. In February the Government's PDF forces allegedly attacked several villages in eastern Aweil and Twic counties, northern Bahr El Ghazal, abducted over 300 women and children, killed 16 civilians, stole cattle, and looted and burned villages. In November there were unconfirmed reports that the PDF attacked the village of Guong Nowh, abducted 24 persons, killed several persons, and stole cattle." (US DOS February 2001, sect.1b)

"[R]aids by the militia are a major source of violations of human rights. In Bahr-al-Ghazal, the Murahaleen militia (or the Mujahideen) often accompany the State-owned military supply train escorted by the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), which travels slowly down to Wau and from Wau back to Babanusa. According to consistent and reliable sources, the Murahaleen ride on horseback along both sides of the railroad tracks, fanning out within a radius of up to 50 km, and systematically raid villages, torch houses, steal cattle, kill men and capture women and children as war booty. Often, abducted women and children are taken up to the north and remain in the possession of the captors or other persons. The PDF are also said to take part in the raids.

[...]

NGO reports communicated to the Special Rapporteur contain lengthy and detailed testimonies of men, women and children abducted in similar circumstances, who regained freedom only by escaping or through ransom. The captors are often referred to as PDF, Murahaleen militia, or sometimes even as soldiers. It is therefore difficult to establish whether regular troops also take part in the raids. According to certain accounts, the perpetrators were said to be wearing uniforms; whereas murahaleen and other militia usually wear plain clothes. Although an auxiliary force, the PDF are directly under the control of the Sudanese authorities." (UN CHR 17 May 1999, paras. 61-66)

An assessment commissioned by the Canadian Government provides more details about the practice of abduction:

"We were told that there are really three different phenomena in the Slavery/abductions issue. First, there is armed and organized raiding in which the role of the GOS is not clear, and is likely complex. Sometimes, we were informed, the GOS provides arms, sometimes the groups of murahleen go off on their own. Tribal groups have been known to organize raids with "representatives" from other Arab groups; returning with children, women and cattle taken in these raids, all of them have had a common celebration.

Then there is the train which carries GOS supplies from the north down through Aweil and Wau in Bahr El Ghazal, down through contested territory. We believe there is formal recruitment by the GOS of militia to guard the train from possible SPLA attack. These murahleen then go out from the train and attack villages suspected of supporting the SPLA on the way from Babanusa to Wau and back. Their booty consists not just of goods, but also of women and children. Finally, we were told of joint punitive raids carried out by the GOS and the murahleen, who, under the Popular Defence Act, can enjoy status as state-sponsored militias, the PDF" (Harker January 2000, pp.3-5).
Peace efforts

Machakos Protocol (20 July 2002) must be complemented by political action

- Machakos Protocol under the auspices of IGAD, and USA, UK Norway as observers is an attempt to promote peaceful negotiations between the GoS and SPLM/A
- It provides the a six-year interim period at the end of which a referendum should be held to vote for unity or secession
- The Protocol does not include all warring parties such as the NDA
- All participants of the Protocol have firmly rejected civil society participation in Machakos which contradicts ideas of fostering democracy in Sudan
- In the case of unity Khartoum is not ready to instore a secular capital
- SPLM/A wants return and resettlement of refugees and displaced before holding a referendum in order to prevent potential political manipulation
- GOS latest offensive in the oil area casts doubts on its commitment to peace (Feb 2003)

“Following five weeks of peace negotiations in Machakos in July, peace negotiations also took a positive turn when the GoS and the SPLM/A reached agreement on the right to self determination for the people of south Sudan and the separation of state and religion. Peace talks held under the auspices of the IGAD were strongly supported by the troika of USA, UK and Norway. The fluidity of the political situation in Sudan was once again underscored when in August, during the second round of these talks, the Sudanese delegation suspended negotiations blaming the attack on the strategic town of Torit by the SPLA on 1 September.

[..]
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) - presided over by Kenya and made up of Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya - issued in 1994 a “Declaration of Principles”, which proposed a peace agreement based on a secular state and the sharing of natural resources and power. The Declaration was signed in 1997, but little serious negotiations followed until Machakos I and II. An IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) was also created, involving a number of European countries, Canada and the USA to support the IGAD peace efforts. The second round of the Machakos peace talks broke down in September 2002 serving to highlight the complexity of the Sudanese conflict. Humanitarian assistance must be complemented by political action, as humanitarian assistance is not a solution.” (UN, November 2002, p.4, 13)

“The Machakos Protocol of 20th July affirms “the unity of Sudan, based on the free will of its people, democratic governance, accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens… and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a framework” (1.1). However it states very clearly that at the end of a six-year Interim Period there will be “an internationally monitored referendum... for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession” (2.5). In this regard it appears to satisfy the aspirations of southerners. The Interim Period will begin after a six-month Pre-Interim Period (2). An Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be formed (2.4), made up of GoS, SPLM/A, IGAD states, international observers (USA, UK, Norway) and “any other country or regional or international bodies to be agreed by the parties” (2.4.1). Recognising that “Religions, customs and beliefs are a source of moral strength and inspiration” (6.1), and thus agreeing with many Sudanese Christians who preferred to talk of religious equality rather than a secular state, the Protocol affirms religious freedom (6.2) and that “Eligibility for public office, including the presidency... and enjoyment of all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion...” (6.3). It is
understood that during the Interim Period there will be a form of devolved government for the south, and Islamic shari’a will remain in the north but will not be applied in the south.

[...]
The Protocol does not include all warring parties (although the small South Sudan Liberation Movement has signed a separate agreement with GoS) and is unlikely to satisfy the northern armed opposition within the NDA. (SFP, July 2002, p.1-2)

“Evidently the Protocol was signed under intense pressure from international mediators, but it is still not clear exactly what was the nature of that pressure. GoS is seeking international respectability, financial aid, the lifting of sanctions, and removal from the US list of states sponsoring terrorism; it is not so obvious what the USA can offer the SPLM/A. Nor is it clear exactly what were the motives. Oil, the US “war on terrorism”, US regional interests in Israel and Iraq, and the beleaguered Bush administration’s need for at least one foreign policy success have all been suggested. But any international guarantees given now will be of little value in 6 years time, as by then there will be a new US administration, the US war with Iraq will be over one way or the other, the situation in Palestine/Israel may be very different, and transnational corporations will have made a lot of money out of Sudanese oil.

[...]
Egypt fears not only that southern secession might lead to increased competition for the Nile waters, but also to a more extreme Islamist government in the north.” (SFP, August 2002, p.1-2)

“At the beginning of September the Government of Sudan (GoS) withdrew from the Machakos peace negotiations, “because of the atmosphere created by the military operations and the occupation of Torit town” by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), according to GoS Foreign Minister Mustafa Uthman Isma’il. This is somewhat disingenuous. Since the signing of the Machakos Protocol on 20th July, GoS forces have launched a major offensive in western Upper Nile in which hundreds of civilians died, have killed and abducted international aid workers in eastern Upper Nile, and have escalated their aerial bombardment of civilians. Even the fighting in Torit was apparently initiated by GoS forces which moved out to attack SPLM/A positions. GoS is demanding a cease-fire as a pre-condition for resuming talks; SPLM/A has always maintained that this should be the last step in the process. A cease-fire would be to the military advantage of GoS should fighting resume, as it would be difficult for SPLM/A to maintain an unpaid “popular army” during a period of peace, whereas GoS would be able to use the oil revenue to strengthen its own regular armed forces.

[...]
It is very likely that the Machakos talks will resume in the near future. This is partly due to pressure from the “observers” who are effectively driving the process, particularly the USA. But, despite all the problems that the parties have with the terms of the peace framework, arguably they also have their own vested interest in pursuing it. It has long been recognised that a major objective of the current regime in Khartoum, a military dictatorship with virtually no popular support base, is to stay in power at almost any cost. But the SPLM/A, while enjoying a degree of popular support, is also an unelected and largely unaccountable movement. The Machakos Protocol is an opportunity for both parties to entrench themselves in power during the next 6 years. The IGAD process has always excluded other parties, and it is no accident that GoS, SPLM/A and the international “observers” all agree on the continued exclusion of civil society from the Machakos talks. The sharing of power.” (SFP, September 2002, p.1)

“All parties, including the mediators, are still insisting that Sudanese civil society should be totally excluded from the Machakos peace process.” (SFP, October 2002, p.1)

“GoS also insists that there will be no “national capital” with laws acceptable to all the citizens of the country. “If we are going to have a government of unity, we must have a capital where all of us operate under no specific laws, religious or otherwise…. we must have a secular capital” said Dr Samson Kwaje of SPLM/A. In contrast, the National Salvation Revolution regime will continue to maintain shari’a and jihad as the main pillars of government policy, according to the President of the Republic, Lt Gen Omer Hassan
al Bashir, while addressing a Popular Defence Forces (PDF) ceremony in mid-November. "We will never relinquish shari'a whatever the price we may pay," he vowed, and affirmed that Khartoum will never become a secular capital city; "Khartoum may only become a secular capital after we have all died". He praised the role the PDF is playing in the protection of the homeland.

This emphasises the basic problem of national identity. The ruling regime sees the country as Islamic, so while they are willing to allow a degree of autonomy for the south, there is no room for a non-Muslim at national level, as president (or with the potential to become president if the incumbent dies), nor even as equal citizens in the national capital. While a short- to medium-term peace agreement may be stitched up under intense international pressure, those who favour a united, democratic, multi-cultural, multi-religious Sudan are unlikely to see their vision fulfilled while the current regime is in power. This is why most southerners see secession as the only viable option.

[...]

It is generally perceived that SPLM/A rejects democratic elections during the Interim Period (cynics suspect that GoS is in favour only because they have already learned to rig elections so as to remove any real threat of democracy). SPLM/A spokesman Yasir Arman’s explains, “We support holding the elections within a reasonable and appropriate time,” but this cannot be done too soon, before the return and resettlement of refugees and the restructuring of the “current state establishments”, because “the regime will use its resources and structures to win the elections, when the other political forces have been absent for 14 years”.” (SFP, November 2002, p.1-2)

“Sudan’s peace process survived a major challenge in the first weeks of the new year. Indeed, signature by the parties of a strengthened cessation of hostilities agreement on 4 February and a memorandum of understanding codifying points of agreement on outstanding issues of power and wealth sharing two days later indicates that the momentum to end the twenty-year old conflict is strong. However, the crisis produced by a government-sponsored offensive in the Western Upper Nile oilfields at the end of 2002 and through January raised questions about the Khartoum government’s commitment to peace and showed that much more attention needs to be paid to pro-government southern militias and the commercial and political agendas for which they are being used.

[...]

“The latest fighting reflected a calculated decision to violate the cessation of hostilities agreement signed on 15 October 2002. The signing of new agreements, therefore, does not guarantee their implementation.” (ICG, 10 February 2003, p.1)

Further reading: on prospects of consolidate peace in Sudan read ‘Sudan’s best chance for peace: how not to lose it’ by ICG, 17 September 2002, click here [External Link]

‘Power and wealth sharing: make or break time in Sudan’s peace process’, ICG, 18 December 2002, click here [External Link]

For more details on issues of structures of government, power sharing, the judiciary and human rights, access the MOU between the GoS and the SPLM/A on Aspects of Structures of Government (18 November 2002) click here [External Link]

Controversy over the status of contested three central regions (2002)

• Nuba Mountain Region, Southern Blue Nile (Funj Region) and Abyei lie between north and south
• GoS opposes the wishes of most people from the contested central regions to be under SPLM/A administration during the transitory period

Controversy over status of Nuba Mountain Region, Southern Blue Nile (Funj Region) and Abyei (Jan 2003):
“Peace talks under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) resumed in January 2003 a few days later than planned, in Karen rather than Machakos. The same difficult issues remain: power-sharing, wealth-sharing and security arrangements during the Interim Period, and the status of the marginalised areas of the Nuba Mountains Region, the Funj Region (also known as southern Blue Nile) and Abyei. The Government of Sudan (GoS) objected to these areas being included in the discussions, and delayed their arrival until a face-saving formula was found whereby these would be discussed separately. A more serious threat to the talks is the breakdown of the ceasefire in western Upper Nile. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) has expressed its concern about this breach of the ceasefire by GoS, but has so far been persuaded by the mediators not to walk out over the issue. Nevertheless the dynamic of the negotiations has been badly affected.

SPLM/A and the mediators insist that while the marginalised areas are not part of the south according to the 1956 colonial boundaries, they are nevertheless part of the conflict. Peace cannot come unless all aspects of the conflict are dealt with. The Nuba people held a convention in November 2002 and the Funj in December – both regions affirmed their wish to stay within the SPLM/A-administered territory and demanded the right of self-determination. While the people of Abyei have not yet held a convention, there is little doubt that they share these sentiments. The Nuba conference was attended by delegates from both sides of the front line, and the level of agreement was notable. Dr John Garang visited the gathering in Kauda, his first trip to the Nuba Mountains during the current war. A new United Sudan National Party was formed, headed by veteran Nuba politician Fr Philip Abbas Ghaboush. The name “Nuba Mountains Region” was chosen to replace the old “Southern Kordofan”. A Nuba activist who attended the All Nuba Conference, Awad Abdel Rahman, was arrested by GoS security officers and detained in a ghost house in Port Sudan. A leading Nuba delegate to the IGAD talks, Tisso Nadim, was murdered in Nairobi in January 2003. Delegates from GoS-controlled territory were prevented from attending the southern Blue Nile convention in Kurmuk, at which the people of the region reclaimed their historic name “Funj”. (SFP, 31 January 2003, p.1)

The Entebbe Peace Initiative (October 2002)

- Sudanese Churches and civil society banned from the Machakos Protocol have gathered and proposed an alternative peace initiative
- They asked elections to be held within two years
- They proposed the creation of three constitutions reflecting the Northern, Southern and ‘Union’ Entity

“The Sudanese churches facilitated a conference in Entebbe, Uganda, bringing together civil society from north and south Sudan. This represents a major breakthrough, with participants acknowledging that they have to work together to safeguard the peace process and a better future for all Sudanese. The forum stressed the need for reconciliation and good governance. The concrete recommendations in its “Advisory Statement in the Context of Machakos Protocol” include: affirmation, guarantee and respect for human rights and democratic freedom, with elections to be held 2 years into the Interim Period; an independent constitutional committee to review the Machakos process; advice on the exercise of the right of self-determination, including the need for “a genuine choice… that is not biased to one of the two options”; clarity on the central government (“Union Entity”) during the Interim Period, to avoid confusion with the “Northern Entity”, with three constitutions (one each for the Union, Northern and Southern Entities), incorporating the “principles and practices of good governance”; no integration of armies (many now recognise that the surest guarantee of the peace process is a strong independent army in southern Sudan); and advice on wealth-sharing, restitution, reconstruction, repatriation, resettlement, and civil society. It has been reported that some delegates from northern Sudanese civil society were harassed by GoS security when they returned to Khartoum.” (SFP, October 2002, p.1-2)
Overview of various national and international peace initiatives (1997-2002)

- Government and SPLM/SPLA agreed in 1994 on a Declaration of Principles (DOP) which outlined a basic framework for a peaceful solution to the conflict.
- In April 1997 the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army concluded a peace agreement with the Government ("the Khartoum Agreement") which by and large remained unimplemented.
- Claimed that SPLA violations of the cease-fire in Bahr Al Ghazal was retaliated by the government forces through aerial bombing of the cease-fire area, the rest of the south, the Nuba Mountains, and the eastern front (June 2000).
- Peace talks facilitated by IGAD have a sad history of failures by 2002, SPLA leaders warn that no cease-fires will be reached until GoS agrees to stop oil companies's activities which are displacing thousands of civilians.
- Libyan-Egyptian Peace initiative prompting for unity, a transnational government, the revision of the constitution and general elections, was accepted by Khartoum but not by SPLA (July 2001).
- Moi has merged the Libyan-Egyptian Peace initiative with IGAD which principally diverge on the issue of self-determination.
- Declaration of Unity between the SPLM/A and SPDF issued on 6 January 2002.

Ongoing peace process

"The 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP) agreed to by the Government of the Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) - united under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) provides the basic framework for a peaceful solution of the conflict in the Sudan. The most important principle set forth in the DOP is the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan.

Beginning in 1995, however, the Government of the Sudan began to focus on a political strategy of "peace from within". In April 1996, the Government's Supreme Council for Peace put forward a political charter, a non-binding document containing a general framework for a political solution of the civil conflict in the Sudan. A year later, on 21 April 1997, a peace agreement between the Government of the Sudan and six splinter rebel groups was signed in Khartoum, in which it was emphasized that the general principles of the Political Charter should guide the Peace Agreement. A common feature with the DOP is acceptance of the right of self-determination. The major shortcoming of the Peace Agreement, of course, is the absence of the SPLA" (UN GA 14 October 1999, paras. 30-31).

"In April 1997, the South Sudan Independence Movement/Army, which broke away from the SPLA in 1991, and several smaller southern factions concluded a peace agreement with the Government. However, the SPLM/SPLA and most independent analysts regard the 1997 agreement as a tactical government effort to enlist southerners on the Government's side. The 1997 agreement remains largely unimplemented, and there was significant fighting between pro-government and anti-government elements who had signed the 1997 agreement during the year. In December 1999, Rieck Machar, a Southern leader who had signed the agreement, broke away from the Government and in January formed a new rebel movement, the Sudan People's Democratic Front (SPDF). The SPLM/SPLA and its northern allies in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) carried out military offensives in limited areas along the borders with Ethiopia and Eritrea and in large parts of the south during the year. As in 1999, neither side appears to have the ability to win the war militarily; although oil revenues allowed the Government to invest increasingly in military hardware. There was no significant progress toward peace during the year.

[...]

In June [2000] the SPLA launched an offensive in Bahr El Ghazal and fighting between the Government and the SPLM resumed, marking the end of the humanitarian cease-fire.

[...]
The civil war continued despite limited cease-fires, and all sides involved in the fighting were responsible for violations of humanitarian norms. At year's end, the Government controlled virtually all of the northern two-thirds of the country but was limited to garrison towns in the south. In June the SPLA launched an offensive in Bahr El Ghazal, fighting resumed between the SPLA and government forces, and the humanitarian cease-fire broke down. (US DOS February 2001, “introduction” and sect.1g)

"When SPLA violations of the cease-fire in Bahr El Ghazal temporarily halted the movement of the government's military train, the government counterattacked by bombing not only the cease-fire area, but also the rest of the south, the Nuba Mountains, and the eastern front. In July, 250 bombs hit civilians and their infrastructure in the attacks, which set a new high, according to conservative calculations based on U.N. relief reports. In August, government forces stepped up targeting of relief, health, and school facilities, apparently aiming to deter or shut down the U.N.-led humanitarian operation in the south, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). And despite promises to stop the bombing in September, more government bombs in October hit Catholic church facilities in different locations in Equatoria." (HRW December 2000)

No cease-fire agreement reached between SPLA and GoS at IGAD summits in 1999 and June 2001:

"After several postponements to allow for a broader opportunity for the attainment of peace, a new round of IGAD peace talks took place in Nairobi from 19 to 24 July. It ended after the Government and the SPLM/A failed to achieve a breakthrough in any of the substantive issues at stake, namely a comprehensive ceasefire, self-determination for the south, defining a border, religion, the transitional period and a referendum. The only achievement was the agreement on the setting-up of a permanent secretariat in Nairobi for the talks, under the supervision of a special envoy who would undertake "shuttle diplomacy" between talks." (UN GA 14 October 1999, paras. 30-31)

"A one-day summit called by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) held on June 2 in Kenya between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLA) failed to reach a cease-fire agreement. SPLA leader John Garang said a cease-fire could only be negotiated when the government stops the activities of oil companies which he says is leading to the eviction of thousands of civilians" (AFP, June 2; Reuters, June 2; Xinhua, June 2) (UNDP 6 Jun 2001, p.4).

"The first meeting of the permanent negotiations under the IGAD Secretariat on peace in the Sudan that was scheduled to take place here from September 24 to October 6, 2001 has been postponed indefinitely because the Sudanese government has refused to send a delegation. […] The reasons the government has given for not sending a delegation to Nairobi for the peace talks include its preoccupation with the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington and preparations for a delegates conference of the ruling NIF party. These reasons, it claimed, are not genuine. The real reason is that the government is backing away from IGAD peace process, preferring other initiatives that do not address the root causes of the war. The SPLA leadership has also claimed that the NIF are pursuing a misguided policy of peace from within, with the hope of buying time to allow them to exploit the oil in the south and displace the civilian population." (KAIROS-Africa, October 8 2001, pp.1-2)

"Peace talks under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) scheduled to begin in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, on 5 September have not taken place - as a result of the non-appearance of the rebel negotiating team. […] The IGAD secretariat in Nairobi said at the weekend that it was hopeful of a breakthrough in negotiations following the work of permanent negotiating committees in the city in recent weeks. These government and SPLM/A committees were working on ways to build on the Declaration of Principles and work towards agreement on a ceasefire, separation of religion and state, and the organisation of a constitutional conference, officials stated." (IRIN-CEA, 11 September 2001, p.1)
The government of Sudan on Wednesday announced that it had fully accepted all the points of a joint Libyan-Egyptian memorandum, which has not been made public, on their peace initiative for Sudan.

[...]

It had previously been reported that the government of Sudan was opposed to a Libyan-Egyptian proposal to have a transitional government of all political parties to undertake implementation of the agreement, hold a national conference for revision of the constitution and organise general elections.

Although the Libyan-Egyptian memorandum was not publicly released, Sudanese media reported that it included principles insisting on Sudanese national unity; recognition of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity within the country; the need to introduce a pluralist democracy; the guarantee of basic freedoms and human rights; citizenship as a basis for rights and duties; the need for a decentralised rule of law; and the pursuit of a foreign policy that guaranteed national interests while respecting good neighbourliness. The memorandum also provided for an undertaking by all parties on an urgent cessation of violence under military observation, they added.

The opposition umbrella National Democratic Alliance (NDA) is reported to have accepted the memorandum in principle, but to have some reservations about a perceived bias by the Libyan-Egyptian mediators towards the Sudanese government. The NDA chairman and leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Muhammad Uthman al-Mirghani, called for the integration of the Libyan-Egyptian peace initiative with that of IGAD (the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development) "so that the Sudanese issue does not become an Arab versus African issue", according to the Sudanese 'Al-Ra'y al-Amm'. Mirghani also accused the government of trying to assimilate the opposition into its institutions as part of its efforts to retain power, it added.

Meanwhile, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) official Mansur Khalid said his movement did not oppose the formation of a transitional government which included members of the other opposition parties and the ruling party, "provided prior agreement is reached on setting the duration of the transition phase, amending the constitution, revoking the emergency laws and the single-party state, and preparing for new legislative elections" [...]

The Libyan-Egyptian initiative differed from that of IGAD in including all the Sudanese parties to the conflict, including northern opposition forces, rather than just the government and southern-based SPLM/A, according to regional analysts. It also insisted on the unity, or indivisibility, of Sudan, as opposed to the IGAD principles, previously accepted by the Sudanese government, which included the right of self-determination - and therefore at least the possibility of secession - of the south, they said." (IRIN, 5 July 2001, p.1)

"The SPLM/A is refusing talks with the government under the joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative without the addition of the principles of separation of religion and state, the right to self-determination for southern Sudan, the creation of an interim constitution, and the creation of an interim government based on it (IRIN-CEA, 11 September 2001, p.1).

**Merging the two initiatives as an integrated peace approach:**

"The SPLA also said it wanted the two mediation forums -- one spearheaded by the east African Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Joint Egyptian-Libyan Initiative (JELI) -- merged (AFP, 24 August 2001)

"A new effort to merge two parallel but different peace efforts on Sudan under the chairmanship of Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi has emerged from last week's summit meeting of the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Moi has been charged with merging IGAD's own peace initiative with the Libyan-Egyptian initiative, the essence of which was distilled in a joint memorandum in July 2001, according to the US peace envoy, John Danforth, as quoted by the Kenyan Television Network on Saturday, after a briefing with Moi in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi."(IRIN, 14 January 2002, p.1)
**After 11 years of disunity SPLA and SPDF reunite:**

"Sudan’s main rebel group announced on Monday that it had reunited with an important militia leader to strengthen its hand in an 18-year-old revolt against the government in Khartoum. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) signed a declaration of unity with Riek Machar’s Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SPDF) in Kenya, effectively pairing the leaders of the two largest southern tribes, the Dinka and the Nuer." (Reuters, 28 May 2001)

“On 6 January, John Garang de Mabior, Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPLM/A, and Dr. Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, Chairman and Commander in Chief of the SPDF, issued the Nairobi Declaration on Unity between the SPLM and the SPDF. It was agreed that the two movements would immediately merge under the name of the SPLM/SPLA. Important outcomes of this alliance have been the cessation of bitter hostilities between the SPLA and SPDF since their split in 1991 and a decrease in inter-factional fighting, particularly in Upper Nile.” (UN, November 2002, p.4)

**Overview of grassroots peace initiatives (2000-2002)**

- 250 traditional leaders representing 6 different ethnic groups met in Liliir and signed an agreement of peace and reconciliation (May 2000)
- Issues agreed upon included access to grazing and watering points as well as return of abducted children and women
- More than 200 Nuer leaders attended the Kisumu peace conference, where a Unity agreement between the Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF) and the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) was signed (June 2001)
- The conference called the oil companies to suspend their activities until a sustainable peace is reached in Sudan
- Conflict transformation between the Dinka and Misseriya is progressing
- Sudan Council of Churches facilitated the Conference on Reconciliation between the Didinga people and the SPLM/A

**Efforts to create peace between ethnic groups the Liliir initiative:**

"The momentum behind the southern Sudanese grassroots peace process continues to quietly, but firmly, progress. Another dramatic breakthrough was achieved in a small village called Liliir, in the Bor area of Upper Nile, between the 9th and the 15th of May [2000].

Under the auspices of the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), over 250 traditional and civil leaders, representing members of the Anyuak, Dinka, Jie, Kachipo, Murle and Nuer ethnic groups from the region, came together to address the deep division and conflict that have arisen between them, especially as a result of the country's 17 year long civil war.

The Liliir assembly was inspired by the success of the previous ‘West Bank Dinka Nuer’ Conference (in Wunlit, March 1999), and numerous mini 'people-to-people' agreements since then. The Wunlit achievement was unanimously endorsed by the delegates, church leaders, and other observers present (including a letter of support from the SPLM leadership).

The Upper Nile conference was both complex and challenging, given the many ethnic groups that make up the region. While traditional hostilities have prevailed for generations among some of the groups, they have been aggravated (and in many cases manipulated) by the warring parties in recent years. The conference welcomed the public declaration by a number of military officers who, in their capacity as civilian observers, pledged their commitment to the people-to-people peace process.
The conference functioned as a forum for people to face each other, discuss their differences and agree to reconcile and make peace. Given the high attendance, the outcome at Liliir was successful, and practical agreements over issues such as access to animal grazing areas, water points and the return of abducted children and women, were sealed. An amnesty for all prior offences against people and their property was also agreed. The occasion concluded with the making of a public covenant between the ethnic groups, when 129 representatives signed a comprehensive document pledging peace and reconciliation.

The conference regretted however that the wishes of the Gawaar-Nuer to participate in the reconciliation process was denied by an Upper Nile faction. The delegates requested that these, and other groups who did not have opportunity to participate in the conference, be given a chance to meet and reconcile as soon as possible. This, they said, was the wish of the people.” (NSCC May 2000)

Kisumu peace deal to reconcile Nuer people in the south:
“The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) has brokered a peace deal among warring factions of the Nuer people in South Sudan, as part of a wider people-to-people peace process to end Africa’s longest running civil war, according to the British-based NGO Tearfund. At a peace conference in Kisumu, western Kenya, part-sponsored by Tearfund, 72 Nuer leaders signed a declaration by which they called for the unity of two factions: the Sudan People’s Democratic Front (SPDF) and the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) [...].

The Nuer signed their Declaration of Unity to alleviate the suffering among their people “as a result of division and conflict”, in order to end others’ exploitation of differences among the Nuer, and to allow them play their rightful role in “the liberation struggle of the people of southern Sudan”, a press release from Tearfund stated.

The Kisumu conference - which brought together more than 200 traditional leaders, elders, women, civil society representatives and politicians from southern Sudan [but, notably, not the Sudan people’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which declined to attend] - called on the international community to respond to the humanitarian crisis in southern Sudan, the South Blue Nile and the Nubah Mountains, according to Tearfund. In addition, it appealed to oil companies to suspend production until there was a comprehensive and just peace agreement in Sudan, and for the NSCC to continue its peace-building work in the region.

The purpose of the Kisumu conference, convened from 16-22 June at the request of traditional leaders, was to work towards "unity of purpose, unity of effort and unity of ideals" among southern Sudanese, according to informed sources. That liberation was "the common and prime agenda" and self-determination the "the central objective" were among the key affirmations of the conference, they said. Unity in the face of "a common threat" and "clarification of the goal of liberation" were said to be constant themes. It was notable that the NSCC was aligning itself with the people in their struggle for liberation from oppression, but was not associating itself with any one movement, the sources added. In the past, the church grouping has been accused of being too close to the SPLM/A” (IRIN, 2 July 2001).

“Progress was also made in conflict transformation with the Abyei (Kordofan) peace process. The people-to-people peace process in Abyei facilitated the return of up to one thousand households to three Dinka villages around Abyei town. Movements of Misseriya herdsmen and traders into Bahr al Ghazal and their return northwards have also been relatively free of violence for the second year in a row. Leaders of the Dinka and Misseriya ethnic groups showed strong commitment to the management of conflict over resources. Meanwhile, in the Dilling and Lagawa areas of the Nuba Mountains and in Malakal and the Sobat valley other community-led low-key peace building initiatives, frequently involving women, created new local political realities. For example, in the Malakal area, such an initiative opened up service delivery in previously inaccessible areas. These initiatives underscore the importance of local conflict transformation in setting examples for national reconciliation. United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) promote the critical importance of grass roots peace
building as a foundation for humanitarian and rehabilitation interventions. This is reflected in the CAP for 2003.

A breakthrough was achieved in attempts to resolve the conflict between the Didinga community and the military authorities in the Chukudum area of Budi County (Eastern Equatoria) in August 2002 as the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) facilitated Conference on Reconciliation and Healing between the Didinga people and the SPLM/A. The Conference successfully tackled some of the underlying sources of conflict. Once an important base for NGO activity, Budi County, in particular Chukudum, saw a reduction of humanitarian activities as the security situation deteriorated. The security situation has improved and, at the time of writing, an Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) assessment team was in Budi County exploring ways of meeting the humanitarian needs of the communities.” (UN, November 2002, p.4)
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Global figures

Representative of the SG on IDPs declares 4.5 million people displaced in Sudan (2003)

- Khartoum declares 4.4 million people are displaced in Sudan
- OCHA estimated IDPs to number at 4,317,720 in August 2002
- 1.8 million displaced are believed to live in Khartoum
- 500,000 IDPs believed to be in the transitional zone and eastern Sudan and 300,000 in southern states controlled by GoS
- 1.4 million displaced are believed to be in SPLM/A controlled areas
- Only about 700,000 IDPs in Sudan live in camps (Nov 2002)
- USCR estimate that IDPs increased by at least 150,000 during the first eight months of 2001
- Aid workers reported 55,000 newly displaced between 2000 and early 2001 from the oil-rich areas
- Rebel military offensive in early 2001 displaced 50,000 in Bahr el Ghazal
- 40,000 fled government military attacks in Nuba Mountains (2001)
- UN estimate around 2.6 million IDPs in Government controlled areas
- A systematic USAID census identified 1.5 million IDPs in southern Sudan in 1994

“It is difficult to count 4 million displaced people. The best estimates available are that nearly 2 million internally displaced persons have congregated around or near Khartoum, many of them southerners. About a half-million people are believed to be displaced in central Sudan’s transitional zone, particularly in the Nuba Mountains. Many researchers estimate that about 1.5 million to 2 million people are displaced in southern Sudan: 10 to 20 percent are reportedly in government-held areas of the south, and about 80 to 90 percent of the displaced population in the south are in SPLM or other opposition areas.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, pp. 45-46)

“During the same period, however, the number of internally displaced persons continued to rise to a current estimate of 25 million persons, of which 10-11.5 million are in Africa, and 4.5 million in Sudan” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, p.2)

“GoS’ Humanitarian Affairs Commission has announced that the number of displaced persons in Khartoum could be as high as 4 million.” (SFP, October 2002, p. 5)

“Some 4.4 million Sudanese are internally displaced, the General Commissioner of Humanitarian Aid, Sulafeddin Salih announced in Khartoum Wednesday.” (PANA, 2 October 2002)

OCHA map of ‘Sudan Affected Populations vs District Internally Displaced and Refugees’ of August 2002 counts IDPs in every state as follows:

Red Sea: 15,000
Khartoum: 1,800,000
Kassala: 87,370
White Nile: 58,000
South Darfur: 203,000
West Kordofan: 85,500
South Kordofan: 470,000
Upper Nile: 390,000
Unity: 70,000
Bahr el Ghazal: 683,600
Lakes: 190,000
Jonglei: 122,250
Western Equatoria: 95,000
Eastern Equatoria: 48,000

Total Figure as follows: 4,317,720

To view full map click here [External Link]

"Of the four million displaced persons in Sudan, 1.8 million are presumed to live in Khartoum, 500,000 in eastern Sudan and the transitional zone and 300,000 in southern states. In SPLM/A held areas the number of IDPs is estimated at 1.4 million. Newly displaced persons rely heavily on humanitarian assistance as their coping mechanisms have been eroded and weakened by the protracted emergency.

[...] Of the estimated four million IDPs in Sudan, approximately 700,000 live in camps, the remaining ones in squatter areas or within the communities. Based on the scenarios foreseen in the CHAP, up to one million IDPs and half a million Sudanese refugees may return to their places of origin, following the successful negotiation of a peace agreement and cease-fire." (UN, November 2002, p.16)

"Between July 1999 and 2001, significant additional population displacement had taken place in Bahr al-Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria states as a result of conflict, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported to the UN General Assembly in October last. Estimates of the number of displaced in those two years were in excess of 100,000, far greater than that of reported spontaneous returns - estimated at 25,000."( IRIN 22 January 2002, p.1)

"Many of Sudan's 4.4 million uprooted people have fled repeatedly from place to place during the course of the long civil war. At least 150,000 additional people became uprooted during the first eight months of 2001, according information pieced together from various field reports. Aid workers reported that 55,000 newly displaced people fled from 48 villages in southern Sudan's conflicted oil zone during 2000 and early 2001. A rebel military offensive in Bahr el-Ghazal Province in early 2001 pushed 50,000 people from their homes. Some 40,000 residents of central Sudan's Nuba Mountains region fled government military attacks during the first eight months of the year. Smaller numbers of people fled their homes temporarily because of aerial bombing attacks." (USCR 24 September 2001, p.2)

"Conservative estimates put the number of IDPs in the Sudan at 4.0 million. Khartoum alone has 1.8 million IDPs. Most of them are forced to live in large camps on the extreme peripheries of cities, where many regard them as unwelcome visitors." (UN November 2000, p.82)

"Sudan continued to produce more uprooted people than any country on earth. An estimated 4 million Sudanese remained internally displaced, and more than 400,000 were still refugees. During the first half of the year, at least 5,000 new Sudanese refugees fled to Uganda, about 5,000 fled temporarily to Ethiopia, and several thousand new refugees sought protection in Kenya." (USCR 28 August 2000)

"Since the resumption in 1983 of the conflict in southern Sudan, internal displacement is at the heart of humanitarian matters in the Sudan. Yet displacement figures are vague. Today's overall population
estimates for the country range from of 25 to 33 million, for the population of the southern states from 3.5 to 8 million.

The overall number of IDPs is said to be over 4 million. The UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU) in Khartoum estimates IDP-figures in Government areas at around 2.6 million: some 1.8 million in Khartoum State, 0.5 million in the east and the transition zone, 0.3 million in the southern states. On the distribution of the approximately 1.4 million IDPs in SPLA-held areas no consolidated data are available.”

(OCHA 28 September 1999, p.2)

"Endemic food shortages and massive population displacement resulting from the war reached new extremes during 1998.

Hundreds of thousands of southern Sudanese became newly uprooted - adding to the nearly 4 million people already displaced from their homes - and chronic malnutrition deteriorated into full-scale famine. An estimated 30,000 to 50,000 people perished in the famine, according to most estimates; one estimate placed the death toll at 100,000."  (USCR 1999, p.91)

End 1997 figures:

"More than 350,000 Sudanese were refugees in six countries at the end of 1997: an estimated 160,000 in Uganda, about 60,000 in Congo/Zaire, 60,000 in Ethiopia, 40,000 in Kenya, 32,000 in Central African Republic, and about 1,000 in Egypt. Up to 4 million Sudanese were internally displaced, although some estimates put the number much lower. Large additional numbers of Sudanese were outside Sudan without formal refugee status.

[...] Years of warfare have left up to 1.5 million Sudanese internally displaced in the south, according to some estimates. In addition, as many as 1.8 million Sudanese – many of them southerners uprooted by the war during the 1980s – have migrated to Khartoum, the capital. Hundreds of thousands more were internally displaced in central Sudan, in the Nuba Mountain region.” (USCR 1998, pp. 95, 96)

Mid-1996 estimates:

"The best data on the internally displaced are available from late 1988 through 1990, the period of greatest NGO activity in both the northern and southern Sudan. A census conducted by the Sudanese government in October 1989 found that there were some 1.8 million internally displaced Sudanese within the three towns (Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Omdurman) that make -up the Sudan's capital region. The vast majority were southerners, but the number also included some drought displaced persons from western Sudan. By 1991, more than 2 million displaced southerners were living in 48 "camps", in greater Khartoum. The largest camp, Zagolona, was home to 377,000 displaced southerners; three other camps had populations of more than 100,000 displaced persons each.

Of the estimated 4 million Sudanese displaced in mid-1996, some 1.8 million were living in and around Khartoum in the north, several hundred thousand were located in South Kordofan and South Darfur, and 1.5 million remained within the southern Sudan. Some 600,000 were in areas under SPLA and SSIM control in the southern Sudan, including 235,000 in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, 125,000 in the Upper Nile region, 110,000 in Equatoria west of the Nile, and 120,000 in Equatoria east of the Nile. An estimated 250,000 displaced persons were living in the southern Sudan's largest city, Juba, which was held by the government but surrounded by the SPLA." (Ruiz 1998, p.155)

USAID survey in 1994 finds 1.5 million displaced in the south:

"Because widespread insecurity prevented aid workers from making reliable estimates of the number of displaced persons, in May 1994, USAID supported a significant effort to count the displaced. In what was the most ambitious effort to compile a census of the internally displaced in the southern Sudan, large
numbers of field reporters enumerated 1.5 million displaced at 112 sites. Those data, however, soon became irrelevant when an attack by the Sudanese military forced hundreds of thousands of displaced to flee toward Sudan's borders with neighbouring countries. (Ruiz 1998, p.153)

Geographical distribution

579,760 IDPs beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance in Bahr al Ghazal (Nov 2002)

- 120,000 displaced around Wau town (May 2002)
- SCIO estimates 7,600 IDPs inside camps in northern Bahr al Ghazal
- Fighting causes displaces over 30,000 from Raga and 28,000 from Diem Zubier in July 2001
- 4576 new IDPs from Bahr el Ghazal take refuge in Wau
- However, in March 2001 it was reported that an average of 70 new IDPs arrived daily in Wau town to seek refuge from fighting in the surrounding rural areas
- Major IDP and returnee movements during 1998-1999, both into Wau county, to West Kordofan and to South Darfur State

“The affected caseload requiring humanitarian assistance and services (550,000 persons) includes 6,281 IDPs in Aweil, 119,724 in Wau, 15,000 in Raja and 438,755 in Rumbek, Cueibet, Yirol and Tonj Counties. Other vulnerable groups are children and the handicapped, pregnant and lactating mothers, and minority ethnic groups who are given unequal access to resources.” (UN, November 2002, p.29)

“An estimated 120,000 people are displaced due to fighting between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) around Wau in Bahr el Ghazal province, according to an official from OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan). The GOS forces are attempting to take the town of Gogrial, but reports from the ground indicate that the SPLA are holding them off as heavy rains are starting in the area. The hope is that this will put a stop to the fighting and that the GOS will retreat to their stronghold in Wau for the duration of the rainy season. Helicopter gunship bombing is taking place on the road between Gogrial and Wau, opening up the route for the retreating Government troops.” (WV, 10 May 2002)

"An estimated 7,600 people are living in misery in camps for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Sudan's northern Bahr el Ghazal region, church and relief sources said Monday.

The reports, which were further confirmed by the SPLA, said the IDPs were a product of military efforts by Government of Sudan forces to entrench their grip on recently recaptured areas in western Bahr el Ghazal, and a rising number of people returning from abductions in the north. The sources said the new arrivals have further compounded the precarious humanitarian situation in northern Bahr el Ghazal. Continued raids on civilians in the area by pro-government Arab militias (Murahiliin) have only made the situation worse.

The Catholic Bishop of Rumbek, Caesar Mazzolari, said that these IDPs are civilians who have fled from Raga County and its environs, areas which have witnessed intense fighting since October last year when government forces recaptured Raga town from the SPLA.

[...]

Out of the total population of the displaced, 4,987 are in camps in Aweil West County while the rest are living in similar camps in Aweil North County. The IDPs in Aweil West are crammed in two camps- Marial Bai (1,439) and Chelkou (919) while those in Aweil North are in two camps- Gok Machar (1,219) and Marol Deng Geng (1,410).
Since the recapture of Raga, Khartoum has been engaged in a military campaign to flush out SPLA forces from the area resulting in a mass exodus of civilians to northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria regions. Apart from Raga town, the people have been fleeing from the nearby areas of Mangayat, Deim Zubeir, Sopo, Khor Ghana, Awoda and Yabulu. They have headed to camps in Marial Bai, Cheklou, Nyamlell, Makuei and Akwem areas in northern Bahr el Ghazal.

The same area is also hosting returnees from abduction from further northern areas of Mabior, Arial, Weweil, Bahr el Arab and along the railway where government forces and Arab militias (Murahilin) have been staging raids on civilians. Returnees from abductions are camped at Adhol (1,410) and Peth on the way to Gog Machar (1,219), a number that according to Bishop Mazzolari is increasing each day. (SCIO 7 January 2002, pp.1-2)

"Internal Displacement and Health Concerns from Fighting in Bahr el Ghazal: NGO reports estimate that, in early July 2001, more than 30,000 people were displaced from the fighting in Raja, and an additional 28,000 from the SPLA attack on Diem Zubier. A majority of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) have settled in the town of Ad Dein or in four GOS sponsored IDP camps; El Firdos, Gimeza, Ghabat el Niem, and Radom. UNOCHA reactivated the Emergency Response Team (ERT) in Khartoum in order to enhance cooperation and coordination of NGOs both in Khartoum and South Darfur." (USAID 28 September 2001, p.3)

"Since the SPLA offensive in western Bahr El Ghazal, the Raga IDPs in Wau have increased to 1406. These IDPs have taken shelter in the Bahr El Ghazal "university building. A "Salvation Village" (IDP camps) is soon to be established within Wau town to house them. An additional new caseload of 3170 persons are settled in three camps in Wau town. This brings the total number of new arrivals in Wau to 4576 persons in 1624 households. These IDPs are in need of humanitarian assistance. Overall, the total IDP population in camps and including the Raga IDPs has been estimated at 50,560." (OCHA 31 July 2001)

"UNICEF reported the displacement of civilian populations from the surrounding rural areas to Wau town on 4 March 2001. From 10-30 March, the total number registered and verified stood at 1338 persons, of which 80% were women and children. 64% of the total influx arrived through Eastern Bank while 21% and 15% through Baryar and Marial Ajith camps respectively. The Influx is continuing at an average rate of 70 persons per day. An initial assessment revealed the presence of 21 unaccompanied children in the three IDP camps." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

"Bahr el Ghazal is also hosting up to 40,000 Nuer displaced from the fighting in Upper Nile, who have gathered along the length of the Nuer-Dinka dividing line. Their condition is poor after having walked long distances to reach safety." (UN, July 2000, p.1)

**Armed conflict and the related famine situation during 1998-1999 was associated with substantial displacement:**

"Bahr el Ghazal is the worst affected area, mainly due to the fighting which took place between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (the armed wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement) in Wau, Aweil and Gogrial towns in January [1998]. This forced 120,000 people to flee their homes, putting further pressure on an already vulnerable neighbouring population who were at that time sharing the little they had with a resident displaced of approximately a quarter of a million people. During the past six weeks, more than 45,000 people (both returnees and newcomers seeking support) have entered Wau county, many of them children. It is estimated that on average they are continuing to arrive at a rate of over 2,000 per day [July 1998].

Long-standing insecurity in the region has led to the displacement of large numbers of people into South Darfur State over recent years, many of whom have been settled in camps for some years, and have been welcomed into host communities. However, increasing conflict over recent months has prompted many of the displaced to abandon their camps and move to safer areas. This has led to many thousands of people in
South Darfur now being in need of resettlement and support, particularly in Ed Daien and neighbouring provinces. Official registration places the number of people at 29,091, but it is likely that the real figure is substantially higher as many move out of the displaced camps during the day to seek agricultural labour. Displaced people have also been reported as arriving in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.” (SCF 14 July 1998, “Background”)

"At present [May 1999], Wau is estimated to have a population of between 120,000 and 150,000 people, including some 46,000 IDPs. Of these, 15,000 have been accommodated in two camps located on the eastern bank of the river, which are administered by the United Nations and NGO OLS team. An estimated 5,000 others are stranded in the streets around the market place, living under trees and verandahs, waiting to be resettled by the Government on a more permanent site. However, the envisaged location, near the railway and in the proximity of a military camp, is being contested on security grounds.” (UN CHR 17 May 1999, para. 56)

**41,289 IDP beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance in greater Darfur (Nov 2002)**

- South Darfur hosts over 49,000 IDPs by end January 2002 with over 7,000 in Umm Therona camp
- Around 13,000 Raga IDPs scattered in Southern Darfur by end January 2002
- By August 2001 30,000 IDPs from Bahr el Ghazal settled in South Darfur some started cultivation activities
- In June 2001 Ed Daein temporary reception center registered 8,172 IDPs
- In May 1999 a UN report suggested a regular flow of IDPs arriving in South Darfur from Bahr el Ghazal
- Approximately 53,500 IDPs living in camps and squatter areas in Ad Daein and Nyala, South Darfur by June 1999

“The total of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance is 165,231 in South Darfur and 200,000 in North Darfur. This figure includes 17,935 IDPs living in six camps in Nyala, 12,766 in Ed Da’ein, 8,809 in Adilla, 1,779 in Buram.” (UN, November 2002, p.30)

"Umm Therona IDP camp, 3km west of Ed Daein, was still hosting over 7,000 IDPs, according to humanitarian sources. Another 2,952 IDPs continued to shelter at Al-Ferdows, 75 km south of Ed Daein [...]. At Radom, 115 km west of Ed Daein, there were still over 2,500 displaced people in early January, with a high proportion of women compared to other IDP camps in the region; another 2,800 or so of those who had moved farther north remained in the IDP camp at Buram, 130 km southwest of Ed Daein, sources told IRIN.

In addition to these IDPs in camps, there were also perhaps another 13,000 scattered Raga IDPs in the vicinity, outside the camps, according to an aid worker in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum. The overall IDP population of Southern Darfur is now reported to be just over 49,000.

[...] From Mangayath, many of the IDPs fled to Awoda, Wau County, to the southeast, where the WFP estimated there were some 16,000 Raga IDPs by mid-November. Awoda was too insecure to allow WFP ready access in October and November as a result of government troop movements along the road between Raga and the Khartoum-Wau railway line, but the agency managed a rapid assessment on 21 November. [...] Estimates of the number of IDPs in Tambura County now range between 9,000 and 15,000, though the latter figure may be overstated (at least partly as a result of double registration) and the numbers involved
needed to be clarified in a joint-agency assessment, according to the nongovernmental organisations MEDAIR and CARE International. "(IRIN 22 January 2002, pp.2, 4)

"The Minister of International Cooperation, Dr Karim al-Din Abdel-Moula (Abd al-Mawla) has said that the situation of displaced people from Raga and Deim Zubeir (Daym al-Zubayr) in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, and who had settled in Southern Darfur, was "contained", the daily 'Khartoum Monitor' reported. The situation in the displaced people's camps was stable following the construction of shelters, opening of basic schools and enrolment of secondary school students in local schools, he said. The displaced had also begun cultivation activities, Abdel-Moula added. The report quoted him as saying that the number of internally displaced people (IDPs) settled in areas near Radom, Buram, Ed Daein (al-Duwaym) and El Ferdose (Al-Firdaws) was around 24,000, with another 6,000 IDPs from Western Bahr al-Ghazal in the [government-controlled] town of Wau.

The IDPs who had taken shelter in and around ED Daein primary school - who numbered over 8,000 at the end of June - had been relocated to Um Herona (Umm Harunah) and the situation was gradually settling, humanitarian sources told IRIN. Food, seeds and farming tools had been distributed to allow cultivation, though efforts continued to be required in relation to the IDPs' shelter, water, health and sanitation requirements, they said. Among the remaining issues in relation to the displaced people from Western Bahr al-Ghazal was humanitarian access, as rains had made some roads virtually impassable, especially around Radom, the sources said. In addition, there was a particular issue of access around Raga town, and to the north of it, as the government had declared it a military area, they said."(IRIN-CEA 3 Aug 2001)

"As of 30 June, 8,172 people were registered at a temporary reception centre in Ed Daein primary school, according to figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The town’s population is estimated at 65,000, including some 11,000 IDPs who left the south in the late 1980s and early 1990s."(IRIN, 2 Jul 2001)

"An estimated 1,275 new IDPs arrived in Khor camp in Ad-Daein, out of which some 550 persons moved to the eastern camps of Adilla, Jad-el-Sied, Al Goura, Mozroub and Abu Karinka. The current daily average rate at Khor Omar is 35 families. Arrivals have been observed through the two entry points of Safaha and Mairam. Most IDPs are coming through Safaha near Bahr Al Arab while some use Mariam in western Kordofan.

"(UNHCU 11 May 1999, p.7) "As of June, 1999, there were approximately 53,500 war-affected displaced persons (mainly Malual Dinka) living in camps and squatter areas in Ad Daein and Nyala, South Darfur." (UN November 1999, p.122)

**Approximately 1.8 million IDPs remain in and around Khartoum (November 2000)**

- 260,000 IDPs living in four official IDP camps by end-2000

"Greater Khartoum is estimated to be accommodating about 1.8 million IDPs. 260,000 of these IDPs are settled in the four officially designated camps (Mayo, El Salam, Jabal Awlia and Wad El Bashir) and the remainder are squatting in a variety of planned and unplanned areas." (UN November 2000, p.143)

"There continue to be nearly two million displaced southern Sudanese people in camps in and around Khartoum. Approximately 222,000 are living in four official IDP camps, while the remainder are settled in 15 main squatter areas. The RNIS has not received any nutritional surveys for these populations since January 1999, which represents a serious information gap." (ACC/SCN 25 July 2000)

"Approximately 40 percent of Khartoum’s population of five million IDPs. Approximately 200,000 live in four official IDP camps. The remainder is scattered among several squatter and other residential areas.
They are traditionally farmers, pastoralists and fishermen and earn marginal livings as casual and seasonal labourers, petty traders and low-income wage earners. Household size is an average of six to seven.” (UN November 1999, p.123)

"The displaced in Khartoum are mainly people who fled conflict or drought in southern Sudan and southern Kordofan since 1983. Among them are also a number of people displaced by drought in western Sudan or deforestation in central Sudan. Making up 41 percent of the capital's current population, they also represent almost half of Sudan’s displaced population which, at about four million, is the world's largest, according to UN estimates.” (IRIN-CEA 24 November 1998)

11,570 IDPs in Equatoria fled conflict over Torit town and LRA attacks

- 6,500 people in Juba displaced by LRA
- 55,522 IDPs beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance in Main towns of the Equatoria region (Nov 2002)
- 11,570 IDPs fled the conflict to Juba after fighting in Torit on 1st September 2002
- 6412 IDPs waited in Liriya village to be moved to Juba
- 5416 IDPs from Torit arrived in Gumbo transit camp following capture of Torit town by SPLM/A in September
- By June 2002, 4,500 people displaced by LRA were in Ikotos

“In Juba, Eastern Equatoria, 6,500 new IDPs are vulnerable to looting, abductions and recruitment by the LRA. In some parts of the country abduction and forced servitude are reportedly rooted in the local culture and therefore difficult to eradicate.” (UN, November 2002, p.16)

“Beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance number over 300,000, of whom 20,000 are IDPs in Juba, 18,000 in Kapoeta, 13,210 in Torit and 4,312 in Lafon.” (UN, November 2002, p.31)

“During the Machakos peace talks between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLM/A the warring parties intensified their military activities and, during the second phase of the talks the SPLA captured the strategic town of Torit on 1 September 2002 displacing the inhabitants of the town and surrounding villages in the process. On protest the GoS pulled out from the Machakos peace talks and demanded the return of the town to government control. Approximately 11,570 people were displaced to Juba, the capital of Southern Sudan (about 134 km from Torit). ACT members Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) and the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) with offices in Juba co-ordinated with other NGOs to carry out needs assessments. At the time of the assessment, before the town was recaptured by the GoS there were 5,416 persons in the transit camp of Gumbo, 8 km east of Juba town. Reports from Juba indicated that over 6,412 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in Liriya village, about 67 km east of Juba town, waiting to be moved to Juba.” (ACT, 25 November 2002)

“A rapid Food Economy Needs Assessment conducted by HAC, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, UN-OCHA, NCA, ACF, Help Age International, SRC, El Bir, OXFAM, Sudan Aid and SFM found that approximately 8,500 IDPs urgently need full food rations in and around Juba. The two largest groups in need are over 5,000 IDPs that fled from conflict in Torit in September 2002 and over 3,400 IDPs who have sought refuge from LRA attacks this year.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“Torit in Eastern Equatoria was captured by the SPLM/A on 1 September. This led to the suspension of the second round of the Machakos peace-talks. Refugees displaced into the Achopi refugee camp in Uganda were reported to be moving back to Torit following its capture. Conversely, approximately 5,000
IDPs from Torit arrived in Gumbo camp (5km from Juba). Although some assistance was provided by humanitarian agencies in the camp shelter material is still urgently required.” (OCHA 14 November 2002)

Renewed displacement on border of Kassala State and Eritrea after renewed conflict in November 2002

- 45,000 IDPs are in Kassala state (Nov 2002)
- 12,000 IDPs in Kassala scattered along the 200km line south of Hamish Koreib
- Up to 60,000 people displaced near the Sudan-Eritrea border in 1998
- Insecurity and drought cause displacement of 40,000 in Kassala State (1998)
- Reported in November
- 2000 that 41,728 IDPs will face a food deficit during 2001
- Significant population displacements as fighting escalated by end-2000

“Kassala is a catchment area for IDPs, refugees and migrants. The population of 1,620,000, mostly farmers and agro-pastoralists, more than 45,000 are IDPs” (UN, November 2002, p.32)

“The early October 2002 conflict on the border of Kassala state and Eritrea resulted in displacement of civilians from Hamish Koreib province. By 29 October, some 12,000 people had been uprooted from homes in an area stretching north of Kassala town to Hamish Koreib, with many IDPs walking a distance of up to 200km to seek refuge. Living conditions are basic to extreme and there is an urgent need for food and non-food items.

[...]
The assessment team visited most locations to which the displaced had fled, including the villages of Hadalia, Hangolia, South Matatieb, Togali, East Tandali, Mahmadob, East Waar. Many displaced remain scattered along a 200km line south of Hamish Koreib.” (OCHA, 24 November 2002)

"In northeastern Sudan, near the Sudan-Eritrea border, fighting [in 1998] between government forces and NDA [National Democratic Alliance] insurgents aligned with the SPLA left up to 60,000 people displaced during the year. Most of the uprooted families lived in six camps near Kassala town.” (USCR 1999, p.92)

"A caseload of 30,000 displaced persons is assisted by WFP each month in Kassala area [as of July 1999]. The situation in the eastern border has remained highly insecure since March 1998, and these IDPs have not been able to cultivate, nor return to their homes of origin near the Eritrea border, nor re-establish their usual coping mechanisms. As a result they depend on emergency food aid for survival. The food insecurity situation in the area has further been exacerbated by the continued influx of newly displaced persons who are arriving in the area a poor physical and nutritional status. Selective feeding programmes are required for these new IDPs for a limited period.” (ACC/SCN 7 July 1999, p. 41)

"It is estimated that 41,728 IDPs will face a food deficit of 84% of their annual food needs in 2001, and will require continued provision of relief food.” (UN November 2000, pp.144)

" In November 2000, an armed conflict between the NDA and the GOS over the town of Kassala had a negative impact on the humanitarian situation in eastern Sudan. The fighting resulted in significant population displacements and a lack of essential services and food sources. Emergency relief response to the area has been extremely limited.” (USAID 20 April 2001)

A UN report provides the following breakdown of location of IDPs in Kassala State as of May 1999 (UNHCU 11 May 1999, p.10):
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Location from Kassala</th>
<th>IDP Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adarman</td>
<td>13 km south west</td>
<td>3323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amara</td>
<td>12 km south</td>
<td>5547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dabalawate</td>
<td>20 km north east</td>
<td>3674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatu</td>
<td>11 km south west</td>
<td>3587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fedayeeb</td>
<td>18 km south east</td>
<td>7095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulsa</td>
<td>22 km south east</td>
<td>4821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shagarab</td>
<td>60 km south</td>
<td>2168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talkook</td>
<td>118 km north east</td>
<td>1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawaiet</td>
<td>30 km north</td>
<td>1235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>33210</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures not stable. Continuous head count is a standard practice.

**Over 80,500 IDPs in the Nuba Mountains (November 2002)**

- 80,616 IDPs and 17,149 displaced returnees beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance in greater Kordofan region
- About 17,000 IDPs moved to the Nuba Mountains between January to August 2002
- Overall more than 158,000 Nuba people displaced since 1983
- 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas in the Nuba mountains to areas around the town of Kadug as fighting escalated in January 2001
- 28,885 IDPs registered in the South Kordofan State (January 2001)

“However, a total of 80,616 IDPs (34,884 IDPs in Kadugli, 6,000 in Dilling, 4,351 in Rashad, 12,000 in Abu Gabra, 18,000 in Talodi, 5,381 in Lagawa ) and 17,149 returnees are in need of humanitarian assistance.” (UN, November 2002, p.34)

“Rains have made most of the villages inaccessible by land. Monitoring of the humanitarian situation is therefore hampered. Approximately 17,000 IDPs are reported to have moved to the Nuba Mountains from January to August 2002. The total number of IDPs in Nuba number over 80,500.” (OCHA, 14 November 2002)

“A few years later they [the Nuba] joined forces with the SPLA. From a population of one million in the past, they now number less than half that number, and according to the United Nations World Food Programme, more than 158,000 have been displaced or left homeless by the latest fighting in the 18-year civil war in Sudan.

“there are certainly more [Nuba people] […] now living around Khartoum than in the Nuba mountains” 600 kilometers (460 miles) from the capital, said Christian Delmet of the French National Scientific Research Centre (CNRS).” (AFP 28 November 2001)

“Reports indicate that some 30,000 people, mostly women, children and the elderly, from the Nuba Mountains, are displaced around the suburbs of Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan State. The displacement
is as a result of clashes between the military forces of the Government and the SPLM in the Nuba Mountains.” (OCHA 31 January 2001)

"Renewed fighting between the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) started in January 2001 in the Nuba Mountains. Eleven villages that have 4,283 families with a total of 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas to areas around the town of Kadugli. The IDPs are mostly women, children and elderly. The expected dry season's offensive by the warring parties is likely to displace more people.” (ACT 21 March 2001)

"South Kordofan State Participatory Rapid Assessment (PRA) recently reported that there are 14 reception points for the war-affected population. Shat damam, Kulolo, Daloka, Shat Sofia, Fama, Tabaniya and Tamma are newly recaptured locations. Katcha, Kuhliat Kaigakhail, Kanga and Kurungo Abdalla are existing villages receiving more war-affected population. The needs of these IDPs include food, clothing and shelter.

The following table is the summary of the influx up to 14 January 2001:
Source of data PRA South Kordofan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Population</th>
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<td>Kulolo</td>
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<td><strong>2336</strong></td>
<td><strong>26540</strong></td>
<td><strong>28885</strong></td>
<td><strong>5656</strong></td>
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(OCHA 31 January 2001)

**115,000 IDPs in Blue Nile State (Feb 2003)**

- The presence of previously ‘invisible’ 115,000 IDPs in the Blue Nile was reported by the HAC
- Un estimates 30,000 IDPs in Ed damazin camp (Nov 2002)

“A team from the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) has completed survey and monitoring of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in the Blue Nile areas in the context of the agreement reached recently between the government of Sudan and the United Nations to provide humanitarian assistance outside the frame work of Operation Life-line Sudan (OLS) to the Blue Nile area, the daily Al Ayam reported Thursday.

The United Nations shall begin this month its assessment of the situation in the area, the paper said.
HAC Emergency official, Khalid Farj told the paper that the total number of IDPs in the area were 115,000, as follows: 978 in Rosseries province in the areas of Kalo, Maban, Aaradaiba, Tirkalo and Rosseries, 18,000 in Pao province including the areas of Mazgli, Fadas, Gissan and Aardalo while the number of IDPs in Kurmok reached 6006 in Blenk and Haddor.” (UN Information Center in the Sudan, 6 February 2003)

“At least 30,000 IDPs in Ed Damazin in Blue Nile” (UN, November 2002, p.35)

**Half a million flee violence linked to oil-exploitation during first 10 months of 2002 in Western Upper Nile alone (1999-2002)**

- ICG estimates half a million displaced in Unity State during 2002 first ten months
- 60,000 vulnerable people and IDPs reported in Koch, Upper Nile in December 2002
- 13,000 IDPs in 5 camps in Malakal (Nov 2002)
- Between 150,00 and 300,000 displaced in Upper Nile between January and April 2002
- 40,000 Nuer displaced from fighting in Upper Nile have sought refuge in Bahr el Ghazal
- Over 127,000 people fled Western Upper Nile to Northern Bahr el Ghazal (Sept 2002)

“Fighting in the oilfields region of the South escalated at the beginning of 2002[...]With both sides’ capabilities improved, and the government determined to expand oil exploitation at any cost, estimates are that the last ten months have seen the displacement of nearly half a million civilians in Western Upper Nile.” (ICG, 14 November 2002, p.5)

“A rapid assessment conducted by Medair in Koch confirmed the presence of approximately 60,000 vulnerable people (IDPs, returnees and residents). Medair responded to needs in the health sector while SC-UK responded to some of the educational needs. Medair also conducted a rapid assessment with SRRA in Leal, which confirmed the presence of approximately 10,000 vulnerable people. WFP has responded with food assistance, while the Emergency Response Team is coordinating the non-food response from several agencies, including UNICEF, OXFAM and SC-UK.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“[...] 13,000 IDPs in five camps in Malakal (Upper Nile)” (UN, November 2002,p.35)

“An influx of 24,000 IDPs entered Mayom as a result of conflict around Weinken in Upper Nile. [...] UNICEF reports a total of 9,054 IDPs displaced into IDP camps in the Malakal area, due to insecurity in Waat, Ayod and Fangak areas.” (OCHA, 17 September 2002)

"In Upper Nile itself, UN/OLS has completed an assessment mission to eight locations where access has been denied for the past eight months. The assessment mission conservatively estimated the number of displaced people at 51,000, with a vulnerable host population of about 150,000. “ (UN July 2000, p.1)

"The devastation in Block 5a chronicled above is, at the time of publication, being repeated in a wide swath of Eastern Upper Nile, from the Adar oilfield east to the Ethiopian border. Local chiefs and opposition commanders say that here too the government is attempting to drive civilians from the area in order to allow oil exploration to proceed unimpeded. They say the attackers - primarily government militias, some of them newly organised and armed - are avoiding military targets and attacking only civilians.” (Christian Aid 15 March 2001, pp.8-9)
Large number of IDPs seeking refuge inside and outside of the Unity State/Western Upper Nile (1999-2002)

- 100,053 IDPs estimated in garrison towns of Bentiu, Rubkona, Pariang, Mayom and Kumagon (Nov 2002)
- 24,000 IDPs entered Mayom fleeing conflict in Upper Nile (Sept 2002)
- 75,000 people deliberately targeted by the GoS fled Rubkona Province (May 2002)
- Attacks for cattle in IDP camps in Mayom re-displaced 34,000 people (Western Upper Nile)
- 60,000 IDPs seeking refuge in Bentiu/Rubkona area during 2000
- Claims that government militias burned 48 villages and displaced some 55,000 people around Adar oil fields during 2000
- Villages north of Bentiu cleared of their civilian population (1999)

“Beneficiary figures are difficult to determine due to high mobility and denied access. However in the garrison towns (Bentiu, Rubkona, Pariang, Mayom, Kumagon) the affected populations are estimated at 100,053 people. Most recent fighting in and around Mankien caused the displacement of over 25,000 IDPs into Mayom. […] Mayom, Bentiu and Rubkona, for the above-mentioned reasons and IDPs living in camps i.e. 1,458 in Tong, 26,575 in Bentiu, 25,004 in Rubkona, 11,856 in Pariang, 34,000 in Mayom, 942 in Kumagon and 218 in Tor.” (UN, November 2002, p.36)

“The security situation in Mayom has remained tense; IDP camps were attacked twice during September due to conflict over cattle. A high number of the population was displaced (34,000) due to this conflict. These individuals were forced to settle in the open with no shelter. IDP movement outside Mayom for grazing purposes was restricted due to insecurity. Many of the IDPs depend on milk from their cattle. The nutrition rate of the IDPs is deteriorating as a result. The UN is currently involved in negotiating access to pasture land for livestock in order to prevent complete loss of this coping mechanism.”

“Displacement of over 127,000 people took place from Mayom County (Western Upper Nile) into Twic, Gogrial and Tonj Counties (Northern Bahr el Ghazal) during the month of August. The population comprises 50% children, 30% women and 20% men. Of the total, approximately 75,000 people arrived in Mayen Jur and Thiek Thou (Gogrial County) with another 50,000 IDPs displaced into Bulyom in Twic County. The remainder of the displaced are located in Tonj County. WFP identified 50,000 of the IDPs located in Mayen Jur as most vulnerable and provided them with 353 MT of mixed food commodities. Major priorities for this caseload are water and health care. UNICEF, FAO and other agencies are supplying IDP kits and fishing equipment. Fighting began in June 2002 in Mayom County and continued during August. Agencies on the ground characterized the conflict as the worst witnessed since 1983. Most displaced households have already lost this year's cultivation season. It can be expected that they will be food insecure in the coming year.” (OCHA, 17 September 2002)

“According to UN OCHA, between 150,000 and 300,000 people were displaced in Western Upper Nile from January to April 2002” (USAID, 14 August 2002)

“The majority of people in Rubkona Province in western Upper Nile have been forced to flee their homes in the last few weeks “due to an intensification of conflict in the highly contested oil-rich areas”, the Church World Service reported on Wednesday. Perhaps as many as 75,000 people had been displaced as the government deliberately targeted civilian populations, it added.

“Victims interviewed have given consistent reports of being bombarded by planes, strafed and hunted down by helicopter gunships, and of being chased and shot at by armed horsemen militias and foot soldiers,” it
said, adding that this was part of an ongoing, but worsening, experience for the people of western Upper Nile.

Earlier this month, the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan suggested that 50,000 civilians had been forced to flee the express targeting of civilians "in an extended area along the road from the oil site at Rier and southwards" - though the government had claimed the purpose of its military engagement was to rid the area of SPLA forces." (IRIN, 24 May 2002)

“It was impossible for the team to estimate the number of displaced people, as they are spread out over a large area of maybe 5000 square kilometres. The authorities have encouraged the people not to congregate in any one area for security reasons. The displaced are, therefore, spread over an area up to two days' walk from Chotchar, mostly to the south and west towards the River Dol and Bahr el Ghazal.

The local authorities and SRRA told the team that the total population of Rubkona County was 222,000 and that all these people are now displaced. 75,000 of these are considered by SRRA to be most vulnerable. This number seemed high to the team. Even the SRRA staff from the Nairobi office travelling with the team agreed that the figure was unrealistic. The team estimated that the number of displaced maybe as many as 50-60,000 from Nimni, Rier/Pultuni, Buoth, Nhialdui, Kuey and Chang. There is a sizeable host population in the area of maybe 20,000 also, especially between Touc and Pam as far as we saw. This would bring the total population figure up to approximately 75,000-80,000 - spread over the area. Most of them are in need, but maybe a quarter need assistance immediately - around 18,000-20,000 people or about 3,000 households. The SRRA and the local NGO partner, SSOM, were urgently requested to work closely with the sub-chiefs to determine actual figures if an intervention is to take place in a timely manner.” (Dan Church Aid/Christian Aid, 30 April 2002, p.11)

“The Sudan conflict has been particularly disruptive in Unity State. Fighting between pro-government militias, inter tribal factions and SPLA has contributed to the displacement of 60,000 IDPS. The influx, mainly from Jikany, Leek, Jagei, and Adok, has been into Bentiu and Rubkona towns.” (UN November 2000, p. 142)

"Last year more than 47,000 people were displaced into Bentiu and the adjacent town of Rabkona. [...] The number of registered IDPs as on March 2, 2001 was 2,120 with 1,500 being unregistered. On 15 March 2001, the governor of Unity State visited the SCC to appeal for help for his state to avoid the threatened famine. He reported the number of displaced in Bentiu has increased to about 60,000 persons with many more expected. The IDPs are mainly women, children and the elderly. A total of 1,133 school age children are without basic education.” (ACT 21 March 2001)

"Following the flare-up of inter-factional hostilities among the various armed groups in Unity State, particularly around Koch, Leer and Adok, a total of 44,757 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) together with about 100,000 cattle entered Bentiu and Rubkona in July and August. This brought the total IDP population in the Bentiu/Rubkona area to over 60,000, with women and children making up over 65% of this total.” (UNICEF 25 September 2000)

“OLS officials say privately that they believe the government has one aim in the area: 'to depopulate the oilfields so oil surveys can be done in peace.'

Churchmen in the area say that in the year 2000 government militias burned 48 villages and displaced some 55,000 people around Adar. This area, Block 3, is where Malaysian and Chinese state oil companies have recently extended their investment under a new $30 million exploration programme.” (Christian Aid 15 March 2001, pp.8-9)
"OLS Agencies are particularly concerned about Unity State, where conflict erupted again in 1999, affecting an estimated 40,000-60,000 people, some of whom have already fled the area for eastern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes regions." (UN November 1999, p.117)

"Villages north of Bentiu, such as Gumriak and Pariang, were cleared of civilians at the beginning of 1999. Among the villages most affected by the attacks and subsequent forced displacement since mid-1999 are Mankien, Langkien, Neny, Duar, Koch, Toic and Leer. In July 1999, the World Food Program (WFP) reported that tens of thousands of people who had fled their homes in June to seek safety were trapped in the oil-rich area of Western Upper Nile." (AI 3 May 2000, p.9)

**Large number of people displaced from the Nuba Mountains living in "peace villages" in South Kordofan State (1999-2001)**

- "173,000 IDPs reported living in "peace villages" by 1999
- Sixty percent of the inhabitants in "peace villages" are estimated to be war-affected Nubas
- Several famines or incidents of hunger have made many people to leave the mountains to join the areas under the control of Government garrisons
- Reported that 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas by the beginning of 2001

"GOS controls most of the [South Kordofan] State, Estimated total population said to be around one million persons, about 20 percent out of them living in RebelHeld areas. There are estimated to be seventy-two (72) peace villages with an estimated population of 173,000. Sixty percent of the inhabitants are estimated to be war-affected Nubians [Note that this group should correctly be referred to as "Nuba" or "Nubas"]. Forty-one (41) of these villages, and 105,000 of the population, have been identified as most vulnerable. Crop production in peace villages barely reaches subsistence levels and is constrained by insecurity and the lack of access to fertile land. Health services are generally very poor and there is inadequate water and sanitation." (UNHCU 11 June 1999, p.5)

"Some 60,000 Nuba people became newly displaced during 1997-98, according to one report. Sudanese authorities refused to allow UN workers to enter rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains to assess reports of serious humanitarian needs there, despite earlier government promises that it would allow access for such studies. Unidentified attackers ambushed and killed three local aid workers in central Sudan in June." (USCR 1999, p.92)

**In 1999 the UN was able to undertake an assessment of the IDP population in parts of the rebel held Nuba mountains:**

"Nagorban County has received many people displaced from various places including the Kadugli area, Heiban County, Buram County, and the plains of Nagorban county itself. Because the latter belong to the county and usually joined relatives in the mountains, they are not considered displaced, only those from other counties are. Numbers of displaced people from both within and outside the county are not accurate but the County administration has been able to supply estimates. Only four payams out the county’s six are affected by displacement. They are the payams of:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payam</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nagorban</td>
<td>300 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tura</td>
<td>100 persons - Masakin tribe from Buram County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seraf Jamus</td>
<td>25 households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limon</td>
<td>27-28 households - Tira in Heiban County</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The administration in Buram payam still considers the displaced living in Nagorban as inhabitants of Buram payam.

The estimates of the displaced from the plains to the mountains are:
Nagorban payam 600 households
Um Dullu payam 800
Limon 150
Seraf Jamus 200
Tangal 300
Tura 250

These numbers could not be verified. Most of the people concerned left the plains for the mountain during a Government offensive during 1996-97. From Heiban there have been several arrivals including an important one in 1995 due to a food gap and the occurrence of hunger. In 1994, a Government offensive drove people out of their homes in Buram and they sought refuge in Nagorban. Several famines or incidents of hunger have made many people to leave the mountains again to join the areas under the control of Government garrisons where food was available. Some went to large cities such as Khartoum, Kadugli, Al Obeid and Port Sudan. In 1998, residents of Nagorban County experiencing hunger left for Buram. The people affected are mostly the former inhabitants of the plain. Some left their families in Buram and came back to cultivate their farms in Nagorban.” (UNCERO 8 November 1999, pp. 108-109)

“Renewed fighting between the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) started in January 2001 in the Nuba Mountains. Eleven villages that have 4,283 families with a total of 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas to areas around the town of Kadugli. The IDPs are mostly women, children and elderly. The expected dry season’s offensive by the warring parties is likely to displace more people.” (ACT 21 March 2001)

**Distribution of IDPs in 1996**

"Of the estimated 4 million Sudanese displaced in mid-1996, some 1.8 million were living in and around Khartoum in the north, several hundred thousand were located in South Kordofan and South Darfur, and 1.5 million remained within the southern Sudan. Some 600,000 were in areas under SPLA and SSIM control in the southern Sudan, including 235,000 in the Bahr al-Ghazal region, 125,000 in the Upper Nile region, 110,000 in Equatoria west of the Nile, and 120,000 in Equatoria east of the Nile. An estimated 250,000 displaced persons were living in the southern Sudan's largest city, Juba, which was held by the government but surrounded by the SPLA.” (Ruiz 1998, p.155)
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Oil-rich areas produce both inward and out-going flow of people (2002)

- Displaced from Rubkona, Western Upper Nile crossed to Mayom county
- Some crossed to Twic County
- Others cross to Tonj or Rumbeck Counties
- Most IDPs expressed wish to stay as close to home area as possible within Rubkona

“Some of the displaced are said to have crossed into Mayom County to villages such as Tam or Manee. Others may have walked as far as Kerial and Kuerbol in Bul areas and onto Twic County. Others may cross into Tonj or Rumbek Counties of Bahr el Ghazal. These locations are accessible to OLS who can carry out assessments there while the non OLS agencies concentrate on the locations that are OLS denied by the government.

However, it was repeatedly stated to us that most people wanted to stay within Rubkona County and be assisted to remain there - within a few days walk of home. The community is in the process of building an airstrip at Chotchar, called Lel. At present it is 700 metres long, but they intend to lengthen it to 1000 metres during March so that larger cargo planes can land.” (Dan Church Aid/Christian Aid, 30 April 2002, p.11)

“An additional 1020 IDPs from Unity State (Western Upper Nile) are reported in Mapear, Rumbek County. These come in addition to the 1300 arrivals in February (source WFP / Tear Fund).” (OCHA 31 July 2001)

“The Sudan conflict has been particularly disruptive in Unity State. Fighting between pro-government militias, inter tribal factions and SPLA has contributed to the displacement of 60,000 IDPS. The influx, mainly from Jikany, Leek, Jagei, and Adok, has been into Bentiu and Rubkona towns.” (UN November 2000, p. 142)

Many IDPs have fled repeatedly towards areas considered safe (1984-1999)

- Estimated 80 percent of southern Sudan's 5 million people displaced at least once during the past 15 years of war (1999)
- IDPs seek refuge beyond the war zones and many have fled repeatedly over the years to stay alive
- Town and cities in northern Sudan attract IDPs from the south despite not being welcomed, but also reports of IDPs inside SPLA controlled areas seeking shelter near their homes

"USCR conducted [in 1998] extensive interviews with uprooted families; many had been displaced from their homes for years, or had fled their homes repeatedly over the years to stay alive. An estimated 80 percent of southern Sudan’s 5 million people have been displaced at least once during the past 15 years of war.” (USCR 1999, p.92)
Amnesty International released in 1997 a report that outlined how IDPs are attracted towards safe areas in the North:

"Sudan is a huge country, the largest in Africa, and nearly two million internally displaced people have moved well beyond the war zones, seeking refuge in the towns and cities of northern Sudan. […]

Southerners and Nuba are widely seen as second class citizens and as supporters of 'the enemy', exposing them to discrimination and abuse. Sudanese law reinforces prejudice by differentiating between 'squatters' - - people who arrived in Khartoum before 1984 (mainly because of drought and famine in western Sudan) -- and the 'displaced' – people who arrived after 1984 (mainly southerners and Nuba fleeing the war). Squatters have the right to settle in Khartoum; displaced people do not."(AI 20 June 1997, "Sudan: abuse and discrimination")

"There are also reports of IDPs giving preference to shelter close to their homes, e.g. "Many of the displaced in the SPLA-controlled areas live near their places of origin, in camps or temporary locations where they can farm or herd until the next attack. Others have moved to more distant towns." (Ruiz 1998, pp. 161)

Dynamics of displacement from Bahr Al Ghazal towards neighboring states (1999-2002)

- IDPs from Awoda (Bahr al Ghazal) walked 300 kilometres across the forest to reach Tambura in Estern Equatoria four weeks later (2001-2002)
- From Daim Zubeir 30,000 IDPs flee towards Timsahah and 8,000 towards Ed Daein (June 2001)
- IDPs who fled Bahr al Ghazal to Timsahah in South Darfur were displaced a second time by the government (2001)
- The north-south civil war has disrupted traditional conflict resolution mechanisms
- The Dinka of northern Bahr Al Ghazal have often looked to their northern neighbours, the Bagara Arab tribes, for labour opportunities in times of strife and famine
- West Kordofan state serves as a transit area for IDPs since 1998
- Difficult to distinguish between displaced and returnees in Bahr Al Ghazal (1999)
- Continuous flows of IDPs from western Bahr al Ghazal to northern Bahr al Ghazal and eastern Equatoria

"Thousands of the displaced from Awoda later continued southwards across difficult forested ground (described by one humanitarian source as a "no-man's-land") towards Tambura, on the border with the Central African Republic, while perhaps 2,000 remained in Awoda as of late December, according to aid officials. The IDPs who remained in were not considered to be in particularly bad shape at that time […]. Access was difficult by both air and road to those who made the difficult, four-week 300-km walk south to Tambura County (centred on Tambura town, 5.36 N 27.28 E), in Western Equatoria, southwestern Sudan, and little assistance reached the IDPs for much of their journey, humanitarian sources told IRIN."(IRIN 22 January 2002)

"Following the on-going SPLA offensive in Bahr El Ghazal and the capture from GOS military forces of the towns of Daim Zubeir and then Raga from about 2 June 2001, there has been an exodus of the civilian population (and military families) from those towns and surrounding areas heading north and north-west into areas which are still GOS-controlled."( OCHA 10 June 2001)

"Since the recapture of Raga, Khartoum has been engaged in a military campaign to flush out SPLA forces from the area resulting in a mass exodus of civilians to northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Equatoria"
regions. Apart from Raga town, the people have been fleeing from the nearby areas of Mangayat, Deim Zubeir, Sopo, Khor Ghana, Awoda and Yabulu. They have headed to camps in Marial Bai, Chelkou, Nyamllel, Makuei and Akwem areas in northern Bahr el Ghazal.” (SCIO, 7 January 2002)

"Sudan has urged the UN and its aid agencies to dispatch aid to tens of thousands of citizens displaced by the recent rebel attacks on Daim Zubeir and Raja localities of Bahr el Ghazal State in southern Sudan. International co-operation minister Karameddin Abdulmoula has told representatives of the UN, the WFP and the UNICEF that 30,000 persons have moved to Tumsaha town in Bahr el Ghazal while 8,000 persons flocked to Eddiain region in West Kordufan State to run away from the fighting. He said an unspecified number of people had found their way into the Radoum Forest in South Darfur State as a result of the attack from the Southern Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA).” (PANA 10 June 2001)

"In Bahr al-Ghazal, an upsurge in insecurity as a result of an offensive by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in May/June had led to the displacement of over 10,000 people from Abulu, Daym Zubayr, Sopo, Besilia and Raga into Awoda payam (sub-county area), with more expected as a result of the peace prevailing there. USAID’s Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) reported in its southern Sudan update, released on Monday. The internally displaced people (IDPs), including 5,350 from Daym Zubayr and more than 4,600 from Abulu, planned to settle in Awoda until the security situation settled in their home area, it said. Poorer IDPs were living on relief food and wild plants as well as minimal grain supplies from petty trade or relations.” (IRIN 17 July 2001)

"The Raga IDPs originally fled in two main directions: one group took a northerly route through Timsahah, from where some pressed on to Al-Ferdows, while others went on to Ed Daein (Al-Duwaym); thousands more took a more westerly route, then swinging north, through Radom and on to Buram. […] After the initial displacement in June, over 5,000 IDPs were forced to move out of Timsahah, 144 km north of Raga, where they initially sought safety, when the Sudanese government declared it a military operations area. […] Almost 5,000 people displaced from Raga were also among 7,600 IDPs currently living in misery in Aweil West and Aweil North counties in northern Bahr al-Ghazal, the Sudan Catholic Information Office (SCIO) reported on 7 January, citing church and aid sources. The other IDPs referred to were part of a growing number of returnees from abduction by pro-government murahilin militias in the north […]. The arrival of the IDPs in Aweil North and West had compounded an already parlous humanitarian situation in these parts of northern Bahr al-Ghazal, according to SCIO. Since the government regained control of Raga and surrounding towns, IDPs had headed north to makeshift camps in Marial Bai, Chelkou, Nyamllel, Makuei and Akwem in northern Bahr al-Ghazal […]. There were about 1,400 IDPs in Marial Bai and 900 plus in Chelkou (Aweil West), as well as 1,200-plus in Gok Machar and about 1,400 in Marol Deng Geng (Aweil North), the report stated. The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) - humanitarian wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army - has appealed for agricultural kits, cooking utensils, sleeping and shelter materials, clothing and medicine as well as food, it added.” (IRIN 22 January 2002)

The Bahr Al Arab is a meeting point for the Dinka of northern Bahr Al Ghazal and the Bagara (cattle-keeping) Arab tribes of South Darfur and Western Kordofan. Here they come to fish and market. While conflicts between the two pastoralist communities are as old as the history of relations between them, in the past, there were traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. However, with the involvement of the belligerents in the north-south civil war, what used to be purely tribal conflicts have now taken on political overtones, thus complicating the situation for the vulnerable civilian population of northern Bahr Al Ghazal. […] It is worth-mentioning that, the political differences between the south and north not-withstanding, the Dinka of northern Bahr Al Ghazal have often looked to their northern neighbours, the Bagara Arab tribes,
for labour opportunities in times of strife and famine. Moving southwards entails walking very long distances through areas without food. However, under the current circumstances the best option is to move northwards.

[...] From past experience, insecurity triggers an uncontrolled movements of IDPs from camps, with the following possible consequences for humanitarian operations in the area and therefore requires preparedness measures:

- By May every year most IDPs families take up share-crop farming contracts with their traditional landlords (one of their coping mechanisms) and start clearing fields in preparation for the onset of the rainy season in June. Therefore, heightened insecurity in northern Bahr Al Ghazal and Bahr Al Arab at this time could force them to abandon their fields in favour of the relative security of the camps, thereby missing out on the agricultural season altogether.” (UNHCU 11 June 1999, p.7)

"West Kordofan is host to a long-term population of IDPs who have fled drought and insecurity in northern Bahr Al Ghazal. It is expected that the State will continue to serve as a transit point for displaced populations coming from northern Bahr Al Ghazal and western Upper Nile travelling to urban centres or mechanised schemes in the East and North. Some IDPs from the southern conflict zones are expected to remain in the State although the majority are likely to transit the area. Most IDPs are dispersed among the host community but approximately 36,000 IDPs live in conditions of chronic emergency in IDP settlements in Meiram, Abyei, An Nahud and in the peace villages near Lagawa." (UN January 1999, "West Kordofan State")

"In most locations, the displaced are grouped according to their county of origin (e.g. the Abyei, Twic, Rumbek, Yirol etc displaced), and have elected a representative for this entire group (the Alek displaced are an exception, as this is a payam). Representatives should represent all different sections, but obviously do not know everyone and cannot be equally accountable to every section or clan. This group is also highly mobile, and sometimes the representative moved without handing over responsibility. Within WFP, there is confusion over the terms displaced and returnees. For example, the category Wau displaced is used in some locations, but are generally returnees; i.e. they belong to the same sections as the resident population. Also, the terms say little about the duration of displacement and where they have come from before arriving in a particular location. For example, the Aweil and the Twic displaced have generally come straight from their areas of origin, whereas the Rumbek and Yirol displaced are generally people who were displaced from Wau, but whose original home is in these counties. They may never have lived in Rumbek or Yirol themselves." (Jaspars 12 April 1999, sect. 4.3.1)

**People in Nuba Mountains relocated into "peace villages" by Government (1992-2002)**

- 400,000 people in the Nuba Mountains SPLM/A-controlled territories are cut off from the rest of Sudan
- Claimed that Government locate "Peace villages" close to agricultural schemes as a source for cheap labour
- Reported that blockade is used as a tool to force people out of the Nuba Mountains
- Suggested in UNHCU report that people being encouraged by humanitarian services move from rebel to GOS areas, relief and access to better life

"The NRRDO said that an estimated 400,000 people remaining in SPLM/A-controlled territory in the Nubah Mountains had been effectively cut off from the rest of Sudan. Over the last year, it said, Sudanese government forces had increased their military targeting of these people and abducted many, taking them to "peace camps" in government-controlled territory. Houses, farms, food stores and livestock had been "systematically destroyed", and over 50,000 people had been displaced, many for the second or third time,
according to the organisation. Poor rains across the region had exacerbated the situation, and 33,000 people had been unable to harvest any crops this year, it added." (IRIN-CEA 22 June 2001)

"The government regards controlling the internally displaced as vital. Since 1992 it has organized the systematic clearance of whole Nuba communities from areas contested with the SPLA into so-called 'peace villages', often close to garrisons. Access to outsiders is restricted and some people who have tried to escape have been shot dead.

Many 'peace villages' are sited close to intensive mechanized agricultural schemes growing crops for export. These schemes -- a key element in the government's economic development program -- rely on a supply of cheap labour. An official review of Operation Lifeline Sudan, the UN emergency relief operation for the war-affected populations of Sudan, has pointed out "an un-comfortable connection between the Sudan Government's economic development policies with regard to agriculture, its policies concerning the war-displaced, and its assertion of control over land in the context of internal warfare." (AI 20 June 1997, "Sudan: abuse and discrimination")

Human Rights Watch indicates that the government uses a blockade of the Nuba Mountains to force people out of the SPLA held areas:

"Not even included in the southern famine total were the approximately 400,000 people of the SPLA-held areas of the Nuba Mountains, located in the center of Sudan. There the government continued its efforts to starve civilians out of rebel-held areas into government 'peace villages.' Army troops and Nuba collaborators captured and relocated or killed civilians. They looted and burned villages, animals, and grain. A permanent government blockade, in place since the beginning of the war, barred all U.N. relief operations and even traders from the rebel areas of the Nuba Mountains. A private assessment in March estimated 20,000 civilians there were at risk of starvation." (HRW 1999, p. 75)

"Populations within the [South Kordofan] State have tended to move from rebel to GOS areas, encouraged by humanitarian services, relief and access to better life. Although, accurate needs assessment have been difficult, reports suggest that several thousand people in the rebel-held areas facing acute food shortage have moved over the last eight months into GOS areas." (UNHCU 11 June 1999, p.5)

IDPs in Equatoria motivated to manage on their own (1998)

- Reported that IDPs welcome food aid but stress their preference for agricultural tools and seeds

"With the exception of the Dinka in Manglatore camp, most of the displaced on the west bank of the Nile River have been forced to flee their homesteads, but are still staying near their areas of origin, in areas familiar to them and often within their ethnic group's geographic boundaries. These people are generally highly motivated to manage on their own, and although they welcome food relief, they consistently stress their preference for agricultural tools and seeds with which they can help themselves.

[...]

In eastern Equatoria, east of the Nile, the majority of the displaced are Dinka from the Bor region, virtually all of whom have been displaced two or three times since they were first driven out, of their home areas by the Nuer raid in October 1991 and by the Sudanese army's 1992 offensive. Most of those displaced have received agricultural support in addition to food relief since 1993. Despite the hopelessness generated by their frequent displacement, displaced Bor Dinka generally have responded positively to attempts to reduce their food aid dependency. Still, because of the insecurity in the areas of their camps before the SPLA offensive in October 1995, and because of insufficient rains in most seasons since 1993, food aid continues to account for as h as 80 percent of the group's needs." (Ruiz 1998, pp.162 & 162)
OLS Review relates dynamics of population movements in the North to strategy aimed at controlling territory, resources and peoples (1996)

- Reported that IDPs in the North are frequently moved to areas where they live under the authority of the same groups responsible for their original displacement
- Wage labour and migration once a seasonal activity in the subsistence economy - has now become a survival strategy of the war-displaced
- OLS Review links Government's mechanised farming schemes with the creation of "peace villages" for IDPs

"The existence of large displaced populations in Sudan is not necessarily only a byproduct of internal warfare; there is also evidence to suggest that it constitutes part of a strategy aimed at controlling territory, resources, and peoples […]. Here, it is important to emphasise several points concerning these populations in the Northern Sector:

First, war-displaced populations are frequently moved to areas where they live under the authority of the same groups responsible for their original displacement. This has important implications for the role of humanitarian operations in protecting war-displaced from violence and other abuses. In Ed Da'ein, for example, Dinka from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal were displaced into areas inhabited primarily by the Rizeigat, from whom the GOS-supported Murahaliin militia have been drawn. In Wau, Fertile militia armed by the government were responsible for both the displacement of Dinka from their home areas, and for violence against them in the town. As noted earlier, massacres of Dinka civilians took place in both Ed Da'ein and Wau in the late 1980s.

Second, war-induced displacement is continuing. In Wau, evidence from UN and GOS annual needs assessments, and interviews by the Review Team, suggest that since 1992 the number of war-displaced has risen every year. There have been periodic increases in numbers of war-displaced in Khartoum since 1989, and large-scale war displacement continues in areas of the Transition Zone, particularly the Nuba Hills. This raises important questions concerning the extent to which present humanitarian operations are addressing the underlying causes of displacement.

Third, those people who have moved into government-held areas as a result of raiding and other forms of military activity have typically lost the bulk of their assets, most importantly cattle. Thus, war-induced migration differs markedly from traditional seasonal migrations of rural people to participate in the labour economy in the North. Indeed, wage labour - once a seasonal activity in the subsistence economy - has now become a survival strategy of the war-displaced.

In this regard, the Review Team found an uncomfortable connection between the GOS's economic development policies with regard to agriculture, its policies concerning the war-displaced, and its assertion of control over land in the context of internal warfare. Economic policy in Sudan since the late 1970's has emphasised the replacement of subsistence production with capital-intensive, mechanised farming for export; and this policy continues today. For example, The Peace and Development Foundation, created in 1992, and later reconstituted as the National Development Foundation (NDF), has as one of its objectives the consolidation of government control over land through the expansion of mechanised farming […]. The emphasis that the GOS has placed on mechanised agriculture as opposed to subsistence production fits well with the creation of "peace villages", where war-displaced populations are moved to mechanised farming schemes to act as either producers or wage-labourers. These policies are justified by the GOS on the basis of promoting self-sufficiency among the war-displaced, and of promoting a policy of "Salaam min al Dakhal" or "peace from within". It is in the context of this kind of "development" agenda by the GOS, which has been accommodated by OLS agencies, that the use of humanitarian relief to promote self-reliance needs to be analysed." (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 185-186)
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

Protection of IDPs still insufficiently addressed

- IDPs particular vulnerability to human rights violations during displacement still insufficiently addressed (November 2001)
- IDPs particularly at risk of land mines

"Many of the estimated 4 million IDPs in the Sudan are migrating within war zones, where they are particularly vulnerable to violations of human rights and humanitarian principles. Civilian populations are instrumentalised for military advantage, forcibly displaced, prevented from access for humanitarian aid and harassed while migrating. Numerous attacks against displaced civilian population were reported in 2001, particularly from Western Upper Nile, where militias practice a scorched earth policy. Protection of IDPs is still insufficiently addressed within the overall humanitarian response to displacement in war zones in southern Sudan. There is a need to operationalise guidelines for the protection of internally displaced persons and to increase the advocacy and awareness raising efforts to enhance the protection of IDPs. There is further need to obtain a more accurate, up to date picture of internal displacement, migration patterns and violations of humanitarian principles in relation to displaced populations in the Sudan.

According to the UN’s landmines database, the Sudan is one of the ten most seriously mined countries in the world. Yet, capacity to inform and warn remains critically deficient. An estimated 500,000 to two million mines are thought to have been laid by the army and armed opposition movements. Several thousands of people, mainly civilians, have fallen victim. In 1999, both the Government and SPLM/A pledged to no longer use mines, but old and reportedly newly laid mines continued to claim victims throughout 2001. IDPs, farmers, women and children are at particular risk. Local populations are often negligent of the dangers, as mine awareness is generally low." (UN November 2001, p.82)


- Latest GOS offensive in the oil area included abduction, gang rapes, ground assaults, helicopter gunships, destruction of relief sites and burning of villages
- Pro-Government militias given power to forcibly recruit Nuer IDPs and arrest them (Jan 2003)
- Humanitarian workers feel GoS is deliberately targeting relief centers (Jan 2003)
- Civilians fleeing Yabus following GoS capture of Midil town
- After bombing Yabus planes dropped leaflets urging people to go to Damazin and join GoS (Oct 2002)
- Less than one week within the signing of the Machakos Protocol, GOS launched an offensive against civilians
- Bombings began after the GOS had granted access to bring supplies to IDPs
- Gunship helicopters attacks over Mayom killed about 300 and displaced about up to 100,000 civilians (Jul 2002)

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“The offensive from late December until the beginning of February was an extension of the government’s long-time strategy of depopulating oil-rich areas through indiscriminate attacks on civilians in order to clear the way for further development of infrastructure. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the tactics included the abduction of women and children, gang rapes, ground assaults supported by helicopter gunships, destruction of humanitarian relief sites, and burning of villages.1 A senior Sudanese civil society member concluded: “The Nuer militias are the most potent threat to human security and stability in the South, regardless of whether peace is concluded or not”. (ICG, 10 February 2003, p.1)

“41. While there have been no major waves of further displacement, the situation of IDPs has remained an issue of concern. Sources referred to it as “exasperating”. Some sources reported that IDPs, particularly from Unity State, have been facing serious problems during the past two months, because of a pro-Government militia led by Paulino Matiep who reportedly has been given the power to arrest Nuer, detain them in a house in Khartoum and/or forcibly recruit them to be sent to war zones. This has reportedly led to inter-tribal clashes and shooting.” (UNCHR, 6 January 2003, p.10)

“The cease-fire has broken down completely in the oil-fields of western Upper Nile, where GoS has launched major offensives in the areas of Tam, Mankien, Leer and Leal, with many villages destroyed and civilians killed or displaced. Leal was attacked shortly after a visit by a UN Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) aircraft, and OLS has noted that this is not the first time this month that a location in western Upper Nile has been attacked after such a visit. An NGO working in Mayom County reports that there seems to be a deliberate attempt to attack relief sites, thereby cutting local civilians off from humanitarian assistance. GoS claims that the attacks are just local militia activity but there is little doubt that these militia are under GoS control and are supported by regular forces, including helicopter gunships. It is thought that GoS garrisons along the “oil road” have been strengthened. Cdr Peter Gadet defected back to GoS with some of his senior commanders but few troops, and there are reports of forced recruitment in the Bentiu area.” (SFP, January 2003, p.5)

“Heavy fighting continued in southern Blue Nile after GoS captured the town of Midil. Civilians have deserted Yabus following aerial attacks. Antonovs are now dropping leaflets calling on the citizens of southern Blue Nile to have nothing to do with the “southern rebellion” and to go to Damazin to join GoS in its quest for peace in Sudan. The tracts say southerners have betrayed the country and Islam to the enemy.” (SFP, October 2002, p. 4)

“Aid agencies in southern Sudan have reported that, in September 2002 alone, there has been government bombing affecting civilians in Mundri (11 killed, 10 wounded in a displaced persons camp) and Yei in Western Equatoria; Torit and Kapoeta in Eastern Equatoria; Wunrok (13-year-old boy killed, seven wounded) in Bahr El Ghazal; Atar (nine killed) in Upper Nile; Gar, Kawer and Tanger (Western Upper Nile); Lualdit, Kanawer, Ajajer, Padak and Matiang (three killed) and Lui (13 killed in a cattle camp, including four children), in Jonglei; Ganga in Abyei county (family of six killed). This list does not include all bombing incidents in the war in September, but clearly represents an escalation of aerial bombing.

There have been reports that in September the SPLA attacked villages south of Mayom (three killed) and used a landmine in Thar Jath (four or five killed) in Western Upper Nile, and that the SPLA shelled the town and summarily executed an unknown number of captured soldiers in Torit, Eastern Equatoria.” (HRW, 28 September 2002)

“Less than one week after signing the Machakos Protocol, GoS launched a large offensive in western Upper Nile, presumably as part of its scorched earth campaign aimed at clearing civilians from block 5a to encourage Lundin and OMV to return. Ground forces, Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships were used. The villages of Tam, Keriel and Rier were amongst those reportedly overrun. Initial claims that 1,500 civilians were killed proved false, but the probable civilian death toll in the low hundreds is still unacceptably high. There are reliable reports of the gunships “herding” civilians on the ground, and tens of thousands were displaced. This offensive began soon after GoS had granted a 5-day window for the UN to
bring relief supplies into the area, thus encouraging civilians to return to the area, and also ensuring plenty of relief supplies for the attacking forces to loot. Sudanese church leaders meeting in Entebbe called for an immediate investigation into this attack which clearly breaches the agreement on protection of civilians brokered by Senator Danforth, but there was no sign of action by the international verification team based in Khartoum.” (SFP, August 2002, p.5)

“Our sources on the ground estimate something between 200 and 300 were killed by helicopter gunships, ground forces, horsemen and militia” during a three-day attack on the county of Mayom, in Western Upper Nile, said Michael Chang, the regional coordinator of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, the humanitarian arm of the SPLA.

Chang added that Mayom's entire population, estimated to number between 80,000 and 100,000, had fled to neighbouring counties and that others had been abducted with their cattle.

The attack was across "the whole county", he said. Chang said there was no fighting late Tuesday as the SPLA had withdrawn following the attack which led government forces to take control of the area.” (AFP 30 July 2002)

**IDP protection threatened by multiple LRA attacks (2002)**

- LRA displaced 500 people from Imatong Center IDP camp (late-April and early May 2002)
- GoS urged civilians to vacate areas occupied by LRA and run to garrison towns (May 2002)
- Following LRA abductions IDPs in Gumbo camp have spent the night in the bush by fear of renewed attacks
- GoS has maintained the three year flight ban to the areas affected by LRA attacks

“Many LRA fled from the UPDF and possibly from the Sudan army to the safety of the Imatong Mountains, east of their Juba-area bases, looting along the way. As the UPDF was moving troops, heavy artillery, tanks, and armored personnel carriers into Sudan, the LRA was looting and razing to the ground at least six villages, according to the Catholic church in the area just across from the Uganda border. The church estimated that the LRA had killed more than 470 southern Sudanese civilians in these and other Imatong villages, and displaced more than 500 others from a displaced persons camp in Imatong Center in one week in late April-early May 2002. Included in the dead were 350 Sudanese civilians living in Katire, mostly elderly, women, and children, killed with LRA machetes starting from April 26. The LRA robbed, looted, and ransacked the village and surrounding hamlets of all food and valuables.

On May 9, 2002, the Sudanese government, through its governor in Juba, ordered civilians to vacate areas currently occupied by the LRA, calling on them to run for safety to several named towns, according to a Sudanese government press report. The Sudanese government, however, made no attempt to offer protection to civilians outside its garrison towns, even though the LRA was based in its army and militia-controlled territory.

A few NGOs tried with minimal resources to provide for thousands of newly displaced civilians inside southern Sudan, both in the garrison towns and in SPLA areas. By June 2002, there were approximately 4,500 internally displaced Sudanese in Ikotos, an SPLA-controlled area of Eastern Equatoria, in poor conditions, having just fled the LRA-UPDF fighting in the Imatong Mountains, according to a United Nations (U.N.) official.

On August 15, 2002, the LRA attacked Gumbo and Rejaf, located also in Sudanese government-controlled territory just southeast of Juba. In Gumbo displaced persons camp, the Sudanese government patrol engaged the LRA. According to U.N. sources, the LRA abducted two internally displaced persons and
killed two Sudan government soldiers. One LRA soldier was killed. In Rejaf village the LRA killed one woman and looted cattle. After one of the displaced abductees reportedly returned with a threatening note from the LRA, the displaced persons in Gumbo camp began to spend the night in Gumbo village. On August 24, the LRA attacked Gumbo village, killing one policeman. An LRA soldier was killed and five LRA injured as the Sudan government responded to the attack, and the internally displaced fled to Juba. On September 9, a delegation of chiefs and elders from Rejaf called on Sudanese authorities in Juba, complaining of LRA harassment and theft from their farms in daylight. The villagers slept in the bush at night for fear of more LRA attacks.

Despite the displacement caused by this military activity, the government of Sudan has kept in place the three-year flight ban it has imposed on the affected area, preventing access to the U.N. and NGOs working through the U.N.-coordinated relief effort Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)-Southern Sector, based in Lokichokkio and Nairobi, Kenya.” (HRW, 29 October 2002)

ICG report on famine and displacement used as a weapon of war in Sudan (2003)

- ICG argues that famine not a by-product of war but a deliberate objective of GOS carried through relief manipulation and access denials
- ICG argues GOS rationale that enfeebled displaced southerners will not be able to support the insurgency
- Displacement of populations to attract humanitarian relief where military troops are in need have been a war tactic used by both GoS and SPLM/A

“Instead of adopting a “hearts and minds” strategy to peel away SPLA popular support, the government has consistently targeted the “stomachs and feet” of civilians. By actively encouraging their displacement and steadily undermining their ability to feed and support themselves, including by destroying livestock, the government has sought to leave civilians in broad swathes of eastern and southern Sudan as vulnerable as possible. Famine in the war-torn regions is not a by-product of indiscriminate fighting but a government objective that has largely been achieved through manipulation, diversion and denial of international humanitarian relief. The calculation seems to be that a dispirited and enfeebled population will be unable to assist the insurgency. However, this has done little to persuade southerners that there is any place for them in a Sudan governed by the current leadership in Khartoum, and it poses a direct challenge to the international community’s responsibility to protect innocent civilians from the worst excesses of armed conflict.

[...]

“The government has a consistent record of contravening the Geneva Conventions, the Tripartite OLS Agreement of 1994, the 1999 Beneficiary Protocol of Operation Lifeline Sudan10 and the recent Nuba Mountains agreement. Khartoum continues its simultaneous policy of launching offensives to depopulate the oilfields while blocking relief access to displaced and war-affected civilians. Despite this clear and persistent infringement of international humanitarian law and a host of other relevant agreements, the international community has remained largely silent at senior policy levels, though it has taken up the issue more vocally in other countries such as Iraq and Bosnia. Most of the protest about the use of food as a weapon has come from the humanitarian community, particularly from U.S. Agency for International Development chief Andrew Natsios. Most of the practical engagement on the access issue has been left to the UN Special Envoy, Ambassador TomVraalsen, while the donors held behind-thescenes meetings in Geneva in an effort to craft common positions. General Sumbeiywo, who brokered the MOU and is now pressing for its extension, is also playing a major role.

At least until recently, however, the silence of and selective enforcement from the international community generally emboldened the government of Sudan to continue using food as part of its military strategy of weakening the SPLA and its population base. As long as its manipulation elicits only occasional verbal
condemnation from the Western donors, Khartoum will have little incentive to change. Both the government and the SPLA would then inevitably approach international guarantees included in a peace agreement with great suspicion. 

[...] “Although the government is guilty of the majority of humanitarian related crimes, the SPLA cannot be seen as an innocent bystander. SPLA abuses of food policies and manipulation of humanitarian access to southern civilians during the first decade of the war has been well documented. Abusive policies included the persistent stealing of food and cattle from civilians, forced unpaid civilian labour on SPLA farms, taxation forcibly levied on civilian goods (including relief supplies) and cattle, diversion of humanitarian relief supplies to the military, and the displacement of civilian populations in vulnerable locations in order to draw more relief supplies. Abuses of humanitarian assistance have been less frequent in the last few years, but the insurgents regularly tax relief supplies in the areas they control. Internal fissures within the organisation also continue to disrupt aid activities. A recent trend of desertions from the SPLA in Equatoria led to the freezing of humanitarian operations in some locations. For example, Yambio was temporarily evacuated of humanitarian workers at the beginning of October following repeated attacks on the UNICEF compound by deserters. [...] The SPLA also has used the provision of aid to manipulate population movements and patterns of displacement.” (ICG, 14 November 2002, p1, 4, 10, 11)

**MSF survey shows unacceptable level of killings and violence against IDPs in Bahr al Ghazal (January 2002)**

- MSF mortality survey in Yed Akuem IDP camp, showed that 11% deaths recorded concerned under-five children
- 94% causes of death was by gun-shot wounds
- 9% of the initial population had disappeared mostly after being abducted

"Because of war and drought, several thousand internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been in search of food and grazing areas for cattle in the past months within Aweil East. In this context, we did a retrospective mortality survey that focused on IDP camps within the area. The objective was to identify the main causes of deaths and prioritise and orient medical-related activities. War-related deaths as a result of continued and ongoing violence in the region, and disappearances, were also investigated.

For logistical reasons, the survey was limited to Yed Akuem IDP camp. In this camp, the majority comprised the Dinka population mainly originating from Titcok Mareng, a village of a few thousand, situated in the lowlands of East Aweil. The Dinka population has been specifically targeted by the militia groups during the civil war between northern and southern regions of Sudan and the majority of them have been forcibly displaced as a result. The survey, carried out among families over a period of 2 days each, was done between Jan 21 and April 8, 2001.

We collected data on all deaths reported by the families. Information on family members lost or taken away by the militia was also collected.

A total of 270 families were surveyed, representing 1,027 individuals (three to four individuals per family), of which 201 (20%) were children younger than age five years.

During the period investigated, 168 deaths were reported (13% of the initial population [1314] under study) of which 24 (11%) were children younger than five years of age.

94% (158 of 168) of all deaths, and 79% (19 of 24) of under five deaths were due to violence, from mainly gun-shot wounds.

9% (119 of 1314) of the initial population had disappeared, the majority abducted by the militia as hostages, but others lost and separated during the displacement.

Analysis of sex distribution was possible for 121 families reporting 44 disappearances: women represented 21% (nine of 44) of the total, including one girl younger than five years old.
It was not possible for us to analyse sex distribution among reported deaths as the survey was done under difficult emergency conditions. All violent deaths and disappearances we documented occurred on Jan 21, 2001.

Although the proportion of deaths recorded may have been over-estimated, the situation we report clearly highlights an unacceptable level of killings perpetrated in part against civilians. In particular, the death of children is intolerable. Families claimed that nearly all of the disappearances, and notably disappearances of women, were abductions.

The secondary health effects of war such as malnutrition, population displacement, and disease outbreaks are often documented as an essential feature of programme planning of aid agencies. Less, however, is known about the primary impact of war through violence on civilians and data is often impossible to collect under such insecure circumstances. Bahr El Ghazal has been severely affected by famine in the past years [...], but this should not obscure the dramatic impact of violence in this war-torn region.

The example of violence among the displaced from Tictok Mareng village provides a small insight into some of the human rights abuses being perpetrated in southern Sudan. In the context of on-going war in Sudan and elsewhere, investigations to document and quantify violence among forcibly displaced civilians must be carried out. Such data will have an impact on the prevention of abuses against vulnerable populations in the future." (MSF 11 January 2002)

IDPs from Raga in Bahr al Ghazal face multiple security threats since June 2001

- UN Humanitarian Coordinator calls for protection of the Raga IDPs against armed robbery
- Over 5,000 Timsahah IDPs forced to flee again when GoS declared Timsahah a military area

"In June, more than 30,000 IDPs fled northwards from Raga County after the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) seized the town from government forces. Many of them lived and slept in the open air with little food or shelter as they made the march north, and sometimes thereafter, until aid agencies put arrangements in place to provide food, shelter and medical attention.

The UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan wrote to the Ministry of International Cooperation in June, highlighting the danger of banditry and armed robbery along the route, and calling on the government to provide the IDPs with protection - although the local authorities in Southern Darfur said few such incidences affected the displaced.

[...]

After the initial displacement in June, over 5,000 IDPs were forced to move out of Timsahah, 144 km north of Raga, where they had initially sought safety, when the Sudanese government declared it a military operations area.

The condition of the displaced in Timsahah was poor, and aid agencies' efforts to help them were hampered by the government's declaration of Timsahah as a military area and humanitarian flight bans, as well as the geographic difficulty of the area, flooding and impassable roads, relief officials told IRIN.

The IDPs were also endangered by intensified aerial bombing by government forces in Bahr al-Ghazal (including Raga, Malwal Kon and Mangar Angui), they said."(IRIN 22 January 2002)

Particularly intense aerial bombing on IDP camps and IDP food distribution sites during 2001-2002

- Helicopter gunships used to push local residents from oil-producing areas
- 100 air strikes during the first six months of 2001: particularly intense on Equatoria and Upper Nile and on Bahr al Ghazal in May-June 2001
- Bombardements in Eastern Equatoria on the rise hitting Ngaluma IDP camp (August 2001)
Bombardements on Pariang IDP camp and Malual Kon IDP relief center (November 2001)
Bombardement in Mangayat as WFP was dropping food air to 20,000 IDPs from Raga (October 2001)
WFP food distribution site bombarded by the army despite GoS flight clearance in Akuem, which hosts 3,000 IDPs
Aerial bombings kill four civilians and one MSF staff in oil-rich Bentiu (February 2002)

"Sudanese government military aircraft continue to bomb civilian and humanitarian targets throughout southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains. On March 8 and 9 [2001] Sudanese government planes bombed Kauda, in the Nuba Mountains. This is the same locale where a school was bombed last year, killing 14 children and injuring 18 others. Two days ago, on March 14, the Sudanese government bombed Mankien with as yet unknown casualties.

The total number of bombings confirmed this year by the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) stands at 20. This is almost certainly an understatement of the frequency of actual bombing by the Sudanese government as it often takes weeks to confirm bombings in remote locations, particularly where the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan is not present. For example, an additional 10 bombings in Blue Nile Province have been reported since February 1, but have not yet been adequately confirmed by USCR and sources in the field.

The presence of UN or other humanitarian agency relief personnel is no deterrent to Sudanese government bombing. On February 22, for example, Padit in Upper Nile Province was bombed while the World Food Program (WFP) was preparing an aerial food drop there. Such food drops attract civilians, who are the targets of Khartoum's bombing campaign. In this instance, three bombs reportedly struck the food-drop zone and a fourth fell within 50 meters of a WFP compound." (USCR 16 March 2001)

"The Sudanese government's objective seems to be to push people from their homes in preparation for a large new military offensive and to depopulate areas to begin exploitation of expanded oil fields," Winter said." (USCR 23 January 2001)

"During July [2001], the government's apparently indiscriminate bombing campaign in southern Sudan seemed to have resumed its previous intensity, according to humanitarian sources […].
There were at least 13 aerial attacks by government forces that endangered civilians in southern Sudan during the month of July, humanitarian sources stated. Five of the attacks occurred in Equatoria (in Ngaluma, Ikotos, Magwe, Kayala and Parajok) while four occurred in Bahr al-Ghazal (on Raga, Malualkon [Malwal Kon] - twice, and Mangar Angui) where fighting has intensified since an offensive by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in late May/early June, they said.

There were also four attacks in Upper Nile (Juaibor, Thokchak, Padit and Maiwut) during July, they added. Each side has accused the other of targeting civilians displaced by fighting in Western Bahr al-Ghazal since late May. In all, there were almost 100 air strikes in the first six months of the year, with attacks on Bahr al-Ghazal, in particular, intensifying in late May and through June, humanitarian sources told IRIN. There have also been reports of an increased number of areas to which humanitarian agencies are denied flight access, thus limiting their chances of assisting vulnerable populations." (IRIN-CEA 3 August 2001)

"Six people including three children were killed and a similar number injured after a Government of Sudan bomber dropped 24 bombs on a village in the country's southern Eastern Equatoria region on September 3. […] The bombing of Mura Hatiha is the second raid by Khartoum planes on Eastern Equatoria in as many weeks. On August 26, Antonov bombers hit Ikotos, together with the villages of Ngaluma and Hiyala
seriously injuring a teenage girl in a camp for the displaced in Ngaluma that is run by Catholic Relief Services (CRS).

Estimates by relief and church officials show that Eastern Equatoria is the most bombed province in southern Sudan in the past two months. Out of the five bombing incidents reported in August three occurred in the area while out of the 14 incidents reported in July, six were also in Eastern Equatoria. Further, most of these raids are concentrated in five towns- Ngaluma, Ikotos, Magwi, Hiyala and Parajok. They have now extended to Mura Hatima.” (SCIO 5 September 2001)

"At least 8 people were seriously injured when Sudanese planes bombed civilian targets and a camp for displaced persons in southern Sudan, Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) [...] In a statement released here Friday, SPLM/A spokesman Samson Kwaje said eight people were seriously injured in Malual Kon, where seven bombs were dropped.
A displaced persons camp in Pariang was also targeted in the air raids, but no casualty figures were given for that attack.

Malual Kon is a major relief centre for the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and other non-governmental organisations, and a refugee base for thousands of people displaced from their ancestral homes by Arab militias raiding and hunting for slaves, Kwaje said.
Kwaje recalled that on November 12, Sudanese government forces shelled Kauda airstrip in Nuba Mountains, while WFP planes were on the ground. [...] Kwaje also alleged that government forces carried out a raid at Kumo village, about 10 kilometres (six miles) from Kawuda, and killed prominent Nuba judge, Augustino el Nur himela, and civilians.” (AFP 23 November 2001)

"According to WFP, on October 5, 6 and 8, GOS Antonov military aircraft bombed the village of Mangayat, western Bahr el Ghazal, at the same time as scheduled U.N./OLS WFP emergency food airdrops were taking place to a population of more than 20,000 displaced civilians from Raga. This is not the first time that the GOS has bombed a humanitarian flight that it had cleared. In early June, a similar incident occurred when the GOS bombed the village of Bararud, northern Bahr el Ghazal, just as a U.N./OLS WFP Hercules aircraft was preparing for a humanitarian food airdrop.
On June 11, 2001, the GOS announced that it was resuming aerial bombing of targets in southern Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains. This statement came just 17 days after the GOS announced that they would suspend all aerial bombings in the South.” (USAID 10 December 2001)

"The United Nations World Food Programme today strongly condemned the bombing and subsequent death and injury of civilians living in Akuem, southern Sudan, where the Agency had just finished distributing food to 18,000 people suffering from drought and insecurity.
On 10 February, an Antonov aircraft dropped six bombs on the town of Akuem, Bahr el Ghazal, at 17:00 hours. Three of the bombs landed directly on the WFP food drop zone, while the other three fell in the surrounding area. A 12-year-old girl and another child were killed in the attack. Another 10 to 12 people were injured. Some of the injuries occurred inside the MSF-France compound, which was hit by shrapnel. [...] All humanitarian activities conducted by WFP in Southern Sudan take place with the agreement of all sides to the conflict.
Akuem has been affected by serious drought and instability, hampering the local population's ability to produce enough food to survive. The village also hosts about 3,000 people from Aweil West who frequently flee their homes due to insecurity.
This latest attack is the fourth in Akuem since May 2001. The last bombardment took place in November 2001 when a number of people were killed.
The shelling of a southern Sudanese town while WFP food operations were underway also occurred in October 2001, in Mangayath, Bahr el Ghazal. A series of heavy bombings over three separate days took
place directly in the area where WFP teams were in the process of distributing relief food to some 20,000 civilians. The incident was strongly condemned at the highest levels." (WFP 13 February 2002)

"A Sudanese health worker from the international medical aid organisation Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) was killed last week along with four other civilians, when at least three bombs were dropped in Nimne in the oil-rich area of western Upper Nile (Wahdah, or UnityState), southern Sudan. […]

The bombing closely follows the looting of Nimne, once home to between 1,000 and 1,500 people, by a militia group at the beginning of February. MSF workers and local people had managed to escape just before the soldiers arrived, MSF said. Hundreds fled to Bentiu, 25 km to the west, and other areas in the region. James Koang and a few other individuals had returned a few days later to the village, where Koang was subsequently killed by the bombs on 9 February." (IRIN 18 February 2002)

Sudanese children, women and disabled at risk of sexual abuse, abduction and military recruitment (2003)

- About 7,000 Dinka and Jur Luo children and women abducted in northern Bahr al Ghazal by muraheleen militia since mid-1980s
- New abductions reported in 2002
- Over 17,000 child soldiers in Sudan
- Over 500 abducted people were retrieved in 2002
- SPLA and SPDF forces demobilized 9,600 child soldiers between 2000 and 2002
- Sudan among top ten worst affected by landmines

“Certain long-lasting, deep-seated human rights problems will require action in 2003 whatever the situation. For example, as many as 7,000 Dinka and Jur Luo children and women abducted from northern Bahr al-Ghazal in raids by muraheleen militia since the mid-1980s may remain missing and there continue to be reports of new cases of abduction. Meanwhile, inter-tribal abduction is a feature of inter-community conflict involving militia in Upper Nile between the Murle, Nuer, Anuak and Dinka. A peace agreement would open up opportunities for new official and community-based cross-line action to address abduction and related exploitation within the framework of inter-community dialogue and peace building. Should a deal not be forthcoming, existing mechanisms will remain essential.

It is estimated that there are more than 17,000 child soldiers, including girls, in Sudan. Child soldiers are exposed to physical risk, abuse and neglect, including when employed behind the front line as non-combatant labourers. Over the past two years the SPLM/A has demobilised over 9,600 children. However, there are still children within the SPLA, other rebel groups, notably the SPDF, and government allied forces, such as the muraheleen militia and the southern Sudanese groups forming the South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF). The DDR of children should address their special needs. In particular, the reintegration of children with their families and communities should be sustainable. This means that DDR of children should take place within a framework that integrates community rehabilitation with psychosocial support, education and vocational training.

The UN Landmines database puts Sudan among the ten worst affected countries worldwide. Villages have been deserted, roads abandoned and livelihoods paralysed because of fear of landmines. In many areas, landmines constrain overland delivery of aid, which must then be delivered by air. Those most at risk include children, farmers, pastoralists and persons on the move into unfamiliar areas. Returning IDPs and refugees are often particularly vulnerable. Landmines action -- integrating mapping, clearing, marking and risk awareness -- became an immediate priority in the Nuba Mountains following the Nuba cease fire in
early 2002. In March 2002, UNMAS posted a Chief Technical Advisor to Khartoum in order to coordinate and plan mine action activities. UNICEF is developing the MRE component.

Across both north and south, translating protection principles into practice remains weak among humanitarian actors, civil society and the authorities. This leaves IDPs, street children, abandoned infants, women and other persons affected by conflict vulnerable to abuse, sometimes through policy implementation that does not give sufficient priority to protection or through deliberate attacks on civilians involving rape, extra-judicial execution, and looting and destroying cattle and household goods. Over the past three years, 80% of abandoned infants admitted each year to the Mygoma orphanage in Khartoum have died within 12 months (approximately 400 children per year). There is a need to develop action on sexual violence. Also there is a serious need for a more accurate, up to date picture of internal displacement, migration patterns and violations of humanitarian principles in relation to displaced populations in Sudan. Planning for IDP return should integrate with planning for child soldier and adult DDR, and land mines action. Like peace building, successful work with IDPs involves strong inter-agency coordination.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 131-2)

“In a context where governance remains a fundamental challenge, progress in the promotion and protection of human rights is never linear. Achievements in one sector or geographical area can be contrasted or undermined by setbacks in another. Nevertheless, during the year over 500 abducted children and women were retrieved in western Sudan and over 300 reunited with their families, 50 of them "cross-line" in Bahr al-Ghazal. In advance of GoS and UPDF military action against the LRA, agencies and NGOs geared up child protection capacity in Juba to receive en masse persons escaping from the LRA. In the event, the mass escape never took place but during the year 20 former LRA were returned home to Uganda. The SPLA and SPDF demobilised over 8,000 child soldiers.” (UN, November 2002, p.11)

Protection concerns affecting displaced women (1997-2002)

- Abductions decreased slightly since the train from Babanusa to Wau no longer runs and the CEAWC (Committee for the Eradication of the Abduction of Women and Children) was restructured
- Nevertheless no progress has been made to prosecute those guilty of abducting
- Displaced Nuer women had been raped up to four times by militia-men
- Women and girls face abduction and sexual slavery

“During my last visit, I was informed that some, though still limited, progress was made in the field of abductions, following the restructuring of CEAWC on the one hand, and further to the fact that the train from Babanusa to Wau has not been running lately, on the other. It was not clear, though, whether this was due to a political decision or not.

I was informed that the Government has finally followed up on its pledges and given CEAWC 200,000 USD. CEAWC considered that this was a satisfactory amount of money, while lamenting decreasing funding from donors.

I was also informed of a new rule whereby any new cases of abductions will be prosecuted and won't benefit from the current procedure, as described in my previous reports. As I reported, after one year since CEAWC’s restructuring, also old cases will be referred to prosecution. The new rule falls within the CEAWC rules of cooperation and its nature is legally binding. It should be noted however, that so far not much has been done in terms of prosecuting responsible people.” (UNHCHR, 12 November 2002)

“Lawrence Otika, Resettlement Officer for Catholic Relief Services, reported that women made up an overwhelming percentage of the internally displaced. Rape and other sexual violence were both a cause and
a consequence of displacement for these women. Unfortunately, rape was rarely discussed in Southern Sudan and women were often unwilling to report that they had been raped for fear that they would not be able to marry. Soldiers and militia members knew this and took advantage of the culture of silence. Although there was little data on the issue, a recent study found that many displaced Nuer women had been raped as many as three to four times by militia members. Women and especially girls also faced abduction into sexual slavery by armed forces such as those of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which frequently entered Sudanese territory. Women’s traditional tasks, such as gathering firewood and cultivating crops, tended to place them at increased risk of rape in a conflict environment. Avoiding such activities made subsistence impossible. Moreover, rape brought with it not only physical and emotional trauma, but also a high risk of transmission of HIV, as was confirmed by a recent study carried out by Médecins Sans Frontières in Upper Nile.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002,p. 9)

"In the current war situation, women are also threatened by the immensely heightened levels of personal violence and the significantly increased risk of rape. There are reports that in some areas rape is used as a weapon of war by both sides to the conflict. In a recent UN mission in the Nuba Mountains, women report that collecting water from the water points has become a hazardous chore as soldiers and other armed men await their arrival and rape and sometimes abduct them. Lack of awareness about the increased incidence of violence against women during the various armed conflicts is evident. Often shame prevents women from revealing their rape and this leads to negative and often life-long psychological effects on those affected women.” (UN November 1999, p.50)

"The testimonies of abducted women and children contain descriptions of the ill-treatment and the forced work to which they were subjected, usually involving cooking, cultivation, tending animals, collecting firewood, washing clothes and other domestic chores. Women's and girls' testimonies cite rape, forced "marriage" and other sexual abuses amounting, in certain cases, to sexual slavery. Many of those who were freed were either pregnant or gave birth to children fathered by their captors.” (UN Commission on Human Rights 17 May 1999, para.64)

“Women displaced to the 'peace villages' and garrisons are vulnerable to rape and sexual exploitation by soldiers and PDF personnel. Few women are prepared to reveal that they have been raped; beyond the sense of personal degradation, rape is considered a social disgrace in Sudan. Many southern Sudanese and Nuba women use the phrase "taken as wives" by soldiers and PDF members to describe their ordeal. […] In their home areas, women from southern Sudan and the Nuba mountains can earn money from selling alcohol. However, under the Sudanese penal code, brewing and consuming alcohol are illegal. Internally displaced women often have few other options. Nyandeng Makwak, a Dinka woman imprisoned for brewing beer, has described her experience. Policemen searched her house late at night, found that she had alcohol and demanded a bribe. She was unable to raise the amount and so she was arrested. When she refused to sleep with the police officer who arrested her, she was taken to a Public Order Court and sentenced to six months in jail and a fine after a summary and unfair trial. Although defendants have a theoretical right to defence counsel, trials are often immediate, leaving no time to find a lawyer, and internally displaced people rarely have the means or the contacts to get legal representation.” (AI 20 June 1997, chapt. 3)
• Displaced children separated from their families during flight are often discriminated and have less access to education
• Children are continuously victims of forced recruitment and despite some progress in demobilizations children were reportedly recruited again
• Reports of displaced children being forced to convert to Islam and undergo military training

“The Special Rapporteur was informed that no significant progress has been made on the situation of children. Reportedly, street children and juvenile justice remain areas of concern. Only two reformatories exist and children are very often detained with adults and allegedly subjected to inhumane treatment.

61. The Special Rapporteur was informed that child exploitation reportedly continues to take place, particularly in the agricultural and pastoral sectors. Families are poor and forced to send their children to work rather than to school. Agriculture keeps children far from towns and population centres, they roam in dangerous areas where they are potentially more exposed to abuses (armed conflict, banditry, etc.) while in cities the situation is reportedly slightly different, they still run the risk of becoming street children (shoeshiners, car-washers, etc.). The Special Rapporteur’s attention was drawn to the fact that street children in Khartoum are mostly IDPs. Networks that exploit them, including sexually, reportedly flourish. The Special Rapporteur deems that stronger government involvement is necessary.

62. The Special Rapporteur was also informed that forced recruitment of children in war zones has reportedly continued. He learnt that an unconfirmed number of children have been imprisoned in Bahr al-Ghazal because of desertion and sentenced to up to 20 years in prison. He was glad to learn that the Wali of Wau reportedly decided to release them based on the fact that, as minors, they should not have been recruited in the first place.” (UNCHR, 6 January 2003, p. 13 para. 60-62)

“It is estimated that in the settlements around Khartoum alone, there are up to two million IDPs, many of them women and children. A recent study of an unplanned settlement in Khartoum found that 40 per cent of the inhabitants were women and 40 per cent children. […] Children often have to be left alone and unsupervised while their parents seek work. Indeed, many street children originate from displaced families. There are now an estimated 34,000 street children in Khartoum.” (Save the Children/etc, 1 May 2002, p.22)

“A correspondent of the London-based Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, who toured the front with other foreign journalists a week after hostilities resumed, reported that the fighting had stranded 7,000 unaccompanied children and preteenagers in Hamashkoreib, including resident students in that town’s renowned Koranic schools. The fighting had displaced entire villages. The town’s food stores were described as badly depleted, the pharmacy empty and the hospital destroyed.28 A government source confirmed that the food situation was already fragile prior to the fighting. […]”(ICG, 14 November 2002, p7,8)

“Julianna Lindsey, Projects Officer at UNICEF, reported that displaced children were frequently separated from their parents and communities and therefore faced particular danger. She noted that although some orphans had been taken in by local communities, they frequently faced discrimination and a lack of educational opportunities. In the event of return, Lindsey cautioned that differences in language, culture and experience could generate increased discrimination.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, p. 9)

“On the issue of child soldiers, in spite of some progress made on their demobilization, as previously reported, some sources reported that forced recruitment of children around 15 years of age continues to take place in conflict areas. Sources also reported that demobilized children are sometimes recruited again.

Forced recruitment is also reportedly on-going.” (UNHCHR, 12 November 2002)

"According to, Human Rights Watch, the Sudanese government also has been particularly guilty of human rights violations against internally displaced children. Human Rights Watch says that the government
removes displaced children from their families against their will, forces them to undergo Islamic religious training, and makes them adopt Arab names, thus suppressing their heritage. As if these abuses were not enough, many southern and Nuba children have been forced into unpaid labor and even slavery. These findings were reinforced in an article by reporters from the *Baltimore Sun* who travelled to the Sudan undercover and demonstrated that it was possible to buy southern Sudanese children. While the government vehemently has denied that forced labor and slavery exist in the Sudan, it has refused the assistance of international organizations in investigating such allegations.” (Ruiz 1998, p. 156)

"Internally displaced children are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary arrest. In 1994 official figures estimated that there were 25,000 "vagrant" children in and around Khartoum. In September 1992 the government began to implement a policy of rounding up "vagrant" children and taking them to special children's camps.

Southern Sudanese and Nuba children are often seized by police if they are found on the street without an accompanying adult. They may be held for some days in police stations before being taken to the camps. There are reports of police beating such children.

In 1994 the government admitted that there were camps for children in Khartoum, Kosti, Geneina, Abu Dom and Durdib. Children are reportedly beaten if they try to escape and made to crawl naked on the ground. Reports suggest that there are other camps in remote areas closer to the war zones where the treatment of children is even worse. For example, children were allegedly shot while trying to flee a camp at Abu Dikiri on the fringes of the Nuba mountains in April 1995.

Some children's camps are reported to be run as schools for the teaching of Arabic and the Qur'an, although most of the children are non-Muslim. Some boys in the camps have been forcibly recruited into the army or the PDF.

The SPLA also runs children's camps where youngsters are directed into the armed forces. It seems, for example, that over 1,000 children at Omere camp were recruited to the SPLA in early 1995.

Children have also been abducted from the war zone and taken to the home areas of their captors in Darfur and Kordofan. Some are sold back to their families. Others are taken into domestic slavery, cleaning homes and looking after livestock. Children who try to escape run the risk of severe beatings and even death. In late September 1996, four Dinka boy slaves who escaped during inter-communal fighting between Rizeiqat and Zaghaiwa cattle nomads were hunted down by their "owner" and shot dead.

While the law forbids abduction and slavery _ the government denies that slavery exists _ internally displaced people often dare not attempt to free their children. In September 1996 Maiwen, an internally displaced Dinka living in al-Obeid, located his 11-year-old daughter, named Acol, in South Kordofan. When he tried to claim her he was beaten and tied to a tree for three days. His daughter, and her "owner", disappeared. In a few cases police and local courts have intervened to free children but Amnesty International does not know of a single case where a kidnapper or slave-holder has been prosecuted.” (AI 20 June 1997, chapt. 3)

**Protection concerns affecting Disabled IDPs (2002)**

- Disabled people are often abandoned during flight
- Disabled people are the last to receive education or resources

“Fatuma Juma, Thematic Head for Community-Based Rehabilitation of children with Disabilities for Save the Children/Sweden reported that disabled people were the most vulnerable of populations, especially in
situations of armed conflict. In many societies, including Southern Sudan, they were considered to be lesser people and therefore suffered discrimination that compounded the challenges posed by their disabilities.

Disabled children were especially at risk. When people were forced to run, disabled children were frequently left behind to be killed by armed forces or hunger. They were also the last to be provided resources and education. It was estimated that fewer than 3 percent of disabled children were in school in Southern Sudan. Ms. Juma noted that the Guiding Principles stipulated that special efforts should be made to meet the needs of disabled persons during displacement and called upon participants to integrate advocacy for this community into their protection programs.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.8-9)

UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights says human rights indicators worsen (July 2001)

- Increased human rights violations including abductions, and forced displacement
- Declarations of "state of emergency" are an alibi for law and human rights abuses
- Children most severely affected by conflict through abductions, displacements and violations
- Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains most affected by bombings (2001)

"Human rights violations are increasing in Sudan, with abductions, arbitrary arrests and the forced displacement of people a daily reality, according to UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Sudan, Gerhart Baum. “There is a bad climate in Sudan as far as human rights are concerned,” the Associated Press agency (AP) quoted Baum as saying at a press conference in Britain on 27 June. “The situation now is worse than one year ago.” […]

“Baum said many of the human rights violations in Sudan were happening under the cover of war - for example, that a state of emergency had been declared, allowing the government to rule through provisional acts, and that security forces operated without oversight restraint, AP reported.

He said women and children were abducted by militias and forced to work, while young men were seized off the streets of the capital, Khartoum, for military service. In the rebel-controlled south, there had been no effort to establish a civil society, Baum added.”[…] "Children have been among the most severely affected by conflict in Sudan, through displacement, physical injury and distress, Save the Children-UK stated. "Many children are separated from their families either in flight or as a result of abduction," it said. "Children have also been recruited into armed militias and paramilitary groups supported by both sides.” “(IRIN-CEA 3 July 2001, pp.1-2)

In October 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights witnessed “repeated bombing during a World Food Programme distribution operation”:

"There was particular concern at the recurrence of instances of bombing civilians, particularly in the Nuba Mountains and in the Blue Nile State, he said. During the visit of the Special Rapporteur, in early October, there was repeated bombing during a World Food Programme distribution operation. Denial of humanitarian access remained a major problem. The Nuba Mountains and the whole of southern Blue Nile remained inaccessible. There also were reports of serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law by the by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and allied militias, particularly in the oil-rich Western Upper Nile. This led to a situation where people were left with no other option than fleeing." (UN GA 9 November 2001, p.5)

Sudan Human Rights Organisation SHRO, based in Cairo after being evicted by the Government of Sudan alleged in July 2001 that:

"The Sudan Government continues to commit extrajudicial killing and forced displacement of the indigenous population of the south and Nubah Mountains, abuses of oil and other vital resources for

**Freedom of movement**

**Violation of right to freedom of movement during displacement and return (2002)**

- Dinka returnees harassed by the military (2002)
- Military controls movement between Bahr el Ghazal and West Kordofan as well as between neighbouring villages to Abyei
- Particularly harassed are young men and the village of Awolnom
- Military troops prevented the 1800 IDPs fleeing LRA attacks to move to Juba

“It was also noted that the Abyei Peace Committee had demonstrated its ability to facilitate the resolution of local conflicts between members of the two groups. However, concern was expressed at periodic harassment from the military and control over the movement of civilians, which periodically prevented people, especially youth, from moving across the borders to Bahr el Ghazal in the south or even between the surrounding villages and Abyei town. This was a particular concern in Awolnom, the village sited near the north bank of the Bahr al Arab (Kiir) River.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.12, para 32)

“Approximately 1,800 IDPs fled to Gomba (5 km east of Juba) following LRA attacks on their villages. During the attacks two of this caseload were killed and seven abducted. The military prevented IDPS attempting to move to Juba from accessing the town, as they were concerned that members of the LRA could filter in with them. OCHA has taken up the issue locally with authorities. LRA activity has also prevented people residing in villages up to 30 km from Juba from accessing their land and in some cases safe drinking water.” (OCHA 29 July 2002)
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

General

Health needs in Sudan remain a serious concern (Nov 2002)

- Infant mortality at 68/1000 lives and maternal mortality at 509/100,000 live births in GoS areas (Nov 2002)
- 94% of deliveries take place outside the reach of health facilities
- Diarrhoea is the main cause of mortality due to lack of access to safe water
- Malaria accounts for 63% causes for attending hospitals
- TB prevalence is 90/100,000 and only 500 beds for TB treatment are available in southern Sudan
- An estimated 2% of Sudanese are infected by HIV while in rural areas 84.8% women were not knowledgeable about HIV
- Measles outbreak during displacement killed 125 children in the Nuba Mountains in July 2002
- About 30% of Sudanese have a food intake below minimum energy requirements
- Equatoria has one doctor for 100,000 people
- Western Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal have no doctors

“As underscored in the Financial Overview, thirteen years after the founding of OLS, funding requirements continue to increase, while main social indicators remain unchanged or slightly increased. In GoS held areas, infant mortality is 68 per 1,000, maternal mortality 509 per 100,000 live births, with average global malnutrition rates between 18% and 23%. Main causes of mortality are reported as diarrhoea, caused by lack of access to safe water, acute respiratory diseases, malnutrition, measles and malaria (35,000 per year). WHO morbidity figures show that malaria is the main cause for attending hospitals and outpatients clinics (63%) in Juba, Wau and Malakal. Tuberculosis is also one of the most serious communicable diseases in Sudan with prevalence of 90 per 100,000. An alarming expansion of HIV/AIDS is being experienced. It is estimated that 600,000 persons are infected (2% of the population). Assuming that this trend continues, Sudan is on the verge of a major Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic.

Although the polio eradication programme has achieved remarkable success during the national immunisation campaigns, routine immunisation coverage remains low due to impeded access and inadequate technical capacity and infrastructure. Coverage in SPLM/A areas remains half of that in GoS areas between 28-30%. During displacement and despite the efforts of agencies, outbreaks of measles have occurred this year, such as in the Nuba Mountains in July when 125 children died. The health situation is further compromised by the largest IDP population in the world (four million), and the increasing number of mine victims, estimated at over 75,000 in the year 2000.” (UN, November 2002, p.14)

“Sudan suffers from acute and complex health problems. The cycle of poverty, malnutrition and loss of productivity exposes at risk populations to debilitating and serious diseases such as malaria, malnutrition, diarrhoea, and ARI. The expansion of health facilities has not matched the growth in population over the years, and the war has destroyed many previously operating health facilities. Ineffective coverage is manifested in lack of infrastructure, inadequate drugs and medical equipment, and lack of skilled health personnel. The limited and inequitable access to essential child and motherhood health care services accounts for the high infant and maternal mortality rates, which are 68 per 1000 and 509 per 100,000 live
births in GoS areas. Neonatal deaths estimated at 31/1,000 live births represent 40% of total infant deaths in GoS areas. Data are not available for SPLM areas.

In Government areas of Sudan, 86% of women deliver at home with less than 57% attended by skilled personnel. The strategy “Making Pregnancy Safer” was adopted in 2001, however the programme is constrained due to widely scattered populations, lack of trained personnel and a high illiteracy rate. Similar problems exist in SPLM areas. Training for TBA is underway through a number of OLS agencies, but MICS figures show that 79% of women do not receive Tetanus Toxoid (TT) during pregnancy, that 94% of deliveries are done without the benefit of a health facility and 77% without the benefit of a trained birth attendant. Only 86,294 women received the TT vaccine during January and August of 2002.

The number of estimated HIV infected cases has risen to 600,000 in 2001 from 400,000 in 2000. Sentinel sero-surveys recently conducted by the Sudan National AIDS Programme revealed an infection rate of 1.6%. [...] The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS 2000) revealed that 84.6% of women aged 15-49 years in rural areas and 57.9% in urban areas are not knowledgeable about HIV/AIDS. Only 33.3% of women in southern states had heard about the problem.

In SPLM areas, HIV/AIDS continues to be a major concern, as well. Although sero-prevalence studies are not common in southern Sudan, the prevalence rate is felt to be rising dramatically. [...] Only eight OLS agencies are currently dealing with TB cases in southern Sudan and it is estimated that they are only able to service 1.3 million people, or 16% of the population. At present only 500 beds for TB treatment are available in the entire region. This number is not adequate for the 12,000 cases estimated per year.

Malaria, diarrhoea, and acute respiratory infection are the major diseases in Sudan. Malaria is now considered endemic throughout the country. In two years, the prevalence rate rose from 195/1,000 to 250/1,000. About 40% of outpatient attendance nation-wide is due to malaria with a current estimated rate of 7.8 million cases and 35,000-40,000 deaths per year. The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2000 (MICS), conducted in the Northern States and government controlled areas in the South, showed that diarrhoea and ARI prevalence rates are 28% and 17% among children under-five respectively, and diarrhoea prevalence reaches 40% in some States.

In 2002 there have been continuous outbreaks of epidemics such as meningitis and measles. Acute gastroenteritis is a sporadically endemic disease occurring especially after floods and other natural disasters. In SPLM areas, meningitis, measles, and severe diarrhoea have hit the Nuba Mountains, Ruweng County, Maridi County, Ezo County, Torit County, southern Blue Nile, and Padak in Upper Nile. Over 500 cases of Buruli ulcer were reported among IDP groups in Mabia, Western Equatoria. In the first eight months of 2002, WHO received alerts on 23 suspected outbreaks and verified 13. Most of these were meningococcal meningitis, acute watery and bloody diarrhoea, measles, and ARI.

Sudan reported 80% of Guinea Worm cases in the world. In the northern part of Sudan the Guinea worm incidence has been reduced by 98%, however, it remains endemic in the south.

The achievement of the polio eradication programme demonstrates how adequate funding and proper management results in effective outcomes. During the National Immunisation Days in 2002, over 5.8 million children, including IDPs and returnees, were vaccinated. In July 2002 the International Technical Advisory Group concluded that there has been no evidence of wild poliovirus transmission since April 2001.

 [...] The prevalence rate of malnutrition is alarmingly high, increasing from 18% in 1995 to 23% in 2001 in the North and the government controlled areas in the South. Furthermore the level of malnutrition among children in drought affected GoS areas has increased in 2002 from 18-23% to over 27%.

 [...] Data indicate that the food intake of about 30% of the total population provides less than their minimum energy requirements of 2,100 kcal. The 1999 safe motherhood survey shows that 30% of all newborn
babies were of low birth weight, which indicates low nutritional status of mothers.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 101-102)

“Finally, Ms. Sowinska underlined the inadequacy of resources and services available to internally displaced persons in Southern Sudan and called on donors to increase their participation. She noted that in Equatoria, there was currently one doctor for every 100,000 in the population and that there were no doctors at all in Bahr el Ghazal or Western Upper Nile. Many areas also lacked safe water and other necessities. Much greater resources were needed just to meet existing needs, and demands would greatly increase in the case of large-scale returns”. (Brookings/ ect, 25 November 2002, p. 5)

IDP food security undermined by conflict, displacement and drought (Nov 2002)

- About 633,000 people affected by fourth consecutive years of drought in Red Sea and three in North Darfur
- WFP delivers humanitarian assistance to 3.5 million people in Sudan (Nov 2002)
- Thousands displaced in Bahr el Ghazal and Jonglei missed two harvests (Sept 2002)
- A rise of numbers of IDPs in the Lakes region is likely to cause conflict over resources (Sept 2002)
- Southern Sudan crop production declined by up to 50% and malnutrition rocket as high as 39.9%
- 197,000MT food aid need in 2003 for 3.5 million people
- Global malnutrition rates ranged between 23% to 39.9% (August 2002)

“The effects of the drought were disastrous in parts of North Darfur after three consecutive years of drought and in Red Sea State following a fourth year of drought. The total number of affected people is estimated at 633,000.

Sudan has been experiencing a nation-wide average malnutrition rate of 18-23%. Despite a better harvest season, 2002 is not expected to see a major improvement in the over-all nutritional status of the affected populations. In large areas of both the south and north sectors, the nutritional status of will deteriorate rapidly, unless food aid is provided. Occasional agricultural regional surpluses are not channelled to deficit areas because of in-built structural constraints and a weak unbalanced marketing system of surplus production, as prices drop discouraging farmers from re-investing in the following year. Food aid intervention in Sudan constitutes the largest component of the international humanitarian assistance programme. During the year 2003 WFP will continue to target about 3.5 million beneficiaries in Sudan.” (UN, November 2002, p. 95)

“The food security situation in western Upper Nile is "precarious", having deteriorated over the last month due to continued conflict, the Famine Early Warning System Networks (FEWS Net) reported. In addition, thousands of people displaced by fighting into neighbouring Bahr al-Ghazal and Jonglei States have lost the benefits of the current agricultural season as they have been forced to leave before harvesting their crops, and will also be unable to take advantage of the crop season in their areas of refuge, as it is now too late. The displacement has put pressure on host communities and risks increasing insecurity still further. An increase in the numbers of displaced people, particularly in the Lakes region, is likely to cause conflict over local resources such as water and pasture.” (SFP, September 2002, p. 5)

“Preliminary information from the Annual Needs Assessment was released during the month of December. Main findings indicate that food security has deteriorated in Southern Sudan, Red Sea State and other parts of North Sudan. Crop production in Southern Sudan has declined by 30-50 percent with malnutrition rates remaining above the national average of 18 percent.
Livestock production is on the decline among agro-pastoralists with markets remaining significant to the household’s food economy. Poor infrastructure and insecurity limit food from surplus producing areas from reaching deficit areas.

The total estimate of food aid required for Sudan is 197,000 MT for 3.5 million persons comprising of a northern sector requirement of 116,500 MT for 1.75 million persons and a southern sector requirement of 80,500 MT for 1.65 million persons.

In the non-food sector an increased need for agriculture inputs such as seeds and tools was identified. Provision of fishing equipment to IDPs and the general population in affected areas was also noted as a necessity. Diversification of crops to reduce risks of drought was identified as a possible way forward. Other areas for action were in the provision of safe drinking water, expansion of health and veterinary services and de-mining of roads and farmlands.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“Confirming concern raised by FAO in May, the Sudan Early Warning System (SEWS) reports that rainfall in most parts of Sudan remains unsatisfactory although slightly improved in July with the exception of Bahr el Ghazal. Red Sea state in particular continues to experience dry conditions for the fourth consecutive year. The WFP Technical Support Unit and the quarterly FAO sponsored Food Security Meeting report that the general food security situation in southern Sudan has deteriorated over the last three months due to late rains, insecurity and flight denials. The Food Security Meeting also stated that a one to two month extension of the hunger gap is expected as a result. Global malnutrition rates from most areas surveyed in southern Sudan range from between 23% to 39.9%.” (OCHA 20 August 2002)


- About 60% people in GoS-controlled areas have access to safe water and only 30% in SPLM/A territories
- Insecurity and inaccessibility have hampered interventions to construct water supply facilities in Upper Nile, Jonglei and Bahr el Ghazal
- Only 5% people use latrines in Upper Nile
- About 670,000 children in Sudan die from preventable diseases each year
- Sudan hosts 80% of Guinea Worm cases in the world with Jonglei as the worst affected state
- Most women and girls walk two to four hours daily to fetch water

“The prospect of a peace agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A provides an opportunity to address issues concerning the progressive realisation of the right of all people, including IDPs and those living in the war-and drought-affected areas, to have access to safe water and improved environmental sanitation. The lack of access to safe water due to the widespread destruction of water supply facilities in conflict-affected areas, large-scale displacement of population groups from areas affected by conflict and recurrent drought combined with inadequate water supply facilities for IDPs, non-availability of financial resources for the establishment of new water supply and sanitation facilities, the lack of adequate equipment and managerial personnel and the existence of a large number of hand pumps and water yards which are non-operational in different parts of the country continue to deprive thousands of people of access to safe water and appropriate sanitation facilities. As a result, many parts of the Sudan continues to be characterised by low coverage in regard to safe water and sanitary means of excreta disposal.

In spite of the on-going efforts to improve access to safe water, the coverage of the existing water supply facilities remains very low in the Sudan. About 40% of people in the GoS-controlled areas do not have access to safe water for domestic consumption. In urban areas, population with access to improved drinking water sources is close to 80%, but in rural areas it is only 47%. The percentage of population using
improved drinking water sources range from 93 in Khartoum to 50 in South Darfur, 42 in North Kordofan, 29 in West Darfur and 24 in Blue Nile. While significant progress has been made in SPLM/A-controlled areas for increasing access to safe water for population, insecurity and inaccessibility have hindered interventions to construct water supply facilities in areas such as Upper Nile, Jonglei and some parts of Bahr El Ghazal. In SPLM/A-controlled areas, only 30% of people have access to safe water.

Low coverage of safe water supply is not only due to the lack of water supply facilities but also to a high proportion of non-functioning facilities. In the country as a whole about 40% of the hand pumps and 60% of water yards are not functional. In the war-affected areas more than 70% of the available hand pumps and water yards need rehabilitation and repair.

The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted in 2000 indicated that in the GoS-controlled areas as a whole, only 60% of the population had sanitary means of excreta disposal. In urban areas, 83% of the population use sanitary means of excreta disposal compared with 48% in rural areas. Despite the work of OLS agencies to advocate for the use of latrines in the SPLM/A-controlled areas, open defecation is still widely practised. MICS 2000 indicated that some of the more stable areas such as Western Equatoria have 88% of the population using sanitary latrines, while only 5% of the population in Upper Nile use them. Lack of access and insecurity have hindered progress in Upper Nile, Lakes and Jonglei, despite continued efforts of OLS agencies to maintain programmes in those locations.

Approximately 670,000 Sudanese children under-five die each year from preventable causes. Of these, about 40% die from diarrhoeal disease, which could be significantly reduced with increased access to safe water supply, and improved personal and communal hygiene and sanitation. In addition to diarrhoeal disease, a large section of the population is afflicted with guinea-worm disease (dracunculiasis), which can be largely prevented with improved access to safe drinking water, sanitary facilities and hygienic practices. Sudan is hosting over 80% of the total Guinea Worm cases (in 2001) with 99% of cases being in the south in which Jonglei State is the most endemic area. Southern Sudan presents great challenge for the Guinea Worm Eradication programme, where more than 4,000 villages are endemic. It is estimated that if access to Guinea worm endemic areas were available, it would require four years of intensive efforts to eradicate Guinea worm in the country.

[...]
There has been insufficient attention to promoting positive water, sanitation and hygiene-related behaviour to achieve the full benefits of improvements in facilities. Although water provision relieves some burdens on rural women, there remain serious gender-disparities relating to management of water source development, water collection and use.

As is the case in many parts of Africa, the task of fetching water for domestic use falls mainly on women and girls. Water collection typically entails average daily travel for about two to four hours. This daily ordeal has heavy impact in terms of sheer physical exertion and burning up of precious calories from an already meagre dietary intake. In addition, it consumes valuable time, which could be better utilised, for example, in the care of young children in the home or employment in income generating activities. For girls, the task of fetching water from distant sources combined with the lack of educational facilities within easy walking distance from their residences, often stands in the way of their education.” (UN, November 2002, p.198)

IDP needs in the Bahr Al Ghazal Region

Food needs of IDPs in Bahr el Ghazal (2002)

• Access constrints reduced the ability to address the needs of 579,760 IDPs
Global malnutrition was 10% in GoS controlled areas compared to 29% in SPLM/A controlled areas.

IDPs in Wau town cannot afford to supplement WFP’s half food ration due to sorghum price rise.

General Overview: Impeded humanitarian access to Greater Bahr el Ghazal significantly reduces the ability to address the humanitarian needs of the 550,000 targeted beneficiaries. Population is predominantly composed of agro-pastoralist and livestock herders.

Poor nutritional status, particularly in Aweil and Wau, is reflected by almost 10% of children under-five suffering from moderate malnutrition and 8% severely malnourished. The nutritional situation is worse in SPLM/A held areas with 29% global malnutrition in Twic country, 20% in Aweil east and 18% in Gogrial. Although 80% of employment is in the agricultural sector, harvests invariably fall-short due to drought and acerbated by the civil war and inter-ethnic conflict.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: insecurity and high malnutrition rates critically affect Twic County, Aweil East, Gogrial and Aweil West. EPI coverage is also low in these areas ranging from 25% to 0.1%. In 2002 101,126 children were vaccinated against polio. School enrolment is low, with an overall average of 14%. The affected caseload requiring humanitarian assistance and services (550,000 persons) includes 6,281 IDPs in Aweil, 119,724 in Wau, 15,000 in Raja and 438,755 in Rumbek, Cueibet, Yirol and Tonj Counties. Other vulnerable groups are children and the handicapped, pregnant and lactating mothers, and minority ethnic groups who are given unequal access to resources.

Operational constraints: Limited access to beneficiaries due to insecurity, lack of adequate physical infrastructure such as schools and health centres, lack of qualified and trained health personnel and teachers, lack of updated statistical and demographic data.” (UN, November 2002, p. 29)

Acute destitution among IDPs in western Bahr al Ghazal due to intense conflict (2001-2002)

- 75,000 IDPs and the host community in Gogrial counties have no access to safe water (Sept 2002)
- 20,000 IDPs from Raga in Mangayath survive on wild foods and only 2 boreholes
• Host community in Mangayath unable to feed 15,000 IDPs after two consecutive poor crop yield and wild foods have been exhausted
• Population displacements and limited mobility due to conflict precludes access to food
• Continued IDPs influx in Tambura county (18,588 by January 2002) may reduce surplus available to host communities
• IDPs from Wau victims of the Murahiliin dry-season counter-insurgency, lack food and non-food items, medicines and water
• 15.5% acute malnutrition and 2.2% severe malnutrition lead to increased admissions in MSF selective feeding centers in Gogrial County hosting 19,000 IDPs (May 2001)
• 7,400 IDPs suffer 26% acute malnutrition at the beginning of the hunger gap in March 2001 in the Twic County

"Since late September [2001], some 20,000 people have fled from Raga to Mangayath area. Daily arrivals have reached approximately 1,000 people per day, many being women and children who have made the 25 kilometer trek from Raja town with few or no belongings. Until this recent influx, Mangayath's population was only 2,000 people, most of whom can barely feed themselves and therefore offer little assistance to the newcomers. Until relief assistance started, the main source of food arriving population has been wild foods which as townspeople, they are not accustomed to. This makes the arrival and distribution of relief food extremely urgent.

According to aid workers on the ground, shelter conditions in the area are appalling. With only two working bore-holes, access to water is also very limited. And as in many parts of southern Sudan, health facilities are also highly inadequate." (WFP 9 October 2001)

"Despite the apparent satisfactory food security in some locations, concern prevails in Mangayath (Raga County, Bahr-el-Ghazal Region), which is currently host to a large number of IDPs fleeing renewed fighting in Raga town. The WFP/Technical Support Unit (TSU) notes that the influx of an estimated 15,000 IDPs (as of October 2), with more arrivals recorded each day since then, has had an impact on the food security situation of the estimated 1,200 residents. Residents are facing a second consecutive year of low crop yields due to erratic rains and insecurity caused by fighting at the start of this year’s agricultural season. Consequently, their ability to feed the IDPs is limited. The IDPs reportedly have fled with quickly dwindling food. Wild foods in the immediate environment have been exhausted, and fishing is available only for those with fishing equipment. Limited quantities of grain are available in the local market, but the prices are too high for the IDPs. The poor food security situation is compounded by poor sanitary conditions and limited water availability (only one hand pump out of four is reportedly functioning). Most of the IDPs are noted to be using stream water. Given these conditions, the likelihood of a disease outbreak is high and this may compromise the population’s nutritional conditions. WFP has already intervened with a 75 percent food ration despite the recent bombings in the area." (FEWS 21 October 2001)

"Continued insecurity [as a result of fighting between the government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)] and intensified bombing by the government was "precluding or limiting access to the various local markets and other food sources in parts of Bahr al-Ghazal"[…].

The World Food Programme's Technical Support Unit (TSU) estimated that, by mid-November, there were 16,000 new internally-displaced people (IDPs) in Awoda, Raga County, Western Bahr al-Ghazal, it stated. This was as a result of the government's recapture of Raga town [in mid-October] and of all other towns along the road from Raga to Wau [including Mangayat, Sop, Deim Zubeir, Yabulu and Boro] […].

The IDPs would remain food insecure and need food and non-food assistance […].

Awoda, hosting 16,000 IDPs from Raga, had been too insecure to allow WFP access as a result of troop movements along the road between Raga and the railway line but the agency managed a rapid assessment on 21 November […].
WFP staff subsequently managed to get food relief to some 20,000 beneficiaries, including 10,000 newly-arrived IDPs [joining 6,000 who had previously fled Raga], in a "hit-and-run intervention"[...].

The agency also continued its efforts to serve IDPs from Raga in Numatina. [...] It was "highly likely" that the government dry-season offensive would be intense, as it sought to capture strategic locations in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, while the opposition might also to capture - or recapture - new areas, according to FEWS Net.

With no indications of insecurity abating, the likelihood was high of more population displacements, increased vulnerability to food security, disease and deteriorating livelihoods in 2002 [...].

Population displacement, limited mobility and precluded access to food sources meant that "personal insecurity remains one of the major determinants of food insecurity in southern Sudan"[...]. (ACC/SCN 28 December 2001)

**Displaced populations from Wau face acute destitution:**

"Among them [displaced persons] are numerous single Dinka mothers, who are victims of rape by Arab militias," he [Bishop Mazzolari] said.

Bishop Mazzolari said most of the children were badly malnourished as, like their parents, they depend on wild foods and water from contaminated sources. "The situation is macabre," he said.

"Their condition is bad due to lack of food and non-food items, water and medication," said Deng Thiep Akok, the SPLA Country Secretary for Aweil North in a statement.

[...]

According to the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), the humanitarian wing of the SPLA, the worst affected are the people who have been displaced by the Murahiliin from their homes which lie along the railway line from the north to the provincial capital, Wau via Babanusa.

"The Murahiliin are known to have razed down houses, destroyed property of unknown value, raped and abducted women and children as well as the elderly," said a statement signed by Valentino Mel Wal, SRRA's Secretary for Aweil West and North counties. The SRRA official said the militias were out to destabilise the area during the current dry season runs from late October to May.

The SRRA has appealed to the Church, relief bodies and other concerned parties to respond to the crisis, pointing that the plight of the IDPs is pitiful. "The living conditions of these people is appalling with no food and shelter since most of the items, and general belongings were left behind as they were fleeing Raga and those from the North were robbed by government soldiers while crossing River Kiir," said SRRA official Wal. The group is appealing for non-food items like agricultural tools, cooking utensils, sleeping materials, clothes and medicines as well as food items. The latter have to be high protein foods as the malnutrition rates among the elderly, breastfeeding and young children populations are very high."(SCIO 7 January 2002)

"In Tambura County, however, the influx of IDPs from Raga County continued in January. WFP notes that as of January 25, a total of 18,588 IDPs had been registered. While there have been no reports of serious negative impact on the food security situation of the area given WFP's food aid intervention, the continued influx of IDPs may reduce the amount available to resident households and the surplus that would otherwise be available for sale." (FEWS 22 February 2002)

**In Gogrial County**

"WFP, SC-UK, Supraid and WHO carried out a joint assessment of IDPs from Western Upper Nile displaced into Gogrial, Twic and Tonj Counties. The assessment revealed over 127,000 IDPs. Results indicate that 75,000 IDPs and the host population in Mayen Jur and Thiek Thou (Gogrial counties) have no access to safe water. Major needs include IDP kits, water and sanitation services, health services food, fishing equipment, food and veterinary services and tracing services." (OCHA, 17 September 2002)
"WFP/TSU reported 19,000 IDPs in the area mostly centred around Akon (WFP/TSU 05/01). Agencies on the ground have noted deteriorating nutritional conditions with increased admissions to selective feeding programmes. MSF-B conducted a 30x30 cluster survey in Ajiep, Kuajok Payam, in May and found an estimated prevalence of acute malnutrition of 15.5% (W/Ht < -2 Z-scores and/or oedema) including 2.2% severe malnutrition (W/Ht < -3 Z-scores and/or oedema). MSF-B reports that the results are double those of a similar survey done in July 2000 and are an indication of a rapidly deteriorating situation. Mortality rates were not estimated but the coverage rate of measles vaccination was very poor and the potential for an epidemic was considered high (MSF-B 14/05/01). MSF-B opened a Therapeutic Feeding Centre (TFC) in Ajiep in May and are expecting the number of admittances to increase from an initial 45 cases in the first 3 weeks. The relative high prevalence of malnutrition at the beginning of the hungry season is a result of insecurity and drought and the risk of further deterioration is high (FEWS 15/06/01)."

In Twic County

"A TSU assessment in March 2001 estimated that there were a total of 7,400 IDPs and returnees in Twic County (WFP/TSU 05/01). The late rains threaten to extend the hunger gap for one to two months, which will exacerbate the current nutritional risk. The most recent nutritional survey information is from a Goal nutrition survey in February of three payams, Wunrok, Turalei and Aweng in Twic County. It estimated 26% acute malnutrition (W/Ht < -2 Z-scores and/or oedema) including 2.4% severe wasting (W/Ht < -3 Z-scores). The results are alarming and particularly so given that they were at the beginning of the hunger gap. The survey indicated that there was little food available on the ground and that general food security was poor. The survey included pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, and noted that less than half the people interviewed owned cattle, with one third having access to milk, which is a major food source. Little stored food was evident and people reported a high dependence on wild food sources (Goal 12/02/01). A recent WFP report indicates that the numbers in the Goal SFC are rising rapidly and calls for close monitoring of the situation (WFP 28/06/01).

Goal operates four feeding programmes in the area, and eight clinics. Two of their clinics were without food because of logistical difficulties. They noted with alarm that selective feeding programmes were not the answer to the current widespread food insecurity, which requires a regular and reliable general food distribution to all those who need it.

In the absence of a general ration, a selective feeding programme is likely to encourage the worst affected to abandon their homes and congregate around feeding centers in the hope of some assistance. The impact of this ‘magnet effect’ around feeding centers has in the past had a catastrophic effect on the health environment and the displaced people’s access to food, and resulted in massive mortality, as witnessed in Kuajok Payam in 1998. Apart from this problem, takehome supplementary feeding is of limited benefit as the distances are too long between the centers and peoples homes in the three payams for mothers to walk on a weekly basis for a few kilograms of Unimix." (ACC/SCN July 2001, pp.14-15)

Alarming health and nutrition status among IDPs in northern Bahr al Ghazal reflects their acute destitution even in camps (2000-2002)

- 20 humanitarian staff evacuated from Aweil town due to insecurity and no humanitarian access between June and August 2001
- 5,919 IDPs in GoS controlled areas of Bahr al Ghazal camps suffer 26.4 acute malnutrition and under-five mortality rates are at 6.5/10,000 a day
- The main cause of malnutrition is poor food delivery due to security impediments
- The region suffers from very poor water quality and critical lack of access to health facilities
- Aweil south significantly above emergency thresholds in July-August 2001: 21.9% acute malnutrition, 3.1% severe acute malnutrition, 3.86/10,000/day under-five mortality rate
28,500 IDPs in Aweil East suffered a deterioration of acute malnutrition from 15.5% to 28.9% between May-June 2001 and food stores were severely depleted.

High insecurity in Aweil West doesn’t forecast nutritional improvements as agencies pull out for security reasons.

Already in 2000 there was only 5% access to safe drinking water in Bahr al Ghazal rural areas.

Reported worsening situation for IDP in northern Bahr Al Ghazal (March 2001)

"Aweil town and camps Aweil town and camps are a government held enclave in northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and have suffered from insecurity over the course of 2001. As a result, there have been many evacuations of 20 humanitarian staff from the town with no access between June to August 2001. This has resulted in a suspension of the general food distribution […]. Food security is considered to be poor because the inhabitants of the town have very little access to the surrounding area and depend on flights to northern Sudan for any commercial exchanges. The fighting in Bahr-el- Ghazal has displaced a large number of people to Aweil town and its camps and WFP estimates that there are currently in the region of 5,919 IDPs in two official camps. IDPs also live in the town amongst the non-displaced population […].

ACF conducted a survey in the camps and the town in September 2001 and found a prevalence of 26.4 % acute malnutrition (W/Ht < -2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 5.4 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht < -3 Z scores and/or oedema) in the camps. In the town, the prevalence of acute malnutrition was estimated to be 15.9 % (W/Ht < -2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 2.4 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht < -3 Z scores and/or oedema). The levels of acute malnutrition in both the camps and town are above emergency thresholds although the levels were significantly higher in the camps. The seriousness of the situation is further reinforced by the underfive mortality rates of 6.5/10,000/day in the camps and estimated to be 1.25/10,000/day in the town. The high underfive mortality rate in the camps is further cause for concern, although the authors indicate that confusion over the recall period may have biased the results. The causes of the high malnutrition rates are linked to the poor food security of the area compounded by months of no general food distribution, the hunger season and the generally poor security of the area. The survey also draws attention to the very poor quality of water sources and a critical lack of access to health facilities […]. The hunger season has now ended and the general food distribution has resumed and as a result, access to food is assumed to have improved. However, the poor water quality, the lack of health facilities and continuing insecurity combine to make this population extremely vulnerable."

[…]

In Aweil South

"Aweil South In late July and early August, Tearfund and Action Against Hunger (AAH) USA conducted a nutritional survey in Aweil South. The survey was conducted to investigate the level of malnutrition amongst households suffering from drought, insecurity and a prolonged hunger period. The survey estimated a prevalence of acute malnutrition of 21.9 % (< -2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 3.1 % severe acute malnutrition (< -3 Z scores and/or oedema) […]. The survey also indicates that the majority of the children classified as being not malnourished (i.e. >-2 Z scores), were only marginally above the cut off point and would be likely to become acutely malnourished should the situation deteriorate significantly. The level of acute malnutrition is alarming being significantly over emergency thresholds and is comparable to levels found in Aweil East in June (see RNIS #34). The survey also estimated the under-five mortality rate to be 3.86/10,000/day, which is above alert levels and also gives rise for significant concern. The reason given for the high levels of malnutrition were the poor food stocks from the previous year’s drought conditions and the elongation of the hunger gap. This was a result of the expected harvest being put off from early August19 to September […]. The survey also draws attention to the poor access to health facilities for the population. The level of measles vaccination was very low at 13 % of surveyed children, and certainly reinforces this observation. It is also likely that the poor security seen in the area has also contributed to the food insecurity of the population. It is important to note that whilst these levels of acute malnutrition are often regarded as normal in south Sudan, they are very significantly above emergency thresholds and indicative of a very serious situation. The harvest in September and October has been relatively good in the Aweil counties and it is hoped that the increased availability of food will significantly
improve the food security in the area and contribute to an improvement in the nutritional status of the population.” (ACC/SCN October 2001, pp.17,18)

**In Aweil East**

"Poor rains and insecurity continue to affect the area, and have severely disrupted the planting season. WFP/TSU estimated that there were a total of 28,500 IDPs and returnees in the area in May while most were fleeing the fighting around the railway line or from within Aweil West (WFP/TSU 05/01). Tearfund has conducted two nutrition surveys in Malakon, Aweil East. The first, in March 2001, reported 15.5% acute malnutrition (W7Ht < -2Z-scores and/or oedema) and 1.8% severe acute malnutrition (W7Ht <3Z -scores and/or oedema) (see RNIS 32and 33). A follow up survey in June indicated that the nutrition situation had substantially deteriorated with a prevalence of acute malnutrition of 28.9% (W7Ht <-2Z-scores) including 5.5% severe wasting (W/Ht <-3 Z-scores).

[...]

The results are particularly alarming because the survey was conducted in the hunger gap and the population faces further food shortages ahead. It indicates that household food stores are already severely depleted if not empty and that reliance on relief and wild foods has risen dramatically[...]. The possibility of increased insecurity remains high and this will further disrupt existing coping mechanisms, cause population displacements and further nutritional decline and increased risk of dying. To put the figures into perspective, during the height of the 1998 famine according to Tearfund surveys the rate of acute malnutrition reached 36.2%. MSF-F also carried out a nutrition status and health survey in the same area in aoril. The RNIS does not have access to the report, but WFP report that the rate of acute malnutrition was 17.1% of severely acute (using Z-scores)[...]. The lack of information on methodology from the MSF-F survey makes comparison with the Tearfund survey very difficult. Both agencies report falls in the number of children attending their selective feeding programmes as mothers take their children to the fields during the cultivation season. However, numbers are expected to rise again with the end of the cultivation period [...].

**In Aweil West**

"Recent insecurity has particularly affected both East and West Aweil Counties, and Concern Worldwide had to pull out of the area but will go in when conditions permit. As a result, no new survey information exists but given the insecurity and the conditions seen in Aweil East, it is likely that the nutritional situation of the populations has already been compromised. In May WFP/TSU estimated that there were 22,940 IDPs and returnees in the area (WFP/TSU 05/01).” (ACC/SCN July 2001, p.13,14)

"The population of Bahr el Ghazal lacks sufficient safe water supplies. In the northern sector, access to safe drinking water is 50-80% in the towns, but it is estimated at only 5% in the rural areas. A total of 500 functioning hand pumps are partly maintained by NGOs and SARRA water teams in the southern sector. There is generally low health and hygiene awareness among IDPs and rural populations” (UN November 2000, p.140).

"In Bahr el Ghazal, recent assessments in the Aweil region have shown that there was a complete crop failure during last year and the situation has further deteriorated this year. Prices of essential items have increased significantly compared to 1999. The insecurity in the region has discouraged trade and commodity transfers.” (WFP 30 March 2001)

"A Catholic bishop said on 2 March [2001] that up to a million displaced people were suffering from hunger, thirst and disease in the northern part of the Bahr al-Ghazal are in southern Sudan. After visiting the area, Caesar Mazzolari, Bishop of Rumbek, said he had seen about 55,000 people in very poor condition around Malwal Kon. According to the bishop, the displaced are the result of military confrontations between the government-aligned Arab Murahilin militia and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).” (IRIN 9 March 2001)
Displaced population marginalised in food distribution (1998-99)

- Task force finds that food distributions were regularly taxed by the SPLA and re-distributed by local leaders.
- Reported that IDPs were excluded from food distribution when not accompanied by their local leaders.
- Nutritional and mortality surveys reveal that the displaced had higher malnutrition and mortality rates than the resident population during the 1998 Bahr El Ghazal crisis.

"The possibility that some of the most vulnerable people in Bahr El Ghazal (BEG) were not receiving any or enough food was first identified by the SRRA in late May 1998. As a result, SRRA and OLS, and later the SPLM, agreed to form a joint Task Force to investigate and better understand the causes of this problem.

Within the above distribution process certain groups are clearly marginalized. The following are the groups which were consistently identified within this category during the Team’s visits to various locations:

Displaced people without representation of a chief, ghol leader or some other authority figure are being excluded from general distributions. These groups are many and varied and include: people displaced due to the long standing chronic insecurity in BEG; people displaced by the recent fighting around the main towns (including from inside the towns); people who form part of a new phenomena - the “C-130 invitees” - a group of the most marginalized displaced who are continually traveling within the region from airstrip to airstrip in hope of securing food; and households that move to relief centers leaving the area where they would have received a general ration." (SPLM/OLS 27 August 1998, pp. 1, 16)

A report commissioned by WFP further details how IDPs have been marginalised in the food distribution:

"WFP has to work with the SRRA [the Sudanese Relief and Rehabilitation Association] as the "humanitarian wing" of the SPLM. Since 1995, WFP has attempted to develop a distribution system that was independent of SRRA and local leaders, because of perceived problems of diversion and corruption by local authorities. In 1998 however, despite these efforts the SRRA and the chiefs effectively determined who received food aid. Community based relief committees established by WFP were found to have little or no role. In addition, because WFP is entirely dependent on the SRRA for translation, any independent distribution planning and monitoring was extremely difficult. In distribution planning, WFP was often excluded, or if a meeting was held between WFP, SRRA, relief committee and chiefs, either translation was incorrect, or subsequent meetings were held where decisions were made which excluded WFP. Reports are full of examples of non-cooperation or inadequate translation by SRRA. In addition, several cases have been reported where monitors were denied access beyond the immediate vicinity of the drop zone. The SRRA have in some situations been directly implicated in abuses and food diversions. Like any local representatives, they are subject to political pressure.

There is clear evidence of exclusion and marginalization of the displaced from distribution reports [during the 1998 crisis in Bahr El Ghazal], nutritional surveys, interviews with monitors and with the displaced themselves. Often, the food allocation for the displaced is smaller than the resident population (relative to their size), and the displaced are generally served last. If there are any losses during the distribution, it is the displaced that lose out.

In interviews with the displaced, they said they were excluded if their chief, sub-chief or ghol leaders were not present, or if they were represented by a sub-chief from a different sub-section (but the same section). Whether the displaced are excluded also depends in part on the particular resident chiefs, and their relation with the displaced. For example, the executive chief in Akon is well known for his negative attitude towards the displaced. When food aid was perceived to be insufficient in October 1998, all displaced were
excluded. People interviewed in Rumbek, who had come from Wau and returned to Rumbek via Mapel, said that they were excluded from distribution in Mapel, and had to rely on charity from the resident population. Many had sold possessions to purchase food.

[...]

Nutritional and mortality surveys in Mapel and Panthou show that the displaced had higher malnutrition and mortality rates than the resident population. In Panthou in August, the CMR amongst the displaced was 20.6/10,000/day, but for the resident population it was 1.5/10,000/day [...]. In Mapel, the CMR amongst the displaced was 23/10,000/day, and 11/10,000/day in residents [...]. The survey in Panthou found that only 39% of displaced received the general ration, and 61% of residents. The Mapel survey reported that 59% of the displaced reported receiving the general ration and 84% of residents.” (Jaspars 12 April 1999, sects. 3.2, 4.3.1)

**IDP needs in the Blue Nile State**

**IDP needs in Southern Blue Nile Region (Feb 2003)**

- 50,000 displaced in January 2003 due to fighting in Liech are depleting their grain stocks to survive
- IDPs from Raga meet their food needs through selling labour or collection of wild foods
- IDPs are concerned about insecurity in camps and wish to move to safer areas
- There were critical water shortages as well as high malnutrition prevalence in camps (Feb 2003)
- In Sobat, about 50% of households close to GoS controlled areas have been displaced since April 2002

“Continued fighting in the northern parts of Liech (Western Upper Nile) displaced about 50,000 people in January of this year. This is likely to result in the accelerated consumption or loss of grain stocks.

[...]

Heavy fighting between the Government of Sudan (GoS) backed militia and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in the central and northern parts of Liech in January 2003 displaced 50,000 people. Although fighting has been recurrent over the past four years, the cumulative impact of continued insecurity on households in Liech may be most evident this year, when neighboring areas, such as Gogrial, Tonj, Twic, Rumbek and Yirol, experienced in their worst harvest since 1999, and will not be able to provide the same support they did in the recent past, when the displaced population from Liech would typically exchange assets such as livestock for grain.

[...]

A multi-agency assessment mission conducted in Ezo and Tambura in January 2003 raised concerns about the increasing presence of returnees and refugees. An estimated 40,000 and 10,000 people are residing in camps in Tambura and Ezo respectively. About 15,000 of these are people who fled from Raga to Tambura in July 2001. An additional 10,000 (EZO) and 18,000 (Tambura) returnees and refugees arrived from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Central African Republic (CAR) during the last year. The latest group arrived just this month from the DRC. Most of these people are residing in camps where, according to the January assessment findings, food, water, sanitation and health services are lacking. The assessment recommended food aid, water and health services in addition to 100 percent food aid rations between February and April, followed by 75 percent between May and July. While the recommendation to provide a full ration to parts of the population may be valid, this recommendation may not be appropriate for the entire returnee, refugee and displaced community, since part of the population is able to sell labor for food. In fact, in July last year, an assessment conducted by WFP indicated that the displaced people from Raga was able to meet a significant proportion of their food needs from labor sales and gathering of wild foods. This resulted in WFP reducing food aid rations from 100 to 50 percent. As such, 100 percent food rations
may only be appropriate for people who are not able to obtain food in any other way apart from relief. Given the need to understand more about the ways different refugee and returnee groups are meeting their food needs, it is important to carry out a proper food security assessment and nutrition survey in the camps in order to make more appropriate interventions. This is especially so since the camps are located in food surplus producing areas, where a number of income opportunities exist. Also, although the team recommended seed aid, it is important to note that locally procured seeds were provided to the Raga displaced group in Tambura during last year's cropping season, but the seeds failed to perform. Reasons for this failure need to be understood before such an intervention is made so the same problem does not occur again this year.

[...]
Field reports indicated that meningitis-related deaths occurred in the central parts of Bieh state in early February. In the past, limited access to water has contributed to the outbreak of water borne diseases that also contribute to malnutrition in the dry season. This year, water shortages are raising similar concerns. The multisagency assessment on refugees, returnees and displaced persons conducted in Ezo and Tambura in January this year indicates that health and water services were very poor in two (Bariguna and Bangima) out of four camps. Malaria, cough, chest infections and diarrhea cases were commonly observed. The other two camps of Baikpa and Mabia were found to have better services. However, a kind of ulcer referred to as “Buruli ulcer” was endemic in Mabia camp, but health agencies had managed to control it.

[...]
The displaced population wanted to return home by the end of the year.

The assessment recommended coordinated interagency interventions and proper food security and nutrition assessments. The October 2002 ceasefire agreement provided an opportunity for OLS to plan these interventions. WFP Southern Sudan sector estimated total requirements at 2,259 MT, translating into 266 MT monthly for the 30,000 displaced people in the SPLA held areas until August-September 2003. In response, the GOS and SPLA made agreements inviting the UN agencies to provide assistance to southern Blue Nile and other needy areas. The UN followed up by sending an assessment team to the northern area of the region at the beginning of February. The findings of the assessment were that:

The displaced camps were insecure and people's priority was to move to safer areas.

The shortage of water had become critical following lower than normal rainfall last year.

There was a high prevalence of malnutrition in one of the camps.

HIV/AIDS was a concern due to Ethiopia’s close proximity.

The magnitude of food insecurity varied from area to area.

Provision of water, agricultural inputs, implementation of supplementary and therapeutic feeding and provision of food aid were some of the recommendations made by the assessment. Although the population requires food assistance, proper food security assessments have not been conducted yet. While intervention strategies are being finalized, it is important that relevant agencies prepare strategies for conducting proper assessments to obtain food security and general baseline data in order to improve the effectiveness of upcoming humanitarian interventions.” (FEWS, 20 February 2003)

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**IDP needs in the Equatoria and Bahr Al Jebel Regions**

**IDPs in desperate conditions in Camp in Western Equatoria (Nov 2002)**
• 57,000 IDPs including those relocated in October 2001 live in desperate conditions since they fled the town of Raga
• IDPs have no doctors and lack water
• Main illnesses reported were malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, respiratory infection, scabies and sleeping sickness

“The Internally Displaced People in the camps of Mabia in Mupoi and Baikpa in Ezo in the Western Equatorial Region in southern Sudan have been facing hardships since being relocated to the camps around October 2001 after they fled fighting between the SPLA and the Sudan government army in the town of Raga, in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Over 57,000 were displaced and have been living in what has been described 'very severe and desperate conditions' by the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Rumbek in south Sudan.

CARE international and UNICEF has been the only organisations providing basic services to the IDPs in the two camps. But in an assessment carried out by the Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) in July 2002 to assess conditions of the IDPs in the two camps, it become apparent that the people were seriously lacking basic needs such as water, medical facilities, shelter, and food. CEAS therefore, proposes to take part in the assistance of the IDPs in the sectors of water, health, education, shelter, and food security through the provision of tools and seeds. This appeal describes clearly how CEAS will carry out their intervention in this program through its members, the Catholic Diocese of Tambura/Yambio, and the Episcopal Church of Sudan, diocese of Ezo.

 […]

**Water**

Of the 10 bore holes drilled by UNICEF earlier in the year, 6 are functioning but with insufficient water. This problem is likely to worsen during the dry season between November and March.

**Health**

There are no medical doctors in the area. However, there are 4 medical assistants and 4 trained traditional birth attendants.

Insufficient and inappropriate drugs have been provided.

There is no laboratory nor equipment such as microscopes, although there are 2 trained laboratory technicians.

Major illnesses in the camp comprise:
Malaria/fever
Diarrhoeal diseases
Respiratory tract infection
Scabies
Sleeping sickness (there are a lot of tsetse flies in the area).

 […]

Each family was allocated and settled in a 20 x 40 meter plot. Most of the IDPs have since built grass thatched, mud huts. When grass was not available, plastic sheeting was used for roofing. Most of the plastic sheeting is now torn from the heat of the sun. The IDPs are in need of more plastic sheeting and other non-food items such as blankets, mosquito nets, cooking pots, plates, cups, spoons, basins, buckets, water jerry cans. Some assistance of this kind was made available by the Church during the course of the year, but in insufficient amounts.” (ACT, 1 November 2002)
Worsened nutrition situation in Eastern Equatoria during 2001-2002

- 8,500 IDPs who fled conflict in Torit and LRA attacks in need of food aid
- LRA attacks during 2002 have destabilised the Equatoria food surplus area
- Improved market access is needed in the region
- Deteriorating nutritional conditions for IDPs in Bieh State, food aid required until 2002 harvests
- Number of malnourished children rose by 18% during May 2001 and admissions in MSF supplementary feeding centers rose by 28%
- Insecurity in Upper Nile and Unity states cause poor access to food in Juba, where under-five acute malnutrition reached 12.1% (July 2001)
- Emergency feeding centers needed to assist 30,000 newly uprooted
- Food security of these areas is also complicated by an influx of returnees from the north and by local displacement
- Screening in 12 supplementary feeding centres in Juba revealed a reduction in the number of vulnerable groups by 43.9% - from 2,283 in February to 1,280 in March 2001

“A rapid Food Economy Needs Assessment conducted by HAC, WFP, FAO, UNICEF, UN-OCHA, NCA, ACF, Help Age International, SRC, El Bir, OXFAM, Sudan Aid and SFM found that approximately 8,500 IDPs urgently need full food rations in and around Juba. The two largest groups in need are over 5,000 IDPs that fled from conflict in Torit in September 2002 and over 3,400 IDPs who have sought refuge from LRA attacks this year.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“General overview: The population in the region is estimated at 2,200,000 of whom 869,000 in Bahr el Jebel, 686,000 in Eastern Equatoria and 675,000 in Western Equatoria. Agriculture is the main source of income followed by livestock, fishing and hunting. The operating environment in eastern Equatoria has further deteriorated during the third quarter of the year due to IRA activity around Juba and ongoing fighting between GoS and SPLM/A for control of the strategic towns of Torit, Lafon and Kapoeta. Flight access to eastern Equatoria has been denied for over four years. In September a flight ban imposed on eastern and western Equatoria prevented humanitarian assistance from reaching an average of 600,000 vulnerable populations in SPLM/A held areas of southern Sudan for ten days. The ban was eventually lifted, but the usual flight denial south of Juba, Torit and Yei remained. Western Equatoria is a food surplus area with relatively stable security and therefore development opportunities. Agricultural producers in this area require support in improving market access. Sleeping sickness and guinea worm are issues of concern specifically in Mundri / Mvolo, Maridi and Kajo Keko Counties. Expanded Programme of Immunisation (EPI) coverage is 40% in Bahr el Jebel and 1.8% in eastern Equatoria, school enrolment is estimated at 19% only. In Juba, immunisation against polio and measles reached 50%.

Coping mechanisms: Firewood collection, selling charcoal and grass, fishing, labour and hunting.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Torit, Lafon, Magwi and Kapoeta counties are particularly vulnerable due to armed conflict and insecurity. Beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance number over 300,000, of whom 20,000 are IDPs in Juba, 18,000 in Kapoeta, 13,210 in Torit and 4,312 in Lafon.

Operational constraints: Consistent denial of access to most vulnerable populations, poor communication, a complex geopolitical situation and geographical isolation, drought and instability caused by the presence of the LRA.”(UN, November 2002, p.31)

"Civil insecurity still prevails in many areas, making food access extremely difficult, especially for the poor and most socially disadvantaged."
Bieh State is currently extremely food insecure. WFP field team reports are corroborated by the local authorities who describe the situation as desperate. Food aid assistance has begun and may need to continue up to the harvests in 2002.

Deteriorating nutritional conditions are currently reported among the food insecure groups in Bieh State, IDPs in Tambura County, and in parts of Bahr-el-Ghazal Region. Urgent and sustained intervention measures are needed to stem further deterioration, given that the hunger period is yet to begin.” (FEWS 22 February 2002)

“During a field visit to Akobo, Bieh State in May, FEWS NET observed that the MSF-Belgium supplementary feeding center was receiving an exceptionally large number of beneficiaries on a daily basis. The staff at the supplementary feeding center reported that it was caring for an estimated 2,500 malnourished children as of mid-May [2001]. By the end of May, this number had risen by 18 percent to around 2,955. The number of new admissions also rose by 28 percent in May compared with April new admissions. The rise in numbers is attributed to the large numbers of displaced persons from other locations in the state. Figure 4 shows the increase in beneficiary numbers and new admissions in Akobo since March due foremost to food scarcities.

The MSF therapeutic feeding center had 210 children as of mid-May, 42 percent of which belonged to displaced families from other locations in Bieh State and neighboring Phou States.” (FEWS 15 June 2001).

"Juba is a government held enclave in south Sudan that has received enormous amounts of IDPs over the course of Sudan’s 11 year civil war. As a government enclave it depends on supplies from the north of the country and as a result of ongoing insecurity in the Upper Nile and Unity states, the normal supply barges from Khartoum have been unable to get through. This has resulted in a reliance on air support and as a result many food items are extremely expensive. WFP is conducting targeted food distributions to IDPs and other vulnerable groups and the daily ration is composed of cereals, pulses, oil and CSB to give a full ration of 2,155 Kcal/person/day. ACF conducted two surveys in July, one in the town and one in the surrounding area. The surveys indicated that the prevalence of acute malnutrition amongst the un-21 der-five population in Juba town was 12.1 % (W/Ht < -2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 1 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht < -3 Z scores and/or oedema). In the surrounding area the prevalence of acute malnutrition was 9.3 % (W/Ht < -2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 0.8 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht < -3 Z scores and/or oedema) (ACF 17/07/01). The under-five crude mortality rate was calculated as 2.3/10,000/day and 0.68/10,000/day in the town and surroundings respectively. The results of the survey indicate that the nutritional situation is precarious with IDPs in the town appearing to be slightly more vulnerable than those outside. However, the situation is not currently not critical. It is likely that the good food distribution targeted at the vulnerable groups such as IDPs has helped to prevent a slide in nutritional status. It is important to note that the area is isolated and prone to insecurity and the population remains at risk." (ACC/SCN October 2001, pp.18-19)

"Crop failures and livestock deaths in and near the key southern town of Juba might worsen malnutrition among 200,000 local residents, one international relief agency reported in February. Catholic bishops in southern Sudan urged aid agencies to establish emergency feeding centers in addition to aid drops of food to assist 30,000 newly uprooted people from 17 villages. WFP reported that it was able to deliver 12,000 tons of food aid during May -- less than half the 28,000 tons needed by local populations.” (USCR Sept 2001)

"The number of malnourished children in the IDP camps of Nimule and Labone in Eastern Equatoria Region increased by more than 100 percent in April [2000] compared to March. Recent multi-agency assessments reveal a global malnutrition rate of 33.8 percent in Bieh State, and an increased number of children in feeding programs in Aweil East and Twic Counties. Health related problems are increasingly being identified as principal factors of the observed food insecurity, highlighting the need for intensified health interventions in addition to relief food distributions. The food security of these areas is also complicated by an influx of returnees from the north and local displacement of populations, low stocks due to the poor harvests last year, and limited access to some of the affected locations due to civil insecurity.” (FEWS 30 June 2000)
Background to the IDP situation in Juba:

"The displaced people were earlier re-settled in camps in the out-skirt of Juba where they were able to cultivate and earn their livelihood. In June 1992, their camps were destroyed when SPLA attacked Juba, and they were forced to camp in open spaces within Juba town. In 1995, the Government of Sudan stopped blanket distribution of food; this made the IDPs to exert effort and embark on food production. Lately the IDP population has been assimilated in the ordinary population of Juba. In 1997 we witnessed another influx of 15,000 civilians and some refugees into Juba town when the SPLA captured a string of towns along Sudan-Uganda-Zaïre boarders. In the same year 1997, crops were affected by drought. In 1999, during the month of August and September, there were heavy rains, which caused flood and severe damage to crops.

[...]

The long term displaced in Juba are now assimilated in the town, but still the new arrivals are lodging outdoor in the market verandas. In other areas, where people fled from the war zone to stay in villages under government control, there are also new arrivals in need of shelter before they settle. Especially, groups like widows, elderly people, women heading household, since it became difficult for them to construct a house. Plastic sheets will be the suitable material to use for shelter.” (ACT 29 March 2001)

An ACF report provides further details about the nutritional status in Juba:

"ACF-F conducted a nutritional survey in Juba, a government enclave and the largest town in southern Sudan, among children aged 6-59 months in December 1999 [...]. The survey reported that the total population is approximately 128,000, of whom approximately 50% are displaced. The prevalence of acute malnutrition was estimated at 11.1% (including 1.0% severe). This is only a very slight improvement since July 1999 [...]. Oedema was recorded in one child. The measles vaccination coverage rate was relatively low at 44.5%. The feeding programme coverage was 39.7% [...].

[...]

Given the improvements in the general food security situation post harvest, greater improvements would have been expected. For example, a relatively stable security situation had allowed increased utilisation of the farmland around Juba. Also yields of sorghum, maize and ground-nuts were good in 1999 and food prices in the market remained stable. In 1999, WFP provided full rations to 15,000 of the displaced, targeted vulnerable groups, including people who were disabled, had TB or were leprosy patients, and half rations for moderately malnourished children, elderly people, pregnant and lactating women based on anthropometric measurements. Targeted feeding was provided for a further 5,000 vulnerable people. The survey’s authors suggested that health factors may have been the primary cause of the malnutrition [...], also only a proportion of the displaced benefited from humanitarian assistance.” (ACC/SCN 31 March 2000, pp. 33-34)

"Based on the findings of a nutrition survey conducted in December 2000, the malnutrition rate in Juba was 8.6 GAMR. SMOH, WFP, UNICEF and ACF screened 12 supplementary feeding centres in Juba, with the results showing a significant reduction in the number of vulnerable groups by 43.9% - from 2,283 in February to 1,280 in March 2001.” (OCHA 31 March 2001)

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IDP needs in Kassala and Red Sea States

Kassala 12,000 IDPs caught between renewed fighting and serious drought (Nov 2002)

- Living conditions among scattered IDPs north of Kassala town described as basic to extreme
- Emergency response needed in food, health, water and nutrition sectors
- Water and cooking fuel are scarce resources needed to be trucked from long distances
- Agencies present in Kassala provided initial but limited assistance and need 346,700US$ to meet IDPs minimum needs
- Malnutrition rates among IDPs range between 19 and 26%
- Global malnutrition is 18% among IDPs by contrast to 8% among locals (Nov 2002)
- IDP female-headed households particularly vulnerable due to lack of access to employment outside the home
The early October 2002 conflict on the border of Kassala state and Eritrea resulted in displacement of civilians from Hamish Koreib province. By 29 October, some 12,000 people had been uprooted from homes in an area stretching north of Kassala town to Hamish Koreib, with many IDPs walking a distance of up to 200km to seek refuge. Living conditions are basic to extreme and there is an urgent need for food and non-food items.

A formal assessment led by HAC Kassala was undertaken 3-6 November 2002 to assess the needs and living conditions of these newly displaced Haddendawa and Beni Amir tribespeople. Participants in this assessment were: HAC Kassala, MOH, WFP, WES, SRC, IRC, GOAL, Ockenden Venture, ITDG, Hamish Koreib province representative, Dawa Islamia, and Rahma Islamia.

The top priorities identified in the assessment were:
- Water
- Shelter - short term emergency/longer term recovery
- Food
- Access to fuel and cooking utensils
- Access to health services and medicine
- Household items including mosquito nets

The assessment team visited most locations to which the displaced had fled, including the villages of Hadalia, Hangolia, South Matatieb, Togali, East Tandali, Mahmadob, East Waar. Many displaced remain scattered along a 200km line south of Hamish Koreib.

In order to reduce cost while facilitating access, it is proposed that basic services for the displaced be congregated in three centres; namely Hadalia, Togali and Dabalaweet East; 90 km, 60 km and 30 km north of Kassala town respectively.

Problems of displacement in the area already demand urgent responses of an emergency nature including food, health, water and nutritional assistance. Agencies having on-going operations in Kassala were able to provide a limited, initial response. The Sudanese Red Crescent (SRC) distributed non-food items to families displaced at Hadalia and Matatieb on 29 October 2002. WFP provided a month's ration of Sorghum but had insufficient stocks to provide other needed food commodities. ICRC and UNICEF attempting to make available limited in-country reserves to address some of the priority water, sanitation and health care requirements. Other key actors, namely Goal and IRC, have exhausted reserves in trying to provide essential medicine, to upgrade health clinics and to provide meet minimum shelter requirements...

HAC has concentrated its resources on preparing centres at Hadalia, Togali and Dabalaweit for proper reception and care of the displaced.

The three locations planned for relief operations offer certain advantages in being closer to natural resources than other locations. Still, water and cooking fuel remain scarce throughout Kassala State and must be trucked in from distant locations. A water well exists at Tugulei but will need to undergo urgent
repair. No suitable accommodations or basic services exit in the area, which necessitates agency staff being based in Kassala town and travelling 100 to 180 km daily to and from the area of displacement. While agencies have endeavoured to provide essential services using whatever means at their disposal, their reserve funds and stocks are nearly depleted. An additional US$ 346,700 will be required for them to meet the minimum needs of 12,000 IDPs for three months or until the threat of conflict has diminished. (OCHA 24 November 2002)

“General overview: Kassala is a catchment area for IDPs, refugees and migrants. The population of 1,620,000, mostly farmers and agro-pastoralists, more than 45,000 are IDPs and 91,000 Eritrean refugees.[…] Their primary source of employment is casual farm labour. The vulnerability of IDPs is highlighted by a global malnutrition rate of almost 18%, which contrasts sharply with the average of 8% for the region. However, the steady decrease in agricultural production and employment is likely to lead to a corresponding increase in the malnutrition rate. The most vulnerable, and likely to be amongst the first affected by a further decrease in food security, are IDP and refugee female-headed households as cultural and social morays inhibit refugee and IDP women’s mobility and engagement in employment opportunities outside their homes.

[…]

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: A significant number of IDPs and refugees in Kassala rely on humanitarian assistance for survival. (Indicative of the vulnerability of IDPs is the 19-26% rate of malnutrition in the Guls, Fatu and Dabalaweit IDP camps.) Those living close to the Eritrean border are vulnerable to Unexploded Ordnances (UXO) and landmines. In the Red Sea State the most affected areas are Tokar and Halieb provinces, which register the worst social indicators for malnutrition in adults and children. Mortality rates are also the highest in these provinces, reported at 1 per 10,000.

Operational constraints: Land cultivation has been limited by insecurity, landmines (close to the Wad Sharife refugee camp, the Fata, Awad and Dabalaweit IDP camps in Kassala and in south Tokar), inadequate funding of emergency programmes, limited presence of NGOs, sparsely populated areas, difficult terrain, and the rapid growth of the Meeskeet1 Meeskeet is a land protection shrub introduced to stop desertification, which has encroached on arable land. tree. This has constrained livelihoods and caused major displacement. Other constraints include geographic isolation and low community involvement - particularly due to the exclusion of women.” (UN, November 2002, p.32)

30% under-five malnutrition rates due to severe drought in Red State likely to rise (2002)

• 30% under-five malnutrition rates due to severe drought in Red State likely to rise
• 1/5 women malnourished and 10% are severely malnourished
• WFP needs assessment in Red Sea State found rapid deterioration of health and nutrition among IDPs (2001)
• Around 14,000 IDPs around main towns resort to begging as the only survival means

“The Red Sea State currently suffers from severe drought affecting sustainable livelihoods of most of the population. Lack of basic services such as health care and sanitation negatively affects the health and nutrition status of the population. One in five women is malnourished while one in ten women is severely malnourished. Malnutrition rates for children under-five have steadily increased to 30% and are likely to climb further. Increased incidence of night blindness has been reported with 10% of the population currently affected. Ninety-five percent of the population is nomadic with the remainder being agro-pastoralists and traders. Only 30% of the land is available for agriculture. This land is located around South Tokar where the deltas flood. The affected caseload requiring humanitarian assistance in Red Sea is
"WFP completed the first distribution in Red Sea State and has carried out a needs assessment. Results indicate: increased displacement to urban centers with about 14,000 IDPs in and around the main towns; rapid deterioration in health and nutrition; two or more child deaths reported during the month in all villages/sites visited; death among the elderly; women observed to be very thin and anemic; increased number of cases of tuberculosis, diarrhoea, malnutrition and respiratory infections; coping mechanisms stretched to the limit and host communities under stress. Begging among the displaced has become a means of survival. Livestock, the main source of livelihood of this community has completely collapsed. Market price of cereals has increased while that of livestock has fallen. Food deficit was estimated to be 80% to 100% for some population groups."

(OCHA 31 July 2001)

IDP needs in the Khartoum State

Majority of IDPs in Khartoum live in squatter areas with poor conditions (2002)

- IDP communities in Khartoum State consist mainly of children, women and elderly
- Most displaced in Khartoum State are scattered in planned and unplanned squatter areas or settlements
- Thirty percent of the IDPs in Khartoum have no access to medical services
- But, IDP camps relatively well covered with health facilities and water facilities
- Claimed that a general anti-Christian bias affects IDPs' chances to find jobs or space for adequate shelter

“Greater Khartoum is estimated to be accommodating about 1.8 million IDPs. 260,000 of these IDPs are settled in the four officially designated camps (Mayo, El Salam, Jabal Awlia and Wad El Bashir) and the remainder are squatting in a variety of planned and unplanned areas.

The main sources of income for the IDPs are daily, casual and seasonal agricultural labour, as well as petty trade. Women generally provide the core income and perform most of the work. By way of the above, IDPs in Khartoum are expected to secure 85% of their annual food needs in 2001, while the remaining 15% of needs are expected to be met through a variety of coping mechanisms and targeted food relief.
The bulk of the IDPs income is spent on food and water, which leaves no extra income for other basic or immediate needs. In both the camps and squatter settlements the most stressful period is July-September. During this period, the demand for labour in the city is very low, as brick-making and general construction, mostly performed by men, stops. As a result, migration to rural farms and the large agricultural schemes for seasonal labour opportunities occurs.

In 2001 the vulnerable IDP group is projected to be 25% of the overall camp populations and those will be targeted for assistance during the stress period.

The IDP camps are relatively well covered with health facilities, unlike the squatter camps, only some of which have access to PHC facilities. In the camps, training is required in most of the health units, to cover topics like case management, rational use of drugs and data keeping. The supply of essential drugs needs to be reinforced in Jebel Awlia and Mayo camps. Malaria, ARI and Diarrhoea are the main contributors to morbidity. EPI is scheduled daily in the clinics and a cold chain is functioning. Vaccination supplies come from the MoH. The nutritional status of children under-five shows a marked seasonal variation with peaks in admissions to the feeding centres around August to September.

The general situation of water supply in the IDP camps is satisfactory. The quality of water is relatively good and the distance covered to collect water is reasonable. There is no cost participation or community management system. However, in As Salaam camp, CARE is presently working out a cost sharing modality. Squatter areas are less well served. In Id Babiker squatter area, there is a need for additional boreholes. Um Badah squatter area does not have a water source. Water is purchased from donkey carts at Ls 250 per pair of jerry cans. The IDP camps have very good latrine coverage in both households and schools. The squatter areas normally lack proper latrines.

"The displaced and poor communities in peri-urban Khartoum pay as much as 40% of their income for small quantities of poor quality water." (UN November 2001, p.65)

Education at primary level is generally available in the IDP camps, though not in the squatter areas. Even when available, the quality of education is poor due to lack of teaching resources, trained teachers and a dilapidated environment. Considerable numbers of children do not attend school because they cannot afford school fees. There are no secondary schools in the camps." (UN November 2000, pp.143-144)

**Information by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights apparently confirms the difficult situation facing IDPs in Khartoum**:

"The Special Rapporteur and his party were able to visit only one of the camps set up by the Government, where, reportedly, conditions, including primary educational and health facilities, are better than in other makeshift camps. It was, nevertheless, apparent that the displaced have basically been concentrated in an isolated and barren area, removed from any commercial centre offering work opportunities. There is no general relief distribution for the displaced in Khartoum who are considered to be long-stayers, and many complained of insufficient food and clothing. According to reports confirmed by the United Nations, food security in camps such as this one is precarious and malnutrition among children under five ranged from 12 to 24 per cent in 1997-1998.

Although a small number of the displaced manage to obtain odd jobs on construction sites or as domestic workers, the majority cannot afford to pay the cost of transportation into town. According to certain accounts, not all of the camp dwellers are war-displaced from the south; some have migrated to Khartoum for economic reasons or for reasons related to drought and deforestation in various areas of the country. As things stand, despite efforts under way to promote income-generating projects, it cannot be said that this population has any real prospects of economic and social integration; hence their fervent desire for peace that would enable them to go back home.

[...]

Of particular concern to the Special Rapporteur was the extremely precarious situation of displaced women and children, in the camps or on city streets. In particular, women lack adequate means of survival for
themselves and their children. Many have no choice other than to engage in practices such as beer-brewing (traditional in the south, but strictly forbidden in the north under Shariah law) and prostitution. Displaced southern women charged with these crimes make up 95 per cent of Khartoum's Omdurman Prison population. Another alarming feature is the imprisonment of girls as young as 10, serving sentences for petty crimes, such as theft. The legal situation of these women and girls was examined during the visit to the prison by the Special Rapporteur's team.” (UN Commission on Human Rights, 17 May 1999, paras. 76-80)

A mission commissioned by the Canadian Government made in January 2000 confirms the above pictures:
“Learning that the GOS had developed a plan for dealing with the IDP phenomenon in Khartoum State, we resolved to visit both a redevelopment area and a camp for the IDPs.

[...]
One woman we spoke to had arrived there [the Wad El Bashir IDP camp] from Aweil, and was just getting by, as no work was available. Most IDP households are headed by women. In order to survive and feed their families, in circumstances where there are no jobs and no financial support from government, the women have to do what they can. When they turn to producing alcohol, as many do, the results are catastrophic. The activity is illegal in Sudan though it does earn the women subsistence income. Perhaps the authorities are against it as much for this reason as any other. In any event, the result is often heavy fines and very hard imprisonment, sometimes children incarcerated along with mothers, further family break up and destitution all round.

The camps themselves are home to rough and ready church buildings, and it is these which often face demolition at the hands of the State authorities. Our information is that, indeed, at the local level, there is a general anti-Christian bias which affects chances of finding a job or being given a proper house space, which the authorities are providing for the Northern "squatters" who come into the city. Camps have Popular Committees which appear to serve as the government's mechanism for informing the people when necessary, and for being informed at all times. There are traditional chiefs, whether the people are Nuer or Dinka, and sometimes they are mixed, but the chiefs seem to have little authority.

In addition to the camps such as El Bashir, Salem, and Mayang, many IDPs are reduced to becoming squatters, erecting rude shelters where they can, and, of course, being regularly subject to demolition. But still they arrive in Khartoum.” (Harker January 2000, pp. 44-45)

IDP needs in the Darfur Region

IDP flows exacerbate conflicts over resources in drought affected Darfur (2002)

- 9.6% children under five severely malnourished in North Darfur and 6.6% in South Darfur
- Pit latrines are rare and access to basic health inadequate
- Infant mortality rate is at 70/1000 live births
With a population of 5,626,000 mostly agropastoralist, including 12 ethnic groups and Dinka and Fertit IDPs, Darfur is characterised by recurrent drought and increasing ethnic conflict. In 2002 a combination of sporadic and inadequate rains, poor pasture, food shortages, and floods in Kass and Nyala Provinces, led to mass migration to southern Darfur and northern and western Bahr el Ghazal. Drought and insecurity has also caused movement of population to the transitional zone of El Fashir, El Geneina and Nyala. This migration has caused conflict between migrants and host populations leading to attacks, armed robbery, looting and cattle stealing. At least 7,000 families in Darfur are affected by conflict, more than 80 people have been killed and 108 sentenced to death. The situation is likely to deteriorate. Large areas of North Darfur suffer frequent droughts, which erode the food security of large parts of its population and the rise of armed conflict in competition over scarce natural resources.

Throughout Darfur there is a lack of basic infrastructure such as roads and water points. Malnutrition rates vary within Darfur, with North Darfur having the highest rates of 9.6% of children under-five severely malnourished and 15% moderately malnourished. West Darfur ranks next with severe malnutrition at 8.1% and 6.6% in South Darfur. Due to successful National Immunisation Days (NIDs) campaigns more than 50% of the population have been immunised against polio and 30-50% against measles (MICS 2000).

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Natural disasters are the leading cause of displacement throughout Darfur. North Darfur is the most drought-affected area, Kass and Nyala in South Darfur the most prone to recurrent floods. Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of displacement and one of the consequences is a low school enrolment rate of 24.3%. The total of beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance is 165,231 in South Darfur and 200,000 in North Darfur. This figure includes 17,935 IDPs living in six camps in Nyala, 12,766 in Ed Da’ein, 8,809 in Adilla, 1,779 in Buram and 6,583 flood-affected persons in Kass and Nyala Provinces.

Coping mechanisms: Selling of charcoal and grass, wild food collection, casual labour, petty trade and firewood collection.
Operational constraints: Lack of access to parts of North and West Darfur, Sheria Province, Geneina and Jebel Marra due to insecurity caused by conflict and armed banditry; low community involvement; inadequate number of health centres, resources and qualified and trained health personnel particularly in the IDP camps in Nyala; and, complicated administrative procedures.” (UN, November 2002, p.30)

Low rains in South Darfur prevented 20-30% IDPs to cultivate

“Rainfall in this state was sporadic as a result 20 to 30% of IDPs were unable to cultivate. WFP expects that this will seriously affect harvest, cash crops and pasture.” (OCHA, 17 September 2002)

IDPs in Ed Daein (South Darfur) unappropriate school shelter could not be assisted (July 2001)

- Needs of 8,100 IDPs accommodated in one school in Ed Daein to be addressed
- OCHA concerned about unknown needs of 15,000 IDPs who took refuge in the forest
- 8,000 IDPs in Ed Daein school need shelter
- Agricultural inputs inappropriate aid for urban IDPs

“The main current problem was that of over 8,100 internally displaced people (IDPs) in Ed Daein (al-Duwaym), Southern Darfur, most of whom were accommodated in a single school with minimal facilities, it said. An alternative location for temporary settlement of these displaced people needed to be agreed upon, and resources such as shelter, water, sanitation and essential drugs were urgently required, it added. OCHA also expressed concern about the unknown humanitarian needs of up to 15,000 IDPs (a government estimate) reportedly taking refuge in forests from the fighting in Western Bahr al-Ghazal, with small quantities of food.” (IRIN 18 July 2001)

“The need for physical shelter and for a government decision on the situation of a displaced people’s camp have emerged as key issues for over 8,000 newly displaced people in Ed Daein (Al-Duwaym), Southern Darfur, according to local government and humanitarian sources. These internally-displaced people (IDPs) are among more than 30,000 civilians who fled Raga and Daym Zubayr in Western Bahr al-Ghazal after the capture of the towns in an offensive by the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in early June. As of 30 June, 8,172 people were registered at a temporary reception centre in Ed Daein primary school, according to figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). The town’s population is estimated at 65,000, including some 11,000 IDPs who left the south in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of the new arrivals from Raga were living and sleeping in the open air and, with the rainy season having started, the need for shelter was urgent, humanitarian workers on the ground told IRIN in Ed Daein on Saturday. Apart from the number of displaced people being too large for the school site to accommodate, and more IDPs still arriving, the school was due to reopen next week, they said. Moreover, the acting head of the government’s Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), Bahid Jacob, emphasised that the reception centre at Ed Daein primary school was temporary and did not constitute an IDP camp, and that the Raga IDPs would have to move to a facility nearby. The location of the new site has not been finalised, although it is understood that the government has proposed one some 60 km from Ed Daein, while the IDPs are seeking one considerably nearer, preferring to be in an urban environment with which they are familiar. The IDPs from Raga include government officials, teachers, craft workers (and reportedly some soldiers) who would find it difficult to survive through farming even if provided with seeds and tools, according to relief workers.
"We’re looking at the possibilities for getting another place, eight to 10 km away, [from] where people can come to town to work,” said Bahid Jacob. “The host community is ready to give land, we have contacted FAO [the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation] about getting seeds, and the Islamic Cooperative Bank is ready to provide finance for them” [...].

In Buram, where the number of IDPs from Raga was approaching 6,000, the matter of finding a suitable site appeared to be closer to a resolution, according to relief workers. A location had been provisionally chosen about 11 km outside Buram, at Gimesa, and both the host community and IDPs appeared comfortable with the choice, they said.

In all, over 20,000 people displaced from Raga had made their way to six sites in Southern Darfur and northern parts of Western Bahr al-Ghazal [from where they are expected to continue northward to South Darfur], the acting commissioner of Ed Daein, Hasan Salih, told IRIN on Saturday. (IRIN 2 July 2001)

High level of severe malnutrition among IDPs living in north Darfur (2001)

- Worst drought in 60 years in Darfur deprives over 400,000 people from access to water
- By May 2001 acute malnutrition at 23.4% six months before the peak of the hungry season was recorded
- IDPs particularly vulnerable due to fewer coping strategies, poor access to health services, as a result they are 1.7 times more prone to sickness than other groups
- Deteriorating coping mechanisms: depleted wild food reserves and declining labour wages contribute to extreme nutritional vulnerability
- Global malnutrition rates of 26.10 percent found amongst the displaced population
- 25,000 southern Dinkas known as Semi-Resident Southerners (SRSs) have sought shelter in southeastern parts after fleeing insecurity in Bahr El Ghazal

"Darfur is suffering from a drought that some are claiming is the worst in 60 years, with over 400,000 people critically short of water (SCF-UK 15/05/01). SCF-UK conducted a series of nutritional surveys in five food economy zones in North Darfur (see graph below), one of which included the displaced living on the outskirts of El Fasher. The overall prevalence of acute malnutrition was 23.4 % (W/Ht < -2 Z-scores and/or oedema) and included 2.1 % of severe malnutrition (W/Ht <-3 Z-scores and/or oedema) (SCF-UK 15/05/01).

[...] The very high levels of acute malnutrition six months before the peak of the hungry season are extremely grave. The displaced population were considered particularly vulnerable as they have fewer resources and coping strategies to fall back on. The high level of severe malnutrition among the displaced may also indicate a poorer public health environment. Displaced people were 1.7 times more likely to report sickness and 1.5 times more likely to report diarrhoea than others surveyed.

The surveys also highlighted low rates of measles vaccination (36.6 %) which combined with the high rates of acute malnutrition greatly increases the risk of measles epidemics with devastating effects on risk of dying and nutritional status (SCFUK 15/05/01).

The main cause of acute malnutrition was food insecurity: lack of availability and limited access to food sources and the general breakdown in the usual mechanisms to cope with food scarcity. been very poor or failed altogether, leaving people with almost no stored food. As a result the survey indicated that 87.7% of people are dependent on purchased food. In times of food crisis wild foods usually account for a large proportion of food consumed but the drought has resulted in the failure of koreb, one of the most commonly eaten wild food source. The price of staple cereals has risen beyond the reach of most people and the prices of livestock are declining making the terms of trade for people trading livestock to buy
cereals extremely poor. In the pastoral food economy zone of North East Darfur (Malha) the rise in acute malnutrition has closely followed the rise in millet prices.

Employment usually offers another alternative way to generate cash for food purchase but the survey also records considerable slumps in labour wage rates. The author convincingly demonstrates that many of the traditional coping mechanisms have been exhausted not just for the poorer sections of society but that everybody has been affected. A frequency distribution graph of all the children showed that the nutritional status of the previously better-nourished children has slipped as much or more than those presenting with a poorer nutritional status. The population is extremely nutritionally vulnerable and in desperate need of food assistance and associated interventions to prevent loss of life (SCF-UK 15/05/01).” (RNIS 34, July 2001, p17)

SCF-UK Nutrition Report:
“This report describes the results from four of the five cluster surveys and the survey of children living in displaced camp in El Fasher.

[...]
Displaced people were 1.7 times more likely to report sickness (95% CI = 1.3 – 2.3) and 1.5 times more likely to report diarrhoea (95% CI = 1.0 – 2.1).

[...]
The current nutritional status of children living in N Darfur is extremely poor. The global malnutrition rates of 23.4% amongst the resident population and 26.10% amongst the displaced are very high. These levels of malnutrition exist six months before the peak of the hungry season in September (see Figure 8). In the non-displaced population, the rate of severe malnutrition of 2.1% is low compared to the global rate. This probably indicates that at the moment, coping strategies are still relatively intact and the public health climate is reasonably conducive to health. Amongst the displaced populations, the severe rate of 4.4 represents a more usual proportion when compared to the global malnutrition rate. The higher prevalence of severe malnutrition indicates that in the displaced populations, coping strategies have broken down and the public health environment is poorer.

[...]
During the next few months, the coming of the hunger season will increase the rate of “distress” displacement. If the low measles vaccination coverage is allowed to persist, the displaced population in particular will likely suffer measles epidemics. Should these epidemics occur, there will be very high rates of mortality.

[...]
Time to prevent a disaster in N Darfur is fast running out. All nutritional guidelines recognise a global malnutrition rate of greater than 15% as a serious situation. Even in the absence of aggravating factors, this level of malnutrition requires preventative blanket supplementary feeding for all risk groups as an interim measure until improvement in general availability of food (harvest or general ration provision) occur.” (SCF UK April 2001, pp. 9, 13, 24, 26)

IDP needs in the South and West Kordofan States (incl. Nuba Mtns.)

17% global malnutrition rate in so-called ‘peace villages’ (Nov 2002)

- Unresolved land tenure issues and conflict have led to unsustainable farming practices
- Nuba Mountains need agricultural inputs and livestock
General overview: The population in the region is estimated at 3,700,000 of whom IDPs scattered in the three states and some returnees to the Nuba Mountains and Abyei receive humanitarian assistance. They are mainly agro-pastoralists and traders. War has led to widespread destruction of traditional livelihoods and complete breakdown of social services in south Kordofan, while recurrent droughts in North Kordofan resulted in food insecurity for many households. Malnutrition rates in IDP camps and so-called Peace Villages reportedly average 17% in North Kordofan, 8% in South Kordofan and 11% in West Kordofan. Major constraints to livelihoods are recurrent droughts, inadequate access to arable land, because of unresolved land tenure issues, and conflict forcing populations into unsustainable farming practices. EPI coverage registers the lowest rate of 35.4% in West Kordofan, 65% in South Kordofan and 68% in North Kordofan. School enrolment is low in North Kordofan with a rate of 34%, 46% in West Kordofan and 52% in North Kordofan.

The overall humanitarian situation in the Nuba Mountains has been improving over the past eight months as a result of the renewed cease-fire agreement signed in January 2002. Needs assessments have identified a chronic lack of agricultural inputs and depleted livestock assets as key factors behind the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Other areas of concern focus on rehabilitation of livelihoods, healthcare requirements, education opportunities and sustainable food security coupled with economic recovery. Education remains a critical area with enrolment rates standing at 37% for GoS areas and 27% for SPLM/A areas. Few Nuba retain access to their traditional land. In Abyei the grass-roots peace process has facilitated increased access to land, return to some previously abandoned villages and to traditional farming practises which reduces their dependency on relief aid. Conflict over water will continue to be an issue between pastoralists and farmers. Shared management of basic services such as health, education and veterinary services, is being adopted as a mechanism to promote conflict transformation in the area.

Coping mechanisms: Firewood collection, selling charcoal and grass, casual labour, seasonal labour on mechanised farms.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Cease-fire and local peace processes in Nuba and Abyei should reduce needs for emergency assistance and lead to humanitarian-plus programming being a priority. However, a total of 80,616 IDPs (34,884 IDPs in Kadugli, 6,000 in Dilling, 4,351 in Rashad, 12,000 in Abu Gabra, 18,000 in Talodi, 5,381 in Lagawa) and 17,149 returnees are in need of humanitarian assistance.
Operational constraints: Lack of funding for humanitarian-plus programmes, poor infrastructure, landmines, limited access and cumbersome administrative procedures.” (UN, November 2002, p.33-34)

Nuba Mountains populations suffer severe food shortages following GoS bombing (2001)

- Civilian populations in Nuba Mountains suffer severe food shortages and remains cut off form humanitarian assistance following GoS bombing of the only air strip (September 2001)
- 72,000 IDPs are expected to be affected by of 40 percent food-deficit including those in "Peace Villages" (2001)
- Nuba Mountains are expected to experience a food shortfall during the four months hunger period, May-August (2001)
- OLS denied access in Nuba Mountains since May 2000 seriously undermined food security in the region region (April 2001)
- Inter-agency assessment of the new IDPs in Government-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains indicated that no emergency existed by in February 2001

"Nuba Mountains: In late May 2001, the GOS started shelling the town of Kauda, which has the only airstrip open and available for humanitarian relief flights in opposition areas of the Nuba Mountains. Recent reports from isolated areas of the Nuba Mountains indicate severe food shortages following poor harvests and major displacement due to recent Government of Sudan (GOS) offensives.

The civilian population in the Nuba Mountains remains cut off from any trade, while continued fighting has destroyed any attempt at recovery. The area remains outside of OLS mandate, making humanitarian access risky. The impact on the local population has been devastating: over the years many people have died and even more have been forced to migrate to northern urban centers in search of food and shelter. Primary health care, potable water, and long-term food security are humanitarian needs that continue throughout the Nuba Mountains." (USAID 28 Sept 2001)

"Based on food economy analysis of the area, a food gap is expected from May to August 2001 in most locations. A food deficit of 40% will affect an estimated 72,000 IDPs, including in the Peace Villages around Kadugli which were not assessed.

The Nuba Mountains are expected to experience a food shortfall during the four months hunger period, May-August, in both Government and SPLM controlled areas.

IDPs in the Kordofans are provided with some preventative and curative health services by humanitarian agencies, services which, also benefit host communities. However, such facilities tend to be under-equipped. The most common causes of morbidity are Malaria, ARI and Diarrhoea. EPI is provided though both static and mobile facilities.

The locations assessed showed that clean water is available to IDPs through water points/yards, hand pumps and wells. However water quantities were insufficient in several areas. This forces the population to use stagnant water to fill the gap. Latrine coverage ranges from 0% to 30%.

Enrollment in schools in the region is 66% with a female: male ratio of 4:5. Facilities are generally poor. School feeding is being implemented to try to encourage attendance.

Abductions of women and children in the region are reported and a peace-building centre in El Foula has been established to monitor the situation." (UN November 2000, p145)
"Renewed fighting between the GoS and the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) started in January 2001 in the Nuba Mountains. Eleven villages that have 4,283 families with a total of 28,867 civilians were displaced from the SPLA held areas to areas around the town of Kadugli. The IDPs are mostly women, children and elderly. The expected dry season's offensive by the warring parties is likely to displace more people.

[...]

**Impact on Human Lives**

The newly displaced persons are hungry and naked, they include 15,360 children 50% of whom are female, 8,790 adults - 71% are female and 2,053 elderly - 56% are female. The 2,394 were old IDPs. The IDPs have nothing as they either left all their properties behind or those properties were burned during the displacement.

**Description of Damages**

The IDPs lost everything - their shelters, food, clean drinking water, clothing, blankets, kitchen utensils and any other possessions were destroyed or left behind.” (ACT 21 March 2001)

"An Inter-agency assessment mission visited Government-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains, Kadugli province in the South Kordofan State from 14 - 16 February 2001 to assess the needs of the new influx of IDPs into the area. The findings of the assessment indicated that no emergency exists at present, although the situation in the area needs to be closely monitored as the dry season progresses.

[...]

Local authorities in Kadugli, however, said that the recaptured villages along the mountain range north west and south west of Kadugli town present emergency needs and called on international agencies to provide shelter, medical and other relief supplies to the displaced. The influx has reportedly also stretched water and sanitation services in these areas.

The health situation was reported to be stable with no apparent signs of malnutrition or risk of epidemics. Still, 250 cases of goiter, as a result of iodine deficiency, were reported among women. The GOS is responding to basic needs including the provision of shelter materials, some clothing, health facilities, grinding mills and hand pumps.

The population of the IDPs in Kadugli is put at 28,862 with an additional 768 recent arrivals in Dilling province and 550 in Talodi province." (OCHA 28 February 2001)

"The Nuba Mountain region has been underserved by relief agencies because, in part, the area is not accessible to OLS. Since May 2000, increased military activity has had severe negative effects on the food security as a whole. Garrison towns held by the GOS dominate the fertile lowlands of the Nuba Mountains and provide a base for militia raids against populations in the mountainous SPLA-controlled areas. The impact on the local population has been devastating: over the years many people have died and even more have been forced to migrate to northern urban centers in search of food and shelter. Primary health care, water, and long-term food security are humanitarian needs than continue in the SPLA-controlled areas.” (USAID 20 April 2001)

**IDPs in Abbei need better health services and general health education urgently (2001)**

- IDP pregnant women face serious obstetric dangers in Abei due to lack of Reproductive Health services

"The Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced people (4 million) in the world, majority of whom women and children. Lack of even basic reproductive health services in IDP camps, low awareness
of danger signs during pregnancy result in tremendously high maternal mortality rates (up to 804/100,000) and morbidity among women already suffering from anaemia, malnutrition and dramatic poverty. The displaced population in Abyei is around 5,009 people. Abyei hospital lacks basic medical equipment, a doctor and a midwife. The drugs supply has run out before the target date due to increase in numbers of displaced. However, the other common diseases are malaria, ARI and diarrhoea. Diarrhoea is usually common at the beginning of the rainy season due to poor sanitation system. There is utter need of sprays on the onset of the rains. There is also dire need of health education to increase health awareness. Families live in host communities, further straining the ability of a fragile health system to provide adequate RH services – especially maternal and emergency obstetric care. In Abyei pregnant women from IDP camps have to travel long distance to the state capital to receive the emergency care because the only doctor of the rural hospital has no equipment and supplies to deal with obstetric complications." (UN November 2001, p.52)

Reported in 1999 that IDPs in so called "peace villages" suffered from conditions associated with chronic emergencies

- IDPs gathered in 72 government-controlled "peace villages" in the Nuba Mountains
- Poor health infrastructure and lack basic health facilities for IDPs
- Food gap is expected from May to August in most locations
- Approximately 75 percent of the Abyei Displaced Camp uses unsafe drinking water
- UN report suggest that IDP needs in rural areas are virtually identical with those of local villagers and recommend that targeting should be avoided
- IDPs in Dilling town live under appalling conditions

"The majority of the region's IDPs are located in 72 Government peace villages scattered throughout the Nuba Mountains. In the villages where OLS mounts humanitarian interventions, beneficiaries continue to suffer from conditions associated with chronic emergencies. A large part of the IDP population, however, is not accessed by the humanitarian community due to Government restrictions and insecurity, and their condition is not known." (UN January 1999, "North and South Kordofan States")

"In South Kordofan there are 175,000 IDPs. Women and children represent 85 percent of the total displaced population. In West Kordofan the IDP population is estimated at 36,000 mainly from Northern Bahr Al Ghazal. The remainder of the displaced population originates from Upper Nile and the Nuba Mountains. Most IDPs have fled insecurity, tribal conflicts, drought or poverty and live in camps, peace villages and squatter areas. Most IDPs earn their livelihoods by sharecropping as they do not own land, collecting grass and firewood, collecting and selling wild food, petty trading, fishing or working as labourers. […]

The Kordofan region suffers from poor health infrastructure and the IDPs lack basic health facilities. In 1999, outbreaks of measles, meningitis, acute gastro-enteritis, malaria, tuberculosis and viral hepatitis were reported. Health sector support required in 2000 includes in-service training, medical equipment, cold chain support, essential drugs provision and strengthened health awareness.

Hand pumps are the main source of water in the region but cover less than 50 percent of the needs. Approximately 75 percent of the Abyei Displaced Camp uses unsafe drinking water because only one of the three water yards is functioning. Inadequate provision of pit latrines contributes to poor sanitation. The construction of water yards and drilling of hand pumps need to be considered as an emergency in 2000." (UN November 1999, pp.124-125)

A UN assessment mission in October 1999 provides further details about the situation in the Dilling area:
"In the GOS-controlled area, the Mission had an opportunity of visiting seven villages in Dilling Province, as well as one IDP quarter in Dilling town. It also undertook one truncated assessment at Um Deheleib, near Kalogi, in Talodi Province. Hence, the discussion that follows is primarily based upon the situation prevailing in the Dilling region.

[...] Dilling continues to host a large IDP population, some of which have been displaced within the province and others have come for elsewhere in the Nuba Mountains or beyond. In addition, there has been a considerable return migration of IDPs that had been in Khartoum, the Gezira or elsewhere. Dilling town appears to be a major destination for IDPs as well as for returnees from outside the province.

[...]

One of the four IDP quarters (Hilla Gedida) on the periphery of Dilling town was assessed by the mission and, judging by the documents received the following day from representatives of two of the other quarters, it would appear that this settlement was representative of the local IDPs. Hilla Gedida is alleged to have 11,000 IDPs from all over the Nuba Mountains and including some Arab tribesmen and Southerners. The settlement is situated on the western periphery of the town, some three to four kilometres from the town centre. All live in tukuls, which, at the time of the assessment, had been damaged by the heavy rains of the previous days.

Apart from their small homestead-land (normally about a quarter to half a feddan), they have no access to land, albeit a few cultivate land leased from local landowners. Poverty is acute and very visible. Access to basic services is also limited, if not non-existent. The primary message gained during the assessment is that the community has received no assistance to date and desperately needs some basic relief inputs, such as food, blankets, clothes, plastic sheeting and mosquito nets. Their other concerns included:

- that they survive on whatever meagre income they can derive in town
- that they have inadequate shelters, especially in the rainy season (very evident to the Mission)
- that they are fearful that if assistance is provided through the authorities it is unlikely that it will reach the needy
- that their children have not had access to any education since 1991
- that they have no access to local health services since they have no money to pay
- that they need to be assisted to obtain access to income generating activities

On the positive side, despite being a very ethnically mixed community, there appeared to be a relatively high level of harmony within the community. Moreover, there was a strong expression from the youth that they want access to work, including any food-for-work programmes.

It is evident from this assessment that there is a serious disparity between the population in Dilling town and those living at the periphery as IDPs.

In contrast, in rural areas, villages that had a mix of local residents and IDPs, such as Kujuria, Al Fanda or Hagar Gewad, did not show such glaring disparities. Indeed, there appeared to little difference in the needs and opportunities for sustainable livelihoods between the two groups. Consequently, any programming form these areas should avoid any targeting of IDP for inputs into these communities.” (UNCERO 8 November 1999, pp. 111, 115-116)

**IDP needs in the Unity state (Western Upper Nile)**

**Dan Church Aid and Christian Aid IDP needs assessment in Chotchar, Western Upper Nile (March 2002)**

- Shelters built from swamp reed due to lack of grass will not protect IDPs from rains
• One hut shelters from 10 to 35 people due to lack of building materials
• Women’s entire days spend looking for food
• People eating only water lily and other wild food
• People have no fishing equipment for the rainy season onsets
• No health clinics neither health NGO present in the area
• No potable water neither any sanitation facilities and people bathe and drink in the same water with livestock
• Lack of firewood does not permit boiling drinking water

The area of Chotchar is flat and open with few trees but many streams to cross, which provides an element of security for the people - though some streams are dry at this time of year. It is hot, and there are many flies during the day and mosquitoes at night. There are some cattle around grazing in the swamps, though most have gone further south towards the River Dol. Grass for roofing and trees for building are some distance away. People are surviving, but are under increasing pressure, including the host community. All types of assistance are required as soon as possible.

With the onset of the rains, generally by late May-early June, most of the airstrips in WUN become unusable for several months. It is imperative, therefore, that a major intervention should take place now to see the displaced people, and their host populations, through the hunger gap period until the main harvests in October. Presently, it is very hot and dry. Once the rains come it will be a different matter, and disease and hunger will increase.

1 OLS is Operation Lifeline Sudan - the 13 - year - old United Nations co-ordinated humanitarian response into Sudan. Some agencies operate under OLS and some choose to remain outside the OLS umbrella for greater freedom of operations. These are called the non-OLS agencies.

**Shelter**

Some of the displaced people are living with, or alongside, the host population in Chotchar and the surrounding areas within a day’s walk of Chotchar. Many more displaced are living some distance away from the village proper - south west towards the River Dol. Shelter is a major problem, since there is little grass available this time of year. Many have built makeshift shelters from swamp reeds. These provide some shading during the day but will most certainly not keep people dry and warm during the coming rains.
The team found that the lack of building materials mean the tukuls being built are smaller than usual. Yet the number of people dwelling in each shelter is much higher than normal. In some huts, the team found anywhere from 10-35 people in residence. If they were fortunate, they managed to share two small tukuls amongst the group. At the moment, people can live like this as they can choose to sleep or relax outside. Once the rains begin, this will not be the case. Then the people will find themselves constantly wet and chilled. Diseases will flourish.

There seemed to be a large number of women-headed households. Some of the women stated that their husbands were dead. For others, it is likely their husbands are fishing at the toic, (swamp lands), or had taken their cattle to grazing areas. Many of the women said all of their time was taken up trying to find food for their family. They did not have time to worry about shelter. This will change soon, though, as the wet season kicks in.

**Food**

Many of the displaced people are surviving on water lily and what little grain relatives or hosts can share. The team was shown water lily in most of the homes, along with other types of wild foods. Many women, especially those from Nhialdiu, said they were having to learn about these wild foods in order to keep their families alive.

A minority of people have some grain, but only in very small quantities. The team saw little grinding taking place, except for the grinding of water lily seeds. People were reduced to using the husks from maize seeds as food. There were sorghum stalks from last year's harvest in the fields farmed by the local population, but it is difficult to know how much sorghum is stored. It is also difficult to tell how much seed will be held back for planting, if the host population has to feed the displaced for much longer.

The team heard of people being sent to the fishing camps in order to catch and send back dried fish. However, dried fish was not in evidence as the team toured Chotchar. Few people mentioned having hooks or nets. Once the rains begin, and the rivers and swamps rise, it will be impossible to fish with spears.

**Livestock**

Many of the displaced people managed to flee with some livestock - though many lost some also. Since the attacks took place during the dry season, most of the livestock had already been taken from the villages to the toic. Those interviewed said milk production is always down during the dry season. The cattle did look relatively healthy. Most of the cattle have been taken towards the River Dol to the south, where there is better security and better grass. However, if the displaced are not able to build proper shelters for their livestock before the rains begin, the health of the cattle will quickly deteriorate when they are constantly exposed to the wet conditions and the mosquitoes. Goats, in particular, do not withstand such weather and are likely to succumb quickly to disease.

**Markets**

There is a small market in Chotchar, with teashops run by women. Tea leaves, sugar, salt and soap were available for those who could afford them. The traders said they were bringing the goods from Bahr el Ghazal. There was no grain, cooking oil or vegetables such as onions for sale - although these items were later seen in the larger market in Pam.

**Health**

People interviewed said they had little to eat and that this was affecting their health. Although there were no signs of serious malnutrition, people were thin and in need of more nutrition. Children were skinny but were not yet listless. Rather, the children were seen to be attentive and playful. […]
There is no health NGO in the area, nor are there any health clinics. The team met one medical assistant and several community health workers but they had few drugs with which to treat people and no centre from which to operate. Those drugs had been brought recently by Safe Harbor. The chiefs informed the team that there were the usual health problems - diarrhoea, malaria, upper and lower respiratory infections, fevers and general weaknesses. Kala-azar is one of the most prevalent diseases in Upper Nile but the team was not told of suspected cases. Guinea worm and river blindness are also known to be highly prevalent in the region. A proper technical medical assessment is needed.

There is no potable water in the area and sanitation is non-existent. There were no hand dug protected wells or latrines. The team encouraged the local SRRA to educate the community and organise a campaign. There was a little soap available in the markets but most people are too destitute to afford it. **Food was the first priority.** People are bathing in filthy swamps that they share with livestock. This is also the source of their drinking water. Since firewood was at a premium, it is unlikely the SRRA will be able get people to boil their water. Nor was there any evidence that people were attempting at least to filter their drinking water.

As for mortality figures, neither the SRRA nor the health staff are keeping records of numbers or causes of death.

**Psycho-social aspects of the conflict**

Most of the displaced people gave horrific accounts of bombardments and gunship attacks. Many interviewed were chased and shot at by the horsemen. All too many of those interviewed spoke quietly of relatives, even their own little children, being killed in front of them. There has been a systematic and wholesale abuse of human rights against its own civilians by the government despite the many overtures made by the Sudanese government officials to the US special envoy, former Senator Danforth.” (Dan Church Aid/Christian Aid, 31 April 2002, p. 8-10)

**Direct link between IDP malnutrition and mortality from disease (MSF April 2002)**

- Conflict, food insecurity and malnutrition in Padeah village caused high mortality rates
- May 1999 conflict around Ler town affected most villages in the area
- June 2000 survey showed that 75% people had been displaced and 93.4% had lost their cattle
- Global malnutrition was at 28.6% and severe malnutrition at 8.7%
- Crude mortality rate was 1.5 deaths/10,000 lives a day

“However, repeated violent displacement combined with the inability to cultivate, the increase of disease and malnutrition, loss of access to clean water, loss of livelihoods, loss of seeds and fragile food security combined can have serious effects. In addition, traditional sources of income such as labour markets and economic migration have been disrupted, while many families have sold or been robbed of key assets such as cattle. This means that when people displace to other areas, they have few resources and are forced to rely on indigenous communities or relief.

[...]

The link between malnutrition and mortality from disease has been clearly established in medical research.23 Malnourished children are more susceptible to die from diarrhoea and other basic diseases when they lack treatment. In western Upper Nile, the link between the conflict, food security and malnutrition is clearly demonstrated in the example of Padeah village: Padeah is located north-east of Ler town. In May 1999, armed conflict around Ler affected most villages in the area, right at the start of the period of cultivation in southern Sudan. Between June 1998 and early 2000, no humanitarian agencies had been present in the area, and no food distributions had taken place. MSF initiated activities in Padeah in early 2000 and became alarmed by the visible malnutrition among young children. MSF conducted two
surveys in Padeah. The first survey, in June 2000, was a nutritional survey which also gathered information about rates of displacement and cattle losses.

Survey results showed that of the 271 families surveyed, 203 households (75%) had been displaced by the fighting and 253 households (93.4%) had lost cattle in the 1999 fighting. The global malnutrition rate was 28.6% and the severe malnutrition rate was 8.7%. The crude mortality rate was 1.5 deaths/10,000/day. The high malnutrition rates were related to the fact that people had been unable to cultivate in 1999 due to their displacement, had lost their cattle, had received no relief food, and were forced to await the new harvest in 2000.” (MSF, 30 April 2002, p.13)

IDPs in the Unity State living in deplorable conditions (2000-2002)

- Malnutrition in garrison towns averages 30%
- Al Khazar malaria and TB are prevalent in the area
- Immunisation coverage is appalingly low at 11.2% mostly due to insecurity in the region (Nov 2002)
- Rub Kona town where IDPs seek assistance, recorded acute malnutrition at 38.4% well above emergency threshold
- 24% malnutrition in Bentiu town where relative peace attracts IDPs from oil-producing areas
- Malnutrition likely "extremely high" in Unity State where ACC/SCN received no new nutritional information since July 2000, indicating extreme insecurity conditions
- People in the Unity State experienced major losses in livestock, cultivation and trade during 2000
- Global malnutrition rate in Bentiu 2000 at 28%
- The rural population has little or no access to health facilities

“The population is estimated at 4,091,869 most of them dependent on agriculture and raising livestock. A blanket flight denial existed to non-GoS held areas of this State from January to mid-June 2002 due to continued and intermittent fighting between GoS and SPLM/A over the oil fields. The majority of the population in the State has become increasingly vulnerable as a result of forced displacement, the impact of lack of access and security constraints. Beneficiary figures are difficult to determine due to high mobility and denied access. However in the garrison towns (Bentiu, Rubkona, Pariang, Mayom, Kumagon) the affected populations are estimated at 100,053 people. Most recent fighting in and around Mankien caused the displacement of over 25,000 IDPs into Mayom.

For over three years, malnutrition rates in the garrison towns have averaged approximately 30% with mortality rates ranging from 2 per 1,000 to 4 per 1,000 per day in Bentiu and Rubkona respectively. EPI coverage averages only 11.2%. […]

The rainy season exacerbates the situation with seasonal outbreaks of malaria and respiratory infections. There is inadequate clean water and sanitation particularly in Rubkona, Mayom and Pariang. Kala Azar and TB are prevalent. Worth noting is the recent expansion of the security perimeter around Bentiu and Rubkona that has allowed beneficiaries to expand their coping mechanisms such as horticulture and pastoralism.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Mayom, Bentiu and Rubkona, for the above-mentioned reasons and IDPs living in camps i.e. 1,458 in Tong, 26,575 in Bentiu, 25,004 in Rubkona, 11,856 in Pariang, 34,000 in Mayom, 942 in Kumagon and 218 in Tor.
Operational constraints: Inaccessibility due to flight denial and lack of roads, insecurity and swampy areas.” (UN, November 2002, p.36)

“In Unity State, a volatile and fragile security situation continued through 2001. Fighting around the oil fields, coupled with militia and inter-tribal clashes have displaced over 50,000 people of Bentiu, Rubkona and Pariang. As a result, agriculture production has suffered as many displaced flee their homes in search of relatively secure areas and food aid. In Greater Bahr el Ghazal fighting in Raga displaced more than 18,000 IDPs mainly during the planting season affecting crop production. Raga was a main supplier of food crops to Wau and other parts of the region. In Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria dry spells, inadequate availability of inputs such as seeds, floods and pests have resulted in poor harvest increasing the need for food assistance at least through the hunger-season until July 2002. Emergency assistance will also be required in Red Sea State, parts of North & south Darfur and North & West Kordofan well into 2002, due to poor harvest following erratic rains.” (FAO 17 January 2002, p 25)

“Unity state has suffered continued insecurity over the year and as a result there has been a massive displacement of population, with many people coming to the towns of Bentiu and Rub Kona seeking assistance. The populations of the towns have received food assistance but it has been irregular as a result of insecurity and did not take place from March to June 2001 (ACF 23/06/01). ACF conducted two nutrition surveys in June 2001 in the two towns to assess the level of acute malnutrition. The survey in Bentiu estimated a prevalence of acute malnutrition of 28.9 % (W/Ht <2 Z scores and/or oedema) including 4.8 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht <3 Z scores and/or oedema). In Rub Kona the prevalence of acute malnutrition (W/Ht <2 Z scores and/or oedema) was estimated to be 38.4 % with 6.8 % severe malnutrition (W/Ht <3 Z scores and/or oedema) (ACF 23/06/01). The results of the survey indicate very alarming rates of acute malnutrition that are well above emergency threshold and indicate a very serious situation. It is hoped that the general improvement in food security as a result of better harvests will improve access and availability of food. However, the insecurity in the area continues to restrict livelihood activities and prevent access by humanitarian agencies. As a result this population can be assumed to be extremely vulnerable.” (ACC/SCN October 2001, p.18)

"The UN World Food Program (WFP) stated that "we have a looming crisis on our hands," with 3 million Sudanese nationwide facing food shortages. "The food security situation is worsening more quickly than expected," WFP warned. Humanitarian aid workers expressed concern about potential famine in Western Upper Nile Province of southern Sudan. The town of Bentiu, a magnet for displaced families in Sudan's oil-producing region, suffered 24 percent malnutrition, according to WFP. Inadequate distributions of food relief triggered violence among competing populations and competing armies in Western Upper Nile Province, prompting some local leaders there to request that food deliveries be suspended.” (USCR September 2001)

“Unity State The situation in Unity state remains extremely precarious with continued fighting. The fighting is largely around the oil rich areas of the state and has resulted in the displacement of many thousands of people. The RNIS has not received any new nutritional information from the area. The last survey was conducted by ACF-F in July 2000 and indicated very high rates of acute malnutrition. Given the prevailing security and drought conditions, it is very likely that the nutritional risk in the area is extremely high." (ACC/SCN July 2001, p.16)

"WFP reports that the numbers of IDPs in Bentiu have increased from 29,230 at the beginning of 2000 to the current figure of 36,539. On 7 March 2001 alone, WFP registered 244 persons (63 households). The rate of malnutrition in the area is reported to be 28 per cent. WFP provided 14 days full food ration to contain the nutritional status of the IDPs while the sick reported to the NGO-run Health Centres. The war-wounded were taken to Rub-kona and Heiglig. [...] ACF nutritional survey conducted from 14 to 19 February 2001, showed cases of slight malnutrition for children under five in Pariang. Although there were no recorded cases in Kumagon and Tor, the situation might deteriorate due to food shortages.” (OCHA 28 February 2001)
"The IDPs are mainly women, children and the elderly. A total of 1,133 school age children are without basic education. They lack shelter, blankets, clothing, kitchen utensils, mosquito nets, salt and hand tools. [...] The IDPs left all their properties behind during the displacement or were burnt by the combatants. They came in without any properties including livestock." (ACT 21 March 2001)

"Healthcare has always been poor in Western Upper Nile. But over the past two years, the government flight ban, continuing insecurity and the failure of OLS to respond have all combined to create a medical emergency. [...] Displacement from the oil war has also created new waves of illness. The burning of Nhialdiu in July sent more than 10,000 inhabitants fleeing, some as far as Bahr el-Ghazal.

Health worker Joseph Chang, interviewed three months later at a health clinic in partially rebuilt Nhialdiu, reported: 'I have been to all the villages around Nhialdiu and found many children dying, mostly because of diarrhoea. 'When they escaped from Nhialdiu the children drank dirty water. They had no good food and whenever they got diarrhoea they had no resistance. The situation is very, very bad. You cannot imagine how hard it is. People come with so many diseases- and you have nothing to help them with.'

One of the most common diseases in the region, kala azar, had been brought under control by 1998, but is now spiralling out of control. Kala azar is a bacterial disease of the liver and spleen, to which the malnourished are especially vulnerable. It is fatal in 95 per cent of cases. After renewed fighting and the looting of NGO compounds, key programmes, including a hospital in Leer, were closed. In the absence of medical services, the incidence of the disease today can only be very roughly estimated. But a spot check carried out at Nhialdiu airstrip by MSF-Holland in January 2000 found that 39 out of 50 people tested positive, a dramatic increase on the usual rate of one in three." (Christian Aid 15 March 2001, p. 14)

**IDP needs in the Upper Nile and Jonglei States**

**Insecurity, inaccessibility and poor rains undermine food security in the Upper Nile and Jonglei States (2002)**

- No improvements in health, food, water and sanitation sectors in Jonglei and Nile States due to insecurity
- Bieh reports the highest malnutrition rate in Sudan (Sept 2002)
- Data on humanitarian situation is not available due to access denials reported since 1999 in Blue Nile
- 28% rise in MSF-B supplementary feeding centers with 3,200 beneficiaries in June, 40% of which are IDPs
- Food deficit in upper Nile is expected to affect about 50% of the population in 2001
“Constant displacement is caused by militia activities in Upper Nile and localised fighting in Jonglei. The whole of southern Blue Nile remains inaccessible to the UN. In spite of assistance provided by non-OLS NGOs, no significant improvement has been reported in the sectors of health and nutrition, water and sanitation, education and food security.” (UN, November 2002, p. 14)

“The population is mainly agriculturist and pastoralist and is estimated at 883,000 in River Nile, 598,610 in Blue Nile, 124,000 in Jonglei and 500,336 in Upper Nile. Floods in 1999, followed by poor and erratic rains in 2000, 2001, 2002 makes it certain that Jonglei will have a fragile food security situation in the coming year. Also reduced water levels due to less rainfall is likely to negatively affect the populations coping mechanisms. Swampy areas are a breeding ground for mosquitoes and water borne diseases such as malaria, Kala Azar and Guinea Worm, which is prevalent in parts of Jonglei and Upper Nile. For the same reason, wells and latrines are difficult to establish. EPI coverage is low and an area of concern with a rate of 8% in Jonglei and 27% in Upper Nile. The overall school enrollment rate is just over 30% in both Jonglei and Upper Nile, 32% in Blue Nile and 79% in River Nile. Schools lack trained and qualified teaching force. The affected caseload requiring humanitarian assistance is approximately 150,000 persons in Jonglei and 398,000 in Upper Nile.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Inter-factional and inter-ethnic fighting, insecurity and limited access due to flight denials make the entire region a priority for life-saving and sustainable interventions. At least 30,000 IDPs in Ed Damazin in Blue Nile and 13,000 IDPs in five camps in Malakal (Upper Nile) depend on humanitarian assistance. Blue Nile is of special concern as access has consistently been denied and reliable data on the current humanitarian situation are not available. Access to areas along the Sobat river corridor has also been constrained by insecurity.

Coping mechanisms: Firewood collection, selling charcoal and grass, fishing, casual labour and petty trade.

Operational constraints: Limited access by air, road and river, poor security for humanitarian staff, low capacity of local partners, low community involvement, lack of adequate physical infrastructure such as schools and health centres, lack of qualified and trained health personnel and teachers, low funding and an inadequate telecommunications system.” (UN, November 2002, p. 35)

“Increased insecurity due to factional fighting in Bieh was reported during the month hampering the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Bieh is reporting the highest malnutrition rates in south Sudan. Lack of access to basic services and conflict is expected to perpetuate the food insecurity within the state.” (OCHA, 17 September 2002)
"Upper Nile / Jonglei FEWS reports that the rains have been good in some parts of Leech, Latjor and Phou states. However the food security situation looks extremely grim as a result of continued conflict in the Western Upper Nile region around rich oil fields. The extent of the fighting has displaced tens of thousands of people and made many areas inaccessible, leading to a resultant food deficit, as people are simply unable to access potentially fertile land. WFP/TSU reports that there are an estimated 50,000 IDPs in Leech state with a further 68,000 in Latjor and 29,000 in Phou (WFP/TSU 05/01)."

"In the last RNIS high rates of acute malnutrition were reported from MSF-B nutrition surveys in Akobo, Bieh State. The high rates of malnutrition were due to large numbers of IDPs and the poor food security situation. The RNIS has no new nutrition survey information for Akobo but a recent FEWS visit to the area observed that the MSF-B supplementary feeding centre was admitting exceptionally large numbers of beneficiaries. The number of new admissions rose by 28% in May with a reported 3,200 beneficiaries at the end of June (WFP 28/06/01). MSF-B estimates that 40% of the beneficiaries are IDPs. The agency also reports that the incidence of diarrhoea and malaria was very high in those attending centres (FEWS 15/06/01)." (A CC/SCN July 2001, pp.15,16)

"The people of Upper Nile are agro-pastoralists. Late rainfalls, lack of seeds and pest infestations have resulted in low crop yields. Food shortages and insecurity have in turn generated displacement from Lure to Malakal. In western Upper Nile fighting around the oil fields led to large scale displacement into Bentiu, straining IDP coping mechanisms, a state of affairs which was also evident on a smaller scale in eastern Upper Nile.

In Bieh, Latjor and Leech States, as well as Ruweng County, insecurity/inter-tribal fighting and inadequate rainfall have led to accessibility problems, poor yields and some local displacement. Food aid is indicated for these areas as well as in Shilluk Kingdom and Phou State.

The food deficit in Upper Nile is expected to affect about 50% of the population in 2001 and food assistance in 2001 is indicated for Malakal and surrounding camps. " (UN November 2000, pp. 141-142)

**IDP needs in the White Nile State**

**IDPs in the White Nile have no sanitation facilities (2002)**

- Moderate malnutrition in IDP camps 16% and severe 9%
- Only 39% out of a total population of 1,389,106 people have access to drinking water in White Nile
- Most vulnerable are women who make 75% of IDP population and have scarce access to sources of employment
- Adequate health coverage and immunization campaigns hampered by conflict and insecurity
The IDPs are largely reliant on humanitarian aid as their traditional means of livelihood support, agro-pastoralism, is largely thwarted by drought and the limited availability of arable land. Moderate malnutrition rate in the IDP camps is 16% and 9% severe. The IDPs are particularly vulnerable to waterborne diseases, which proliferate during the periodic floods that the White Nile State is particularly subject to. Floods have affected 35,000 people in El Geteina and Ed Duem Provinces in 2002.

Throughout the State only 39% of the 1,389,106 people have improved drinking water sources. Further exacerbating the poor health status of the IDPs is the absence of sanitation services. It is therefore not surprising that the under five mortality rate is 111 per 1,000 live births and the Infant mortality rate 101. Conversely, EPI coverage is relatively good at 79%.

Critical pockets and vulnerable groups: Dan Kuch, Goz Es Salam and Liya IDP camps in Kosti, where labour opportunities are scarce, disaster-affected persons, women who make up 75% of the IDP population, especially widows, and 3,000 street children.

Coping mechanisms: Agricultural labour, domestic labour and petty trade.

Operational constraints: Lack of access to beneficiaries during the rainy season, non-user friendly bureaucracy, lack of adequate physical infrastructure such as schools, health centres as well as lack of qualified and trained health personnel and teachers and reduced presence of NGOs.” (UN, November 2002, p.37)

“Floods in White Nile affected at least 35,000 persons in August 2002, destroyed crops, infrastructures including shelter, schools, market access roads, water point and latrines, and caused an outbreak of malaria and other infection diseases. The humanitarian community and the GoS provided assistance in shelter, health and nutrition, water and sanitation. The area is prone to diseases outbreak such as measles and meningitis, thus requiring that immunisation campaigns be carried out regularly. However, adequate health coverage and immunisation campaigns are hampered by lack of roads, insecurity, flight denials and lack of skilled personnel. Mine action is required in Jonglei, Upper Nile and Lakes.” (UN, November, 2002,p.14

IDP needs in the Red Sea State

WFP needs assessment in Red Sea State found rapid deterioration of health and nutrition among IDPs (2001)

- Around 14,000 IDPs around main towns resort to begging as the only survival means
- Up to 100% food deficit for some population groups
"WFP completed the first distribution in Red Sea State and has carried out a needs assessment. Results indicate: increased displacement to urban centers with about 14,000 IDPs in and around the main towns; rapid deterioration in health and nutrition; two or more child deaths reported during the month in all villages/sites visited; death among the elderly; women observed to be very thin and anemic; increased number of cases of tuberculosis, diarrhoea, malnutrition and respiratory infections; coping mechanisms stretched to the limit and host communities under stress. Begging among the displaced has become a means of survival. Livestock, the main source of livelihood of this community has completely collapsed. Market price of cereals has increased while that of livestock has fallen. Food deficit was estimated to be 80% to 100% for some population groups." (OCHA 31 July 2001)
ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

IDPs have inadequate education facilities and parents cannot meet the costs of education (Nov 2002)

- Primary education enrolment rate was 54% in GoS compared to 30% in SPLM/A-controlled areas during 2000/1
- Girls’ enrolment in GOS was 45.5% while only 26% in SPLM/A areas
- Bahr al Ghazal recorded the lowest rate of girls enrolment with 16%
- About 50% of pupils in Sudan do not reach the fifth grade and 88% are in grades 1-4
- Only 12% of the teachers have a basic Teacher’s Training Certificate
- There is only 11% of school and classroom structures are permanent

“The prospect of peace in the Sudan provides an opportunity to address issues concerning the progressive realisation of the right of all primary school-age children to quality basic education. The lack of educational facilities due to the widespread destruction of educational infrastructure in conflict-affected areas, massive displacement of population groups from areas affected by conflict and recurrent drought and flood combined with inadequate educational facilities for internally displaced children, inability of parents to meet the cost of educational materials, the discontinuation of schooling by pupils due to illness and severe malnutrition, unattractive learning environment, teachers without the required qualifications and the lack of basic amenities like drinking water supply and sanitation facilities in the schools as well as in the community, and poor quality of instructional processes continue to deprive thousands of primary school-age children of adequate and appropriate learning opportunities. As a result, the primary education system in the Sudan continues to be characterised by low enrolment levels, significant gender gaps and serious regional disparities, unsatisfactory learning achievement of pupils, and low efficiency.

There is a dearth of reliable educational statistics. Data available with the Federal Ministry of Education indicate that the gross enrolment rate for primary cycle of education (6-13 years group) in the GoS-controlled areas was about 54% in the year 2000/01. In absolute terms, the phenomenon of out-of-school children, according to the same source, was largest in South Darfur (362,274), West Darfur (278,497), Gedarif (211,281), South Kordofan (171,921), North Kordofan (171,921) and Blue Nile (112,320). A survey conducted in SPLM/A-controlled areas showed that of an estimated 1.06 million primary school age-children (7-14 years), less than 30% of them were enrolled in school in 2001/02.

Enrolment levels vary by gender and in southern parts of Sudan the gender gap is of alarming proportion. The percentage of girls’ enrolment to total enrolment in GoS-controlled areas was 45.5 in 2000/01 academic session. The percentage of girls to total enrolment ranged from 49.3 in Khartoum to 42.6 in Gedarif, 40.7 in West Kordofan, 40.0 in South Darfur, and 35.5 in West Darfur. The percentage of girls to total enrolment in SPLM/A-controlled areas was only 26% in 2000/01. The gross enrolment rate for girls in SPLM/A-controlled areas was only 16% compared to 37% for boys. Among the regions in southern Sudan, Bahr El Ghazal has the lowest enrolment of girls (16% of the total enrolment). In Upper Nile, 27% of pupils are girls while in Equatoria the percentage of girls to total enrolment was 37% in 2001/02. The girls/boys ratio in the SPLM-controlled areas ranged from 0.41 in grade 1 to 0.26 in grade 8.
Low enrolment levels are a product not only of children never entering school, but also of the cumulative effect of a high dropout rate at every grade of the primary cycle. The overall dropout rate up to the fifth grade was 9.7% in 1998/99. Over 30% of children enrolled in grade one dropped out before reaching grade two in 1999/00. About 50% of pupils do not reach the fifth grade, which is considered the threshold for sustainable literacy and numeracy. A consistent feature of primary schools throughout southern part of Sudan was that the vast majority of their pupils were in the lower grade classes. Of all the pupils enrolled in 2000/2001, 88% were in grades 1-4, and just 12% in grades 5-8. The data from the follow-up assessments indicated that there was a significant drop out of pupils particularly between Grades 1 and 2. The numbers of pupils in grade 2 were only 57% of those in Grade 1 and the numbers in Grade 3 were only 40% of those in Grade 2. Due to dropout and repetition, a significant part of the investment in primary education is wasted.

Available information indicates that the learning achievement of a significant proportion of pupils does not measure up to the expected levels, indicating that the quality of schooling is inadequate. The unsatisfactory educational quality is attributed to the poor physical and academic facilities in schools leading to unattractive learning environment, non-availability of basic learning materials such as textbooks and shortage of qualified teachers. In GoS-controlled areas, only 12% of the teachers have a basic Teachers’ Training Certificate and of the remainder, 27% do not even hold a Sudan School Certificate. Fifty percent of teachers do not have the prescribed qualifications and in many schools the textbook to pupil ratio is 1:3. In SPLM/A-controlled areas only 7% of teachers have the prescribed qualifications, 48% have received some in-service training while 45% of the teachers are completely untrained. The textbook to pupil ratio is about 1:9 in most of the schools and teachers’ guides are not available in 78% of the schools. The issue of medium of instruction for children of returning IDPs and refugees remains a major concern.

The physical and learning facilities in a majority of schools do little to attract children to attend. A sizeable number of primary schools are housed in dilapidated structures and are deficient in terms of essential classroom furniture, water supply and sanitation facilities. Large proportion of classrooms remains overcrowded. Majority of schools in the war-affected areas is ‘bush schools’ or ‘one-teacher multi-grade schools’. Around 45% of schools in southern Sudan function in the open, under trees and the percentage of permanent classroom structure is just 11%. More than half of the schools do not have source of safe drinking water and almost three quarters of schools are without latrines.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 84-85)

**Insufficient standards of education in Jabaronna IDP camp (Sept 2002)**

- No secondary schools available in the camp
- Education had an Islamic bias
- Many primary children not enrolled due to incapacity of parents to afford the minimal fee
- Also 5 or 6 year old children had to look after their younger siblings

“Provision is made for primary schools in some of the IDP camps by the government, however there are no secondary schools in the camps. The education offered by the government is said to have a heavy Islamic bias and tends to be under funded and under resourced. NGOs, in particular religious organisations also operate schools in the IDP camps. These schools are run either by the Churches or the Dawa Islamia, an Islamic Organisation providing religious based education. In spite of the general availability of primary schooling many children are not enrolled. This can be attributed to the fact that many parents are not able to afford even the minimal fees charged and also the fact that older children – some as young as 5 or 6 are made to care for their siblings, while their mothers search for employment. The school I visited while in the camp, was funded by the Church. The facilities can only be described as inadequate. Primary 1 consisted of a reed shelter with only blackboard and no desks or chairs. The teachers I spoke of complained of inadequate funding, lack of teaching materials and also of the fact that students often fainted in class because of a lack of food. (Bekker, 19 September 2002, p. 22)
Potential returns will be a challenge to reintegrate IDPs to different school curricula (2002)

- Southern IDPs returning from the North might have difficulties reintegrating into southern due to language and curriculum differences

“An emergent reintegration issue is that of merging the educational systems of those educated in the North in Arabic and those who have been educated in SPLM areas in English using an East African curriculum. The implications of this are that IDPs from the North may experience problems continuing their education in southern schools. Southerners educated in English will have difficulty entering Sudanese universities. Refugees from Uganda and Kenya returning to such places as Juba or Wau will also experience problems as schools there are following the Arabic curriculum. Therefore, any assistance by the international community to the rehabilitation of the educational system must also attempt to also address this language problem.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p.18)

Decade without education for many children of the Nuba Mountains on both sides of the conflict (2003)

- 6,920 IDP students given UNICEF education material in South Kordofan (December 2002)
- School enrollment in main southern towns Kapoeta and Torit was at 2 and 4% (2000)
- 34% of teachers are untrained
- No schooling in SPLM areas between 1987 and 1996
- Schools in Government areas in an advanced state of deterioration

“The Ministry of Education distributed UNICEF education materials to 3,241 pupils in 54 nomadic schools and 6,920 pupils in IDP schools within the five provinces of South Korodofan.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

"In Juba town, the gross school enrollment rate is estimated to be 70.3% and it is also relatively high in rebel held parts of Western Equatoria. However, in Kapoeta and Torit enrollment rates are only 2 and 4% respectively. In all areas, the drop out rate for girls is high with only a few girls left after Grade 4. The percentage of untrained teachers is 34%. There is congestion in classrooms, insufficient textbooks and materials and buildings are in need of maintenance. Most IDP households cannot afford to pay school fees.” (UN November 2000, pp.140-141)

"The civil conflict has had a very serious impact on education in the Nuba Mountains both in Government- and SPLM-controlled areas. In most cases, schools were closed at the beginning of the hostilities and children’s schooling remained interrupted for several years. In SPLM areas there was practically no schooling during the decade 1987 and 1996, whereas in the territory under Government control, the interruption lasted from 1990 until 1994. In the latter case, however, the failure of the public sector to sustain children’s education, mainly through an inability of local authorities to pay the salaries to teachers and other staff, has brought the education system to a standstill. The result is a fresh series of school closures begun in 1997 and a new interruption to the schooling of the area’s children.

Both sides of the civil conflict presently have a massive deficit in educational equipment including the most basic school supplies. Schools are in a state of dilapidation or are established in the most rudimentary way, which constitutes a serious impediment to learning. In the SPLM areas there are hardly any schools with stone or brick buildings. The remaining few which have not fallen into ruin because of disuse, or have not
been destroyed in military operations, are a coveted asset which figures prominently in educational projects such as the establishment of teacher training institutions.

The territory under Government control boasts a number of schools dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. Some of them enjoyed a good reputation both for the quality of the education they provided and their capacity to offer full board to pupils from far away villages. Most of them are now in an advanced state of deterioration and the local authorities do not have the resources to restore or rehabilitate them. Furthermore, a number of schools whose construction began in the 1970s or 1980s were never completed and they either stand unfinished and unused or have been quickly mended with makeshift thatch additions. Both in the SPLM and in the Government areas, schools do not, on the whole, constitute a favourable environment for learning.

In both cases, the majority of teachers and headmasters have no access to any school equipment or furniture. They have no offices, no desks, no tables, no chairs and all records are kept in rudimentary filing systems making use of exercise books and writing pads. Children at best sit on home made, uncomfortable, benches, on logs, on stones, or directly on the floor. They rarely have a desk and stationery is scarce. The isolation of the SPLM areas has increased the scarcity of materials and only minute quantities of supplies are smuggled in and reach the schools. In the Government areas, the increase in parents having to subsidize schools has excluded many children from school. It has also limited access to education to a very small number of children whose families are unable to meet the necessary expenses determined by the communities to compensate for the lack of Government inputs.

The bare and highly alarming reality is that an entire decade has passed without education for many of the children of the Nuba Mountains on both sides of the conflict. This fact has enormous consequences on other sectors of life including health, nutrition, and, of course, the economy. Recovery measures are threatened by failure due to the scarcity of educated persons who could undergo essential training, especially where a degree of basic knowledge is a requisite. The number and quality of teachers in the SPLM areas is seriously deficient and the situation necessitates an earnest intervention.” (UNCERO 8 November 1999, pp. 17-18)
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Self-reliance in Jabaronna IDP camp (Sept 2002)

- Jabaronna camp is situated in a barren area where nearest employment opportunities are four hours drive
- Without water
- Most people had to purchase water at exorbitant prices no animals nor crops could be raised
- Women earned their living through casual domestic work
- Half of their income on transport and the rest on food
- Food aid from Islamic Organisations went hand in hand with religious education
- As a consequence of illegal beer brewing and overwhelming number of women were jailed
- Men sometimes worked on construction sites

“The name of the IDP camp I visited, Jabaronna (“they forced us here”) was indicative of the situation in which the displaced find themselves in. (I interviewed a group of between 50-60 women, within the “church compound”. I was not able to interview any men, given that I had come to the IDP camp on the pretext of praying with this group of women and did not want to raise suspicion of the people’s committees by walking around in the camp randomly speaking to people.) Jabaronna is located in an isolated and barren area at least an hour’s drive from the nearest possible employment opportunities.

What struck me upon arrival in the camp (which can be termed a long-term settlement as it has been in existence for 10 years) was the complete absence of livestock and small scale farming. When I inquired, I was told the main reason behind this was because of lack of access to water. I noticed that around Jabaronna there were a few boreholes, which CARE had drilled (I was told that many of the pumps were no longer functioning), but that many, particularly those situated in outlying areas had to purchase their water from donkey carts at exorbitant prices.

From speaking to the women in the IDP camp, it appeared that they were for the most part primary breadwinners, and were more often than not the heads of households, with many having lost their husbands as a result of the war. They informed me that they earned their living through casual domestic work – washing, ironing and cleaning in Omdurman, Khartoum and Khartoum North. They told me that they would occasionally go for days without finding any work. All the women I spoke to told me that they spent almost half of their day’s earnings on transportation to and from work, and the remainder on food. They told me that they often were not even able to provide one meal (which normally consists of a sandwich) for their families. Francis Bassan, the Executive Director of Sudan Aid, informed me that the organisation was involved in some school feeding schemes in the IDP camps, but that this was limited to certain parishes. Many women told me of how Islamic Organisations were providing food aid, but that this went hand in hand with religious instruction, often requiring people to convert in order to obtain assistance.

Many women resorted to illegal brewing of alcohol in order to survive. One young woman I spoke with had been imprisoned on 5 separate occasions for brewing for periods ranging from 3-7 months. Women spoke of their children being incarcerated with them and also of instances where their children were left for neighbours to care for, while they were in prison. The prison conditions they described spoke of inadequate
food and lack of sanitation. One woman described how in the absence of any brooms or other cleaning materials they were forced to sweep up feces and urine with their hands in their cells. Simeon Bolis an advocate associated with the Catholic Bishop’s Conference briefed me on their efforts to assist women who have been imprisoned for the brewing of alcohol by providing legal assistance to them. He noted that they had had some success in this regard, but that the numbers of women who were imprisoned for these offences were overwhelming.

Men on the whole seemed to have a harder time at finding work. They mostly engaged in odd jobs on construction sites. The months of July -September were said to be particularly hard, as practically all construction and brick making ceased due to the rain. The rain also caused severe problems for those living in shelters made from sacks, plastic and cotton and even those living in more permanent mud brick structures. The rainy season also brought with it the onset of malaria and other diseases. (Bekker, 19 September 2002, p. 20)

**Last resort survival strategies can have serious health consequences for IDPs**

- MSF reports that IDPs in Unity State resort to gathering of wild foods and leaves
- Since late 80s IDPs were pushed in the acacia forest in search of shelter and food
- Kala azar disease spread considerably as a result as the forest is the sandflies vector’s habitat

“During the nearly two decades of war in the region, most civilians have been forced to resort to survival strategies even outside of the traditional lean times; foraging for wild foods: leaves, plants, fruit, digging out the grain stored in ants’ nests, and fishing have become vital food sources. However, these survival A second nutritional survey was conducted in Padeah one year later, in June 2001. The area was more or less stable in this period, people were not displaced, and were able to harvest satisfactory crops. The second strategies have sometimes had unexpected long-term consequences – the rapid increase of the kala azar epidemic is believed to be linked to the fact that in the late-80s, many people were forced to seek shelter or forage for food in the acacia forest. The acacia forest is the known habitat for the sandfly – carrier of the kala azar disease. Even aside from the potential health threat of the sandfly, these survival strategies are by no means sufficient when the majority are hungry and no other source of food, including humanitarian relief, is available.” (MSF, 30 April 2002, p. 18)

**IDPs coping mechanisms in selected states (Nov 2002)**

- Bahr al Ghazal IDPs rely mostly on petty trade and casual agricultural labour
- IDPs coping mechanisms mostly strained in main towns due to insecurity constraining mobility
- In Kassala and Red States people cope by borrowing assets and producing charcoal

“Casual agricultural labour and petty trade provides an important source of revenue, particularly for IDPs and poor resident households. Alternate coping mechanisms rely on reducing food intake and wild food collection. However, in the garrison towns of Wau and Aweil the coping mechanisms are constrained by insecurity, as the IDPs are unable to move far beyond the cities.” (UN, November 2002, p.29)

“Coping mechanisms include kinship support, borrowing and selling of assets and livestock, extensive rural to urban migration, and charcoal production, which is a major cause of environmental degradation.” (UN, November 2020, p.33)
Malnutrition in both deficit and surplus producing areas is caused by lack of access to food rather than agricultural failure (2002)

- Increased cereal production in the northern sectors in 2001
- Access to farming land improved except in Raga, Unity State and Upper Nile State
- Southern Sudan cereal production 38% higher in 2002 than in 2001, however serious food-deficit pockets exist
- WFP buying food from surplus producing areas to support deficit areas which also suffer from marketing and access problems
- East Equatoria, Aweil, Gogrial, Twic/Abyei, Tonj, Raja, Jonglei and Unity will be in cereal deficit due to population displacement and insecurity
- Despite overall better production, overall 155,000 tonnes of food aid is required in 2002 Civil insecurity and its related consequences considered the most important determinant of food insecurity

"In the Northern sector, this year’s satisfactory production has been largely the result of area expansion. Farmers increased their plantings due to favourable weather, relatively high cereal prices at planting and in response to Government inducement to cultivate more cereal crops, particularly in the irrigation schemes. As a result, area harvested under cereals in 2001 increased by nearly 30 percent compared to 2000. Cereal production on the irrigation schemes, mechanised farms and traditional sector has increased by 32 percent, 36 percent and 41 percent respectively compared to last year.

In the Southern sector, civil conflict and insecurity have continued to hamper agricultural activities. However, in 2001 rainfall has generally been good over much of the south and production has improved over last year, especially in Western Equatoria. Improved access to agricultural areas in many zones, with the notable exception of Raga, parts of Unity State and parts of Sobat Corridor in Upper Nile State, has increased planted area. Crop pest and disease levels have been low and have contributed further to the satisfactory season. Rangelands have benefited from the favourable rains, and livestock condition is generally good at present. The continuing adherence to the peace accord between the Dinka and the Nuer is expected to benefit pastoralists over significant areas of the south.

The Mission forecasts 2001/02 total cereal production in Sudan at about 4.81 million tonnes, comprising 3.77 million tonnes of sorghum, about 579 000 tonnes of millet and 315 000 tonnes of wheat (to be harvested in April/May 2002) and about 146 000 tonnes of other cereals. At this level, cereal production is about 38 percent above last year's average crop and about 9 percent above the average of the last five years.

This above average crop, coupled with carryover stocks and forecast commercial imports, consisting mainly of wheat, will result in an overall ample cereal supply in 2002. This will allow increased cereal consumption and building up of stocks. In response, prices of cereals in major producing areas of central and eastern parts of the country have declined sharply. In Gedaref, sorghum prices in November/December 2001 were substantially below their level a year ago and were declining. The decline in prices coupled with a sharp increase in gasoline prices has discouraged many farmers from harvesting standing crops in parts.

With limited prospects for exports in 2002, mainly due to improved harvests in neighbouring countries, heavy supplies are expected to depress prices further. The Government intends to implement a floor price policy of market intervention, through the Strategic Commodity Reserve Authority (SCRA), in order to stabilise prices. The World Food Programme (WFP) has also made some local purchases for its programme food assistance in the country. Substantial purchases are required from surplus producing areas to support farmers as well as consumers in deficit areas.
Livestock in the north of the country are generally in good condition. However, poor rangeland productivity in some areas, particularly in parts of Kordofan and Darfur, is expected to result in severe feed shortages in the coming months, necessitating stock movements. This is by no means unusual, but the situation is exacerbated this year by the very depressed prices of livestock resulting from the ban on livestock imports from the Horn of Africa, including Sudan, by countries in the Arabian Peninsula due to suspected Rift Valley Fever. Recent reports indicate that the ban by Saudi Arabia, by far the most important importing country, has been lifted, but it will take some time for the effect of this to filter down to pastoralists. In the meantime, stocking levels are expected to remain higher than can be adequately sustained through available grazing, for lack of marketing outlets.

While the overall food situation is favourable, the global picture masks serious deficits at regional and local levels. Despite increased production, several zones in southern Sudan, including Kapoeta and Torit in East Equatoria, Aweil West, Aweil East, Gogrial, Twic/Abyei and Tonj in North Bahr el Ghazal, Raja in West Bahr el Ghazal, Jonglei and Unity will be in cereal deficit mainly due to population displacement and insecurity. The predicted cereal surpluses in West Equatoria, Lakes and Upper Nile States will be unavailable in deficit areas due to market segmentation and absence or break down of normal trade routes and infrastructure. Even within surplus States the inability of both urban and rural poor to access the available food means that food assistance will be required in 2002. In northern Sudan, parts of North Kordofan, West Kordofan, North Darfur, South Darfur and Red Sea State have suffered crop failures due to erratic weather. For most, this is the third consecutive year of poor harvest. As a result, prices of cereals, particularly for the staple millet crop, have remained unusually high, thus eroding the purchasing power of the population, with large segments depending of food assistance. Therefore, targeted emergency food assistance will be required in these areas. It is particularly important to facilitate the timely purchase and transfer of grains from surplus to deficit areas to support both producers and consumers.

For various interventions in the drought affected States of Kordofan, Darfur and the Red Sea, an estimated 78 000 tonnes of cereals are required. In southern Sudan, where insecurity is a major cause of food aid needs, the overall needs are estimated at 52 000 tonnes. In addition, food aid needs in the Nuba Mountains (both northern and southern sectors) amount to about 25 000 tonnes. In total, 155 000 tonnes of food aid will be required in 2002 to assist about 2 million IDPs, drought affected and vulnerable people.” (FAO January 2002, pp.2,3)

“...The food security crises are worsening in Western Upper Nile Region (Liech State and Ruweng County) and Bahr-el-Ghazal Region (the Aweil Counties) […]. Food insecurity persists in Bieh, Phou and Latjor States (Upper Nile Region), and in Torit, Budi, and Kapoeta Counties (Eastern Equatoria Region). Civil insecurity and its related consequences remain the most important determinant of food insecurity. Coupled with insecurity are the current low food stocks due to poor harvests last year and inadequate food distributions as a result of a poor WFP food pipeline. Those most affected are the displaced that have no food of their own and are straining the host populations’ scarce food resources. Consequently, increased consumption of wild foods, a normal coping mechanism during the peak of the hunger period in April/May, is being witnessed now. Food aid interventions by WFP and CRS continue to mitigate the food insecurity in parts of the Equatoria Region, but the crises are far from over.” (FEWS 15 March 2001)

**Local food production in Nuba constrained by conflict (2001)**

- Nuba people coping mechanisms such as use of wild foods complementing their diet are no longer possible to gather due to insecurity
- IDPs forced to flee higher in the mountains, but harvest on the steep and eroded lands are miserable
- 450 hunger-related deaths since May 2001 in the Nuba Mountains, with grain consumption 50% lower than the average level
• People are forced to slaughtering their livestock to survive, with long-term negative consequences on future food security

“The same drought that affected Darfur and Kordofan and other parts of Western Sudan earlier this year has also had a severe impact on the Nuba. The combination of drought and insecurity has reduced food production by almost 60 percent, pushing another 93,000 people into extreme poverty. Many families do not have access to the most fertile areas in the plains of the Nuba Mountains. As a result of the conflict, the population is being forced higher and higher into the mountains to cultivate very steep and eroded lands, with little prospect of a good harvest regardless of weather conditions.

Collection of wild foods, which used to be a significant component of the Nuba diet, has also become extremely difficult. Most of these foods are to be found in highly insecure areas in the plains. The threat of ambush, abduction and rape has severely reduced access to these important food items.

Grain consumption currently is reported to be 50 percent below its normal level for this period of the year, resulting in widespread malnutrition. Since May 2001, Nuba civil authorities have reported 450 hunger-related deaths - 271 of whom were children; the levels of kwashiorkor - a sign of grave malnutrition - among children admitted to hospital are historically high.

[…] By providing relief food aid, WFP also wants to help people resume their normal lives and protect the Nuba people from losing all their assets. More and more families are selling or slaughtering their livestock to survive. This gradual impoverishment of people will have serious consequences for the nutritional situation of the Nuba people.

The urgent needs of the Nuba people had already been identified during a UN mission in 1999 when a major relief intervention was recommended. However, the recommendation could not be implemented because humanitarian agencies were not granted access to the area. Efforts to gain access to the Nuba Mountains, however, continued allowing for the current relief operation to take place. While on the ground distributing aid, WFP teams will carry out an accurate assessment of the needs of the Nuba people.” (WFP 14 November 2001)

Kinship ties create opportunities for IDPs in the Lakes to acquire food and engage in trade and labour exchanges

• The 10,000 IDPs in the Lakes from western Upper Nile had started cultivation and had work opportunities in Rumbek town

"Here, options exist for obtaining food, such as trade with neighboring Western Equatoria Counties. Harvesting has reportedly begun in a few locations and greater food availability should improve food security further. However, the region is host to IDPs who fled fighting in Western Upper Nile, some of whom were not able to cultivate this year and hence remain vulnerable to food insecurity. In view of the strong kinship ties that exist in southern Sudan, these IDPs should be able to acquire food from the host population and engage in trade and labor exchanges to meet their food needs. Food aid distributions also continue and this should help the IDPs to cope.” (FEWS August 21 2001)

"In Lakes region, some 10,000 IDPs from Western Upper Nile had settled in Yirol County and 5,000 in Rumbek County, and they had cultivated after being given seeds, tools and access to land, the report said. These people had options to work, particularly in Rumbek town, and their food security situation was generally reasonable, although they would need support until harvest, it said. Rapid assessment had also confirmed an improving food security situation for the resident population in Yirol and Rumbek counties, FEWS added.” (IRIN 17 July 2001)
Researcher claims that humanitarian efforts undermine local self-sufficiency (2000)

- Dependency on international relief services for day to day survival increased sharply throughout the 1990s
- Relief strategies overlook the importance of the socio-cultural dimension

"In southern Sudan, self-sufficiency and sustainable livelihood in times of peace are achieved through specific practices, or “survival strategies,” which have their root in the local customs and cultural beliefs of the various southern ethnicities. Due to the population displacement provoked by the combination of constant insecurity, recurring drought, and a dwindling cattle population, these survival strategies can no longer be deployed with success. Once displaced, affected groups face even greater difficulty in surviving on their own, as long as insecurity and drought continue. Throughout the 1990s, dependency on international relief services for day to day survival has increased sharply. The life-support system of emergency aid in southern Sudan is a forced necessity in view of ongoing combat, displacement, and the pressures of scarcity.

It is of crucial importance, I believe, to relief efforts in Sudan and to policy makers concerned with the Sudanese plight, that the self-sufficiency of southern Sudanese be appreciated as an achievement of the socio-cultural survival strategies described in the following pages. The possibility of a return to self-sufficiency lies in an assisted recovery of these survival strategies, which are socio-cultural in origin and nature. Relief strategies often focus on the socio-economic dimensions of humanitarian crises, and overlook the importance of the socio-cultural dimension. The present study criticizes this tendency and defends a socio-cultural interpretation of the southern crisis: in addition to the contingent factors of ongoing violence and natural disaster, humanitarian efforts undermine local self-sufficiency by ignoring the socio-cultural dimension of southern livelihood.

To support this position, I argue that in southern Sudan, the effects of displacement, insecurity, aid dependency, and natural disaster have combined to effect a profound socio-cultural loss of self-sufficiency. The urgency of this loss is not empirically measurable or quantifiable in socio-economic terms, but can only be understood through a deeper knowledge of the central place held by survival strategies within traditionally self-sufficient southern cultures.” (Rackley 30 August 2000)

Displaced persons residing in camps or squatter areas around Khartoum are caught up by chronic emergency syndrome (1999)

"It has been increasingly felt that the internally displaced persons residing in camps or squatter areas around Khartoum are caught up by the chronic emergency syndrome resulting from long years of displacement and absence of programmes promoting self reliance, either during displacement or through settlement. They remain vulnerable to food insecurity and run a constant risk of losing access to social services mostly provided by the assistance community. This situation has been every now and then attributed to a lack of common strategy to address the multidimensional needs of the IDPs. Protection and promotion of sustainable licit livelihoods have also requires coherence in view of relocations of IDPs from some areas within Khartoum State.” (UN HCU 11 June 1999, p.1)

Generations of youth without basic agricultural skills (1999)

- War has disrupted traditional transfer of skills from parents to children
- NPA project aims at reviving traditional skills and technologies
"Due to the devastation of thirteen years of civil war, the social and economic fabric of the South Sudan has been nearly destroyed. Generations of youth have grown up knowing only of war, displacement, hunger, with virtually no access to education, formal or informal. The challenges to the rebuilding of the South Sudan are many, but the capabilities of its people have been severely damaged.

Many youth have grown up without even learning the basic agricultural skills that are traditionally handed down to them by their parents. The insidious nature of the extended conflict and its destruction of the traditional, technical, and formal education and skill base cannot be underestimated. The South Sudanese often referred to these youth as the «lost generation.»

For many, they have never had the chance to learn any trade or skill with which to become productive and self-reliant. For others, the skills may exist yet they have no access to tools and resources with which to get started again. Providing the necessary training and experimentation, improving people’s access to tools and resources, and reviving traditional trade and marketing linkages are all part of a strategy to initiate economic recovery.

NPA and SRRA conceived and designed two Resource Centres in Chuckudum and Yei, to help revive traditional skills and technologies, and to introduce new and innovative multiple skills and ideas appropriate to the immediate needs of the people of South Sudan. The focus has been on building local skills, using local resources, and building local institutions in order to initiate a return to food security, productivity, economic recovery, and return to the simple dignity of self-reliance.

Through multiple vocational skills training, community extension and participation, business skills training, and student follow-up and support, the Resource Centre attempts to stimulate a long-term, holistic approach to rural development. In the Resource Centre, students learn carpentry and joinery, blacksmithing and tool making, environmentally friendly building construction, sustainable agriculture and agro-forestry, as well as other appropriate technologies and skills.

The project approach is based on the concept that training, capacity building, and long-term development oriented activities are appropriate not only to long-term development objectives, but also for mitigation and alleviation of the effects of humanitarian emergencies. A relief response to an emergency invariably fails to address the root causes of disaster, and thus fails to reduce the impact of recurrent disaster. By focussing on expanding food security, building local institutions, and fostering economic recovery, a community’s resilience to disaster is strengthened, as are the foundations of long-term, sustainable development.” (NPA January 1999, p.24)

Long term displaced in the White Nile State (Kosti) move towards central and eastern Sudan to the rain-fed agricultural schemes working as seasonal laborers (1999)

- IDPs have lost their traditional livelihood and their assets have been depleted
- Majority of the IDPs had shown interest to practice agricultural activities in their new area/environment but face difficult conditions by landlords
- IDPs move towards central and eastern Sudan to the rain-fed agricultural schemes working as seasonal laborers

"Kosti town received most of these displaced persons since early 1980s as a transitional period. Some of them remained in the province trying to find their needs concerning, security, food, shelter, health care.... etc. Kosti town received the majority of these IDPs. The IDPs having lost their traditional livelihood, have escaped from their home areas in search of survival and labour opportunities. Following the relocation of the displaced camps in Kosti in 1992 from their previous Combo, to Goz Al Salam and Allaya camps (4 to 6 Kms South east Kosti)
Ethnically the two camps are inhibited by IDPs originated from south Sudan, Darfur Kordofan and White Nile States. The major ethnic groups are the Dinka, Shuluk, Nuir, Latoka and Bari from the southern states representing 75% of the caseload. Falata, Fur and other Arab tribes represent the remaining 25%. In previous years only two NGOs were serving the two camps, MSF Holland and CONCERN but they had phased out their activities since 1994.

IDPs had to change their coping mechanism as their traditional livelihood was lost as well as their assets were depleted to suit the new situation. Although most of the IDPs came from an agro-pastoral background but unfortunately they could not have access to land for cultivation. The land is owned traditionally by the indigenous tribes and persons. The IDPs when tried to have access to land faced a lot of unfair production relationships as crop-sharers.

An attempt to seek self-reliance
The majority of the IDPs had shown interest to practice agricultural activities in their new area/environment but the difficult conditions attached by landlords have been beyond the abilities of the displaced people.
the tenant displaced have to pay an amount agreed upon with the landlord before the beginning of the cultivation season in addition to the yield to be divided equally whatever it would produce between the tenant and the landlord. And even when there is a crop failure the landlord would be still demanding compensation in cash. This situation is unfair for the IDPs and discourages them to cultivate. Only 2% cultivate small plots near their homes but have experienced 90% crop failure this season mainly because of soil fertility which was exhausted years ago by the landlord and spoiled by extensive repeated cultivation and the uneven rainfall in most of the agricultural seasons.

Traditional IDP movements from the area
The rest of the displaced people move towards central and eastern Sudan to the rain-fed agricultural schemes working as seasonal laborers. This always depends on the success of the season for production and unfortunately it happened recently to be unsuccessful to satisfy their need and fill the food gap. This population movement to these areas seasonally has its negative impact on children education as they move with their parents and on health and protection because they are unstable and poor.

Other small groups of shuluk and Filata practice fishing and rice production as cash crops to cover some of their needs. In addition some weaker members of the families are working in petty trade, cheap casual labor, house servants and other marginal jobs in Kosti and Rabak towns. Using wild food collection as a coping mechanism is also recognized among the poorer IDPs in Kosti. But wild food is a rare product in that area.” (UNHCU 11 June 1999, p.15)

Public participation

Outline of the civil administrative structure within SPLM/A held areas in the Nuba Mountains (1999)

- Traditional forms of leadership disrupted by the war
- New three tier-civil administration set up in seven counties
- Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society, a local NGO, plays an important role in delivery of relief aid

"Civil Administration
Traditional forms of leadership based on ethnic affiliation have been disrupted as a result of the war. In Heiban County, the five main ethnic groups (Atoro, Tira, Lira, Abul, and Shwaia) used to be represented in
a Council that last met in 1985. Today the seven counties have a new form of Civil Administration organised at three levels: *boma*, *payam* and county. Each *boma* (village) has a committee composed of 12 members (in Heiban, 5 women and 7 men), with a chairwoman and a chairman (in Nagorban the village Council consists of 11 members). The villagers elect the members of the committee and their chairpersons every three years. In Heiban County, for example, there are 65 *bomas*.

At the *payam* level, 20 members (in Heiban, 15 men and 5 women) constitute the committee. The committee has a male and female head elected every three years. The County Committee has 42 members (in Heiban, only 9 are women) which is headed by the County Chief and the County District Officer (DO). Both the County Committee and the County Chief are elected every three years, while Commander Kuwa appoints the DO. Representatives from all the County Committees take part in the Congress, an advisory council that meets every five years.

**The Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society (NRRDS)**

The civil administration interacts very closely with the civil society which in Heiban and Nagorban Counties has many significant actors. The most prominent of all is the Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Society, a local NGO based in Gidel (Heiban County), which has a representation office in Nairobi where the Executive Director is based, and one in London, where the Chairman of the Board of Trustees sits.

NRRDS was set up in 1995 with the aim of collecting financial support from donors and NGOs abroad in order to fund local initiatives and undertake service-oriented projects in the area. Some of the activities carried out so far include basic health care provision; teacher training and provision of school materials to self-help schools in the area; water development (borehole drilling and hand-pump installation); support to income generating activities (agriculture, soap-making, blacksmithing, tailoring); paravet training; and community development work (including management training). The organisation also distributes food and non-food relief to the poorest in the community, their priority targets being widows, disabled and orphans.

NRRDS management is responsible for the implementation of the projects and the delivery of humanitarian assistance and submits regular reports to its donors. All NRRDS workers are volunteers and do not receive any incentive payment for their work. Most of them derive their livelihoods from their own farming land or livestock. Training for NRRDS workers is organised locally, particularly in community development methodology and development management. Because of the precarious security situation in the area, NRRDS leaders are not continuously based in one location but have to move between different counties. Collaboration with NRRDS is imperative for any future form of intervention in the area, in order not to undermine their development efforts to date and ensure to long-term sustainability of any initiative.” (UNCERO 8 November 1999, pp. 97-98)

**Almost complete lack of an independent, civilian led judicial system in the “liberated areas” controlled by the SPLM/A (1999)**

- Breakdown of just and equitable political and legal systems
- SPLM/A control and martial law undermine the power of chiefs, civil society and civil authorities
- SPLM/A in the process of establishing an attorney general’s chambers, appointing judges and establishing courts
- Local SPLA commanders claimed to be involved in food diversion or looting, forced conscription, rape, and summary execution
- People reported detained by the SPLA years ago but never acknowledged remained unaccounted for
"The accompanying effects of war in the south has been the destruction of economic infrastructure and the moral and social fabric of society, that is manifested in many ways:

The breakdown of just and equitable political and legal systems. The almost complete lack of an independent, civilian led judicial system in the "liberated areas" controlled by the SPLM/A, coupled with the administration of justice through field commanders who have little knowledge of law, has led to the administration of ad hoc laws and violations of human rights.

The taking over of traditional authority by the SPLM/A and imposition of martial law has seriously undermined the power of chiefs, civil society and civil authorities.

The long war has brought about the militarisation and brutalisation of society. This has been accompanied by "rule of the gun" resulting in the destruction of moral and ethical bonds, traditional responsibilities, and mutual respect for individuals and the values of communities.

The displacement of populations from their traditional locations has led to a loss of traditional values and humanitarian principles, especially among the young men. The young men are recruited at an early age and are exposed to the brutal discipline of war. The brunt of brutality is borne by the civilians when they are caught up in military operations, as the young soldiers behave outside of society's norms.

The preponderance of modern assault weapons has led to intense cattle rustling between tribes at the prompting of the GOS and it's southern allies, resulting in more deaths than occurred in the past. This has exposed communities in Bahr El-Ghazal and Upper Nile in particular, to displacement and almost total dependence on humanitarian aid.

The SPLM/A has recognised the need for increased administrative capacity, as its citizens begin to lay heightened expectations on the administration of their civil structures, health institutions and security apparatus. While the SPLM/A has produced draft laws and is in the process of establishing the attorney general’s chambers, appointing judges and establishing courts, which will bring benefits in the long run. Short-term measures struggle to be effective due to a lack of resources." (NPA January 1999, p.28)

"The SPLA had not instituted a judicial system or any mechanism for civilians to complain about arbitrary actions by local commanders, which ranged from food diversion or looting to forced conscription, rape, and summary execution. Although some commanders showed greater respect for the civilian populations, this appeared to be the result of personality rather than SPLA policy. SPLM reformers complained that SPLM leader John Garang promulgated a constitution by executive order instead of submitting it for SPLM debate and promulgation. An SPLA military intelligence officer, Maj. Marial Nuor, was accused of many summary executions and the detention in 1996 of a priest and nuns. He was court martialed by the SPLA and sentenced to five years—for mutiny—but was not sanctioned for the killings or abductions. People reported detained by the SPLA years ago but never acknowledged remained unaccounted for. The SPLA released most of several thousand Sudan government forces it had captured in battle; released prisoners complained of inadequate food and very poor conditions of detention. The government, with few exceptions, did not report any captures of combatants." (HRW 1999, p.76)

**IDPs not actively involved in Government's relief structure (1996)**

"[T]here is a notable absence of representation from war-displaced communities in formal relief structures that determine both needs and recipients. The Review Team was told by one displaced person that:
We have not been given the opportunity to solve our problems. We have no power to think and talk alone and have a definite person who is responsible for us...members of the [High] Committee do not call on us except when there is some food for them (Interview, Ed Da'ein).

Where formal representation does exist, it is largely in the form of Popular Committees, appointed and supported by the government. In Ed Da'ein, even this form of representation is absent; the Dinka Paramount Chief who sits on the High Committee is rather considered to be a token representative only.” (Hendrie et al 1996, p. 93)
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

Family Unity

Displacement and family desintegration in the Nile states (2002)

- Protracted displacement has led to family disintegration in White Nile
- Larger concentration of street children in Kosti town (Blue Nile) is the result of chronic displacement

“For the past 15 years the White Nile State has been the destination of IDPs fleeing the civil war in western and southern Sudan. They are primarily housed in five IDP camps in Kosti along the White Nile River. Chronic and long-term displacement has led to family disintegration and a relative increase in orphans, female headed households and unemployment. Kosti is home to the second largest concentration of street children after Khartoum.” (UN, November 2002, p.37)

Culture

Sudanese criminal law discriminates against southern and mostly Christian IDPs

- Tradition of beer brewing condemned under the Criminal Act while it is often the only source of income for displaced and destitute southern women
- Khartoum Courts do not recognize southern marriage practices and charge people of adultery and/or prostitution

"As a result of the failure of the Sudanese courts to adequately ensure the individual rights in the constitution, the laws of Sudan continue to have disproportionately adverse effect on internally displaced persons. The provisions of the Criminal Act 1991 that are especially relevant in this regard include the prohibition of drinking (art. 78) and "dealing in" alcohol (art. 79); the law prohibiting indecent and immoral acts (art. 152); the law prohibiting prostitution (art. 154) and adultery (art. 145-146). As the brewing, drinking and selling of alcohol is often a part of the culture and social life of non-Muslim displaced persons from the south, but not of northerners who are predominately Muslim, the displaced are more frequently affected by the law. Similarly as indigenous marriages are not always recognised by the authorities because they do not follow the procedures prescribed by law and instead adhere to customary practices and as a result, couples are charged with adultery and indecent behaviour or the women with prostitution, although they are in reality joined in a family bond as wife and husband.” (Curtis Doebbler 1999, p.6)

Breakdown of traditional kinship ties in Bahr el Ghazal (1998)

- Traditional hospitality and inter-dependence in Dinka society stressed by the war
- Non-residents marginalized as chiefs and traditional tribal structures tend to focus their attention on their immediate constituents
"[I]t is difficult to maintain strong kinship ties and networks in a famine situation. Most of the areas that fall within the BEG region have experienced increased insecurity over the last four years. With each incidence people fled their original homes and were taken in by kin in different payams or counties within the region. This hospitality and inter-dependence is very strong in Dinka society but has been continuously stressed in the last few years. With large influxes of people from the towns, the situation has further deteriorated and it has become increasingly difficult for many of the host populations to continue supporting displaced populations. Thus, as competition over scarce resources increases, it is easy to understand the tensions displayed between host and displaced populations. The breakdown of traditional kinship ties is one of the main causes of the marginalisation of displaced populations in food distributions.

The Issue of Representation

In addition to the above, if one is to understand the process of marginalization described throughout this Report it is necessary to understand the traditional system of representation and the shifts which have occurred in relation to this system due to the changing environment.

In the tradition of Dinka society, the chief (Bany) is the leader of the tribe or sub-section of a tribe. The senior leader is the paramount chief (Bany-dit), followed by sub-chiefs (Bany-kor) followed by clan, or ghol leaders (Nhom-ghol).

Traditionally the chief holds almost absolute power over all of the affairs of the ethnic section he presides over. With such absolute power comes numerous responsibilities, including resource management, particularly at times of food shortages. It is important to note that while the chief is responsible for resource management, he is only responsible for the welfare of the people he presides over. Generally, this is an easily identifiable population according to the household, sub-clan, clan, sub-section, section and tribe. With traditional chief structures, rights and duties are easily realized and preserved during normal conditions (the reasonable food security and minimal or only traditional conflict/cattle raiding).

Non-residents are more likely to be marginalized during times of food shortages as chiefs and traditional tribal structures tend to focus their attention on their immediate constituents (subjects), as opposed to outsiders (displaced).

In addition to the marginalization of non-resident persons, traditional structures also recognize a social hierarchy in which members of the tribe with a lower social status and underprivileged tribes could be equally marginalised within the host community.

Prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in 1983, towns in southern Sudan were administered by town councils, which were responsible for the social well being of the resident population. The councils took precedence over any traditional tribal structures. In general, tribal structures tend to be inward looking and segregative, while town and rural councils are more outwardly orientated and inclusive. Populations from towns tend to have little or no experience with a system of tribal administration and when they leave a town they continue to be 'de-tribalised'.

In towns recently taken under the control of the SPLM, such as Rumbek, Tonj and Yirol, County Commissioners have attempted to group displaced and returnee groups under newly appointed chiefs. These ‘town chiefs’ may or may not have been elected, or may or may not have been appointed after consultations with the displaced/returnee population they are intended to represent and administer. The towns have been divided into residential areas and, in the creation of town chiefs as administrators of these areas, an attempt has been made to reconcile an urban administration system with traditional values and accepted and recognised practices. This attempt to provide displaced and returnee populations living in urban areas with some form of representation has been partially, but not entirely, successful, at least where the distribution of relief food is concerned.
The system of town chiefs is an interim measure and it is intended that it will ultimately be replaced by the SPLM with a system of Village Committees, which would actually discourage tribalism and sectionalism.

Under the present situation of acute hunger in many places, the traditional structures are placed under enormous pressure and in many instances, the chief's capacity to manage his resource allocation function is overwhelmed." (SPLM/OLS 27 August 1998, pp. 6-7)
PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Inter-agency mission assessed access to land and property restitution in the event of return (December 2002)

- Providing IDPs return to their tribal lands access to land is guaranteed through customary rights
- Water is a depleted resource
- Displaced people occupying other IDPs former home lands can be a source of conflict
- Only 17 judges operating in SPLM area will leave many property disputes unresolved
- GoS must ensure IDPs choosing to remain in current area of displacement have the same land entitlements as hosts
- Land disputes might be complicated by multiple displacements
- According to southern customary law ancestral land with shrines should be returned to displaced owners
- Customary rules of communal land ownership did not preclude individual property entitlement

“Access by returnees to rural land is not seen as a potential problem providing the displaced return to their tribal areas where access to land is guaranteed through customary rights. There is no shortage of land, albeit availability of water is often a serious constraint. Moreover, customary law can normally resolve disputes over access to rural land. In high-density agricultural areas, this may be more problematic.

In several parts of the South, displaced communities have been replaced in their traditional home areas by IDPs from elsewhere. In such cases, access to land or reassuming ownership of former lands, risks becoming a source of inter-community conflict, especially in the event of any sudden or mass return. Such situations may require a process of sequenced return movements that the authorities appear ill equipped to promote or manage.

In urban areas, land and property disputes are more difficult to resolve. With returnees coming back to urban areas, disputes over land rights and the restitution of property are expected to rise. Statutory judicial systems are woefully under-capacitated to manage this task, especially in the SPLM area where there are only 17 judges currently employed. Subsequently, support to strengthening the judicial system is key to the reduction of potential conflict and the promotion of reconciliation.

Access to land presents a special problem with respect to the displaced that choose not to return to areas of origin. It is incumbent, therefore, upon the GOS and regional authorities to ensure that IDPs choosing to remain in an area of displacement have equal opportunity of acquiring access and/or title to land that other local residents have. To a limited degree, such accommodation is already in place in parts of Khartoum where some IDPs now have title to land. Likewise, access to rural land has been provided to IDPs choosing to relocate to the Sanam el Naga settlement scheme in southern South Darfur. The appropriate authorities must be prevailed upon to continue promoting such initiatives.

While the special considerations regarding rights of access to land and property for women-headed households may not be necessary within most southern traditional systems, this may be a problem in urban
More problematic will be the determination of rights for children of unidentified parents. (Inter-Agency mission, 18 December 2002, p. 17)

“Participants noted that large-scale return would likely provoke disputes over entitlement to property as displaced persons found others on their habitual lands. These disputes would be complicated, inasmuch as many persons had been displaced several times and had made connections with properties in several areas.

Some participants voiced the view that those currently putting property to beneficial use should be entitled to remain there. Others asserted that customary law in the south would require at least that ancestral lands where shrines have been erected be returned to their displaced owners. It was noted that the customary rules of communal land ownership in Southern Sudan were nuanced and did not preclude individual entitlement to property after displacement. There was consensus that equitable laws and a responsive judicial system should be put into place as soon as possible to address all potential disputes.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.11)

**Dinka resettlement raises land concerns (2002)**

- Traditional land use practices provided norther Arab nomads with dry season pastures and southern Dinka and Nuer groups used these dryer lands during rainy-seasons
- While conflicts had undermined access to land-resources for both northern and southern nomads however efforts at peaceful coexistence had been sought since
- Resettlement of Abyei town Arab residents and Dinkas in traditional Dinka villages was viewed by some as encouraging Arab encroachment on Dinka land
- SPLM/A representatives expressed concern about resettlement of Missiyira Arab nomads on Dinka land as tribal land ownership and use was a volatile issue

“An issue which will continue to pose a serious challenge for the peace and stability of the area is the problem of land and who is to return or be resettled where. Traditionally, the Arab nomads moved into the area during the dry season in search of grazing and sources of water. During the rainy season, southern Dinkas and Nuer also moved into the area to avoid floods. The movements of both the nomadic Arabs and the southern tribes were well regulated through convention and cooperation between their respective leaders. Certain routes, grazing areas, water sources and camping sites were designated for the respective groups. Over the last two decades, the Dinka have been forced off their land. The Arabs, too, have not been entirely secure in their use of the land as the Dinka have endeavoured to arm themselves and strike back. In the discussions with the Arabs in the area, they were remarkably frank in admitting that they had been responsible for the attacks against the Dinka, but that they also had been devastated by the war and had decided to turn their back on violence and commit themselves to peaceful coexistence with their Dinka neighbours. The history of amicable ties between the Ngok Dinka and the Missiriya Arabs under their respective leaders Babo Nimir and Deng Majok was repeatedly invoked as a model to go back to and build upon.

The joint resettlement of the Arabs and Dinka in the traditional Dinka villages was viewed with mixed feelings by many. On the one hand, it symbolized the two groups coming together in the context of peace agreements. It was also seen as a pragmatic way of giving the resident Arabs access to the humanitarian assistance which was being provided by the international community to the Dinka in the area. On the other hand, it appeared to the Dinka as representing Arab encroachment into their land, a first step which, it was feared, might encourage their occupation of Dinka land. To mitigate Dinka fears, it was explained that the number of Arabs involved in the resettlement was relatively small and represented only those who were already resident in Abyei town, and that the pattern would not be repeated in the traditional homes of the Dinka to which the preponderant number of IDPs would return. It is important in this context that the traditional sharing of resources between the settled Dinka and the nomadic Arabs and the cordial relations
that had existed between them be reaffirmed and supported. Whatever the outcome of the north-south peace process, these people will continue to live as neighbours and the nature of their relationship will continue to impact positively or negatively on north-south relations.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.19, para 61-61)

“The mission had a brief overnight stop in Rumbek in the SPLM/A-held area, where the Representative met with representatives of the Movement, reviewed the objectives of his mission with them, and heard their perspective on the Abyei peace process, the promotion of conflict transformation and the incremental return of IDPs to their areas of origin. While they strongly supported the local peace process and the return programmes, representatives of SPLM/A expressed serious concern about resettling the Missiyira Arab nomads in the land of the Dinka. Although the nomads were free to enter the area in their traditional seasonal migration in search of water and pastures for their livestock, and while individual Arabs who had settled among the Dinka were welcome, the representatives maintained that any large-scale resettlement of Arabs in the land of the Dinka would be a major impediment to peace and stability in the area. Indeed, the essence of ownership and use of tribal land is a volatile issue which, if not well managed, will continue to be a source of conflict in the area.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.13, para35)

**UN Representative for IDPs follows-up on resettlement and land allocation processes (2002)**

- IDPs settled closer to their place of origin in Abei enjoyed more dignity, security and autonomy compared with those settled around Khartoum
- Displaced in Khartoum were believed to have been removed to camps around the city to "clean" the city of undesirable presence and were still living in shanty dwellings
- On resettlement 3 recommendations were given by the UN Representative
  - Residents in areas of origin are provided with titles to their plots and benefit from much better housing quality compared to newly arrived IDPs
  - Land allocation require IDPs to register their identity and married couples would be given priority
  - This system would exclude many IDPs who lack identity documents and would discriminate against female-headed households
  - Land allocation is limited to peripheral government-owned land risks to further marginalize IDPs from access to health, water, education, trade and job opportunities

**IDPs relocated in/near areas of origin are better off than those relocated outside main cities:**

“With regard to the camps around Khartoum, as the Representative reported following his first visit [1992], conditions at the camps revealed an unmistakable tension between the range of humanitarian services reported to be provided to the displaced and the obvious resentment the people felt about the inherently degrading conditions of their displacement, far away from home and in relative isolation from the adjacent city. The situation in Abyei, on the other hand, where the people were either indigenous or were displaced but close to their roots further south, contrasted sharply with the conditions in the camps around Khartoum. Although relief supplies had not arrived because the area becomes isolated from the rest of the country during the rainy season, people had managed to survive through their own resourcefulness by cultivating land within the constraints of the territorial restrictions imposed by the security situation, or by gathering wild food from their natural surroundings, despite the limitations of the war conditions. The critical difference between the settlements around Khartoum and those in Abyei was not so much that the people in Abyei were better provided for, but rather that they enjoyed a minimum acceptable degree of security, dignity and autonomy.

[…] Several conclusions emerged from the two contrasting cases which the Representative presented to the Government for consideration and which remain valid today. First, whatever services were being rendered,
the location of the displaced just outside the city, where they were neither part of the urban community nor in their own natural setting, was inherently degrading, especially as it was popularly believed that they had been removed in order to “clean” the city and rid it of undesirable elements. Secondly, the physical conditions of the displaced as reflected in their shanty dwellings did not adequately compensate for their removal from the city.

[...]The alternative approach which recommended itself was that, security conditions permitting, people should be given the choice to go back either to their areas of origin or to settlements closest to their natural setting, and accorded the protection and assistance necessary for them to resume normal and self-sustaining rural life. Alternatively, those who choose not to go back should be assisted to move freely into any area of the country, including urban centres, and given the necessary assistance to integrate themselves as ordinary citizens. The third alternative proposed by the Representative was that those who choose to remain in the camps should not only be given the services of the kind described to the Representative as necessary, but should also be assisted with materials to build for themselves more appropriate and durable accommodation to help compensate for their isolation from urban conditions” (UNCHR 5 February 2002, para 12-14)

**Land allocation procedures for IDPs:**

"Although these visits were not extensive, he [the Representative] was able to discern improvements which had occurred as part of an ongoing and at times controversial urban replanning programme around Khartoum. Accompanied by representatives of the Khartoum State Government, as well as the former Minister of Engineering and Housing who, until his retirement a few months prior to the mission, was responsible for the urban replanning programme, the Representative visited areas of Khartoum North, including El Shigla, El Isba, Suk Sita, Karton Kassala, Takamul and Haj Yusef. The contrast between the areas which the former Minister of Engineering and Housing referred to as “treated” and those that were “untreated” was striking. The area of origin of the residents, all of whom were reportedly provided with title to their plots, could be ascertained by the type of housing, as well as the extent of construction. More recent arrivals from conflict areas tended to live in one-room mud housing or basic tukuls in open spaces, and longer-term residents, mostly from different regions of the north, had constructed more substantial housing and fenced compounds. It was evident that the area had been developed and enhanced since the Representative’s previous visit in 1992, but that southern displaced populations were still relatively worse off, presumably because they were more impoverished and lacked the resources for self-enhancement.

[...] The Representative was informed that a planning process was under way in the camps which required residents to be registered and their identity and status checked in order to qualify for land ownership. A survey had also been initiated which demarcated the future locations of the main streets. It was envisaged that all other streets would subsequently be laid out, and that those who qualified for ownership of plots of land would remove their current shelters and reconstruct houses on the new plots according to the regulations and criteria of the Ministry of Housing. It was explained to the Representative that priority is given to married couples with families and claimants must present marriage and nationality documents. While the merits of these criteria are obvious, they could potentially exclude the needy displaced who are not married and those who have lost relevant papers, especially as it is not clear how easily replacement documentation can be obtained. It also raises concerns about access to land by female-headed households, of which there are a significant number and whose humanitarian needs should receive high priority.

[...] Although this process commenced in 2000, it was noted that progress to date has been slow. Concerns were expressed also with regard to the implementation of the replanning programme and in particular the fact that it has often been erratic and poorly communicated to those displaced households directly affected by the process.

[...] In addition, the Representative was informed that the process is subject to the limitations of Government-owned land, as a result of which an estimated 6,000-7,000 displaced households may be relocated more to the periphery of the current area of Omdurman and will become further removed from access to health care, education, transport, markets and employment opportunities” (UNCHR 5 February 2002, para 15-19)
Tens of thousands homes burnt across Western Upper Nile and Eastern Upper Nile (2001)

- Hundreds of thousands villagers forced to leave their burned villages in the oil-producing areas
- Reports of deliberately destroyed harvests and looting of livestock

"Since construction of the pipeline to the Red Sea began in 1998, hundreds of thousands of villagers have been terrorised into leaving their homes in Upper Nile. Tens of thousands of homes across Western Upper Nile and Eastern Upper Nile have been burnt to the ground. In some areas, the charred remains of the humble mud huts that got in the way of oil are the only evidence there is that there was ever life in the region.

Government forces and militias have destroyed harvests, looted livestock and burned houses to ensure that no-one, once displaced, will return home. Since the pipeline opened, the increased use of helicopter gunships and indiscriminate high-altitude bombardment has added a terrifying new dimension to the war. 'The worst thing was the gunships,' Zeinab Nyacieng, a Nuer woman driven hundreds of miles from her home, told Christian Aid late last year. 'I never saw them before last year. But now they are like rain.' "

(Christian Aid 15 March 2001, p.6)

Law and policy

Sudanese land legislation adversely affects IDPs

- The government shall destroy temporary housing built on land not owned by the people inhabiting it
- Unregistered land becomes government land
- The rights provided by decree 941 stating that demolition should only take place after IDPs have been given alternative accommodation are seldom put before Sudanese courts

"The planning and land laws also disproportionately adversely affect displaced persons. Foremost among these laws is Decree 941 from 20 May 1990 that states in paragraph 2(d) that the government “shall immediately destroy” temporary housing that has been built on land not owned by the people inhabiting it. This decree is supported by article 7 of the Civil Transaction Act 1983 that states that all matters of land registration are to be dealt with by the government through 'special laws'. An amendment of 10 October 1990 to the Civil Transaction Act 1983 states in article 1 that all non-registered land is government land and then goes on to provide that no legal action may be taken concerning government land. As a result even long-term displaced persons who should have otherwise gained title to land by the common land means of prescription-the acquisition of land by peaceful and unchallenged occupation of the land for at least ten years -are henceforth disenfranchised without a means of obtaining compensation. Even before the 1990 amendment, the Unregistered Land Act 1970 had decreed that all unregistered land was henceforth deemed to be government land and could not be registered by private owners, although at the same time the Land Settlement and Registration Act 1925 continues to provide that ownership must be proven by registration. The consequence is that the government is the discretionary owner of all land and that persons who inhabited land after 1970 will not be able to acquire ownership and/or prove their ownership of the land. Attempts to prove that a right to use the land exists will also be unsuccessful against the government after the 1970 Act because in article 7 it prohibits any action concerning government land.
Another relevant instrument of Sudanese law is Decree 941, which is the above-mentioned authority for the government's policy of demolishing the houses of internally displaced persons. This decree also provides that demolitions should only take place after the displaced persons have been given alternative accommodations that have adequate services and after appropriate notice has been given to the persons whose houses are being destroyed so as to allow them to move to their new residence. Although it appears that these rights are at best irregularly respected, it is more striking that many internally displaced persons do not even know of the existence of these rights or do not invoke them against the government. Despite the numerous relocations or forced evictions that took place in 1998 and 1999, almost no Sudanese lawyer raised these rights before the Sudanese courts.” (Curtis Doebbler 1999, pp. 6,7)
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Return

GoS and SPLMA commit to return all the people displaced after 17 October 2002

- GOS and SPLM/A committed to return those displaced from and in Western Upper Nile after 17 October 2002 (4 Feb 2003)
- GOS and SPLM/A committed to return all civilians displaced after the 17 OCtober 2002
- GOS and SPLM/A committed to inform all troop movement and position
- GOS and SPLM/A committed to allow free and unimpeded access to a Verification and Monitoring Team
- GOS and SPLM/A committed to stop all work on Bentiu/Adok road until a final and comprehensive peace agreement

"The government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army have committed themselves to "effect the immediate voluntary return" of civilian populations displaced in the country's main oil-producing area, Western Upper Nile (WUN), to their homes."

A joint communique issued on Tuesday said the new measure would include those displaced within Western Upper Nile, those displaced from WUN to neighbouring Bahr el Ghazal, and all other civilians who had been displaced since the signing of the 17 October Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on a cessation of hostilities.

The agreement could lead to the movement of tens of thousands of people.

Both sides to the conflict also appealed to the international community to address the "humanitarian crisis" in drought-stricken areas in Bahr el Ghazal and "other areas", likely to mean WUN and Southern Blue Nile.

An addendum to the MOU, agreed upon on Tuesday, stated that both sides agreed to notify the MOU Channel of Communications Committee of all troop movements in Sudan, and to provide information on the identity and location of their own forces, allied forces and affiliated militia groups.

They agreed to allow a Verification and Monitoring Team "free access" to travel in and around areas where any complaints were filed by either side, and that any area captured would be "immediately restored" to the party that had control prior to the violation.

Both sides agreed to suspend work in the Bentiu-Adok road until "the final, comprehensive peace agreement" was signed. They also agreed to take further measures to "freeze media wars and propaganda" against one another.

"The body of agreements signed since mid 2002 should create the best conditions since Operation Lifeline Sudan was formed 13 years ago, for the provision of sustained aid interventions in Sudan," OLS spokesman Martin Dawes told IRIN." (IRIN, 5 February 2003)
Recommendations on IDP return from the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons (1992-2002)

- Recommendations of the Representative following his 1992 visit to Dar-es Salaam and Jebel Awlia IDP camps near Khartoum remained valid in 2002
- To cleanse the city from undesirable non-Muslim elements, IDPs from Khartoum camps had been forcibly relocated to deserted areas deprived from services and employment
- Although assistance levels were equally minimal IDPs relocated closer to areas of origins in Abyei were coping much better
- The Representative recommended three options for the IDPs: assisted return nearest to areas of origin, resettlement in area of their choice or enhanced standards of living in camps where they preferred to remain

“During his 1992 mission to the Sudan, the Representative visited two camps for the displaced near Khartoum - Dar-es-Salaam, west of Omdurman, and Jebel Awlia, south of Khartoum - and other centres in Kordofan, including Abyei, where people fleeing from the war in the south and those returning from the north converged. […] However, the displaced had been relocated away from the city to desolate desert areas, where there were no employment opportunities or social services other than essential minimum humanitarian assistance. The dwellings, which were built by the displaced themselves from local materials, did not differ from those often found in the shantytowns in which they had lived in Khartoum, although they were more spread out. The officials defended the relocation policy by pointing to the contrast between the conditions under which the displaced now lived and what they described as the dehumanizing conditions in the squalid areas of the industrial periphery of KhartoumNorth, under which they had lived.

People at the camps, however, far away from home and evicted from the city, demonstrated an unmistakable resentment at the inherently degrading conditions of their displacement. Their faces reflected a sense of rejection, uprootedness, alienation, and anxiety, a suspension between hope and despair, all of which they communicated by various means.

In Abyei, on the north-south border, where the people were either indigenous or were close to their original homes further south, conditions contrasted sharply with those in the camps around Khartoum. Although relief supplies had not arrived because Abyei is isolated from the rest of the country during the rainy season, the local population had managed to survive by cultivating land (within the territorial restrictions imposed by their security concerns) or by gathering seeds from the roots of water lilies and other wild food. […] The contrast with the camps was not that the people in Abyei were better provided for, but that in comparison they enjoyed at least some dignity and autonomy.

Several conclusions emerged from the contrast between the displacement camps around Khartoum and the situation in Abyei, which were presented to the Government for considerations and which were, on the whole, well received. First, whatever services were being rendered, the location of the displaced just outside Khartoum, where they were neither part of the urban community nor in their own natural setting, was inherently degrading, especially since it was popularly believed that they had been removed to cleanse the city of undesirable non-Muslim elements. Second, the fact that their shanty dwellings in the camp were not better than those they had lived in before, except for more open barren space, did not adequately compensate for their removal from the city.

In his report on the mission (see E/CN.4/1993/35), the Representative of the Secretary-General recommended that as much as possible people should be given the choice and assisted to go back to their areas of origin or to settlements close to them. They should also be accorded the protection and assistance necessary to resume normal, self-sustaining rural life. Those who chose not to go back should be assisted
to move freely anywhere in the country, including into urban centres, and given the necessary assistance to become ordinary integrated citizens. Those who chose to remain in the camps should not only be given the services of the kind described to the Representative, but should be assisted with materials to build more comfortable and healthier accommodations to help compensate for their isolation. Organizations that rendered services to the displaced had erected for themselves facilities that were attractive, even though they were inexpensively built from local materials. Extending such expertise to the displaced and helping them help themselves would seem a feasible and inexpensive way to achieve a humanitarian objective.

[...]

While the situation of the displaced had improved, especially in view of the fact that significant numbers of displaced persons around Khartoum had been allocated land to resettle and those in the rural north had also been granted agricultural land to farm, the challenges of displacement for the most part remained as they had been almost a decade earlier and the options the Representative had recommended were still valid.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.9-10, para18-20, 22-23, 25)

**Voluntary return of IDPs from Khartoum to northern Bahr el Ghazal (2000-2002)**

- Return of IDPs from Khartoum to Bahr el Ghazal, going on since 2000 could be further encouraged by guarantees of safe passage

“Spontaneous return from Khartoum to date: Spontaneous return to northern Bahr el Ghazal has been ongoing since 2000, with several thousands having made the journey from Khartoum and arriving via three entry points, namely Warawar and Mangar Ater near Aweil and through Abyei. Reasons given for their return is the lack of opportunity for attaining livelihoods, improved security in Bahr el Ghazal, and local peace initiatives in Abyei. Returnees travel for five days by road to Meiram and then by foot for another five days. The cost of such a journey is approximately twenty dollars per person (or two months savings for an IDP in Khartoum). It is likely that the numbers returning to northern Bahr el Ghazal would increase substantially if safe passage was guaranteed and regardless of levels of services in the places of return.” (OCHA, 14 November 2002)

**Voluntary return of IDPs from Khartoum to Kordofan (2000-2002)**

- 17,000 Nuba IDPs returned from Khartoum to the Nuba Mountains between January- August 2002
- Return of IDPs in Nuba Mountains may be curtailed unless protection and assistance to rehabilitate livelihoods is delivered
- Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) was initiated under the leadership of the Resident Coordinating
- Some of the 800 IDP households who returned to Abyei were relocated to Abyei town following SPLA attacks late September 2002

“A similar spontaneous return movement is underway from Khartoum to the Nuba Mountains. Most Nuba interviewed in Khartoum indicated a strong desire to return. The security provided by the sustained cease-fire, coupled with progressive rehabilitation of basic services and good governance in the region, will likely see an increased flow of returnees.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p20)

“Rains have made most of the villages inaccessible by land. Monitoring of the humanitarian situation is therefore hampered. Approximately 17,000 IDPs are reported to have moved to the Nuba Mountains from January to August 2002. The total number of IDPs in Nuba number over 80,500.” (OCHA, 14 November 2002)
“The Nuba Mountains provides an opportunity to demonstrate an appropriate principled approach to peace building, from which neighbouring communities and intransigent leaders might learn from and replicate. There is a risk that the Nuba Mountains cease-fire may fail because of the inability or lack of will of the international community to support an enabling environment for ensuring that practical and immediate benefits, including protection, accrue to the civilian population. There is also an expectation from the war-affected population that sufficient support to sustainable peace building, livelihoods and community-based rehabilitation will facilitate the civilian population to more fully participate in the peace process. It is important that the cease-fire arrangements are reinforced and extended within the context of the overall peace process. The CAP for 2003 will build a strong case for promoting dividends of peace and alternatives to war.

Since the signature of the cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains in January 2002, thousands of Nuba households previously displaced due to conflict and insecurity expressed interest in returning to their areas of origin. The cease-fire agreement is monitored by an international Joint Military Commission/ Joint Monitoring Mission (JMC/JMM). It has helped bring about a cessation of hostilities and facilitated the freedom of movement of civilians and goods within the Nuba Mountains. A multi-agency, cross conflict programme of interventions to support all Nuba stakeholders to contribute to a Nuba-led response to short and long-term needs has been initiated under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator. While constraints regarding equitable access and administrative procedures remain, the cease-fire has facilitated a change in focus from purely humanitarian aid to one incorporating enhanced peace building, capacity building and supporting self-reliance. (UN, November 2002, p.9, 11)

“The multi-agency supported Abyei peace conflict transformation process led to the return of over 800 IDP households to villages outside the town. However, the vulnerability of such processes to wider political events was demonstrated in late September when action by the army and the SPLA led to the people being temporarily relocated back to Abyei town. Lower-key initiatives involving women in Malakal opened up opportunities for safe water supply in Waat in Upper Nile. Meanwhile, certain Nuba and Arab communities in the western Nuba Mountains settled long-standing disputes over land access and political authority. Mines action national coordination was strengthened by the arrival of UNMAS and, in September, a signed agreement between GoS, the SPLM and the UN to develop a national mine action strategy. Work began to strengthen civil society and the GoS’ capacity to carry out effective mine risk education.” (UN, November 2002, p.11)

**Return of 25,495 IDPs to Twic from Khartoum, northern Sudan and border conflict areas (2002)**

- 25,495 registered returnees in Twic county and number expected to double as rains recede (January 2002)
- Return prompted by food shortages in the camps, conflict intensification and lack of economic opportunities in the north, forcing women to resort to illegal brewing of beer
- Returnees living with relatives in Turalei (Twic county) put a strain on their hosts who suffered drought in 2000 and whose coping mechanisms have been disrupted by war

"A joint assessment by SUPRAID and Christian Aid was undertaken in May/June 2001 and found significant numbers of IDPs and returnees arriving in Twic County on a daily basis from northern Sudan and from border conflict areas. As of the end of February 2001, 24,000 returnees had been registered by local chiefs and the Joint Relief Committee (JRC). Latest figures confirm that there are now 25,495 registered returnees. As the rains recede numbers of returnees are once again increasing and it is envisaged that the current figure may double between now and the start of the rains next June. A number of relief agencies are currently working in the county however, none are providing shelter inputs and fishing
equipment. SUPRAID has an office in Turak, Twic County and is well placed to address the urgent needs of the returnees.

**Current Situation**
The last twenty months in Twic County have been relatively stable but two factors are threatening a serious humanitarian disaster. Firstly people who left Twic County over the last few years have begun to return in significant numbers and this has been compounded by the worsening social and economic situation in the north. Secondly the fighting between GoS and rebel troops (SPLA) has been intense causing large displacements of people from the fluctuating conflict areas. It is anticipated that over 50,000 returnees/IDPs might arrive in Twic County by the end of the year 2002.

Since November 2000 the road from Abyei into Twic County has been open. People are now able to travel by foot from Abyei to Twic, weather permitting. Those leaving Khartoum normally travel by bus to Abyei and then by foot to Turalei and other payams. The journey takes an average of 3 days. However, the road from Abyei is only open on Sundays so people do not arrive in Turalei and surrounding areas until the Tuesday or Wednesday. People are continuing to arrive weekly but numbers dropped during the rainy season. During heavier rains the road from Abyei has become impassable. Rains are phasing away in the county at present and the flow of returnees is resuming as land routes become drier. People are reporting leaving the North because of lack of work. Women in particular reported only two types of work cleaning or illegal brewing of beer. Other reasons for leaving were food shortages in camps in the North.

People leaving Khartoum via Abyei are not able to bring many of their belongings. Eyewitness accounts confirmed that most household and material effects are left behind in Abyei, used to secure a safe passage out of the North or looted during the journey. Many of those interviewed explained that farming tools and household implements could not be taken with them when they left. For those women who left the North, many reported arriving ‘home’ with only the clothes they stood up in and a few spare items. Most returnees recorded having to sell their remaining goods on arrival in order to buy food to survive.

The majority of those interviewed were living with relatives, which they felt was putting a strain on family relationships and resources. This can be noted in the wider context of Turalei. Turalei suffered from drought in 2000, which decreased the harvest leaving only small amounts of seed for 2001. Only small quantities of food were available on the market and the additional families in the county are exacerbating the food situation. Returnees are receiving limited assistance from relatives who are already extremely over stretched, late and erratic rains have compounded the problem. These problems are increasing dependency on food relief.

[...]

**Impact On Human Lives**
As stated above the number of returnees between November 2000 to date is 25,495 and it is anticipated that a similar number could return between now and the onset of the rains in mid 2002. These people lack the basic means of survival such as shelter, bedding and cooking equipment and livelihood equipment to begin to rebuild their lives.

During the wet seasons the situation of the returnees is desperate. Most lack shelter and bedding needs such as mosquito nets, leaving them vulnerable to malaria. If supported with shelter, bedding and household utensils the beneficiary households would be able to begin to live a normal life. At present SUPRAID is beginning to work with local people to open up new and/ or clear old farms in readiness for the 2002 farming season. Support provided through this programme will give returnees fishing equipment to enable them to utilise local fish stocks to generate some sort of food security.

**Description of Damages**
Twic county’s population is estimated to be over 500,000 (UN estimate). The people are engaged in mixed farming, fishing and the collection of wild plants and foods during the hunger season and times of famine. Before the onset of the civil war, labour migration from the mainly rural South to the urban centres in the
North was a major coping mechanism during periods of food scarcity such as drought, famine, pest infestation and floods. The minimally functioning local market was the point of exchange and purchase of food grains like sorghum, traditional farming tools, fishing inputs, clothing, and drugs. The war has destroyed Twic County's access to these services. Commodities are now smuggled into Twic County from government controlled areas, making them too expensive for the ordinary person to purchase. Poor purchasing power has been exacerbated by the lack of markets for local cattle owners to sell some of their stock for cash.

Sudan’s ongoing civil war has led to significant destruction in the area. Cattle, sheep and goats are looted on a regular basis and farmland, homes and granaries have been destroyed. Women and children have also been abducted into slavery. Figures do not exist to quantify such damages, but it is widely accepted that destruction has been extensive and is ongoing."(ACT 8 January 2002)

250,000 IDPs to return to Bor in Jonglei state due to insecurity (2001)

- Already 2,086 IDPs repatriated to Bor County in 2000 and 12,230 were expected to return
- IDP resettlement is a challenge due to 30,000 to 40,000 Nuer IDPs already hosted in Bor

"In 1999 USAID sponsored a repatriation needs assessment that revealed an estimated 115,441 IDPs from Bor county were willing to return to their home areas and was only in the year 2000 when NPA/JARRAD through USAID funding repatriated 2,086 IDPs by air from Triple “N” to various locations in Bor county. Another 7,179 self-repatriating IDPs reached Bor County through West Bank during the same year through the assistance of NPA with transport and food en route. The current resident population in Bor is about 198,720 and 30,000 to 40,000 Nuer IDPs. The second phase began in April 2001 and about 12,230 IDPs are expected to be repatriated from the West Bank to Bor County by June 2001. The repatriation of IDPs has posed a lot of challenges to JARRAD, which is a lead agency in the resettlement project. The IDPs have been out for over nine years, there are young people who have been born in the camps, those who were young are now mature and married, some elderly people who fled when they were a bit strong are now aged and weak.

In the year 2000 another internal displacement occurred when GOS militiamen attacked Nuer Lou in North Bor. The displaced Nuers are currently being hosted by Dinkas." (NESI 31 July 2001)

Resettlement

Local authorities provide land for resettlement of 20,000 IDPs in South Darfur State (1999-2001)

- Pilot project will give secure land title to IDPs currently living in camps
- 110 IDP households resettled on arable land in Sanam Al Naga with assistance from OXFAM-GB and SCF-UK
- Funding sought for the resettlement of 4,000 IDP households over a period of two years
- Reported in January 2001 that resettlement of 500 families was underway in Sanan El Naga

"For the first time in OLS history, it may be possible to find a solution to the long-term chronic emergency in South Darfur by facilitating the resettlement into self-sufficient communities of approximately 20,000 IDPs. At the request of UN Agencies, local authorities have set aside land for a pilot project which will
give secure land title to IDPs currently living in camps and forced to rely on share cropping as their main livelihood strategy. Once funding is forthcoming, UNHCU, WFP, UNICEF, OXFAM, and SCF-UK will implement the pilot scheme. If successful, efforts will be made to expand the scheme to cover all IDPs living in the region’s ten camps.” (UN January 1999, “South Darfur State”)

The implementation of the first pilot projects commenced during the first half of 1999:

"The first of such initiatives [inter-agency multi-sectoral programmes] in South Darfur was completed in April 1999. OXFAM-GB and SCF-UK, using own resources, concluded a pilot resettlement programme for 110 IDP households on arable land in Sanam Al Naga (Buram Province). As a part of this resettlement package, OXFAM rehabilitated a water yard, provided transportation to the IDPs and local building materials, and supported the survey and demarcation of plots under allocation. SCF-UK’s role in this programme included the provision of water jerry cans, agricultural tools and seeds and the distribution of relief food provided by WFP. UNICEF provided some emergency medical kits during the relocation, while the State Ministry of Health provided the health workers.

This resettlement is just the beginning of a larger pilot resettlement proposal that, funds permitting, should benefit 4,000 IDP households (or 20,000 individuals approximately) over a period of two years.

Access of the IDPs to arable land is viewed by the agencies in South Darfur as the only way out of the chronic household food insecurity affecting the displaced in the region.” (UNHCU 11 June 1999, pp. 6-7)

"A process of resettlement of 500 families is underway in Sanan El Naga. The programme, which is funded by DED, is part of a resettlement initiative targeting 4000 IDP families in the area. Implementing partners include OXFAM and SC-UK. A pilot resettlement project involving 105 families was implemented in 1999.” (OCHA 31 January 2001)

Returnees in Bahr Al Ghazal experience difficulties in re-integrating in their former tribal structure (1999)

- Reintegration difficult when returnees have been absent from the area for too long without paying tax or having maintained contact with traditional leaders.
- Reintegration into a farming societies easier than in urban areas

"Returnees from Wau were seen in all places visited and were likely to be excluded [from food aid distribution] if they could not claim representation with the resident chiefs and were not considered a separate group by WFP. For example in Akon, the resident chief excluded returnees when food was considered sufficient only for the resident population.

In all areas visited, except Mapel and Nyawara, the returnees could not be integrated under the chief system, even if they belonged to the same section or sub-section as the resident population. Returnees interviewed in Wunrok and Akon, said this was because they had been absent from the area for too long and had not been paying tax. To be included in the clan system you have to be a tax payer. It also became apparent that some people were not included because they had been working for the Sudanese Government and were not trusted.

A large number of returnees were former government employees; including teachers, nurses, policemen, soldiers, but also traders and farmers. Few people who had been living in the displaced camps around Wau were seen. It was unclear what had happened to this population. It is likely that these are the people that returned to Wau, as they had less to fear from the Sudanese Government, and were most likely to be excluded from food distribution in the initial stages of the relief operation in rural BEG.
In Mapel, returnees were integrated in the chief’s system of distribution despite having lived in Wau as long as the returnees seen in other locations. Returnees gave two explanations on why this was possible. First, in Wau they were still close to their area of origin and maintained contact with their leaders, because people used to come to Wau to trade. Second, it was easier to be re-integrated into a farming society, as after one farming season, you were essentially the same as many of the local people. Also, taxation is based on a proportion of the harvest, so after one season you can contribute. In Dinka society, both taxation and social relations are based on cattle, which is much more difficult to accumulate.

In Rumbek town, the majority of the population are returnees with no relatives outside the town from whom to ask assistance. During GOS occupation, the civilian population was very small. In Wau town they lost their traditional systems of representation and civil administration in Rumbek organized elections of chiefs and gol leaders for this group.” (Jaspars 12 April 1999, sect. 4.3.2)

**Return prospects**

**Machakos Protocol puts return of IDPs high on the agenda**

- Interagency IDP needs assessment in view of potential return and peace agreement (November 2002)
- Capacity building, management and ownership are urgent issues to address in the eventuality of IDP return
- Regional and local administrations are unprepared and infrastructure close to inexistant
- Many northerners interpret the move of southerners fleeing northwards as a vote of confidence
- Will the socio-economic conditions in areas of origin enable those who return to resume sustainable livelihoods?
- If southern self-determination materializes will the southerners who took refuge in the north be forced to return or will their right to chose respected?
- A functionning justice system to address disputes is needed as well as monitoring mechanisms needed
- Dangers of political manipulation to influence potential referendum of independence need to be anticipated
- Reintegration programes can be complicated by sequential displacements
- Differing definitions of home and attachment to ancestral land can lead to disputes
- Cultural changes due to prolonged stay in culturally different areas should be taken into account

“The interagency IDP Mission (fielded in Sudan from 1-17 November 2002) has submitted its final report. The mission report focuses on issues and constraints that will need to be addressed if a peace agreement produces return movements of the displaced while noting that many of its recommendations are equally relevant to addressing the needs of other non-displaced vulnerable groups.

The report discusses issues such as human security and peace building. The lack of capacity among national, regional and local authorities and institutions was discussed as a constraint to the level and quality of support for the displaced. It would therefore be imperative for programming to address capacity building, management and ownership issues in order to promote sustainability. The mission recommended that special attention should be given to the promotion of the return of skilled persons displaced by the war. Planning for the return and reintegration of the displaced must be undertaken in close cooperation with
GOS and SPLM authorities, including ascertaining their levels of potential resourcing for the displaced. It was also recommended that a common reintegration package for rural returnees should be established and food assistance should, where practical, be delivered through community-based food for work modalities. The mission noted that regional and local administrations appear unprepared for the potential needs arising with a substantial return movement. Finally, the mission looked at the actual process of return. It noted a disconnect between both the GOS and SPLM assumptions that there will be massive return movement and predictions from other sources based on surveys which envisaged a more staggered process.

Conclusions and recommendations from the mission will be incorporated into the Post-Conflict Sudan Contingency Plan.

It is anticipated that several thousand IDPs will return as a result of the GoS taking proactive steps to transfer aligned SSIM/SSUM militia away from Juba, Bentiu and Rubkona in attempt to stabilize areas and prevent further Human Rights violations.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

Some return challenges raised by the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons:

“Many in the north tend to see the move by southerners to the north as a vote of confidence in the system and for the unity of the country. The fact is that it is a search for security. On the other hand, although the displaced populations yearn to return and may even favour a separatist agenda for the south, it is not easy to tell whether they would live up to the rhetoric of return, should the situation permit. The prospect of return therefore raises a number of critical questions: Do the displaced populations seriously want to return? And if so, would they rather wait for peace to be achieved or would they want to return even before the war ends? And assuming they do return, whether during the conflict or when peace is achieved, are the existing socio-economic conditions likely to sustain their remaining in their areas of origin, or will they once again move northwards in search of better opportunities? And what would be the mid- to long-term implications of this interconnectedness with the north? Assuming that the large numbers of southerners who now reside in and around the capital city become integrated there, what would be the demographic implications for the state and province, not only in terms of the social and cultural dynamics, but also in terms of the local government? What if the south were to exercise the right of self-determination in favour of full independence: Would the southerners now living in the north choose or be forced to return?” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.18, para. 58)

Challenges identified by UNDP:

“Assuring human security would require means to monitor armed activities not only by the government and the SPLM/A, but by militias and rival ethnic groups. The latter type of conflict was rooted in resource issues and in the lack of a functioning system of justice to address disputes. The task was complicated by the proliferation of small arms and of landmines. A sustainable plan for return would also require capacity-building through the promotion of democratic governance, true partnerships between international and local humanitarian actors, empowerment of traditional authorities and the encouragement of respect for the rule of law. Likewise, communities should be rehabilitated through agricultural support, water projects, health services, education, support for the development of private sector initiative and other infrastructure needs.

Mr. Koop noted that a policy on return should anticipate problems such as movement related security, unrealistic and/or changed expectations, discrimination, the possibility of political manipulation in order to influence a potential referendum on independence, land disputes and potential inequities in assistance between displaced and non-displaced populations.

[…] Participants also cautioned against the use of displaced persons as political pawns, especially in light of the planned referendum on adhesion to or secession from Sudan.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.10)

Challenges identified by USCR:
“What impact does sequential displacement have on relief programs and, eventually, on reintegration programs? For some displaced people, sequential displacement changes their sense of where their home is. A significant number of displaced southern Sudanese -- especially youths -- have no intention of returning back to their original homes when the war ends. After constant movement from place to place, and after restarting their lives over and over again, some uprooted people no longer yearn to go all the way back home. They now define their home in a different place.

Some experienced aid workers might be skeptical about this phenomenon. They know that the pull of the land is exceptionally strong in Sudan as in the rest of Africa. It is true that the majority of uprooted Sudanese probably will choose to return to their ancestral land. But do not be surprised if a significant minority choose to reintegrate in a different location, to a place they have come to regard as a new home. For some people, definitions of home have changed after so many years of war and endless displacement.

What impact might this have on post-war Sudan? It might lead to a higher number of local land disputes, water disputes, and other local tensions as people return to their home areas and find that they have new neighbors to deal with. Some international aid workers, as well as residents of southern Sudan, probably will mistakenly assume that the main goal of peace is to return all Sudanese to where they were before, with the same rules, the same relationships, the same customs and community boundaries. But reintegration might not work quite that neatly. Sudanese society has been changed by two decades of war and upheaval. Some of those changes will hold surprises when peace finally comes.

Therefore, the current distribution of displaced Sudanese into government and nongovernment areas affects how aid workers provide emergency relief every day, and it might affect reintegration when peace comes. For example, perhaps some displaced persons -- especially those in government-held areas -- have adopted new religious practices that they will carry home with them. Some Sudanese will return home speaking new languages and be unable to speak a traditional local language. Some returnees might have a different way to build homes, a different way to farm, or perhaps they will not want to farm at all.

Because of drought, some Sudanese will take longer to get back on their feet. They will need more time to become economically self-sufficient. This means that humanitarian agencies should do more than distribute seeds and tools to facilitate reintegration.” (Brookings/etc, November 2002 pp.47-48)

**GoS suggested response to IDP return: ‘transit camps’ (December 2002)**

- Local authorities voiced their intention to set up transit camps to receive and register IDPs before allowing them to return
- At worse such policy may move people from the North to new camps in the South
- The UN said it would not support such project

“Transit camps

In both the garrison towns and in Rumbek, local authorities advised the mission of their intention to set up transit camps to receive and register IDPs before allowing them to return to home villages. The purpose of such centres was not well articulated by either GOS or SPLM authorities. In some cases, it was suggested that returnees would be medically screened, though to what end was unclear. In general, the setting up of such transit camps should not be encouraged and the UN should avoid getting drawn into such plans. Based on experience elsewhere, there are a number of reasons for this, namely: they have the potential of restricting freedom of movement; they tend to remain open for much longer periods than initially planned; IDPs risk getting stuck in them; they create a host of protection issues; and are expensive and unwieldy to manage. A worst-case scenario is that such a policy might end up moving people from camps in the North to new camps in the South. Also, the donors are unlikely to be supportive of such ventures, preferring that
their limited resources be directed to reintegration and livelihood creation.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p.20)

Inter-Agency Mission reports expectations upon return (November 2002)

- IDPs most likely to want to return immediately after a peace deal will be those in camps and informal settlements
- Expectations of IDPs seemed unrealistic to the mission and beyond what authorities or the UN could provide
- IDPs settled near urban centers where they were exposed to services like education are unlikely to return to rural areas where these are lacking
- Authorities expect that responsibility for IDP return rests with the international community
- Most Sudanese authorities assume IDPs will return to the south and primarily to rural areas, and those choosing otherwise are already integrated and thus not entitled to aid

“Types of returning populations:

IDPs in Khartoum and other major northern towns: The scenarios for urban IDPs in the North are that many will stay, some will go back immediately, and some will delay their decision. Hence, the survey of IDPs currently being undertaken is timely and is expected to provide improved indicators on the decisions that IDPs are likely to make. The IDPs most likely wanting to return immediately after a peace settlement are those living in the camps and informal settlement. However, many will not have the means to return spontaneously. A much larger number of southerners in Khartoum are not in camps but live and work throughout the city. Many of them have been there for 10-20 years and will likely adopt a ‘wait and see’ approach. Many others are fully integrated and thus unlikely to return.

IDPs in garrison towns: Most IDPs in the garrison towns are likely to return to their home area as soon as possible. Indeed, many have been moving back and forth throughout the war as security increased or decreased. However, some may hesitate while they monitor the situation in their home areas, especially the rehabilitation of basic services, or may even remain permanently if conditions in their home areas remain unchanged.

Rural IDPs dispersed in rural camps: These are among most aid-dependent IDPs and most will return as soon as security allows. However, even among these IDPs, some have settled, or even married, in their new communities. Distances to home areas are generally short and most can be expected to return spontaneously as soon as security is perceived to exist in home areas.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p. 19)

“Expectations of returnees

Expectations of assistance among potential returnees vary with location and length of displacement. In most cases, they are unrealistic and beyond what either the authorities or the international community are ever likely to provide. The overarching requirement for return among all displaced is that of human security. This is usually followed by expectations of basic productive inputs and food aid until at least the first harvest. The availability of basic services is the third most widespread expectation, with access to education invariably given priority over access to either health or clean water. Provision of shelters, household kits, transportation to areas of return, as well as skills enhancement and access to micro-credit are further common expectations.

Rural to rural returnees will likely be the easiest to rehabilitate since their requirements seldom extend beyond the provision of basic agricultural inputs and interim food assistance until the first harvest. Rural IDPs currently in camps adjacent to towns will likely have similar rehabilitation needs, albeit their exposure to basic services, especially education, has clearly raised their expectations and some may hesitate in returning to areas that are likely to remain unserviced.
IDPs that have been in urban areas for extended periods, especially in Khartoum and other large northern cities, will be less likely to return to rural areas unless basic services are in place. If they return, it will likely be to urban destinations where services and opportunities similar to those they have become accustomed to will be perceived to exist. Similar expectations will exist among most repatriating refugees from Kenyan, Ugandan and Ethiopian camps.

Expectations of the authorities

The authorities in both GOS and SPLM areas also have unrealistic expectations. This is especially the case among local-level administrations, some of which firmly believe that responsibility for the return of IDPs rests solely with the international community. Moreover, the view that most displaced will return to the South, and that such return will primarily be to rural areas of origin, is also deeply engrained.

It is also widely assumed that IDPs who choose not to return do so because they are economically and socially integrated into host communities and, therefore, there are no expectations of further assistance. This is a false assumption since many who may wish to return, but do not have the means to do so, will likely remain highly marginalized in both economic and social contexts and will, therefore, be in need of rehabilitation and integration assistance into their host communities.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p.13-14)

Return and resettlement programmes

Return of Dinka IDPs to Abyei slowly implemented 2002-2003

- Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation in Abyei was a multi-agency collaborative approach to support Dinka IDPs return building on local peace agreement
- Since January 2002 Dinka IDPs resettled in three villages which had been evacuated a decade ago due to violence
- Missiriya Arabs also benefited from the food for work programmes
- International community’s focus on conflict-transformation did not meet the high expectations of the displaced Dinka
- Only Todaj village had one functioning borehole and concerns were raised concerning slow delivery of basic services
- 1200 IDP returned to Kadugli, 1000 from Blue Nile and 12,000 from Khartoum
- 800 households have already moved back to Abyei
- 28,000 IDPs in Khartoum registered to return to Kadugli (August 2002)

“Attention was particularly focused on a proposed project for return to the Abyei area. As outlined by the Office of the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator of the United Nations system in the Sudan in the document entitled “Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation in Abyei” of 1 June 2002, the project was based on a multi-agency coordinated approach to support return of the Dinka IDPs to the Abyei area, as a bridge between north and south Sudan, to support the search for peace for the Sudanese people. Accordingly, the return programme was to be implemented in a framework of humanitarian cooperation with social and developmental activities that would include the neighbouring Missiriya Arabs to the north and the Twich Dinka to the south. The United Nations agencies formed a task force to work in a collaborative approach to develop an appropriate project design and implementation strategy. The focus of the project was to support conflict transformation in the region, building on a local peace agreement that
had recently been concluded between the Arabs and the Dinka, both the Ngok and the Twich, which would facilitate the return of the Dinka IDPs to their villages and the resumption of sustainable livelihoods.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.11, para 26)

“Since January 2002 the collaborative efforts of the task force, comprising representatives of the United Nations, the Government and NGOs, have seen some significant progress, capitalizing on the opportunities resulting from the grass-roots people-to-people peace agreements. Dinka IDPs in Abyei town moved out into three villages (Awolnom, Todaj and Noong) which had been evacuated because of violence and insecurity more than a decade ago. With the assistance of the task force, returning IDPs were assisted with food for work for the construction of shelters and people received seeds and tools to cultivate food and cash crops. Missiriya Arab households in the Abyei area also benefited from the food for work programmes, provided they met the criteria for registration set by the World Food Programme (WFP).

[...]

While expectations of the Dinka community in Khartoum and other urban centres in the north regarding substantial support for the return of IDPs to Abyei were high, the priorities of the international community in Khartoum focused on promoting and supporting a strong conflict-transformation base to mitigate competition and frustration between communities that would undermine any return of IDPs to the Abyei rural areas, as had occurred in the past.

[...]

In each of the newly resettled villages, representatives of the community presented their perspectives on the opportunities and constraints which had characterized the recent return process. Concerns were expressed regarding the slowness of ensuring adequate access to basic services, and it was clear that people had expected much more than had been delivered. The level of services available to the three villages also varied substantially. Only one, Todaj, had a functioning borehole and water delivery system, while the other two relied on water from the adjacent river and streams. In Todaj, a market had begun and a school had started on the initiative of the community. Regular transport was available to take residents back and forth to Abyei as needed. These services were not yet present in Noong and Awolnom.

[...]

Nevertheless, there was a sincere expression of gratitude by the returning internally displaced persons for the opportunity that had been made available to them. During years of residence in a camp-like setting in Abyei, access to areas outside the perimeter of the town had been limited, and such activities as cutting grass for building shelters and collecting of firewood had been restricted by the security forces. A feeling of confidence in the process of peace-building and resettlement was affirmed by representatives of the Dinka and Missiriya tribes, and by government authorities in the area.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, pp.6-7; 11-12 par.5; 29;31)

“Under a re-settlement/re-integration initiative of the Transitional Council for Peace in South Kordofan, IDPs from Khartoum and other areas are returning to south Kordofan. A reported 1,200 people returned to Kadugli during the month. According to information from the Transition Council for Peace, an additional 1,000 people from Blue Nile areas and 12,000 people from Khartoum and adjoining areas are expected to arrive in various locations in south Kordofan over the next few weeks.

It was reported that a number of IDPs from Abyei town have begun moving to their former villages, in addition to the previous 800 households to Awolnom, Todaj and Noong. They are cutting logs for house construction and hope to cultivate during the second cultivation season, and complete their shelters when the grass is ready for harvesting. An assessment will be undertaken during first weeks of September. (OCHA 17 September 2002)

“During the month of July, the return of IDPS to Kadugli from the surrounding areas of Butana, Rufaa and Khartoum was noted. A total of 28,000 IDPs in Khartoum have registered to return to Kadugli.” (OCHA 20 August 2002)
Project to resettle IDPs from Abyei in their area of origin initiated by the UN Representative for IDPs (2002)

- IDPs returning to Abyei town were assisted with a transit center in Abyei (2000)
- Dinkas to be resettled in their area of origin
- Reconciliation between the Dinka and the Missereya is needed for enabling return
- Displaced Dinka with skills in health and education will be recruited to initiate and assist the return process (2002)

"In terms of assisting the displaced to resettle in areas closest to their natural setting, one initiative in which the Representative is himself involved concerns the resettlement of displaced Dinka households from their present locations in northern Sudan to their areas of origin in the district of Abyei. […] The Representative made [an award of US$ 25,000] available to support the establishment of a transit centre in Abyei which would, given the significance of Abyei as a meeting ground between north and south Sudan, provide basic services to displaced persons who had either left their homes in the south and were moving to alternative locations in the north of the country or who were returning from the north to their homes in the south.

[…]During the mission, the Representative met members of the United Nations country team to review this proposal and to explore ways in which the inter-agency support might be realized. The country team was generally supportive of the proposal and even contributed ideas for broadening its scope beyond a transit centre. At that meeting, an in-country task force of interested United Nations agencies and NGOs was formed and has been developing a project which aims to facilitate the resettlement of Dinka households in their areas of origin in Abyei from their current places of residence in northern Sudan and within a broader peace-building/conflict transformation framework that will benefit the neighbouring ethnic groups to the north and south of Abyei.

[…]Previously, there were 23 functioning village councils in Abyei district. However, in the current conflict situation, all civilian populations have either moved into Abyei town or have been displaced, mostly northwards, and their villages destroyed. The displacement has had a severe impact on the local food security situation, as Dinka farmers have been unable to have access to their traditional agricultural land. Moreover, the situation has been exacerbated by tensions between the pastoralist Missereya and Dinka farmers which have at times been fuelled by the distribution of arms to either side by the Government and the SPLA, respectively. The need for reconciliation between the Dinka and the Missereya and support for systems which would lead to cooperation and conflict resolution have become major concerns for the leadership of both communities.

[…]Against this background, the project aims, in a pilot stage, to facilitate the rehabilitation of selected communities in Abyei district with a view to creating conditions conducive to the return of Dinka households from north Sudan and to provide support to their return to sustainable livelihoods as well as peaceful relations with the Missereya. A return to the traditional status of Abyei as a peaceful crossroads and enhanced potential to influence the political situation in the Sudan is an underlying objective.

[…]After more extensive consultations with Dinka leadership in Abyei and Khartoum, and with NGOs and United Nations agencies, the project will assist a number of households displaced in Abyei to return to their villages, prior to assisting households which had been displaced outside of the Abyei area. Some Dinka households with specific skills in the fields of education and health may also be recruited specifically to return from other areas to the rural areas of Abyei. It is hoped that this would be a more sustainable way to initiate a return programme, and would be a base for further return and resettlement initiatives in the future, which would offer opportunities to displaced households currently in Khartoum and other areas of north Sudan.
United Nations agencies and NGOs will provide support for basic services such as health, education, and water and sanitation; food assistance to those returning, including school feeding programmes; capacity-building to support conflict transformation training and awareness-raising in the target communities; rehabilitation of infrastructure through food-for-work schemes; and undertaking measures aimed at improving food security. For their part, national and local authorities will be required to undertake registration of participants; facilitate their transportation; provide protection as necessary and cooperate in the provision of basic services. In particular, ensuring security will be pivotal to the decision of the Dinka to return and to remain in the area. This may require arrangements involving the parties to the conflict, in particular the Government and the SPLM/A.” (UNCHR 5 February 2002, para. 20-25)

War-displaced resettled in "production" sites since 1989

- Deliberate policy by the Government in the early 1990s to repatriate IDPs to agricultural production sites
- Concerns over the voluntary nature of such relocations have made UN and INGOs refused to become involved in such resettlement programmes
- Under the banner of ‘self-sufficiency’ IDPs are resettled in ‘peace villages’ where they work on export-orientated, capital-intensive and mechanized agriculture schemes (1996)

"A major impact of war-induced displacement has been the creation of an expanded pool of labour in the North. Since 1989, one element of GOS policy has been the resettlement of war-displaced in "production" sites [...]. In August 1990, the Council of Ministers, announced in Resolution 56 its determination to eliminate the problem of displacement within one year. This was to be accomplished both through repatriation of over 800,000 displaced to "areas of origin", and through their relocation to "areas of production" in Upper Nile, Bahr el-Ghazal, Darfur, Kordofan, and Central State[...]. The stated rationale behind relocation was to reduce dependency on relief The displaced were expected to work as labourers on production projects, including mechanised farming schemes.

[...] Upper Nile State in particular has been a destination for relocated peoples. This is likely linked to the fact that, following the signing of a peace charter with the Shilluk, the GOS and the National Development Foundation have invested in the development of Upper Nile, and especially in the area of commercial agriculture.

[...] The UN and INGOs have refused to cooperate with the GOS on such resettlement programmes, due to concerns over the voluntary nature of relocations, and concerns that such programmes were intended to utilise the war- displaced as a cheap agricultural labour force [...]. In October 1991, for example, the GOS unsuccessfully tried to enlist donors to provide food for the transport of some 60,000 able-bodied men to participate in a harvest campaign, which was intended to alleviate labour shortages in the mechanised and irrigated agricultural sector in Upper Nile. Despite pressure from the COD, INGOs also refused to assist. One donor concluded that the project was not a voluntary relocation effort, but a "profit-making venture", and as such humanitarian relief should not be provided in support [...].

Again in June, 1995, the GOS, through the Supreme Council of Peace, sought to elicit the support of the UN and INGOs for the repatriation and relocation of war-displaced from Khartoum, to agricultural production sites[...]; UNHCR support was particular sought for the relocation of displaced to areas that had vacated by Ethiopian refugees. UNCERO responded with a set of conditions, agreed by an informal UN and INGO task force. These conditions included: that relocations were voluntary, that appropriate employment conditions and basic services would exist at each site, that labourers would be granted land if required, and that UN staff would be able to monitor the process of relocation [...]. The GOS rejected these proposals, however, on the grounds that any attempt by the UN to impose conditionalities represented a violation of Sudanese sovereignty[...].” (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 191-192)
“In this regard, the Review Team found an uncomfortable connection between the GOS’s economic
development policies with regard to agriculture, its policies concerning the war-displaced, and its assertion
of control over land in the context of internal warfare. Economic policy in Sudan since the late 1970’s has
emphasised the replacement of subsistence production with capital-intensive, mechanised farming for
export; and this policy continues today. For example, The Peace and Development Foundation, created in
1992, and later reconstituted as the National Development Foundation (NDF), has as one of its objectives
the consolidation of government control over land through the expansion of mechanised farming […] The
emphasis that the GOS has placed on mechanised agriculture as opposed to subsistence production fits well
with the creation of “peace villages”, where war-displaced populations are moved to mechanised farming
schemes to act as either producers or wage-labourers. These policies are justified by the GOS on the basis
of promoting self-sufficiency among the war-displaced, and of promoting a policy of "Salaam min al
Dakhal" or "peace from within”. It is in the context of this kind of “development” agenda by the GOS,
which has been accommodated by OLS agencies, that the use of humanitarian relief to promote self-
reliance needs to be analysed.” (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 185-186)

Obstacles to return and resettlement

Unlikely that IDPs from Raga town will return unless security is guaranteed (January 2002)

- 15,000 IDPs from Tambura resettled in Mabia, some started to be absorbed into the community
- Some IDPs outside Ed Daein camps return to Raga after GoS recaptured the town, however IDP
  representatives require safety assurance for returning

"Estimates of the number of IDPs in Tambura County now range between 9,000 and 15,000, though the
latter figure may be overstated (at least partly as a result of double registration) and the numbers involved
needed to be clarified in a joint-agency assessment, according to the nongovernmental organisations
MEDAIR and CARE International.

The IDPs were being encouraged to make their way from Tambura and from the bush north of Tambura
County to Mabia (or Mabaya), some 15 km southeast of Tambura town on the road to Mpoi (Mupoi), from
the initial registration point at Namutina, northwest of Tambura, relief officials said. Some were already
being organically absorbed into the community, they added.

Some 15,000 IDPs (most of whom are agriculturalists and few of whom are expected to return to Raga
soon, if ever) were eventually expected to be resettled in an open, sparsely populated agricultural area at
Mabia, according to an official from CARE.

The IDPs, from perhaps nine different clans, were almost exclusively agriculturalists, and this should ease
their settling in this area of agricultural surplus, he said.

Basic IDP kits had been distributed and the displaced populations would need seeds and tools to get back
into production; there would also be certain food needs, at least until the next harvest was due about July,
but, otherwise, the prospects were good for the IDPs' return to independent living, he added.

[...]

Apart from the fresh displacement of civilians, Khartoum’s recapture of Raga in October had led to some of
those outside Ed Daein - but not those in the IDP camps - starting to return to Raga in recent weeks,
according to government reports cited by aid workers.
A representative committee of the "camp DPs" in Ed Daein had decided that the displaced would not return until some social infrastructure had been put in place and they got assurances about safety, according to UN sources.

IDPs in Ed Daein told IRIN in July that they would not return to Raga and its vicinity until the situation was safe; some alleged that the SPLA had committed abuses when it was fighting for and took control of Raga, and that they would not return while it was in rebel hands.

The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated at the time that it would be at least six months before consideration could be given to the IDPs returning to Raga County."(IRIN 22 January 2002)
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Insecurity and access denials two top obstacles to humanitarian activities (Jan 2003)

- Flight denials in eastern Equatoria have been in place for more than four years
- 66,500 people in Western Upper Nile alone could not be reached at all by WFP
- Access gained thanks to the Secretary-General’s July visit were reversed when all flights over eastern Equatoria were denied, effectively cutting off southern Sudan, Blue Nile and Nuba Mountains
- In October 2002 GoS denied 61 locations in addition to imposing that aid to the Nuba Mountains be only delivered from government locations (October 2002)
- GoS October flight denials forbid all relief planes to fly over two key areas, effectively shutting access to the whole of Southern Sudan
- Relief workers held 33 day before being released in Khartoum
- In April 2002 flight bans to 43 locations deprived 1.5 million people from food aid
- In 1998 flight bans triggered a famine that killed between 30,000 to 50,000 people

Un agencies ranked operational constraints as follow:

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(UN, November 2002, p.10)

“Flight access into eastern Equatoria has been denied for more than four years. Assistance to this area could be delivered only by road, exposing staff to high levels of insecurity because of LRA activity and the presence of landmines. The peace process was seriously compromised by military activities of both the GoS and the SPLM/A, which continued to exacerbate the humanitarian situation. The GoS withdrew from the IGAD peace talks following the capture of Torit by the SPLM/A on 1 September 2002.

In 2002, the most needy populations were often those living in locations subject to flight denials. World Food Programme (WFP) estimated that over 340,000 beneficiaries were affected by flight denials during the month of August. Of this total, some 66,500 persons in WUN were completely unreachable. The
humanitarian community strove to maintain the provision of assistance despite enormous difficulties. However, beneficiaries accessible by road often faced a two to four day walk followed by another two days wait to receive humanitarian assistance.

The visit of the Secretary-General (SG) to Khartoum (10-12 July) saw a brief improvement in flight clearances with the GoS granting access to 24 previously ‘unknown’ and therefore denied locations. However, the August, September and October flight clearances saw a reversal of gains made during the SG’s visit, when a flight ban imposed over eastern and western Equatoria suspended all humanitarian activities in SPLM/A held areas of southern Sudan, Blue Nile and the Nuba Mountains for ten days. The flight ban was one of the key issues discussed with the GoS by the Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator during his mission to the Sudan from 30 September to 5 October.

Unity State / WUN, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria: Armed conflict persists in these areas, which concomitantly are the worst affected by displacement, human rights violations, mines and flight denials, a situation exacerbated by crop failure. A blanket flight denial was imposed on Unity State from March to June 2002 and subsequently lifted, while the line south of Kapoeta, Torit, Lafon Juba and Yei in Equatoria has been denied for three consecutive years.

The humanitarian community is extremely concerned over the worsening humanitarian situation caused by conflict and continued denial of access by both parties to Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria. In June 2002 a UN proposal to achieve a temporary, one-month cease-fire in these three locations in order to access an average of 320,000 seriously affected populations cut-off from relief aid, came to a stalemate. Instead, humanitarian workers were allowed to provide assistance for five days only. End of September humanitarian assistance to all SPLM/A held areas of southern Sudan including the Nuba Mountains was suspended for ten days following a flight ban on eastern and western Equatoria, which affected an estimated 550,000 beneficiaries.” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

“The month of October, during which the visit of the Special Rapporteur took place, was a challenging, but also a rewarding month on the humanitarian front. At the beginning of the month the situation looked grim. In spite of the reassurances received by the Secretary-General during his July visit, there had been no changes on the issue of access.

36. Restrictions imposed for the month of October were defined as “discouraging”: in addition to the 61 (out of 178 requested) locations denied (or declared “unknown”), the Government requested all areas in the Nuba Mountains to be supplied from government locations, notably El-Obeid. Further limitations were imposed on the use of specific aircraft (two out of three). The flight restrictions over Eastern and Western Equatoria and the suspension of humanitarian activities for over a week were especially worrisome, particularly if considered against the background of the increasingly restrictive policy on access which has made it progressively more difficult for humanitarian operations to work effectively in the Sudan. In terms of impact, it was reported that access to some 400,000 people was denied. While they remained reachable through alternative locations, they had to walk longer distances to reach food supplies. (In addition, the Special Rapporteur was also informed that in view of the military operations around Torit, eastern Equatoria was particularly helpless, with bombing going on and IDP camps exposed to attacks from the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army. He was also informed that groups of soldiers deserting from the SPLM/A were moving to western Equatoria, causing havoc along their way and putting civilians in danger while destroying villages and raping women.) In addition, the recent access denial in Eastern and Western Equatoria was in direct violation of the tripartite Beneficiary and Security Protocols and the humanitarian principles governing OLS.” (UNCHR, 6 January 2003, p. 9-10)

“In March, four Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) staff members--two Kenyans, one Ugandan, and a Sudanese--were abducted and two vehicles were stolen during an attack by Nuer militia in Kiechkuon, eastern Upper Nile. The relief workers were held for more than 33 days before being released in Khartoum.
Insecurity
Numerous international humanitarian aid organizations have evacuated staff from their respective areas of operation due to the increase in GOS aerial bombings over the last month. In addition, the flight denials in Eastern and Western Equatoria placed humanitarian relief workers in danger because international organizations were unable to evacuate staff if needed.

U.N. reports indicate that due to insecurity along the Maridi-Yambio corridor caused by a group of SPLA deserters, international aid organizations have withdrawn staff from Yambio, Western Equatoria. The evacuation of staff from this traditionally stable location underscores the fluid situation in southern Sudan. (USAID, 11 October 2002)

“The October flight clearance list for OLS humanitarian operations into southern Sudan expanded the three year-old ban on all flights to Eastern Equatoria, placed new restrictions on flights to the Nuba Mountains, and denied access to 61 specific locations in opposition-controlled areas, making this the most restrictive monthly flight clearance placed on OLS in many years.

GoS expanded the three year-old ban on all flights to Eastern Equatoria
GoS denied 61 areas which was the most restrictive monthly flight clearance imposed on OLS since years

“GoS expanded the three year-old ban on all flights to Eastern Equatoria.
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The GOS flight ban on humanitarian operations to Eastern Equatoria from September 26 to October 6 shut down both OLS and non-OLS humanitarian aid deliveries to southern Sudan. On October 5, the GOS modified the ban to allow for humanitarian flights over Equatorian airspace. However, the GOS completely blocked the delivery of assistance to Eastern Equatoria by expanding the number of areas denied access to include all serviceable airstrips in the region. The U.N. reported that the nine-day suspension of humanitarian flights by the GOS denied more than 3 million people access to humanitarian assistance, stranded more than 500 humanitarian aid workers, and prevented the delivery of over 150 tons of emergency food and non-food supplies per day.” (USAID, 11 October 2002)

Overview of Access denials during 2002

Access as of October-November 2002:
**Eastern and Western Equatoria** have been denied flight access from 27 September to 6 of October, leaving 800,000 people out of reach.

**Eastern Equatoria** has been no-fly zone for over four years.

OLS was denied access to 61 locations in October and ‘unknown’ locations increased from 15 to 39 in September 2002.

Road access from northern Uganda to Labone, Nimule, Ikotos and Parajok was prohibited due to LRA activities.

On 26 September the GoS issued a restriction on flights overflying Eastern and Western Equatoria and road delivery of humanitarian assistance into these regions. The flight ban was in effect from 27 September to 6 October and prevented assistance from reaching 800,000 people in eastern and western Equatoria. A further 350 - 450,000 people throughout southern Sudan did not receive food aid. Following the visit of the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Kenzo Oshima, the flight restrictions were lifted on 5 October. The no-fly zone in Eastern Equatoria, which has been in place for over four years and covers the area south of the Juba, Yei, Torit and Kapoeta line was extended to include an injunction not to fly south of the line from Lafon. (see map)

WFP estimated that this extended denial over a significant part of the province would cause OLS annual flight costs to rise by an additional US$6.7 million. OLS operations in eastern Equatoria are currently more restricted than ever before. Additionally, the new restriction denies the airstrip at Lokutok, the only airstrip available to OLS agencies working in Eastern Equatoria. As of now there is no air access for OLS agencies to

**Eastern Equatoria.**

This additional restriction followed an October flight list, which denied OLS flights to 61 locations and involved an increase in the number of unknown locations from 15 in August to 39 in September. OLS transport capacity was also severely restricted by a ban on the use of bufaloo aircraft from one of the two companies supplying this service. The GoS notification also stated that rebel held parts of the Nuba Mountains should only be accessed from government areas.

The OLS consortium urged all donors with representation in Khartoum to voice concern felt and to continue to advocate for unhindered humanitarian access.

No improvement in the number of flight denials was noted for the month of September. The number of denied locations remained the same as in August i.e. 61 locations denied.

[...]

The security situation in eastern Equatoria has steadily deteriorated due to increased conflict in the area surrounding Kapoeta and Torit and LRA activity. IDPs were reported to be moving out of Juba due to conflict within the town. Road access from northern Uganda to Labone, Nimule, Ikotos and Parajok was prohibited due to LRA activity. LRA activity also restricted access, by the population to the fertile areas of the Imatong Mountains.” (OCHA; 14 November 2002)

**Access as of mid September 2002:**

In August 21 locations were denied and 15 were categorized ‘unknown’ by the GoS.

Some populations had to walk 4 days to access food assistance.

66,500 needy people were out of reach of aid delivery 44,500 of whom in Western Upper Nile.

“The visit of the UN Secretary General (SG) to Khartoum (10-12 July) saw the government grant access to 24 previously ‘unknown’ and therefore denied locations. However, the August flight clearance schedule saw a reversal of gains made during the SG’s visit. A total of 192 locations were requested for flight clearance in August. Of this number 21 were denied and 15 were categorized by GoS as ‘unknown’. WFP informed that approximately 343,634 beneficiaries were affected by these flight denials although about 277,134 of this number were reachable by road or through alternate airstrips. WFP stated that using alternate airstrips
meant that beneficiaries faced anywhere from a two to four day walk followed by another two day wait to receive food assistance. The remaining 66,500 vulnerable individuals were impossible to reach. Western Upper Nile is the worst affected area as 44,500 out of the 66,500 are from this area.

Increased LRA activity in Northern Uganda, particularly attacks on refugee and IDP camps, and threats against humanitarian agencies have rendered the operating environment in eastern Equatoria increasingly constrained. Road access from northern Uganda to Labone, Nimule and Parajok is currently prohibited due to insecurity. These locations have been flight denied for over three years.” (OCHA, 17 September 2002)

**Access as of July 2002:**
1.7 million out of reach of humanitarian assistance since conflict flare up in March 2002

“Humanitarian Agencies continue to express concern over lack of access to Western Upper Nile/Unity State, Eastern Equatoria and parts of Bahr el Ghazal. An estimated 1.7 million people have been cut off from relief aid since fighting flared up in late March. Aerial bombings of civilians increased significantly in relation to previous months. Strategic locations in Equatoria such as Kapoeta, Ikotos and Kyala, and locations in Unity State/WUN were bombed on average every three days. Bahr El Ghazal was bombed late in the month. The UN protested strongly against the bombing of Malualkon (Bahr El Ghazal), which killed four civilians and severely injured five others. The bombing took place while humanitarian personnel were delivering emergency assistance.” (OCHA, 29 July 2002)

**Access as of May:**
Access denials peaked at 70 locations
New category of ‘unknown’ locations further denies access
319,000 people out of access in Unity State
Flights approvals fell from 41 to 24 during May

“As in the past decade, the principle of unimpeded access was again not respected in a year when the military imperative among warring parties was paramount. Lack of security compounded this situation further proving to be a constant impediment to humanitarian activities. During the year, monthly flight denials increased steadily, peaking at approximately 70 locations denied out of approximately 200 requested in May 2002. This month also witnessed the introduction of a new category of locations, which the GoS designated as ‘unknown’ and consequently off-limits. Access to Unity State/Western Upper Nile (WUN) was gradually curtailed, culminating in a blanket flight denial over this area in April 2002.” (UN, November 2002, p.3)

“Approximately 319,000 persons are affected by flight denials to WUN/Unity State with another 120,000 affected in Gogrial County in Northern Bahr el Ghazal. Although the delivery of humanitarian aid to Equatoria is currently undertaken by road, this access to over 100,000 individuals remains severely disrupted by banditry, insecurity and landmines on the road. Access by air would greatly facilitate regular programmes and the safety of staff.

**Flight denials**
In May 23 locations were specifically flight denied in addition to a continued blanket denial of rebel-controlled locations in WUN/Unity State and Eastern Equatoria. Most of the 23 denied locations were in Bahr El Ghazal. The no fly zone south of the line YeiJuba-Torit and Kapoeta continued to be denied. According to WFP the number of flights approved by the GoS fell from 41 at the beginning of the month to 24. In addition, over 50 locations were not approved as the GoS stated that they were unknown to them.” (OCHA, 31 May 2002)

**Access as of April:**
GOS denied access of OLS to 43 locations hampering humanitarian assistance to 1.7 million people
On average GOS denies access to 25 locations
The United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, in concert with the World Food Programme and UNICEF, today condemned the decision by the Government of Sudan to deny access of OLS flights to 43 locations in southern Sudan. This decision will affect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to about 1.7 million people, who depend on the relief assistance provided by WFP, UNICEF and some 43 humanitarian agencies under the umbrella of Operation Lifeline Sudan.

Lack of access is expected to have serious repercussions on the entire population in the Upper Nile, northern Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes regions. A number of the locations affected by the flight denials in Bahr el Ghazal are crucial to reaching some of the most vulnerable populations frequently displaced by insecurity.

As part of the agreement under which OLS operates, flight requests are submitted to the Government of Sudan and to the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) each month. On average, the Sudanese authorities deny access to 25 locations, which represents approximately 10% of the requests. This is the second month in a row that the Government of Sudan has doubled the number of denied locations, to close to 20% of requests for access.” (OCHA, 5 April 2002)

Continued denial of access by Government to selected locations hinders humanitarian operations in the south (March 2002)

- In total 345,000 vulnerable populations in 45 locations are deprived from food aid due to access denials by the GoS (March 2002)
- In the oil-rich Upper Nile, 19 additional locations were denied access to aid agencies, depriving 170,000 vulnerable people from food aid (March 2002)
- Access denials particularly jeopardise public health campaigns
- Denied areas in rebel-controlled areas increased from 20 to 35 per month over the last six months of 2001
- UN flight restrictions due to high insecurity in Bahr al Ghazal affect 50,000 people in need of assistance
- Some displaced people walk as long as seven hours to access food aid
- Chronic access denial in Western Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal, and Eastern Equatoria, areas worst afflicted by conflict
- UN strategic interest to increase percentage of aid by surface means delivery

"The United Nations system on Monday confirmed that it was in discussions with the Sudanese government in an effort to reverse restrictions on humanitarian flights in parts of southern Sudan. "We are engaged in discussions within the UN system to get a review of this decision,” the World Food Programme (WFP) spokeswoman, Laura Melo […].

According to Melo, the WFP - operating within Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the umbrella operation for UN and nongovernmental agencies operating in Sudan - is, on average, denied humanitarian access to 26 locations in southern Sudan by Khartoum. Despite the UN's request for access at the beginning of March, however, an additional 19 locations had been placed off-limits to aid agencies for one week only, Melo added.

OLS each month submits a request to the Sudanese government for humanitarian access to a number of locations in war-torn southern Sudan. Denial of access could prevent some 170,000 vulnerable people from receiving food aid in the 19 additional locations to which access is denied, according to Melo. The extra denials meant that food aid could be denied to a total of 345,000 people in 45 locations, she added.
Many of the additional 19 locations are situated in western Upper Nile (Unity, or Wahdah State), which is the site of many of southern Sudan's oilfields and has been subject to an escalation of fighting between government and rebel forces in recent weeks.” (IRIN 4 March 2002)

"Denials of access for humanitarian assistance (for all areas both OLS and non-OLS) impact on the broad spectrum of activities in which the UN and its partners are engaged. These include health and education matters, clean water and sanitation projects, efforts to achieve household food security, and the protection of vulnerable communities in general. It is very difficult to pursue public health campaigns for say polio and guinea worm in any sustained manner. The campaign to eradicate rinderpest among livestock is similarly affected.

Present practice for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies centres on mechanisms by air and road, with occasional deliveries by river. There have been no deliveries by rail for many years. Air drops and air lifts (landed) are limited to locations which are cleared monthly in advance by the GOS, and where appropriate for areas not controlled by the GOS, also by the SPLM or other rebel movements. The number of locations in rebel-controlled areas denied UN/OLS flight access by the GOS remained more or less static over the course of 1999 and 2000 and into 2001, at around 20 (out of an average of 200 requested per month). However, over the past six months the number of denied locations has steadily risen, and is now consistently running at around 35 per month.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 4)

"Government has increased by three (from 17 to 20) the number of denied locations for flight access for January 2001. The additional denied locations include the WFP logistics and operational base at Mapel in the rebel-controlled area of southern Sudan.

The UN flight clearance granted by the Government for the month of January 2000[1] recorded flight denial to the following locations: Ganyiel, Leer, Nhialdu, Duar, Mankien, Toy, Gumriak, Lokutok, Yei, Akop, Wicok, Mapel, Tonj and Thiet; south of the line Kapoeta, Torit, Juba, and Yei. The continued denial of flight access to these locations hinders humanitarian operations in the south. Flight access is also critical for eastern Equatoria, where the effect of drought is taking its toll on the population.” (OCHA 31 January 2001)

"Continued insecurity in northern and western Bahr al-Ghazal was “seriously undermining people's ability to cope during the hunger gap”, and, along with the arrival of rains, had hampered air and road deliveries of humanitarian assistance, UNOCHA reported. Insecurity in northern Bahr al-Ghazal led to WFP imposing a temporary flight restriction in locations west of the railway line during parts of June, while UN security considerations had restricted flights to five areas covering 50,000 people targeted for food assistance, OCHA reported. "In some areas, communities are expected to walk for as long as seven hours to access food," it said. Humanitarian response capacity was likely to be hampered during this "hunger gap" period, especially in light of additional flight denials to locations in Bahr al-Ghazal, including most areas of Raga County, it added. The Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) emergency response team for Bahr al-Ghazal has been reactivated, and an assessment of humanitarian needs in Raga County (which is not being accessed by the humanitarian community, except for Awada) is planned as soon as access is granted.” (IRIN, 18 July 2001)

"The UN flight clearance granted by the Government for the month of March 2001 recorded flight denial to the following locations: Ganyiel, Leer, Nhialdu, Duar, Mankien, Toy, Gumriak, Lokutok, Yei, Akop, Wicok, Mapel, Tonj, Thiet and south of the line Kapoeta, Torit, Juba, and Yei." (OCHA 31 March 2001)

""Locations in Western Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal, and Eastern Equatoria are the worst-affected by the flight denials, for both humanitarian assistance in general and for the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. These areas tend to be those most afflicted by armed conflict, between the forces of the GOS and SPLM and their proxies, among armed factions, and by the Ugandan rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). They also tend to be areas of chronic denial, where access has not been allowed for sustained periods, and where it is feared that civilian war-affected communities are most vulnerable.
Road access into rebel-controlled areas of southern Sudan through both Uganda and Kenya, consistent with OLS agreements and plans of action, continues to be an important but under-utilised means of delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to such areas. A strategic objective of the UN in the implementation of the humanitarian assistance programme continues to be to find ways to increase the percentage delivered by surface means, not least because of the cost implications. In principle such deliveries are much cheaper than by air, although in situations of chronic insecurity on surface routes this does not necessarily apply. In such situations deliveries by air can be cheaper and safer.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 4)

Disagreements with SPLM made NGOs withdraw from Southern Sudan (March 2000)

- 11 NGOs pulled out of southern Sudan by 1 March as they refused to sign new MOU with humanitarian wing of SPLM
- NGOs in particular concerned about SRRA's stated entitlement to use NGOs' transport and equipment
- Resumption of operations in June 2000 by Oxfam, SCF, Care and the German and Belgian branches of Veterinaires sans Frontieres (VSF)

"In February, the humanitarian wing of the SPLM/A, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), imposed a deadline on NGOs working in southern Sudan, ordering them to sign by end February the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which had been under discussion for several years. Alternatively, those refusing to sign were notified to cease working in SPLM/A-administered areas.” (UN July 2000, p.4)

"The pullout comes after diplomatic efforts failed to persuade SPLM chairman John Garang to modify the MOU, extend the deadline and ensure that no NGOs were expelled. Garang argued he could not overrule the decision taken by the SPLM's National Liberation Council and the rebel movement appeared willing to bear the consequences of some NGOs pulling out, diplomatic sources told IRIN. At the heart of the matter, according to humanitarian sources, is the issue of how to deliver aid into a war situation. NGOs and donors are concerned about the role of the rebels in distributing relief supplies and providing security, as well as the political independence of NGOs who sign such a "formal, legal agreement".

Of particular concern are specific aspects of the document such as the SRRA's stated entitlement to use NGOs' transport and equipment on certain occasions, the status of assets, terms of employment for local staff, and the payment of fees for services (such as security).” (IRIN 29 February 2000)

"By 1 March, 11 NGOs had pulled out of southern Sudan following their refusal to sign the Memorandum of Understanding with the SRRA. Five of the NGOs planned to carry out food-aid supported projects ranging from road rehabilitation, training in guinea worm eradication, health training, teachers' training and in-patient feeding. The NGOs involved in these activities include The Carter Centre (the whole of southern Sudan), MSF-Holland (Jonglei), Oxfam-Quebec (Yirol County), Save the Children-UK (Gogrial and Wau counties) and German Agro Action (Torit County). A total of 4,969 primary beneficiaries will be affected by the withdrawal of these NGOs.” (WFP March 2000)

"A spokesman for Oxfam confirmed on Wednesday [28 June 2000] that the organisation would be resuming operations in southern Sudan. He told IRIN that Oxfam had not yet signed the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) Memorandum of Understanding - which outlines conditions for aid agencies to work in rebel-held areas - but that it anticipated doing so. He said that Oxfam was co-coordinating its move with other agencies, including Save the Children Fund (SCF). A statement issued by Care International also announced the resumption of operations. SPLA spokesman Samson Kwaje announced on Monday that four international agencies - Oxfam, SCF, Care International and the
German and Belgian branches of Veterinaires sans Frontieres (VSF) had agreed to return to southern Sudan after signing the Memorandum of Understanding. Humanitarian sources said the agencies had received assurances of co-operation by the rebels’ humanitarian arm, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA). A number of international agencies suspended operations in southern Sudan earlier this year, after refusing to sign the Memorandum, saying that it was too restrictive. They also objected to financial stipulations and a clause requiring them to leave behind project assets in the event of an “interruption” of activities, which the SRRA reserved the right to order.” (IRIN 28 June 2000)

_In a press release by CARE the following reason was given for the decision to return:_

"Specifically, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) received a letter from the SRRA affirming its commitment to humanitarian principles as the overriding criteria by which NGOs humanitarian activities would be ruled. This pledge to respect the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality was one of a number of key outstanding issues during the previous months of negotiation over the MOU. The SRRA has acknowledged the original MOU could be improved and a process is underway with signatory agencies to do so. CARE also cited an increased spirit of cooperation and compromise on behalf of the southern Sudanese authorities over the past three months of negotiations.” (CARE 21 June 2000)

Famine worsened by Government prevention of humanitarian access to Bahr Al Ghazal (February - March 1998)

- Government impose total flight ban over the entire region of Bahr Al Ghazal from 4 February to 31 March 1998
- The government and SPLA agreed to a three month ceasefire for the Bahr El Ghazal famine area from July 15 (later extended to July 1999)

"The Bahr Al Ghazal crisis was set off when Kerubino Kwanyin Bol defected to the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army (SPLA) in late January 1998 and attacks were launched against the Government towns of Wau, Aweil and Gogrial in Bahr Al Ghazal. The Government responded to these attacks, which resulted in displacement of approximately 110,000 persons, by imposing a total flight ban over the entire region of Bahr Al Ghazal that paralysed relief operations. After numerous high-level interventions by UN Agencies, the ban was partially lifted in late February when six locations were cleared during an emergency mission by the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, Ambassador Robert van Schaik, and again in mid-March when two further locations were approved. In its efforts to lift the ban, the UN was strongly supported by a number of member states. When full access was finally granted on 30 March, it was estimated that 380,000 persons, including the 110,000 newly displaced, were suffering from serious food shortages. By early June, after comprehensive assessments including nutritional and food economy surveys had been conducted, the number of people in need of food assistance was found to have risen to 795,000 persons.” (UN January 1999, "Year in Review")

Institutional arrangements

MOU between GoS and SPLM/A on cessation of hostilities (15 October 2002)

- The MOU promotes the return of all those displaced from Western Upper Nile after the 17 October 2002 MOU
- MOU commits parties to notify all troop movements and locations
- Both parties committed to allow free access to the Verification and Monitoring Team
• SPLM/A-GoS MOU for a ceasefire or ‘period of tranquility’ until December 2002 (15 October 2002)
• Tripartite signing of unimpeded access (26 October 2002)

“The government and SPLA pulled back from the brink of such an escalation, and the likely collapse of the peace negotiations, by signing an “Addendum” to the 15 October 2002 cessation of hostilities agreement. Under the terms of the new document, the fighting is to end, and both sides are to return their forces to where they were on that earlier date. They have also obliged themselves to report on the locations and movements of their troops. […] The government agreed specifically to halt construction of the all-purpose road in the oilfields.

Many of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) who fled the fighting on the Leer front (the first prong of the offensive) moved toward Dablual. The food and water situation in that area is precarious and could easily become a humanitarian disaster. […] Many residents of the villages south of Mayom and Mankien (the second prong of the offensive) are IDPs from fighting over the last few years in Rubkona, Nhialdu, and other areas now controlled by the government. They were forced to flee again to escape attacks that were aimed as much at civilians and civilian structures, such as tukuls (civilian huts), as military targets. The new agreement acknowledges the plight of all these IDPs and calls for their safe return, and for the international community to facilitate this.

Most significantly the Addendum provides for the kind of mechanism to monitor implementation that was conspicuously absent from the original document.” (ICG, 10 February 2003, p.1)

“The government of Sudan and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army have committed themselves to "effect the immediate voluntary return" of civilian populations displaced in the country's main oil-producing area, Western Upper Nile (WUN), to their homes.

A joint communique issued on Tuesday said the new measure would include those displaced within Western Upper Nile, those displaced from WUN to neighbouring Bahr el Ghazal, and all other civilians who had been displaced since the signing of the 17 October Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on a cessation of hostilities. […] An addendum to the MOU, agreed upon on Tuesday, stated that both sides agreed to notify the MOU Channel of Communications Committee of all troop movements in Sudan, and to provide information on the identity and location of their own forces, allied forces and affiliated militia groups.

They agreed to allow a Verification and Monitoring Team "free access" to travel in and around areas where any complaints were filed by either side, and that any area captured would be "immediately restored" to the party that had control prior to the violation.

Both sides agreed to suspend work in the Bentiu-Adok road until "the final, comprehensive peace agreement" was signed. They also agreed to take further measures to "freeze media wars and propaganda" against one another."(IRIN, 5 February 2003)

“38. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur welcomed the developments that occurred as from mid-October, notably the memorandum of understanding signed on 15 October by the Government and the SPLM/A to cease hostilities for the duration of talks, which, according to some observers, has opened the door to greater access to conflict-affected populations in the south.

39. Also, the Special Rapporteur further welcomed the signing, on 26 October, of what has been defined a “landmark aid deal” between the Government, the SPLM/A and the United Nations allowing unimpeded humanitarian access. Reportedly, the agreement, which would last from 1 November until the end of 2002, when the Machakos peace talks were scheduled to end, would enable the World Food Programme (WFP) to
provide food aid to an additional 558,000 people, on top of the 3 million people already targeted for assistance. In addition, it would allow a polio immunization campaign due to start on 28 October to go ahead as planned.” (UNCHR, 6 January 2003, p.10)

“The Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a “Memorandum of Understanding… on Resumption of Negotiations…” in which they agreed to resume peace talks on 15th October.

[...] The MoU also agrees “to maintain a period of tranquillity during the negotiations by ceasing hostilities in all areas of the Sudan and ensuring a military stand down for their own forces, including allied forces and affiliated militia”. The cease-fire came into effect at noon on 17th October and was scheduled to “remain in effect until the negotiations are concluded, and no later than 31st December 2002”.

To view the full MOU between the GoS and the SPLM/A on cessation of hostilities, click here [External Link]

To view the full MOU between the GoS and the SPLM/A on aspects of structures of government, click here [External link]

To view the full Addendum to the MOU on the cessation of hostilities between the GoS and the SPLM/A regarding strengthening the MOU, click here [internal link]

OLS granted unfettered access from 1 November to 31 December 2002(26 October 2002) between GoS and SPLM/A

- Access agreement signed between UN, GOS and SPLM/A WFP able to distribute over 600MT food in previously constrained Western Upper Nile areas
- OCHA reported decrease in frequency and severity of security incidents since the signing of the MOU
- River transports are now used by WFP to deliver humanitarian assistance to 80,000 people previously inaccessible
- WFP estimated and additional 558,000 people would have access to relief

“The unimpeded access agreement reached in Nairobi, Kenya on 26 October 2002 has facilitated greater flight access by OLS agencies to previously denied areas. During the months of November and December this agreement has allowed a scaling up of activities in addition to safer means of transporting personnel in areas of Eastern Equatoria affected by LRA activities.

Despite the flight denials witnessed up to October this year, OLS was able to continue services to vulnerable populations through use of alternative airstrips or road access. These attempts made some services available, particularly in Aweil East and West, Gogrial, and Eastern Equatoria when security permitted.

The most significant impact of this access agreement was noted in Western Upper Nile, adjacent to the Bentiu and Rubkona oilfields. Western Upper Nile has been an active theatre of conflict for the past four years with flight access extremely constrained. During the month of November, WFP was able to distribute over 600MT of mixed food commodities in this state while some populations received WHO/UNICEF polio immunization for the first time. Over 36,000 children were immunized.

[...]
The frequency and severity of security incidences has fallen dramatically since the October agreement to cease hostilities was signed. (This agreement was part of the MOU signed on 15 October 2002 GoS and the
SPLM/A on the resumption of the Machakos negotiations. This MOU called for among other things the cessation of hostilities to create a conducive atmosphere for talks and called on parties to allow unimpeded access).

Unimpeded access also resulted in the utilization of river transport for provision of assistance to beneficiaries residing along the Sobat River corridor. The WFP barge convoy last sailed over two and a half years ago, effectively preventing assistance from reaching over 80,000 beneficiaries along the corridor.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“The World Food Programme estimated the agreement would enable the UN food agency to provide food aid to an additional 558,000 people, on top of the 3 million people already targeted for assistance” (IRIN, 28 October 2002)


- OLS consortium of 5 UN agencies and 41 NGOs was the first programme to rely on negotiated access in a sovereign state
- UN agreement with GOS and SPLM/A to allow humanitarian aid to Kassala State and Southern Blue Nile areas traditionally outside OLS mandate (Jan 2003)
- Scope of OLS operations and needs assessments in any given year limited to sites that have been agreed by the Government -- allows for the formal exclusion of certain sites from the framework of OLS agreements
- Access to war-affected populations has been maintained largely through an ad hoc and reactive process of mobilising international pressure
- A system for monitoring the level of insecurity for humanitarian operations in the conflict zones facilitates flexible access for humanitarian aid in the context of ongoing warfare
- WFP and UNICEF provide assistance to Nuba mountains outside normal OLS framework
- MSF claims that by breaking or manipulating the OLS agreement, the government and other warring parties have denied humanitarian access to many regions of both North and South Sudan

OLS coordinated relief activities of over forty international and non-governmental organizations
The Arrangement on Ground Rules signed between OLS-South and individual armed groups sets standards for safe and unimpeded access
Half a dozen agencies outside OLS are free from delivery restrictions imposed by national authorities

“A combination of international and local agencies address the humanitarian needs of war-affected populations in southern Sudan. The southern sector of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a UN-coordinated international relief effort which includes more than forty UN and international non-governmental organizations, serves as the main operational framework through which international relief is delivered to the south. OLS-South works in operational partnership with the humanitarian wings of rebel movements to coordinate and distribute humanitarian aid. These arrangements, formalized through the Agreement on Ground Rules signed between OLS-South and individual armed groups, are based on minimum operating standards designed to facilitate safe and unimpeded humanitarian access to populations in insurgent areas on the basis of respect for human rights and humanitarian principles. Half a dozen international aid agencies operate outside the OLS framework, which frees them from restrictions on relief delivery imposed on OLS by the national authorities, and allows them access to otherwise inaccessible populations.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.22)
“A consortium of five UN agencies and 41 humanitarian NGOs (international and indigenous) with a budget of roughly U.S.$150 million, OLS currently provides humanitarian assistance to some 2.5 million people in southern Sudan as well as to camps for internally displaced persons (IDP) in Khartoum.31 It was the first UN program to rely on negotiated access with the primary warring parties to provide relief assistance to war-affected populations within a sovereign country.” (ICG, 14 November 2002, p8)

The official UN response to the 1996 OLS Review defines the role of OLS with regard to humanitarian access as follows:

“There appeared to be some confusion in the Review about OLS being a "safe area programme." In fact, OLS operates on the basis of negotiated access. OLS seeks the agreement of the parties to the conflict to allow humanitarian agencies access to war affected populations. This access is negotiated with the parties on a continual basis. Contrary to some humanitarian operations in other parts of the world, OLS does not attempt to designate specific areas as safe areas and then to allow agencies to work inside of these. Instead, OLS seeks permission from the parties to provide assistance to the war-affected populations in all areas where security conditions permit. The review correctly pointed out that the key to OLS has been a flexible, highly efficient security umbrella that allows agencies to operate in active conflict zones. Agencies in Sudan have been able to work in areas threatened by insecurity because the security umbrella is capable of immediately evacuating at-risk personnel. In terms of its legal framework, OLS operates within the tripartite framework established by the 1994 IGADD Agreement as well as on the basis of the "useful" practices that have developed over ten-year course of the operation.” (UN OLS 29 January 1999)

While the evaluation itself characterises OLS as a safe area programme in South Sudan:

“From the end of 1992, following the involvement of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), OLS has developed into a form of safe area programme in South Sudan. In place of military protection, however, access has depended on the vulnerability of the warring parties to international pressure. In the case of the GOS, this has largely been the wish to avoid punitive diplomatic action. For the opposition movements, the courting of international recognition has been central.

Hence, international pressure has been crucial for the continued operation of OLS, and is a distinguishing feature of the operation in terms of the replicability of the OLS model. Another distinguishing feature of OLS is that in contrast to many other contexts, the operation has developed in a situation where central authority has not collapsed. Rather, the present government gives every appearance of shaping a Process of institutional change and consolidation.

[…] During the initial phase of OLS, emphasis was placed on a series of ad hoc arrangements that promised access to war-affected populations wherever they may be. From 1992, while agreements remained ambiguous, there has been a growing formality, and, significantly, a tendency to interpret access as relating to specific war-affected areas only. In other words, there has been a definitional shift in OLS from principle to geography. This has major implications for OLS's modus operandi.

[…] From the end of 1992, the non-governmental areas of South Sudan emerged as a form of 'safe area'. While lacking military protection - for example, through UN Peacekeeping troops - a sophisticated security apparatus has nevertheless emerged which monitors the level of insecurity for humanitarian operations in the conflict zones. This monitoring has allowed for the development of a system of flexible access for humanitarian aid in the context of ongoing warfare. In place of military protection, access has been maintained through the vulnerability of the warring parties to international pressure. In the case of the GOS, this has largely been the fear of punitive diplomatic action. For the opposition movements, the courting of international recognition is involved.” (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 21, 22, 33)

The OLS review points to problems of access associated with government control of the OLS Northern Sector operations:

“[T]he scope of coverage of OLS Northern Sector is determined not by overall needs, but by negotiated agreements with the GOS which delimit the areas OLS can formally access. More specifically, needs assessments - which define the scope of OLS in any given year are limited to sites that have been agreed by
the RRC [Relief and Rehabilitation Commission]. This has led to considerable unevenness in coverage; for example, war-displaced populations in Greater Khartoum were excluded from OLS needs assessments until 1994; at present, only those war-displaced living in GOS recognized displaced camps are included in OLS, while displaced living in unofficial settlements continue to be excluded. […]

In the case of the Nuba Mountains, WFP is using OLS resources to respond to needs in areas where the GOS has facilitated access, despite the fact that these areas have been systematically excluded from formal agreements, and despite on-going efforts by the UN to negotiate their inclusion […].

Hence, government control over the scope of OLS needs assessments allows for the formal exclusion of certain sites from the framework of OLS agreements. At the same time, by extending access selectively outside the OLS framework, the GOS is de facto sidestepping the application of OLS principles, while still obtaining its resources. Moreover, in the case of the Nuba Mountains, efforts by the UNHCU to promote strict adherence to OLS principles were eclipsed by WFP and UNICEF’s sense of obligation to respond operationally to urgent needs in the area […].” (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 89-90)

“The United Nations has made separate bilateral agreements with the government of Sudan and the country’s main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army, to allow it to provide humanitarian aid in Kassala State and Southern Blue Nile.

Martin Dawes, spokesman for the UN-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), told IRIN on Wednesday that in a series of meetings held from 17-19 January in Nairobi, the UN had been invited to conduct interventions in both areas, which fell outside the traditional mandate of OLS.” (IRIN, 22 January 2003)

**MSF similarly questions the influence given to the rebel movements in the OLS framework:**

"OLS operates under a tripartite agreement signed by the government, the rebel movements and the UN. It delegates and recognises a role for the humanitarian wings of the rebel movements in the organisation of relief supplies.

This is in itself a dubious practice as it is in their nature to continue to promote the political and military interests of their movements. The unfortunate reality is that by breaking or manipulating the OLS agreement, the government and other warring parties have consistently and successfully denied humanitarian access to many regions of both North and South Sudan (the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile and Western Upper Nile). This breach of the access agreement played a critical role in limiting the humanitarian response to the 1998 famine, particularly in the Bahr el Ghazal region.

[...] The ultimate conclusion to be reached from the experience of this terrible famine [in Bahr el Ghazal in 1998] is that the OLS system, which has been in place for the past ten years, has become overly institutionalised and must be overhauled. Indeed, the inadequacies of the OLS framework significantly contributed to the inability of the humanitarian organisations to reach the most vulnerable because they were not permitted to carry out independent needs' assessments (including estimating population numbers), to control distributions or to conduct post-distribution monitoring. At the beginning of 1999 MSF therefore called for radical changes to the OLS and hopes that these will eventually be implemented." (MSF 23 December 1999)

See also "Accords reached between the UN, Government and SPLM about access and protection of aid workers (1999)"

To view the three Protocols signed between the UN, GOS and SPLM/A see annex V of CAP 2003 click here [External Link]
**Cease-Fire in the Nuba Mountains has been extended until mid-2003 (January 2003)**

- Danforth’s Zones and Periods of Tranquility were efficient measures
- Cease fire is monitored thorough the Joint Militray Commission (JMC)/Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM)
- 19th January 2002 Nuba cease-fire agreement between SPLA and GoS is signed
- GoS violates the 19 January cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains
- 5th of March expected arrival of the International Monitoring Team in Sudan
- Khartoum accepts proposal from the US peace envoy to ensure to protection of civilians against military attacks as well as verification mechanisms to deal with reports of attacks
- The new agreement comes after 20 February helicopter gunship on civilians in the oil fields
- As government announces halt on air strikes, SPLA accuses it of burning 14 villages

"On a more positive note, Senator John Danforth’s ‘four points’ represented a significant development and a window of opportunity for peace in the Sudan. As confidence building measures, the GoS and the SPLM agreed to a military stand-down in the Nuba Mountains. This was to allow for the implementation of a humanitarian relief and rehabilitation programme, the Zones and Periods of Tranquillity (ZoT and PoT) and to facilitate poliomyelitis immunisation, guinea worm eradication and Rinderpest surveillance and eradication. It also aimed at the prevention and eradication of abduction and forced servitude throughout the Sudan as well as an agreement to halt aerial bombardment of civilian targets.

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The signing of the cease-fire agreement for the Nuba Mountains in January 2002, a direct outcome of Senator Danforth’s initiatives, was a major breakthrough. The agreement provided for the free movement of civilians and goods throughout the Nuba Mountains region under the international supervision of the Joint Military Commission (JMC)/Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM). It aimed to promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict between the GoS and the SPLM/A and various ethnic groups. In July 2002 the two parties agreed on an extension of the internationally monitored cease-fire for an additional six months. Based on an assessment of critical needs in both GoS and SPLM/A controlled areas, an inter-agency operational framework known as the Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) was drafted, which promoted a principled approach to assistance in support of the Nuba people’s capacity for self-reliance.

Other positive outcomes of Senator Danforth’s initiatives included the visit by the international Eminent Persons Abduction and Slavery Committee to Sudan, which made recommendations for action to eradicate abduction and forced servitude. Additionally, some progress was made with respect to Periods of Tranquility. Since March 2002 the GoS has allowed the UN access to denied locations at the latter's own risk, but only for polio immunisation and surveillance.” (UN, November 2002, p3-4)

"Danforth has proposed four confidence-building measures: calling for a cease-fire while granting humanitarian access to the Nuba mountains; creating zones of tranquility, allowing aid workers to carry out a nationwide immunization program; appointing an international commission to investigate charges of slavery; and cessation of the government's policy of aerial bombardment of civilians. The first three are under way, and in the Swiss Alps the US and Switzerland are facilitating permanent cease-fire talks in the Nuba Mountains.

But the bombardments continue, to Danforth's disappointment. The Khartoum government justifies the practice, saying the rebels, who are fighting for independence from the Islamist north, hide in hospitals, schools, and relief sites before launching attacks.

"There is no meaning for prospects of peace and for US involvement in peace if there is no understanding on something as absolutely basic and consistent with the Geneva Conventions as the immunity of civilians from military attacks," Danforth warned. "[…]"
The Khartoum government objects to what it considers a one-sided requirement of calling for an end to aerial bombardment (it is the only party in this conflict with an air force)." (IRIN, 14 January 2002, p.1)

"The military cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Kordofan, an agreement on which was signed in Switzerland on Saturday [19 Janvier 2002] after six days of negotiations between the Sudanese government and the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) Nuba region, entered into force at 12 noon (local time) on Tuesday, according to the Sudanese army." (IRIN, 22 January 2002, pp. 1-3).

Cease fire in the Nuba Mountains:

“The separate Nuba Mountains cease-fire has been extended for a second time until mid-2003. There are indications that the Joint Military Commission (JMC) is performing better than it did in its early days, but there is a lack of communication and confidence between the aid industry and the JMC.” (SFP, January 2003, p.6)

“The Sudanese government and southern rebels have extended for the second time a ceasefire agreement in the Nuba Mountains region until mid-2003, according to news agencies. [...] The government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army -Nuba (SPLM/A-Nuba) originally signed the renewable six-month ceasefire in the 80,000 sq km Nuba Mountains region of Southern Kordofan State, on 19 January this year, following a proposal made by US peace envoy John Danforth. [...] The Nuba Mountains, however, is considered as a "transition area" between northern and southern and Sudan, and its status in any peace deal has yet to be decided upon. While the SPLM/A have claimed the region as part of the south, Khartoum says it has been part of the north for administrative purposes since independence in 1956, and should not take part in the southern self-determination process.” (IRIN, 24 December 2002)

"The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) claimed on Wednesday that Sudanese government forces had attacked its positions in the Nuba Mountains region of Southern Kordofan, south-central Sudan, violating for the second time a cease-fire agreement both parties had signed on 19 January. " (IRIN, 7 February 2002, pp. 1-2)

Khartoum accepts an amended proposal from the US peace envoy on stopping the targeting of civilians:

"The Sudanese government said on Monday that it had accepted an amended proposal from the United States aimed at stopping the targeting of civilians in the country's 19-year civil war.

"The new version is addressing the whole issue of protecting civilians instead of focusing only on aerial bombardment," said Ghazi Salah al-Din al-Atabani, the Sudanese presidential peace adviser, in a statement.

The scope of the US proposal has been widened beyond the issue of bombing attacks to include shelling, the taking of civilians as human shields and the use of civilian installations for military purposes, according to Atabani's statement, released by the Sudanese embassy in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi. [...] Robert Oakley, a former US ambassador and adviser to the US peace envoy to Sudan, John Danforth, said an agreement on protection of civilians had been reached with the Sudanese government, but that the papers had not yet been signed, United Press International (UPI) reported on Monday.

The agreement, if signed, would include "an international verification mechanism to deal with reports of attacks on civilians in contravention of the Geneva Convention", UPI quoted Oakley as saying.

The US proposal on ending attacks on civilians - one of four confidence-building measures suggested by Danforth in November - highlighted the problem of bombing attacks on civilian targets, but the envoy himself has said that the proposed verification mechanisms will not be limited to bombing.
Danforth called, in a press conference in Nairobi on 17 November, for the "cessation of bombing, artillery attacks and so on - helicopter gunship attacks - on innocent people, on civilians".

He stated in an article in the St Louis Post newspaper (in the US) in February that he had managed to reach formal agreement with Khartoum on: a cessation of hostilities and humanitarian access in the Nuba Mountains; zones and times of tranquillity to allow large-scale immunisations against polio, Guinea worm and rinderpest; and an undertaking to end the taking of slaves.

However, he said, he had not been able to reach formal agreement with Khartoum on measures to prevent attacks on civilians.

Following a Sudanese government helicopter gunship attack on a relief centre in the village of Bieh, western Upper Nile, on 20 February, the US said it was suspending peace discussions with Khartoum until it offered an explanation for the incident.

Khartoum later expressed its regrets, saying the attack was a mistake which occurred in the context of an escalation in military activity against oil extraction facilities by southern rebels.” (IRIN 5 March, 2002)

**Tripartite agreement about monthly Days of Tranquility and Zones of Peace to be implemented in 2002**

- The UN, GOS and SPLM/A agreed in principle to 4 Days of Tranquility monthly from November 2001
- Zones of Peace to be established for risk-free humanitarian relief delivery, cost-effectiveness and improved trade networks
- Cross-Line Movements by road and rail since long curtailed due to insecurity and mine-fields
- Safe river cross-lines explored

“The UN has proposed to both the GOS and the SPLM/A that they declare **Days of Tranquility** for four days early each month (the first Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday) to facilitate access to war-affected areas and denied locations, primarily for polio surveillance. Both sides have agreed in principle, the GOS through HE the President of the Sudan directly to UNUSG Humanitarian Affairs Mr Kenzo Oshima on 10 September 2001, the SPLM/A in writing on 9 November 2001.

[...] A related geographic-based concept which is currently being explored by the UN and its donor and other humanitarian partners for the Sudan, is that of **Zones of Peace**, whereby discrete areas straddling both GOS and SPLM/A-controlled adjoining territories would be identified and established for the risk-free delivery of humanitarian assistance to beneficiaries on both sides of the line.

A range of advantages would accrue, not least an enhancement of so-called cross-line activities, the consequent encouragement of confidence-building mechanisms, more cost-effective and equitable delivery of relief assistance, and even an improvement of trade links across dividing lines. (Even now there is some movement across lines of people, livestock, and trade goods.) To implement the concept will require close consultation with both the GOS and the SPLM/A, but preliminary soundings are positive. It will also be important to ensure that negative consequences do not accrue to such zones, for example if they should act as magnets for communities external to the zones, or if they should create unwanted dependencies.

**Cross-Line Movement:** The UN is seeking to take a fresh look at the whole issue of cross-line movement of supplies, services and personnel, including with the development of the afore-mentioned Zones of Peace.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 4)
Humanitarian access to be monitored by UN network of Field Security Officers (FSO’s) (2002)

- Security Officers to inform UN Designated Official for Security of the overall security situation
- FOS’s conducted 60 relocations of humanitarian workers and negotiated 64 illegal detentions
- GOS inconsistent "grave concern" about attacks on humanitarian workers while exposing them to aerial bombing

"An existing network of UN professional international and national security officers, based in Khartoum and Lokichoggio northern Kenya, at present provides the type of support that is necessary, and which at the same time provides reassurance to humanitarian assistance workers that their safety and security is of paramount importance.

In addition to more routine responsibilities, security officers analyse information and reports on security incidents, evaluate and advise on the suitability of field locations for the presence of humanitarian personnel, organise and direct relocations and evacuations of staff as appropriate, accompany staff on field missions where appropriate, and monitor compliance of security regulations and agreements by national and local authorities and by staff. They further assess whether a humanitarian intervention in a given area may put beneficiaries at greater risk or not. Security officers ensure that the office of the UN Designated Official for security in the Sudan is kept closely informed of the overall security situation and operational environment, and of security incidents as and when they occur.

Adequate funding from Donor Governments and organisations is critical to the successful continuation of this umbrella of safety and protection for humanitarian assistance personnel and for the success of the overall humanitarian operation in the Sudan.” (UN November 2001, p. 12)

FSO’s specific activities 2000:
In the southern sector where at any given time there are more than 550 humanitarian assistance workers in the field in almost 100 locations, the UN security umbrella remains critical to the safety and welfare of staff. For example during the course of the year 2000, FSO’s in the southern sector inter alia carried out more than 60 relocations of humanitarian workers for emergency and/or preventative reasons, negotiated two hostage situations and 64 illegal detentions. (The greater part of such activities is necessarily by air, which is relatively expensive.) A similar pattern has persisted through 2001, and to date insecurity is still acute.

[...]

At various times both of the major parties to conflict, namely the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), have pledged their support for the protection of humanitarian assistance personnel, including under the auspices of a Security Protocol agreed to by the trilateral (GOS, SPLM and UN) Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) at its meeting in November 1998 in Rome Italy. The GOS has expressed its ""grave concern" in UN fora about attacks on humanitarian workers, while at the same time exposing such workers to risk in aerial bombing attacks by their military forces. The behaviour of militia forces allied to one side or the other or even acting independently is often uncertain and unpredictable.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 5)

1998 TCHA Security Agreement between UN, GoS and SPLM still not fully implemented (Nov 2001)

- Unsuccessful surface means aid deliveries (2001)
- Landmines on roads major impediment for cross-line deliveries
• International Advisory Committee reiterates the rights of beneficiaries to receive and retain humanitarian assistance

• UN continues to promote “free and unimpeded access to all war-affected populations in need of assistance” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 4)

• Government of Sudan, SPLM and the UN sign security protocol and minimum operational standards for use of rail and cross-line road corridors (Nov 1998)

“The [1998] protocols and agreements on cross-line corridors, beneficiary rights and security reached during previous meetings of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Affairs (TCHA) were reviewed at the fourth meeting of the Committee in Geneva in November 2000. Prior to this the key agreements had been assembled in pocket booklet form in both English and Arabic, and are distributed on a continuing basis throughout the areas of the humanitarian operation. Nonetheless, progress in implementing these agreements has been slow, which in turn has limited modes of delivery and cost-effectiveness. Efforts by the parties concerned - UN, Government of the Sudan, and SPLM/A - to achieve cross-line deliveries by road, rail or river in the past year, have not been successful. Insecurity along the proposed river and rail corridors and the presence of landmines on roads, are among the major impediments to the achievement of cross-line movement, which among other things could ease the prohibitive costs of deliveries by air.” (UN November 2001, p 4)

“Fundamental human rights norms and humanitarian principles oblige all parties to recognise, respect and promote such basic entitlements as the right to humanitarian assistance, the right to protection, and non-conditionality. Intended beneficiaries must be able to express their needs and be able to receive and retain humanitarian assistance; all civilian populations are entitled to respect for their human rights; and humanitarian assistance must not be used in a negative manner to influence the actions of parties to conflict.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 6)

“The UN also continues to push for “free and unimpeded access to all war-affected populations in need of assistance”, as agreed to by the GOS (and the SPLM) at meetings of the trilateral (UN, GOS, and SPLM) Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA). The TCHA has met four times since November 1998, with the last in Geneva in November 2000. The next meeting is tentatively planned for sometime in the new year 2002.” (UN IAC December 2001, Item 4)

"At a meeting of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA), convened in November [1998] at the request of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Government of Sudan, SPLM and the UN signed a security protocol and minimum operational standards for use of rail and cross-line road corridors. These agreements, the first OLS documents signed since the 1994 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and Drought (IGADD) access agreement, outline the minimum standards which must be met to facilitate assistance along rail and cross-line road corridors. Negotiations concerning the use of these corridors will continue in 1999.” (UN January 1999, "Year in Review")

"[At the 25-26 May 1999 meeting of the TCHA held in Oslo, Norway] both parties reconfirmed their commitment to full implementation of the November 1998 protocol. Both parties also confirmed their willingness to work with OLS representatives to address outstanding issues in an expeditious and timely manner.

**Expanded use of surface corridors:** both parties reconfirmed their commitment to the November 1998 TCHA protocol on minimum operational standards for rail and cross-line road corridors. At the conclusion of their deliberations, the Heads of the respective delegations signed with the UN an implementation plan for the Babanusa-Wau rail corridor and a model implementation plan for cross-line road corridors. Upon the successful operationalisation of the Lokichokio – Kapoeta cross-line road corridor, the modalities developed in this Model Implementation Plan will be applied to additional corridors.
In order to prevent a reoccurrence of incidents similar to the 18 May attack on the WFP barge convoy, the Sudanese Government and SPLM delegations committed themselves to taking all necessary measures to guarantee the safety and security of OLS personnel and property in all geographical areas under their respective control. They will also ensure that those who are allied with them and armed will act accordingly.7 (UN July 1999, p.2)
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response

GoS held national workshop on internally displaced persons (Sept.-Oct. 2002)

- Sudan’s Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs argued Sudan was among the first countries to adopt clear guidelines to answer problems of displacement
- Main objective of the workshop was to review existing national policy and arrangements pertaining to IDPs
- That the causes and socio-economic consequences of displacement need to be monitored and analysed and information shared with the international community
- Future objectives included return in areas of origin, resettlement in ‘reasonable’ areas, local integration
- Workshop participants recommended to establish an IDP Support Fund
- It was suggested that the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) be up-graded to a full fledged Federal Ministry responsible for supervision and coordination of the IDP programmes
- GoS engages to provide IDPs with legal and moral protection and seek international community’s for humanitarian assistance

“The workshop was then addressed by Dr. Sulaf Eddin Salih Mohamed, Commissioner for Humanitarian Affairs. The Commissioner drew the workshop participants’ attention to the decision No. 310 made by the Council of Ministers in 1988, concerning necessary solutions for the problems of displacement. Accordingly, the Commissioner explained, Sudan has been among the foremost of countries that adopted clear policy guidelines regarding the problems of displacement, following the very First National Conference on the Displaced in 1990. He then urged the participants of the workshop to closely review the funding of the 1990 conference and other past experiences to the benefit of developing newer, more viable responses to the challenge of displacement; especially as the country is now moving toward the restoration of peace.

[...] Referring to the objectives of the workshop committee, the chairman explained that the present workshop comes as a continuation to efforts that have been on-going since the early 1980s; and that its principal objective was to review the country’s policy and practical arrangements for responding to the challenge of displacement and the problems facing internally displaced persons. This objective, the chairman said, was to be attained in the light of available experience; and in the context of the presently fast changing circumstances. And that the vision emerging from the workshop will be subsequently presented at the up-coming IGAD Conference on Internal Displacement.

[...] The Basic Principles for a National Policy on Displacement

The policy of Sudan towards displacement basically derives from the country’s constitution and its cultural heritage. According to Sudan’s constitution, all Sudanese citizens are (as individuals) completely free to move within the boarders of the country (and beyond, if they wish). However, the national authorities in Sudan also appreciate the variety of compelling reasons that have driven whole communities away from their habitual places of residence and to become IDPs. And the current policy on Displacement is therefore consisting of the following six principles:
IDPs resettlement programmes should be backed up with simultaneous efforts of rehabilitation and development.

The root causes of displacement should be subjected to in-depth study and analysis for effective response to problems involved.

The socio-economic and security related effects of displacement should be closely monitored and analyzed.

The international community should be timely informed with the human problems of displacement and with projects intended for responding to them.

[...]

**National Policy Objectives on IDPs**

Effectively response to the phenomenon of displacement.

Strengthening the sense of national unity and the promotion of peace culture.

Mobilization of a nation-wide citizen support positively address the displacement phenomenon.

The active search for national consensus regarding alternative solutions to problems of displacement.

The encouragement of voluntary return of the IDPs to their original (habitual) places of residence.

1. Return of IDPs to their original places of residence.
2. Resettlement of IDPs in reasonable new places (e.g. Sanam El Naga in south Darfur).
3. Integration of IDPs into local communities.

[...]

The paper coupled this later proposal with yet another one that calls for the implementation of an earlier recommendation (made by the First National Conference on Displacement in 1988) demanding the establishment of an IDPs Support Fund to be started up through a presidentially inaugurated fund-raising campaign.

In conclusion, the speaker [Secretary General of the Sudanese Red Crescent] identified three options that are eventually faced by both IDPs and the Government proposed policy improvement, the last paper specifically suggested that the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) be made fully responsible for supervision and coordination of the IDPs programme nationally and at state levels, as well as in co-operating with the relevant UN Agencies and the national voluntary organizations. And that, accordingly, should entail up-grading HAC to a full fledged Federal Ministry consisting of a department of IDPs Affairs (among other functions) and provided with adequate budgetary conference on Displacement (1990) and subsequently consultations that have continued locally, regionally and internationally

[...]  

**Outline of GoS’s responsibilities:**

*Firstly,* The Government undertakes to ensure the safety and protection of all IDPs as citizen who happen to have been forced to flee their habitual residence areas by catastrophic events such as war and natural disasters. And as such IDPs are morally and legally entitled to full protection by government and society, and safeguard of their human dignity as well as their material and social welfare.

*Secondly,* Government shall, in co-operation with the international community (as represented in the United Nations and Voluntary Organizations) endeavour to assist IDPs with respect to livelihoods, and in further development of their individual capacity and skills, so as to enable them to contribute to their own self development and resettlement once peace has been realized.

*Thirdly,* The Government shall ensure the welfare of IDPs through providing them with basic social services, including primary health care, education and training, clean drinking water and reasonable shelter.
Fourthly, The Govern shall endeavour to formulate plan, programmes and projects to support IDPs. And the international and regional communities shall be invited by the country’s Government to contribute to such endeavours with humanitarian assistance as may be needed, but without interference with the national sovereignty of the country.

Fifthly, Displacement should be regarded as a temporary situation that results in distinctly difficult economic, social and psychological conditions for the IDPs, and therefore necessitate special attention and care by Government.

Sixthly, Government shall, in co-operation with the international community, attempt to integrate the effort for rehabilitation with that directed to development. Such an approach is deemed particularly important to safeguard against potential dependency and to promote self-reliance in livelihoods and the spirit for future participation in local community development by IDPs.” (GoS, 1 October 2002, pp. 1,2, 4,5,7)

**Limited response by the Government towards the plight of IDPs (2002)**

- Response to IDPs from the HAC remains based on a natural disasters approach Ad hoc and isolated government response to IDPs reflects absence of government policy in addressing protection and assistance for IDPs
- Some government officials consider IDPs are economic migrants
- Absence of focal point for IDPs in Sudan deters donor response
- Sudan Minister for Foreign Affairs said that a department focusing on IDPs was to be established within Sudan's Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
- The Director of the Peace Unit of HAC met with the UNDP focal point for internally displaced to start collecting information about official IDP policies existing
- Operation Lifeline Sudan renegotiated in 1994 with the concurrence of both the Sudanese government and the SPLM/SPLA but reported that Government has bent the rules in its own favor
- Principle of free access not fully implemented in Government held areas

“During 2002, HAC supported by WFP established its own early warning capacity and began producing monthly bulletins on levels of precipitation, vegetation and commodity prices. However, it focuses on natural phenomena rather than man-made risk factors.” (UN, November 2002, p. 21)

[…]Notwithstanding these concerns, the Representative found initiatives taken thus far to be, on the whole, positive. At the same time, however, it is also apparent that they are essentially ad hoc and their effects isolated in the sense that they are not part of a broader and more comprehensive and coherent national policy and strategy for dealing with the displacement crisis, with the support of and in cooperation with the international community. A coherent Government policy and strategy can provide a sound basis for international cooperation to significantly alleviate the plight of the millions of displaced persons in the country and to minimize further increases in their numbers.

[…]Indeed, the absence of any single document which articulates the Government’s policy and strategy for meeting the assistance and protection needs of the internally displaced was cited by members of the Government and the humanitarian community as a significant problem. The resulting lack of clarity on the Government’s objectives vis-à-vis meeting the needs of its displaced citizens, including the lack of a definition, agreed on by all relevant actors, of who constitutes an internally displaced person - with some members of the Government reportedly holding the view that the internally displaced should be considered as economic migrants - precludes the formulation of a common vision, and therefore of a common humanitarian strategy, by the Government and the international humanitarian assistance community. This,
In turn, it was noted, serves only to deter donors from funding humanitarian activities in the country more fully.

[...] In addition, the problem is further compounded by the absence of a focal point within the Government with express responsibility for the internally displaced. There does exist a Commission of Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (CVHW) at the level of the Khartoum State government and, at the federal level, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), which is based in the Ministry for International Cooperation. The CVHW and HAC function as the focal points for the humanitarian assistance community, including for those organizations assisting the internally displaced. Despite the existence of these two institutions, the lack of an interlocutor within the Government with specific and express responsibility for the internally displaced was cited by the United Nations country team as a serious problem.

[...] However, the Representative was informed by the Khartoum State Minister for Foreign Affairs that a department focusing on internally displaced persons was being established within HAC which would in due course formulate guidelines for programming in regard to the displaced. It was envisaged that this new department would provide the entry point for the international community in dealing with the internally displaced and that it would cooperate with the international community in a spirit of positive engagement.”

[...] Developments back in the Sudan following the mission also appear to be encouraging. The Representative was informed in December 2001 that the Peace Unit of HAC has been delegated by the Minister for International Cooperation to act as focal point for the comprehensive study and the development of a national policy on internally displaced persons. The focal point for internally displaced persons in UNDP-Khartoum met with the Director of the Peace Unit and was informed of the steps which were to be taken in this regard and which will commence with the collection of information on existing policies pertaining to the internally displaced from all relevant federal ministries, State governments and departments. On the basis of the information collected, a comprehensive report will be produced and discussed at different levels of the Government. A task force would be established comprising government personnel, practitioners and academics, charged with producing a draft policy document on internally displaced persons which would be discussed at an internal government seminar. At this stage, representatives of United Nations agencies could be invited to assist in further developing the draft policy. The draft policy would ultimately be reviewed at a more inclusive national seminar on internal displacement, which would include participants from the Government, United Nations agencies, NGOs and representatives of the internally displaced. It was envisaged that the information collection and analysis would be completed by February 2002 and that the national seminar would be convened two months later, possibly in April.” (UNCHR 5 February 2002, para. 29-32, 39)

"In 1993 the representative of the secretary-general on internally displaced persons, Francis Deng, visited the Sudan and made a number of proposals aimed at improving the situation of internally displaced Sudanese that the government agreed to implement. In September 1994, Deng wrote to the Sudanese authorities to inquire about its progress. In its response, the government reaffirmed its commitment to implement the proposals in the representative's report, although in reality it had done little or nothing. The UN has not taken any stronger measures to ensure these recommendations are implemented beyond the adoption of resolutions.

[...] The OLS [Operation Lifeline Sudan] charter was renegotiated in 1994 with the concurrence of both the Sudanese government and the SPLM/SPLA. Since then, however, the NIF government has bent the rules in its own favor, without any effective opposition from OLS's managers. An independent review of OLS undertaken in 1996 at the request of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) found that the principle of permitting OLS access to war-affected people irrespective of who controlled the territory in which they were located had 'never been fully implemented especially in GOS [Government of the Sudan-controlled] areas.' The review noted that while OLS agreements continue to refer to the principle of free access, in reality 'UN coordination is confined to those non-government [controlled] areas that the GOS is willing to agree are both 'war-affected' and beyond its control.” (Ruiz 1998, p.158)
Seminar on internal displacement in Southern Sudan with SPLM/A (Nov 2002)

- Aims of the seminar: raise awareness of IDPs needs in SPLM/A controlled areas and increase non-state actors’ accountability with international humanitarian and human rights standards
- The seminar is an effort to engage non-state actors to assume its responsibility for the protection of IDPs
- Requesting non-state actors for accountability of on the basis of international humanitarian and human rights law does not grant them legitimacy
- 3 main purposes: 1) Analyse displacement in southern Sudan
- 2) Find ways to apply the guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in areas of SPLM/A control
- 3) Develop strategies to support return and reintegration of IDPs
- Main recommendations: coordination of assistance and return policies between SPLM/A, GOS and international organisations
- Return must be voluntary and host communities should not discriminate returnees
- Donors should increase their involvement in southern Sudan regardless of peace

“Its overall purpose was to try to promote greater attention to the needs of internally displaced populations living in areas controlled by non-state actors.

[…]

Another major purpose of the seminar was to increase non-state actor accountability with the international humanitarian and human rights standards restated in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Non-state actors as well as state actors are often responsible for the displacement of people and the violation of their human rights. Yet UN agencies often have been reluctant to deal with insurgents, fearing that this might end legitimacy to the rebel movements and offend the government concerned.

[…]

Purpose of the Seminar

Utilizing the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement as its framework, this seminar as three main objectives: 1) to review the situation of internal displacement globally, with particular reference to southern Sudan; 2) to discuss the reception of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and recent initiatives to apply them in southern Sudan, in particular in areas under the control of the SPLM/A; and 3) to stimulate the further development of strategies, with particular regard to return, resettlement and reintegration, and reinforce local capacities for addressing internal displacement.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.1, 22)

“Participants in the seminar made the following recommendations:

1. The SPLM/A should adopt and implement the draft policy on internal displacement developed in September 2002 which was based on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The international community should encourage and support the SPLM/A as it engages with international human rights standards.

2. International humanitarian organizations, local NGOs and the SPLM/A should work together to develop accurate data on displacement in southern Sudan and to coordinate their programs of assistance and protection for the internally displaced.

3. The SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan should coordinate their return policies in the event of peace. The SPLM/A should raise this issue at the next meeting of the Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance.

4. Partnerships should also be forged among local authorities, international humanitarian organizations and civil society to facilitate return and build local capacity.

5. All actors should ensure that the return and resettlement of displaced persons are voluntary, safe and in dignity. To this end, local peace processes could facilitate reconciliation among communities and
clans and foster voluntary and safe returns. Programs designed to assist returning and resettling displaced persons should enlist the participation of host communities and ensure that their needs are taken into account. For their part, local communities should make efforts to eliminate discrimination against returnees and the displaced.

6. International donors should increase their involvement in southern Sudan, especially in the event of large-scale return, but regardless of whether or not there is a peace agreement. To this end, international agencies and the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons should hold discussions with the donor community.

7. The SPLM/A should share relevant security information with local civil society and international humanitarian organizations to assist in the protection of the internally displaced. Special attention should be paid to the protection and assistance needs of women, children and the disabled.

8. Humanitarian agencies should be granted immediate access to displaced persons wherever they may be found to promote assistance and protection to those at risk.

Concluding Comment

It should be reiterated in conclusion that the Rumbek seminar set a very positive example in that the Representative of the Secretary-General in collaboration with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations and, in particular, with the cooperation of the government, engaged a non-state actor to assume its responsibility for the protection of internally displaced persons in accordance with the principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, as restated in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. It has been widely accepted that in addition to state actors, non-state actors are also often responsible for the displacement of people and for the violations of their human rights. The logic of attributing responsibility for displacement and human rights violations to non-state actors is to hold them accountable on the basis of internationally established standards without necessarily implying according them legitimacy in international law. The Guiding Principles make this very explicit and Sudan offers a good example of the practical application of the Principles to non-state actors.

[...]

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate that governments are not the only ones with responsibility towards the displaced. A significant portion of the world’s displaced populations live in areas under the control of non-state actors. Despite the fact that non-state actors are not formally bound by international treaties and commitments, international humanitarian and human rights standards, as restated in the Guiding Principles, apply to both governments and non-state actors. It is my sincere hope that today’s seminar, building upon recent efforts to promote and disseminate the Guiding Principles in southern Sudan, will contribute significantly toward the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced in the southern Sudan, including the prospects for post-conflict return programs.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, p.1, 11-13)

To access the full Rumbek Seminar report (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002) see bibliography below.

New draft SPLM/A Policy on Internal Displacement (Nov 2002)

- Training seminar for SPLM/A on the GP led to draft policy for displaced people to be considered by SPLM/A leadership (September 2002)
- SPLM/A affirmed commitment to international Conventions on Human Rights (1998)

“Mr. Malok reported that at a training seminar for SPLM/A personnel on the Guiding Principles, conducted in September 2002 by the OCHA IDP Unit with the assistance of the Office of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, a policy on internal displacement based on the Guiding Principles had been drafted and presented to him for consideration by the SPLM/A leadership. […]

Mr. Malok noted that because his energies and those of the SPLM/A leadership had been focused on the peace talks in Machakos, he had not yet presented the draft policy for approval. However, he assured the participants that he intended to formally present the draft to the SPLM/A leadership prior to the resumption
of peace talks scheduled for January 6, 2003, and hoped to have the policy adopted soon thereafter.” (Brookings/Ect, 25 November 2002, pp.5-6)

“The SPLM/A is one of a handful of non-state actors worldwide that has pledged to adhere to the standards of international human rights and humanitarian law. In 1995, the SPLM/A pledged to support the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions and Optional Protocols by signing the Agreement on Ground Rules with Operation Lifeline Sudan. In a 1998 reaffirmation of its commitment, the SPLM/A declared that “the movement stands in support and respect of international Conventions on Human Rights and similar international protocols on human rights.” [...] The relief wings of other non-state armed actors operating in southern Sudan have similarly signed cooperative agreements with OLS. In 1996, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that the SPLM/A was observing the basic laws of war by granting the agency access to some prisoners of war.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, p.23)

**Limited capacity of the relief wing of the SPLM/ SPLA (1999)**

- The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), established to co-ordinate and facilitate humanitarian relief assistance and rehabilitation intervention in SPLM/A controlled areas of Sudan
- Lack of resources has caused the SRRA to be an extremely weak humanitarian assistance organisation
- SPLM lacks political will to accord priority to the development of the SRRA

"The Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) as the relief wing of the SPLM/ SPLA was primarily established in 1985, to co-ordinate and facilitate humanitarian relief assistance and rehabilitation intervention in SPLM/A controlled areas of Sudan.

As the South Sudanese lead agency in the coordination of the humanitarian intervention in SPLM administered areas, SRRA’s work involves making a continuos appraisal of the humanitarian situation, participating in specific needs assessment, providing guidance in the determination of areas or sectors for interventions, providing support to intervening organisations, monitoring and evaluation of programmes, general advocacy on behalf of the civil population at the international level. SRRA is charged with the task of maintaining public relations with visiting senior government officials of donor governments and policy level headquarters personnel of NGO’s operating in SPLM administered areas. It liaises with SPLM/A on security matters and generally SRRA serves as the interface between humanitarian organisations and SPLM/A. These roles and functions will continue to be executed in 1999.

Unfortunately the SPLM lack of resources has caused the SRRA to be an extremely weak humanitarian assistance organisation. Some of the cause for this apparently lies with the lack of political will of the SPLM to accord priority to the development of the SRRA. And finally the cause lies with the fact that many of the few South Sudanese who received education have fled the area because of the war and moved to other countries in Africa, Europe, Canada and the USA. Due to these reasons the SRRA as the humanitarian arm of the SPLM is a much weaker organisation than the comparable organisational structures we experienced in the liberation wars of Eritrea and Ethiopia. For the NPA it is a very important political and development objective to contribute to a change of this situation.” (NPA January 1999, p.23)

**Outline of the governmental structure for assistance to IDPs (1996)**

- Individual states have responsibility for relief matters within their territory
- Complex working relationship between state and federal governments
Provision of basic services has largely been delegated to NGOs

"GOS structures responsible for relief policy in Sudan have undergone significant changes since OLS began in 1989. Under the Federal Constitution, individual states have been granted responsibility for relief matters within their territory. These responsibilities are discharged through committees operating at state, provincial, and local level. At federal level, the RRC [Relief and Rehabilitation Committee] in Khartoum is responsible for overall coordination of relief resources, and, also has RRC offices located in the capital of each state, and in some cases in provincial capitals.

In practice, what these changes have meant is that additional layers of authority between the beneficiaries and OLS agencies have been created, and that the particular configuration of authorities responsible for relief matters in a given area is complex. For example, in South Darfur, state bodies responsible for the war-displaced include the Department of the Displaced, in charge of developing state-wide policies, and the Food Security Committee, in charge of monitoring food needs and the allocation of aid resources. The Department of the Displaced liaises with the state RRC office, which also participates in needs assessments [...]. It is not clear, however, how agreements are reached between state and federal governments. The RRC office for South Darfur noted, for example, that they do not receive the results of needs assessments, nor of allocations that are likely to be received in Ed Da'ein Province.

[...] What is apparent from this overview is both the complexity of government structures, and the large number of government authorities and committees involved in relief assistance. Several points are worth noting in this regard.

First, the number of government authorities with responsibility for managing OLS resources has increased. This means additional administrative layers have been created between UN agencies and OLS beneficiaries. Further, despite the number of authorities that exist, very few government services are actually provided in Ed Da'en, Wau, and Khartoum. Instead, the provision of basic services has largely been delegated to NGOs.

Second, in some locations local committees are obtaining material benefit through the management of relief operations, which can also be seen as a factor contributing to the increase in their number. In Wau for example, the committee which oversees the distribution of WFP food in the displaced camps is composed of five Local Relief Committee members (representing four organisations), three people from Public Security, eight porters, drivers, and support staff, four members of the National Youth, and one WFP monitor. In exchange for facilitating distributions, this committee receives 40 sacks (two metric tons) of sorghum, ten sacks of pulses, and 16 gallons of oil per distribution [...]." (Hendrie et al. 1996, pp. 91-93)

**National policy towards IDPs in the North (1988)**

- Attempts have been made to combine provision of relief with programmes to facilitate rural integration and resettlement
- Expressed policy in the late 1980s to create "paired villages" of IDPs next to existing villages, but a strategy of more isolated "peace villages" has been pursued systematically since 1991

"Since the late 1980s, GOS welfare policy for the war-displaced has combined the provision of relief with programmes to facilitate rural integration and resettlement, and the upgrading of informal urban settlements. [...]

[Paired Villages]
GOS and UN policy toward the war-displaced in North Sudan was formulated in response to internal displacement from Bahr el-Ghazal in 1988. In South Darfur, the GOS, with the support of the UN, developed what was considered at the time to be an innovative response to internal displacement, by creating "paired villages" next to existing villages.

At present [1996], there appears to be a shift in GOS policy towards paired villages, whereby the camp structure is to be dismantled and the Dinka [who have moved from Dahr Al Ghazal to South Darfour] fully integrated into the host community. Underpinning this shift seems to be an attempt to normalise the situation of the displaced. A Member of the State Parliament resident in Adila reported that:

When we met with the Secretary-General of the Supreme Peace Council, he said we were not to call them "displaced" any more. Why are people trying to make the displaced special? Government policy is for them to be integrated into the population. A policy was passed at a conference in 1993 when the Secretary General of the Supreme Peace Council said that services had to be uniform [for] displaced and host communities[…].

There is little indication, however, that paired villages will be dismantled. On the other hand, evidence from Wau suggests that normalisation may involve reducing people's entitlements to relief, but not necessarily expanding their access to land. Given the importance to the host community of cheap labour for agriculture, a reduction in relief needs to be assessed in relation to the state of the labour market in the province. […]

[Peace Villages]
As government-held territory has expanded, government strategy has involved the relocation and settlement of war-displaced into "peace villages". Although settlement of war-displaced near their area of origin was an explicit objective of the 1989 OLS Plan of Action, "peace villages" involved the physical separation of the war-displaced from other kinds of populations.

The idea of peace villages has been developed most systematically since 1991, as part of the Governments idea of promoting "peace from within", and from the Comprehensive National Strategy aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in food production […].

[…]
Although proposals to establish five satellite camps in and around Wau were discussed in 1990 […], the idea of establishing distinct areas for the war-displaced did not become explicit government policy until 1992. Prior to this, war-displaced people were accommodated within Wau town, which was besieged on three sides by the SPLA. A distinction was made, however, between displaced people "with shelter" and those "without shelter"; those "with shelter" had relatives in the town with whom they could be accommodated, while those "without shelter" were mainly, but not exclusively, Dinka from the rural areas.

In 1991, weakened by their loss of bases in Ethiopia and by internal divisions, the SPLA began losing ground to the government in the South. In 1991, a new Governor was appointed to the region; his arrival in Wau signalled a change in government military strategy, and government policy toward the relief programme in Wau.

In October, the new Governor informed those displaced "without shelter" to prepare for relocation, and not to expect further relief flights (Deng, 199 1, October 10). In February 1992, the GOS launched a military offensive out of Wau; in April, those displaced "without shelter" were relocated to camps in Eastern Bank to the east of the town, and to Marial Ajith to the north.

The relocation of war-displaced populations in Wau to the camps was presented by the GOS as strategy to promote self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on external assistance. However, the decision was taken without consultation with the UN, NGOs, RRC, or the war-displaced themselves. The fact that these bodies in Wau were told about the plan by a military officer suggests that security concerns were also important. Security aspects of the proposed plan were not discussed with UN/NGOs on the grounds that security of the
displaced was not their concern [...]. In effect, the relocation of -war-displaced to camps on the periphery of the town served to consolidate the security zone around Wau.

In the town, free distribution of food was stopped and replaced by food sold at subsidised prices. By separating those "without shelter" from the town population, the Governor effectively reduced the total displaced population qualifying for relief assistance from an estimated 80,000 [...] to 5,000. As the focus of the relief operation moved from the town to the war-displaced camps, the visibility of OLS declined. Consequently, there is a perception in Wau today that the emergency ended in 1992 [...] Since then, only those war-displaced located in the camps are included in OLS annual assessments. This is despite the fact that grain prices in Wau remain the highest in the country, and that nutritional surveys indicate that malnutrition rates in the town are high." (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 186-189)

**Government policy towards IDPs in Khartoum (1996-1999)**

- Government policy towards the war-displaced has involved the demolition of informal settlements, and their relocation to temporary camps on the outskirts of the city
- Reported in 1998 that approximately three-quarters of a million persons have been forcibly removed from the Khartoum area since 1992

"Greater Khartoum has the single largest concentration of war-displaced in Sudan. In 1994, there were an estimated 800,000 people displaced by war living in the three cities which comprise the capital [...].

Since the late 1980s, government policy towards the war-displaced has involved the demolition of informal settlements, and their relocation to temporary camps on the outskirts of the city. This policy has been implemented with special vigour since February 1990 when, following a National Displaced Conference, the government announced its intention to clear the city of all unauthorised settlements; the displaced were to be relocated to temporary camps, to paired villages, or to agricultural production sites [...].

Relocations of war-displaced are forced, and have typically taken place without warning; they have also been accompanied by violence and the destruction of property. Since 1990, for example, some 39 people are reported to have been killed during the demolition of shelters [...]. New locations have also not been prepared in advance, and have lacked water supply, sanitation, and housing. The distance of many camps from areas of employment also means that opportunities for income-generation are limited. As a result high levels of malnutrition have been a feature of camp populations[...].

[...]

This rationale, however, does not account for the physical separation of the war-displaced, or legislation that distinguishes their legal and political rights from those of economic and drought migrants, and from the general population of Khartoum. The current legislative framework used by the GOS is an amendment to legislation introduced by the government of Sadiq el Mahadi. In 1987, the GOS drew a legal distinction between "squatters" and "displaced" persons. "Squatters" were defined as those persons who had arrived in the city before 1984, and who in theory had the right to settle in Khartoum. Three resettlement areas - known as "Dar es Salaam" or "peace cities" - were created in Khartoum, Khartoum North, and Orndurman to accommodate relocated squatters. In contrast, the "displaced" were defined as those persons who arrived after 1984. They were given no right of residence in Khartoum, no right to own land, and no right to construct permanent shelters. For this group, displaced camps later referred to as "peace camps" - were created [...]. In May 1990, Decree 941 of GOS redefined the "displaced" as those persons who had arrived in Khartoum after 1990."(Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 190-191)

"In the Khartoum area, government officials continued a forcible relocation policy during 1997. Approximately three-quarters of a million persons have been forcibly removed from the Khartoum area
since 1992, often at gunpoint. Many of the families were southern Sudanese who had migrated to Khartoum in the 1980s to escape war in their home areas. The displaced in Khartoum lived in official displaced-person camps, squatter areas, and settlement areas. The official camps, created by the government in 1991, have better health, water, and educational services than the other areas, where conditions are poor. The government demolished several camps during the year, however, in an effort to move the displaced to settlement areas.” (USCR 1998, p.96)

“The Special Rapporteur was made aware that, as part of a broader urbanization project, the Government has launched a programme to relocate the internally displaced from squatter settlements where living conditions are extremely poor to camps such as the one described above, offering a better infrastructure. According to allegations on the part of certain humanitarian agencies, it would appear that the relocation programme is being implemented through forcible methods, often at gunpoint and before alternative housing and other arrangements are put in place.” (UN Commission on Human Rights 17 May 1999, para.78)

**Coordination**

**Special measures for coordinating IDP response through the R/HC (Nov 2002)**

- OCHA will recruit a senior IDP advisor to conduct an IDP survey early 2003 IDP
- Early-warning information database will combine information on man-made risks and IDPs
- Humanitarian Information Center on IDP needs assessment to be established under the R/HC in collaboration of the HAC and SRRA
- Monthly Monitoring Reports have already been produced since August 2002
- Inter-departmental Working Group in Sudan including the OCHA IDP Unit was established at UN Headquarters to draw contingency planning for peace
- RC/HC oversees coordination of activities relating to IDPs together with UNDP, OCHA IDP Unit and Brookings Institute, CUNY Project
- Need to strengthen coordination with the GOS
- Weakness of coordination due to the fact that most senior staff are based outside Sudan

“In 2003, OCHA will undertake three additional tasks as requested by the UNCT and Inter-Agency Working Group on the Sudan (NY):

Lead an *Inter-agency Task Force on IDPs* aimed at identifying key issues that will need to be addressed, and the level and type of assistance that will be required for the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. OCHA will recruit a senior IDP Adviser (P-4) with information management and networking expertise to inter-alia lead an inter-agency IDP survey early-2003, enhance and supervise the maintenance of an inter-agency IDP database and work closely with local authorities to ensure effective joint planning of on-going, return and reintegration programmes for the displaced.

Coordinate the preparation of a comprehensive *UN contingency plan for demobilisation, disarmament, and rehabilitation (DDR)* by engaging DPA, DPKO and other UN departments in the process and by drawing upon best practices in other countries emerging from crisis. This will assist the local authorities and donor governments in identifying the main elements of a transitional assistance programme, including institutional arrangements that must be immediately established in the wake of a peace agreement.
Facilitate coordination and planning by overseeing the establishment and maintenance of an Humanitarian Information Network (www.humanet.org) that will act as a central, on-line repository and clearing-house of data/reports essential to the planning of humanitarian interventions. An extensive network of UN agency and NGO field offices will update the system. Early warning information will be combined with man-made risk factors and a database on IDPs that will be established end-2002 in collaboration with UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and IOM. Network outputs will be accessible via the local Humanet website, and will be linked to and mirrored by the Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) programme on OCHA’s ReliefWeb, and Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) websites.

Finally, OCHA will field two international Field Coordination Support Officers to the southern sector to assist HAC and SRRA in establishing planning committees to supervise OCHA field coordination offices and to expand data collection in support of the Humanitarian Information Network. These measures will strengthen OCHA’s capacity to monitor and evaluate the response of the humanitarian community, to identify and draw attention to critical gaps and potential duplication, and to identify opportunities for joint programming and for ensuring greater complementarity and cost-effectiveness.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 66-67)

“Strategy: Under the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, an action-oriented Humanitarian Information Centre and web-site will be established and maintained by several UN agencies, NGOs and OCHA to serve as inter-agency workspace and repository of needs assessments and situation reports by participating organisations. The Centre will consist of a database on IDPs and other vulnerable groups by area/sector; a migrant tracking and monitoring network, and IRIN Radio Network. The website and associated databases will be linked to and mirrored by www.reliefweb.int/ and a host of other web-sites participating in the Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) programme. The programme, to be undertaken in collaboration with HAC, relevant line ministries and with SRRA will develop information management tools for field reporting, standard instrumentation for joint assessments, web-based forums for posting survey reports by area, sector and affected group, and a contact directory of field practitioners to enable direct and immediate access to a pool of experts drawn from various agencies.

In August 2002, a network of UN, NGO and GoS/SPLM/A field units was established to provide daily, weekly and monthly Monitoring Reports on the crisis situation from various field locations in Sudan. Interagency measures have been taken to address the need for basic health and nutrition indicators as well as indicators of social decay and political risk. Other indicators will be incrementally reviewed and added as part of the collective effort.

[...]

Strategy: In August 2002, an informal inter-departmental Working Group on Sudan was established in UN Headquarters, New York with representation from DPA, DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, WFP and UNICEF. The Group, in close collaboration with the UN Country Team (UNCT) and IDP Policy Unit, Geneva and under the guidance and leadership of the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, was tasked with undertaking immediate contingency planning for a ceasefire and peace agreement. Meanwhile, a UN Secretary General’s Special Representative (SRSG), along with two Military Advisers and one Political Officer will be attending the Machakos peace talks when resumed. Regular briefing by the SRSG will become part of the contingency planning process, which will be organised by OCHA at country level. Programming staff from bilateral aid missions will need to become more engaged in planning sessions. In 2003, there are plans to increase their involvement through the HAF and inter-agency Task Force on IDPs. [...]

Area and sector reviews highlighted the fact that the needs or demand for assistance, far exceed present response or supply levels and that, where several agencies are seen to be engaged in one area and sector (Annex III), their total combined resources are still below the level required to meet minimum Sphere standards in disaster response. There is no evidence to suggest that projects included in the CA 2003 are redundant or duplicative of each other or of projects external to the CA. Quite the contrary is true. Within the UN system for example, the RC/HC oversees coordination of activities relating to IDP policy and programming through a division of tasks between UNDP, OCHA, the IDP Policy Unit (Geneva), the Brookings Institute, CUNY Project, and several implementing partners. Each agency has its own
comparative advantages, resources and responsibilities, which are pooled together through an Interagency Task Force to achieve maximum economies-of-scale and impact.

[...]

As regards UN-Government coordination, the two tend to meet only under circumstances of duress, when there is an issue of divergence to be resolved. Agencies and authorities have little experience in joint planning to achieve common goals and therefore they engage with a considerable degree of mutual suspicion and stereotyping. Another important weakness in the system is that the senior personnel of most agencies are based in Khartoum, Nairobi and Lokichoggio and far removed from the operations at hand. As a result, only junior staff sometimes with relatively little authority is available for coordination in the field. While there are fewer agencies and less complexity in any one-field location, there is a frequent need, often under life-threatening circumstances, for decisiveness and direction by seasoned professionals.” (UN, November 2002, p.22; 23 ; 26, 27 )

Overview of the UN coordination structure (2002)

- The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for UN coordination and the conduit to the coordination structures of the Government of the Sudan as well as opposition movements
- The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (South) is based in Nairobi and is also UNICEF Chief of Operations for southern Sudan
- The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (North) is based in Khartoum and is also the WFP Representative
- OCHA Sudan, formerly known as the UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU), serves as the secretariat for the HC
- There is a network of UN-OCHA Field Coordination offices in key locations throughout Sudan staffed by national officers
- FAO agreed to coordinate UNICEF agriculture, livestock and fisheries activities (2000)

"The Office of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan is at the core of the international humanitarian assistance framework in the Sudan, and represents the primary conduit to the coordination structures of the Government of the Sudan and the armed opposition movements. The Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for the overall supervision and direction of international humanitarian assistance operations, including policy formulation on key issues of programming, access, coordination, adherence to humanitarian principles, and resource mobilisation.

The Humanitarian Coordinator is assisted in these duties and responsibilities by two Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators: the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (South) is based in Nairobi Kenya for humanitarian operations in rebel-held areas subject to negotiated access agreements, and is also the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) Chief of Operations for southern Sudan; the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (North) is based in Khartoum and is also the WFP Representative and Country Director for the Sudan. […]

The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator, including through the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators, will continue to negotiate for unimpeded access to the intended beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance throughout the Sudan.” (UN November 2001, pp. 12-13)

"The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Sudan serves as the secretariat for the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, based in Khartoum. The Humanitarian Coordinator has two UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinators; the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (South) is based in Nairobi for humanitarian operations in rebel-held areas, which come under negotiated access agreements. The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (South) is also the UNICEF Chief of Operations for southern
Sudan. The OCHA Sudan in Nairobi office serves as Secretariat for this office. The Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (North) is based in Khartoum, and is also the WFP Country Director for the Sudan.

[...]

The Coordinator is also responsible for ensuring that humanitarian operations maintain high-quality programming and a principled approach. In addition, OCHA Sudan functions as a secretariat for the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan.

Under the supervision of the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (North), OCHA Sudan maintains an office in the national capital Khartoum, headed by the Chief of OCHA Sudan and supported by a complement of both international and national officers. OCHA Sudan in Nairobi works under the direct supervision of the UN Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator (South), and liaises closely with the Chief of OCHA Sudan in Khartoum.” (UN November 2001, pp. 110-112)

"Monitoring, financial management and administrative support is provided to NGOs in the southern sector implementing projects under the umbrella of the UN specialised agencies. Essential common services, such as logistical support are provided through UNICEF and WFP, and programme coordination through programme lead agencies.

In the context of Operation Lifeline Sudan southern sector, programme coordination and common services are provided through the Humanitarian Services Coordination Unit in Nairobi and Lokichokkio. The Unit provides sectoral programme coordination, ensuring that all OLS agencies adopt compatible guidelines and standards of operation. In addition to sectoral coordination mechanisms, it supports regional coordination thus aiming at maximising Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) humanitarian resources in each region of southern Sudan. The Unit’s emergency preparedness and response office contributes to identifying and prioritising acute emergency needs and takes a lead role in coordinating multi-Agency response.

In the northern sector, UN Agencies have working and project agreements with national and international NGOs for support and implementation of programmes. The Humanitarian Aid Forum (HAF) in Khartoum includes UN Agencies, INGOs and donors who meet monthly to share information on the on the humanitarian situation.

[...]

The Operation Lifeline Sudan consortium is made up of 43 international and national NGOs, and four UN agencies operating in southern Sudan. The majority of these agencies rely upon certain common services and coordination provided predominantly by UNICEF. These services, such as maintenance of the forward staging base in Lokichokkio enable the OLS agencies to operate as cost effectively as possible. Other services, such as Humanitarian Principles and counterpart support, aim to maintain an operating environment conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in the war zone, thus benefiting all agencies.” (UN November 2000, pp. 14, 90)

Dissatisfaction expressed by NGOs and UN about poor north-south coordination (2000-2)

- No resident coordinator for southern Sudan and lack of IDP focal point in OLS are major impediments to the collaborative approach
- Coordination between agencies working in GoS controlled areas and SPLM/A controlled areas is weak, even within the same agency
- Some international NGOs have been reluctant to cooperate with the SPLM/A’s policies concerning IDPs because it was a non-state actor
- Absence of a humanitarian coordinator for southern Sudan is a handicap
- UNICEF criticised by NGOs for inadequate technical expertise and experience in co-ordinating emergency response
• NGOs have advocated for the need to separate the coordination on strategic affairs from coordination on operational matters
• Differences in the approach taken by various NGOs complicate NGO-OLS cooperation

“In south Sudan, both Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and non-OLS agencies are already working on capacity building with the SRRA, Relief Association of Southern Sudan (RASS), other local authorities and SINGOs. However, at this time, there is no resident coordinator for southern Sudan (indeed no permanent RC even for Khartoum), and no local point within OLS for IDP issues. Local civil society feels that it has no one person or agency to turn to on IDPs, especially with regard to protection, and among the international players, there remains a lack of focus on the needs of IDPs. The international community should find a way to coordinate better to ensure that IDPs' lights are observed and particular needs are met.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, p. 44)

“North-south coordination
With the exception of programmes on livestock, food security and national immunization, the mission noted that levels of co-ordination and joint planning between agencies and NGOs working in GOS and SPLM areas is less than ideal, often even within the same agency. Agency staff in the garrison towns are often uninformed about activities being undertaken by sister agencies in nearby SPLM areas. Hence, there is a need for heightened co-ordination, planning and information exchange between North and South to ensure consistency in priorities and implementation. Even if the peace-process fails, closer interaction between the northern- and southern-based agencies is desirable. The recent creation of the IDPTF is, therefore, an important step in enhancing joint programming.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p.12)

“Adele Sowinska, Program Coordinator for the International Rescue Committee, representing the NGO Forum, commented on Mr. Drumtra’s presentation. She observed that there was a pressing need for the various parties addressing internal displacement in Southern Sudan to work more effectively together. In this regard, she pointed out that both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A were in the process of developing policies on the internally displaced. She called for an effort to make these policies cohesive. Ms. Sowinska regretted that a number of international NGOs had been reluctant to cooperate with the SPLM/A’s policies concerning the internally displaced because the SPLM/A was a non-state actor. She called upon international humanitarian organizations to provide greater support in planning and training to local NGOs and to give them greater responsibility as decision-makers.

[…]
The training participants further emphasized the need for better cooperation among the different actors dealing with internally displaced persons. Some local NGOs, they noted, had been drawing up “silent plans” to deal with potential return and resettlement issues in the event of peace because the SRRA had not drawn them into a more comprehensive planning process. Training participants also called for greater coordination among international humanitarian agencies, noting the lack of a “Humanitarian Coordinator” for the south.” (Brookings/etc, 25 November 2002, pp.5)

“There are increased NGO reports about the poor performance of UNICEF in its role as Coordinator of the southern sector of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the UN-led aid operation for south Sudan. Earlier, some NGOs criticised the agency for not speaking out forcefully against the text of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) imposed upon NGOs by the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), the ‘humanitarian wing’ of the Sudanese rebel movement, the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM). Currently, NGOs are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with UNICEF as they focus more and more on their own internal matters at the peril of coordination.

[…]
Since last year several NGOs have advocated for the need to separate the coordination on strategic affairs, including for example negotiated access, from coordination on operational sectors and implementation of projects. Responding to this request, OCHA is now building up a team of officials that should deal with
what is considered the more political side of OLS. According to an organigram, however, the team will be placed under UNICEF's coordination." (ICVA 24 April 2000)

"INGO criticism of OLS also focuses on UNICEF's relatively low level of technical expertise and experience in co-ordinating emergency response. UNICEF's lack of capacity to conduct assessments, and to monitor and evaluate INGO programmes, leaves INGOs in a vacuum. OLS provides security for INGOs, access to OLS flights and meetings but, beyond that, OLS performance for INGOs is governed more by individual contact between actors rather than by structural agreements. Yet, despite these criticisms, it is difficult to envisage an alternative structure other than a loose consortium of INGOs. This would, however, have to deal with two critical, and interlinked, areas: the issue of neutrality and relationships with local partners in OLS. The neutrality issue is especially difficult with reference to the GoS and SRRA. Where SPLM/A is the authority, there is a move towards local administrations taking over power from SRRA. This further complicates local relationships.

Some INGOs in OLS therefore distance themselves, stressing the need for impartiality. Others pursue constructive engagement to reinforce humanitarian capacity - including INGOs beyond the OLS framework. Other INGOs are simply uncertain. None of this variety in response helps co-ordination. In the northern sector, INGOs are uncertain whether the room for manoeuvre allows effective humanitarian assistance. The issue of local partnerships in OLS also reflects similar tensions. Again, particularly with reference to SRRA, the lack of formal recognition means that it is difficult to build sufficient managerial and technical capacity to establish effective early warning systems, monitoring and evaluation control. Training for SRRA staff, which implies staff selection beyond traditional structures, is funded by non-OLS humanitarian assistance agencies who are members of the DEC.

It is not surprising, in this context, that the 1999 Assessment by OLS blames donors for a tardy response and regrets the lack of involvement by humanitarian agencies. Nor is it surprising that it emphasises UNICEF's failure in its co-ordinating role, although SRRA concedes that the SRRA itself was deficient in co-ordination on the ground. Independent evaluations of donor performance and that of OLS itself are awaited.

What emerges from this analysis of OLS is that, for a variety of reasons, there is no significant alternative for the delivery of most humanitarian assistance. What also emerges is that, given the paucity of humanitarian assistance agencies under OLS, British DEC member agencies, either directly or through their international linkages, play a significant role in the OLS effort." (DEC 30 May 2000, para. 8.3)

**Background of the Operation Lifeline Sudan (1989-1992)**

- OLS launched in 1989 as a response to internal displacement
- Government, and later the SPLA, agreed to establish 'corridors of tranquillity' through which OLS relief would pass safely
- Second phase of Operation Lifeline Sudan (March 1990)
- OLS divided into a Northern Sector which covers government held areas and a Southern Sector covering most non-government areas in the South
- Expansion of OLS in the southern sector after 1992

"OLS [Operation Lifeline Sudan] in North Sudan has its origins in the issue of internal displacement. [...] By the late 1980s, internal displacement had become a matter of concern at policy level for the GOS; internal displacement was seen to contribute to rapid and potentially destabilizing urbanisation in Khartoum. Further, the plight of the displaced had attracted negative publicity, particularly in the transition zone, where the famine of 1987/88 left nearly quarter of a million people dead."
In September 1988, the GOS issued a draft of its general policy towards the displaced, reaffirming the rights of displaced citizens and emphasising government efforts to provide relief [...]. For the short term, the policy highlighted the importance of creating employment opportunities in rural and urban areas to increase self-reliance, and the upgrading of spontaneous settlements. For the medium term, GOS policy called for the establishment of reception centres at interregional frontiers, in order to stem movement to the capital and other urban centres, and facilitate returns to home areas [...].

The GOS policy statement coincided with the arrival of a UN team in September 1988, aimed at developing a UN/GOS response to the emergency situation. This mission would establish a framework for international appeals and, subsequently, for the formation of OLS [...]. Importantly, this framework endorsed the government's approach to the issue of displaced populations. [...] The early stages of UN policy with regard to displaced peoples were thus significant in establishing a framework for OLS responses to the humanitarian needs of these populations, which involved a convergence with, and accommodation of, government policy. “(Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 85-86)

"International frustration with the inadequate response to the Sudan's massive suffering triggered intensive diplomatic activities that resulted in a UN-sponsored conference on relief operations held in Khartoum March 1989. By the time the conference was convened in Khartoum, a secure foundation had been laid to ensure its success. The U.S. government representative favored a large-scale program of aid to the displaced. The result of the conference was the decision to launch OLS 1.

To facilitate access to as many civilians in the conflict areas as possible, including enormous numbers of internally displaced persons; the government, and later the SPLA, agreed to establish 'corridors of tranquillity' through which OLS relief would pass safely. This agreement set the stage for what UN officials described as one of history's largest humanitarian interventions in an active civil war.

OLS was a coordinated relief effort between UN agencies such as WFP, the United Nations Children's fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and other international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and international NGOs. OLS engendered optimism in the humanitarian community because both sides agreed to the vital and historic principle that OLS would have access to 'war-affected people irrespective of who controls the territory in which they are located.' and pledged to honor the safe corridors that would permit food aid to reach all those in need. In a two-month period shortly after its inception, OLS I delivered more food to those in need in the southern Sudan—nearly 16,000 tons—than had been delivered from 1983 through 1988.

During 1989, the international community channelled about $205 million directly to OLS I and mobilized as much as another $100 million for Sudanese relief in general. OLS I reportedly exceeded its 107,000-ton target of food aid (some observers question the accuracy of that figure) and also provided 3,760 tons of important nonfood materials, including agricultural hand tools, seeds, human and animal vaccines and medicines, and shelter materials. Food and livestock production rebounded, and nutrition showed measurable improvement." (Ruiz 1998, pp. 146-147)

"While formally under UN co-ordination in Khartoum, OLS is not a unified structure. Activities mostly take place within two distinct operational and contractual environments. The Northern Sector is representative of some government areas. Here, OLS activities are organised from Khartoum and fall within a managerial regime defined by the Government of Sudan (GOS). The Southern Sector pertains to most non-government areas in the South. Managed from Nairobi, it is a cross-border operation with a main logistical base at Lokichokkio in northern Kenya. Here, UNICEF is the lead agency and has been tasked with co-ordinating UN and NGO activities. It is in the Southern Sector that the identity of OLS as a body assisting war affected populations is more in evidence. In government areas, the extent and quality of international access is relatively restricted." (Hendrie et al July 1996, p. 12)

"An agreement acceptable to all parties was worked out, and OLS's second phase began in late March 1990. The UN appealed for 100,000 metric tons of food, roughly comparable to the target of the original OLS.
Between April and December 1990, OLS was able to deliver much of that amount, though it encountered major logistical obstacles.

The difficulties that OLS I had experienced in late 1989 – such as relief trains not moving, barges remaining moored at the docks, and ICRC flights increasingly being curtailed-intensified in 1990. The government bombed OLS relief sites in the southern Sudan in September 1990. Some of the bombings occurred while UN and Red Cross planes and personnel were on site.

Each side in the war accused the UN of partiality toward the other. The government, alleging that OLS had violated Sudanese sovereignty by providing cover for military support for the insurgents, demanded tighter operational controls and accountability. The SPLA, which claimed to control more of the south than it had at the beginning of OLS I, sought a larger proportion of the available relief supplies while resisting calls for increased accountability. At the beginning of 1991, the Sudanese government suspended indefinitely all OLS programs staged out of northern Sudan.

At the July 1991 session of the UN Economic and Social Council in Geneva, Per Janvid, the UN secretary-general's special coordinator for emergency and relief operations in the Sudan, reviewed OLS II. He said that while "substantial quantities of food assistance were initially intended to have been transported by UN train and barge convoys through conflict areas despite protracted negotiations neither train nor barge in the course of 1990 ever left on its humanitarian mission. Similarly, no road corridor through conflict zones had ever been opened during the year; hence, certain areas designated for relief food were never reached." (Ruiz 1998, pp. 148-149)

"From the end of 1992, there has been a significant expansion in the scope of OLS in the Southern Sector. The number and diversity of programmes has increased beyond the original concerns of food and health. Due to GOS restrictions and interfactional insecurity, since 1995 access has been steadily reduced.

As lead agency, the key functions of UNICEF are the provision of shared services and co-ordination. Participating agencies, primarily international non-government organisations (INGOs), sign Letters of Understanding (LOUs) with UNICEF that establish basic programme requirements and secure agreement on OLS humanitarian principles. Funded through the OLS Appeal, UNICEF for its part undertakes to provide free transport, essential programme support, and overall co-ordination. Logistics are largely handled from the UNICEF-managed camp at Lokichokkio." (Hendrie et al July 1996, p. 3)

**Institutional arrangements pertaining to the physical protection of IDPs**

- OLS agreement includes protection of civilians (December 1999)
- Principles binds SPLM/A to "customary human rights law"
- Government and SPLM/A committed not to enforce illegal relocations of civilians
- Southern rebel forces agreed on ground rules which includes human rights provisions (1995)
- Signatories to the Ground Rules undertake to observe the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions

"The Sudanese government, SPLM/A and humanitarian agencies - under the auspices of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) - agreed last week in Switzerland on a set of 'Principles Governing the Protection and Provision of Humanitarian Assistance to War-Affected Civilian Populations' in Sudan. They agreed that agencies accredited by the UN should have "free and unimpeded access" to vulnerable populations, with the UN to decide on routes and logistics for humanitarian assessments and deliveries. It was also guaranteed that all aid would be distributed "only to targeted civilian beneficiaries" and would not be taxed or diverted from those. The Principles also bound the SPLM/A - though it is not a formal signatory to international treaties on human rights - to "customary human rights law", moral and ethical obligations to
keep civilian populations safe from the effects of war. Khartoum and the SPLM/A also gave undertakings not to enforce illegal relocations of civilians and, where communities were to be relocated, to give adequate notice and consult communities.” (IRIN-CEA 20 December 1999)

“On many fronts, there is evidence of programmatic evolution in the Southern Sector. The development of the Ground Rule concept in relation to the Southern movements is an area of particular importance. The Ground Rules were introduced to provide a framework for the regulation of relations between OLS agencies and the opposition movements. Based upon a similar principle to LOUs [Letter of Understanding], the Ground Rules agreement establishes a series of roles and responsibilities. […] Besides capacity building, the Ground Rules have also been extended to include human rights. Since 1994, apart from OLS’s humanitarian principles, signatories to the Ground Rules undertake to observe the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions. More recently, this has enabled OLS to enter into direct dialogue with the movements when it has been felt that the Ground Rules have been violated. Unusual for a relief operation, this has meant that human rights and humanitarian aid issues have been brought together. By exploiting the need of Southern opposition movements for international recognition, the Ground Rules in effect represent a move toward making humanitarian aid conditional. In this regard, the Review Team felt the Ground Rules approach is a fundamental innovation in the field of conflict management, and one that deserves greater study.” (Hendrie et al July 1996, pp. 4-5)

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**International response 2003**

**Multi-agency Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) (Nov 2002-3)**

- This multi-agency cross-conflict programme aims to support long and short term need of the people from the Nuba Mountain
Eight UN agencies and 11 NGOs and GoS and SPLM are involved in the programme

Phase one was preparatory and met humanitarian needs

Phase two focuses on longer term livelihoods development and self-reliance

Phase three focuses on long-term development

“With the new opportunities and challenges presented by the current cease-fire, a large number of humanitarian organisations operating in the Nuba Mountains have come together with the aim of creating a more enabling environment in which appropriate interventions could be implemented. The NMPACT programme, a phased, multi-agency, cross-conflict programme of interventions that aims to support all stakeholders to contribute to a Nuba-led response to the short and long term needs of the people of the Nuba Mountains, has been specifically developed to respond to the special opportunities and challenges arising from the cease-fire agreement. It comprises a collection of integrated cross-conflict projects, implemented by organisations subscribing to agreed principles of engagement, that aim to contribute to the achievement of collective programme goals within a structured framework of support and coordination. The framework is designed to strengthen opportunities for component interventions to be complementary, coordinated, equitable and community-owned.

The overall strategic goal of NMPACT is: “To enhance the Nuba people’s capacity for self reliance within a sustained process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves”.

The NMPACT Framework has been subscribed to by eight UN agencies and 11 INGOs. It has already been signed by the GoS and has now been sent to the SPLM for their written endorsement (they have however already publicly accepted the document). A Partners’ Forum has been established to ensure that the people of the Nuba Mountains and international agencies meet systematically for planning and monitoring NMPACT’s on-going role in conflict transformation. Additional support services are also provided by NMPACT to facilitate implementation by partner agencies, strengthen institutional learning, promote linkages to peace building processes and maximise opportunities for the Nuba to initiate their own longer term peace building process.

NMPACT is being implemented with a phased approach. Phase 1, implemented in 2002, has focused on carrying out preparatory activities and responding to long unmet humanitarian needs.

[...] The overall strategic goal of the second and third phases of NMPACT is to enhance the Nuba people’s capacity for ending relief dependency and gradually but steadily shift towards self-reliance within a sustainable process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves. Phase 2, starting in January 2003, assumes some form of negotiated access is maintained but within a transitional context, with a greater focus on longer term livelihoods development and self-reliance. Phase 3, which could commence at any time thereafter, represents the objectives that could be addressed under a secure and consolidated cease-fire agreement towards a long term development strategy for the Nuba Mountains clearly linked to wider peace building processes in Sudan.

For NMPACT to gradually shift its focus from humanitarian assistance to transitional recovery initiatives during phase 2, additional funding will be required to target interventions that support sustained recovery of communities, while harnessing conditions for the post-war reconstruction of the region with a greater focus on longer term livelihood development, return of IDPs and refugees and self-reliance for the Nuba people.” (UN, November 2002, p.184)

Ensure access to improved sanitation facilities and hygienic conditions for least 400,000 persons living in war-affected and drought-affected/prone areas and in localities inhabited by IDPs/refugees returning to their places of choice/origin.” (UN, November 2002, p.197-8)
UN CAP 2003 plans for major return of IDPs, reconstruction and rehabilitation in all sectors (Nov 2002)

- CA 2003 includes 64 projects totaling US$ 255 million
- 82% of proposed assistance of CA 2003 targets IDPs and other affected by war and natural disaster
- Special focus will be on worst-conflict affected areas such as Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Greater Equatoria, Unity State / Western Upper Nile, and the Nile States / Jonglei
- Progressive shift away from food assistance towards more sustainable and cost-effective assistance
- Response will be focused around four core objectives: life-saving, provision of basic services, capacity-building and protection through supporting grass-root peace building

“The projects contained within the CA are designed for high impact and the mechanisms established for improving coordination and integrated programming will hopefully gain the confidence and support of those committed to assist Sudan’s rehabilitation process in a cost-effective manner. The CA 2003 includes 64 projects totalling US$ 255 million from nine UN agencies, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and nine NGOs. […] Roughly 82% of programmed assistance has traditionally been focused on the most affected groups in the Sudan i.e. those displaced and otherwise affected by war and natural disaster. The majority of the war-affected populations in critical need of assistance are located in the high-insecurity/conflict affected regions of Greater Bahr el Ghazal, Greater Equatoria, Unity State / Western Upper Nile, and the Nile States / Jonglei. Not surprisingly, assistance is skewed in favour of these regions which remain a priority. The spread of assistance between GoS and militia-controlled sub-areas within these regions is generally well balanced but subject to rapid change, based on people’s vulnerability and needs, and depending upon the level of security and access afforded. […] Balanced inter-sectoral and regional funding: Trends reveal an obvious donor preference for specific sectors and regions. Needs in many sectors including health, education and livelihoods may be deemed as non-essential or not life-threatening by some donors, particularly when programmes are under financial pressure. Often the contrary proves true, with e.g. food assistance being provided to individuals who are unable to absorb nutrients due to unaddressed health problems. Similarly assisting households to produce own food is more cost-effective and will be reflected in reduced requirements in food aid in the long-term. […] During January – December 2003, the assistance programme of the humanitarian community in the Sudan will be assessed as to its measurable impact against four limited objectives: Saving lives and reducing human suffering, provision of basic services, building capacity and resilience, and strengthening protection and peace-building mechanisms.

Saving lives and reducing human suffering

To ensure minimum nutritional and health requirements of affected persons. Agencies participating in the CA will remain obliged to reduce suffering through the provision of life-saving food, medicine, temporary shelter, blankets, micronutrients and dietary supplements, education, safe water to reduce morbidity and malnutrition, other essential relief items including seeds, tools and fishing equipment, and interventions such as immunisation against childhood and communicable diseases, and control of livestock diseases. Indicators: Progress in fulfilling minimum international standards.

Provision of essential basic social services
Where circumstances permit, agencies will endeavour to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees by providing temporary life-sustaining support during the period of transition. Agencies will focus on the need to enable an early recovery of the wider agriculture sector, diversify income generating opportunities, rehabilitate basic infrastructure by engaging communities in the repair of access roads, water and sanitation facilities, schools, health clinics and small enterprises. **Indicators:** Reduction of malnutrition rates, percentage of gender balanced school attendance, increase in female enrolment, number vaccinated and disease prevalence, adequate number of social infrastructures in place, adequacy of staff deployed to manage basic services, kilometres of road rehabilitated.

**Building capacity and resilience**

In order to restore livelihoods and stability and to lay ground for a full-fledged immediate and transitional assistance programme, agencies will improve local delivery capacity and promote the well-being of vulnerable groups through training and equipping extension officers, health workers and teachers, community members, and further supporting household food security and the production of marketable surpluses. **Indicators:** Number of personnel trained in different sectors.

**Strengthening protection and grass-root peace-building mechanisms**

Agencies will promote respect for human rights, in particular of children, women, IDPs and persons affected by conflict. Agencies will facilitate the reunification of children abducted or separated from their families and the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers. An important aspect of these activities will be mine awareness and clearance. In order to promote and sustain peace, agencies will support grassroots peace building and conflict management initiatives. Agencies will improve their own and counterparts’ understanding of protection methods and mechanisms and will ensure that protection and peace building are mainstreamed across the work of all other sectors. **Indicators:** Numbers of children demobilised by all armed groups, percentage of separated or abducted children reunified with their families, key areas and roads cleared of mines, number of inter-community peace meetings leading to written agreements.

[...] **Strategy:** Priority attention should be given to continue mainstreaming conflict transformation and bringing about measurable improvements in people's conditions. This should lead to promoting peace-building measures in all transitional initiatives, coupled with support to livelihoods restoration based on ongoing preparatory activities e.g. IDPs resettlement (Abyei) and for the Nuba Mountains. Obviously, the end of conflict will not provide Sudan with a quick fix to its endemic economic and social problems. The preparations for the post-peace transition period should therefore build on existing humanitarian programmes to develop initiatives tailored to end dependency on humanitarian aid and to further bridge the gap between relief and recovery.” (UN, November 2002, p.1;9; 12; 20)

**USDOS Peace Act includes sanctions in the event of non-cooperation in the peace dialogue as well as US$100 million for relief in SPLM/A controlled areas**

- US to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions as well as arms embargoes if Khartoum does not engage into good faith in peace process and supports democratic development in SPLM/A controlled areas
- Act allocates US$100 million per year for humanitarian assistance to SPLM/A until 2005
- US to develop contingency plan in the event of further flight denials on OLS operations and increase use of NGOs outside OLS framework for aid delivery
- ICG warns that the US should use its leverage power with care in order to ensure Khartoum’s compliance with its commitments stipulated in the Machakos Protocol
“The Sudan Peace Act passed the U.S. House of Representatives on October 7, 2002 by a vote of 359-8. The Senate passed the same language by unanimous consent on October 9, 2002.

The Act:

- Seeks to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan based on the Declaration of Principles of July 20, 1994 and the Machakos Protocol of July 2002.
- Commends the efforts of the President's Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan, Senator Danforth, and his team.
- Calls for multilateralization of economic and diplomatic tools to compel Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process, support for democratic development in areas of Sudan outside government control, continued support for people-to-people reconciliation in non-government-controlled areas, strengthening of humanitarian relief mechanisms, and multilateral cooperation toward these ends.
- Condemns violations of human rights on all sides of the conflict, the government's human rights record, the slave trade, government use of militia and other forces to support slave raiding, and aerial bombardment of civilian targets.

[...]

"Funding Authorized for Use in Areas Outside Sudan Government Control"

The Act authorizes to be appropriated $100 million for each of the fiscal years 03, 04, and 05 for assistance to areas outside government control to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance, including support for civil administration, communications infrastructure, education, health, and agriculture.

Certifications and Actions

The U.S. President must certify within 6 months of enactment, and each 6 months thereafter, that the Sudan Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement are negotiating in good faith and that negotiations should continue. If, under this provision, the President certifies that the government has not engaged in good faith negotiations or has unreasonably interfered with humanitarian efforts, the Act states that the President, after consultation with the Congress, shall implement the following measures:

- Seek a UN Security Council resolution for an arms embargo on the Sudanese government
- Instruct U.S. executive directors to vote against and actively oppose loans, credits, and guarantees by international financial institutions
- Take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny government access to oil revenues in order to ensure that the funds are not used for military purposes
- Consider downgrading or suspending diplomatic relations

If the Sudan People's Liberation Movement is found not to be negotiating in good faith, none of the above provisions shall apply to the Sudanese Government.

The Act also states that, if the President certifies that Sudan is not in compliance with the terms of a permanent peace agreement between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, then the President, after consultation with the Congress, shall implement the measures described above.

As with other similar provisions, these provisions will be construed in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.

Reporting Requirements

- Within six months of enactment and annually thereafter, a report by the Secretary of State on the Sudan conflict, to include: the status of Sudan's development and use of oil resources; description of the extent to which financing was secured in the U.S. or with involvement of U.S. citizens; estimates of the extent of government aerial bombardment; description of extent to which government or other forces have obstructed or manipulated humanitarian relief.
- Quarterly report by the President on the status of the peace process if, at any time after the President makes a certification as specified, Sudan discontinues negotiations for 14 days.
- Semiannual report by the Secretary of the Treasury describing U.S. steps to oppose loans, credits, or guarantees, if financing is given despite U.S. opposition.
- Report by the President, within 45 days of taking action to deny the Sudan government access to oil revenues, providing a comprehensive plan for implementation.
Humanitarian Relief
- The President should seek to end Sudan veto power over and manipulation of United Nations humanitarian relief efforts carried out through Operation Lifeline Sudan.
- The President should increase the use of agencies other than Operation Lifeline Sudan for humanitarian relief efforts in southern Sudan. Requires submission within ninety days of enactment of a report describing progress made to achieve this.
- Requires development of a contingency plan to provide the greatest possible amount of U.S. and privately-donated relief to all affected areas of Sudan in the event that Sudan imposes a total, partial or incremental ban on Operation Lifeline Sudan air transport relief flights.

War Crimes
- Requires the Secretary of State to collect information about incidents which may constitute crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes, and other violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. Requires submission of a report from the Secretary of State within six months after enactment, and annually thereafter, on the information collected and any findings or determinations made, subject to protection of sensitive sources or other national security interests.” (USDOS, 21 October 2002)

“...The government remains troubled by the concept of a real partnership with southern Sudanese in a future government, unnerved by new U.S. legislation (the Sudan Peace Act) and generally fearful that the IGAD process increasingly favours the SPLA. As relations deteriorate with Eritrea and Uganda and are strained with the U.S., there is a risk of paranoia that would hamper negotiations.

[...] The SPLA’s attitude has been further hardened by the Sudan Peace Act, which it partly misreads as a promise that the U.S. will give substantial aid if negotiations fail for any reason, even SPLA intransigence. The SPLA must realise that the Bush administration is only prepared to provide large-scale aid to SPLA areas if it is clearly the government that is to blame for blocking the peace process. Washington should ensure that there is no misunderstanding.

[...] Enactment of the Sudan Peace Act (SPA) demonstrated the depth of constituency commitment to the Sudan issue. The SPA puts pressure on the government by making U.S.$100 million available annually for three years to nongovernment controlled areas and by stepping up efforts to block aid or debt relief for Khartoum through international financial institutions if the government negotiates in bad faith.

[...] The U.S. must be particularly careful in utilising the increase in leverage it derives from its Sudan Peace Act and the prospect of conflict with Iraq. Taken together, these create a high degree of uncertainty and even paranoia in Khartoum. This can be leveraged into a pragmatic survival response, but could also be counter-productive if mishandled.” (ICG, 18 December 2002, p.4, 10, 12-14)

Response in the Agriculture and food security sectors for 2003 CA

- Food security disrupted by displacement raiding and looting
- Serious drought in the west and Red Sea State will require recovery assistance during 2003
- FAO will concentrate on increasing productivity, enhance self-reliance and marketing in agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors
- Household food security programme particularly targeting IDPs to support peace building and conflict transformation and reintegration

“Food insecurity for millions of Sudanese arises from the complex interaction between a number of factors resulting from the prolonged civil war. Sudan’s agriculture sector has been hampered by continuing population displacement and insufficient access to arable land. Further, the sector has seen overuse and misuse of its fragile natural resource base and loss of assets through raiding and looting. Natural calamities such as recurrent drought, erratic rainfall and pest infestation have further reduced crop yields and food
availability. The purchasing power of large numbers of people, including the pastoralist communities in the drought stricken areas, has been eroded severely.

The year 2002 has been a difficult one for many Sudanese. Access to parts of southern Sudan has been severely curtailed by LRA activity in Eastern Equatoria and inter-factional fighting around the oil fields in Western Upper Nile and inter-tribal fighting in Bieh State. This insecure situation has caused repeated displacement of the population to neighbouring areas that were already in need of support. The food security and nutrition situation in these areas is dire. The population is scattered and mainly inaccessible and there is little hope of improving the situation until at least the 2003 harvest.

The 2002 cultivation season was delayed due to late rains. Harvests are likely to be late and very poor in many areas. The hunger gap will surely be extended by one month or more as a result, a situation which will necessitate continuing the delivery of large quantities of humanitarian assistance. Many households have been affected by a serious drought in the western parts of the country and the Red Sea State. This has exposed large numbers of people to the risk of starvation, prompting the distribution of substantial amounts of emergency food assistance.

Early warning mechanisms indicate the possibility of facing a worsened situation compared to last year in Darfur and Kordofan regions. The situation may require additional humanitarian and early recovery assistance during 2003 to help communities recover from drought and strengthen their capacity for drought-preparedness. The situation in Red Sea state has not improved and requires serious consideration for 2003 humanitarian assistance.

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The household food security approach will be to continue to increase productivity, enhance self-reliance and promote marketing in the agriculture (including agro-forestry), livestock and fisheries food security sub-sectors in both OLS and the Transitional Zone and in the drought-affected areas. Diversification of income generating activities and relevant capacity building will be promoted. Support to peace efforts will be built in throughout the programmes. This will be accomplished through a combination of emergency and early rehabilitation activities, implemented in close collaboration with all agencies involved in food security.

A robust coordination component of the wider agriculture sector will further be established to provide ways and means for agencies to have access to better information and to share plans to avoid overlapping and/or duplication of interventions and services and to enhance the capacity of counterparts, Government staff and Sudanese organisations.

The household food security programme will also directly support peace building and conflict transformation interventions. It will facilitate the resettlement of a substantial number of returnees and support the re-integration of ex-combatants. Returnee resettlement may prove to be the major activity in 2003 if and when the current Machakos II peace talks are successful and conclusive.

These interventions are primarily aimed at an early restoration of the wider agriculture sector in southern Sudan and in the drought-prone regions in the north. Specific relief and early rehabilitation project proposals are presented in the CAP 2003 framework.

OBJECTIVES

The goal of the household food security programme is to enhance household and community food security, self-reliance and capacity in war and drought-affected areas of Sudan. The programme will contribute to conflict transformation and peace building efforts while giving special consideration to IDPs, returnees and support the reintegration of excombatants.

The programme aims to:
improve food production through the provision of suitable inputs. The programme will provide appropriate
varieties of crop and vegetable seeds and farm tools, fishing equipment, veterinary drugs and animal health
services and improvements in agriculture technology (including animal traction);
provide inputs in response to arising emergencies, as needed;
promote local production of inputs though blacksmith training, local seed production and improvement of
storage for local varieties;
carry out capacity building for households, communities, local authorities, counterparts and Sudanese
NGOs through training and refresher courses;
reduce post-harvest losses by promoting improved food preservation and storage techniques;
promote sustainable community-based cost recovery schemes for agriculture inputs;
promote trade through local purchase of inputs where possible, especially seeds and widening trading
accessibility for surplus production;
ensure efficient coordination between agencies carrying out food security activities to reduce overlaps and
gaps in interventions and service coverage by providing a forum for information sharing through thematic
working group and household food security coordination meetings;
enhance community capacity for a timely and appropriate response to an influx of returnees;
contribute to peace building and conflict transformation efforts.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 51-52)

**WFP activities in 2003 specifically targeted at IDPs**

- As IDPs have been displaced they have lost their productive assets and will be the main targets of
  WFP for emergency food delivery
- WFP provides emergency school feeding in IDP camps
- Women will represent 50% WFP food for work and other micro projects

“The main sectoral objectives are to save lives, improve and sustain the nutritional status of vulnerable
populations, promote peace building and self-reliance, prevent distress migration and bridge existing
gender gaps through the reinforcement of women’s role in food distribution and management. The main
beneficiaries by category are IDPs, war and drought affected. In accordance with the ANA exercise,
priority of food assistance will be geared towards the most vulnerable of these groups, namely the IDPs due
to war or drought, and the war-affected living in drought-affected areas.

Given that the majority of the beneficiaries live either in open camps, where job opportunities may be
available seasonally, or in their own homes or areas, they are usually not totally without access to food.
Their remaining food needs are assessed regularly; using well-defined food needs assessment
methodologies and provided food assistance accordingly. In this way dependency is kept in check and self-
sufficiency encouraged.

The majority of the war-affected populations i.e. those, whose access to food resources have been severely
undermined due to war and insecurity, live in both GoS and SPLM/A controlled areas of southern Sudan.
The distinction between IDPs and other war-affected lies in the fact that the latter have not moved and are
therefore assisted *in situ*. As a result of frequent and successive droughts, a sizeable part of the population
have lost their productive assets and eroded their coping strategies making them extremely vulnerable to
food shortages. These populations are mainly located in the Red Sea, Darfur, Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria
and Bahr-El-Ghazal.

Food assistance and distribution will be effected directly by WFP or through NGOs. Supplementary and
therapeutic feeding is done through specialised NGOs, supporting children under-five and expectant and
nursing mothers as well as the elderly, women-headed households, the chronically sick and the disabled.
WFP also provides emergency school feeding particularly in IDP camps and coordinate all food relief
programmes and activities with NGOs and counterparts.
STRATEGIES
Food aid requirements are assessed and determined by joint teams composed of WFP, FAO, NGO and humanitarian counterparts. Household food economy analysis is primarily used. During the annual needs assessment exercise, ration scales and duration of assistance are determined taking into account the hunger gap period and other sources of food and income.

Not all food will be freely distributed without exploring development possibilities. In collaboration with the counterparts, WFP will determine different ways to distribute the projected food aid requirements to the beneficiaries, namely free distribution, food-for-work, emergency school feeding and training. Approximately 10% of the food requirements will be channelled through micro projects designed to create assets and facilitate rehabilitation and recovery of the affected communities. At least 50% of the beneficiaries involved in micro projects will be women.” (UN, November 2002, p. 95-6)

UNICEF and UNPF project for capacity building on IDP protection (2003)

• Training on protection methodologies within displaced communities in preparation of IDP return
• Community workshops to raise awareness on the needs and rights of IDPs
• Establish and IDP Database in government-controlled Sudan
• Training will be based on ‘Do no harm’ principles and UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

"Translating human rights and protection principles into consistent practice remains a challenge for the authorities, civil society and humanitarian agencies across both north and south Sudan. At least in part, this is because there is widespread ignorance about protection methods. Few formal mechanisms exist to raise awareness of communities and authorities about protection issues and to resolve abuses after they occur. Little is known about the extent of abuses in some areas, such as violence against women or the numbers and needs of separated children. The project aims to reach a common north-south understanding on appropriate protection methodologies. Meanwhile, the protection of IDPs (and preparation for IDP return) is hampered by limited accurate data on numbers, locations and areas of origin of IDP. The project therefore has three main elements:

Practical training on protection methodologies integrated into other on-going work programmes;
Training and capacity building within IDP communities leading to mechanisms to address protection issues;
Establishing information management systems to collect and disseminate accurate information on IDPs.

First, the project will build knowledge of appropriate practical protection methodologies and expertise in applying them among officials, NGOs, wider civil society and UN agency staff. This is a necessary step towards strengthening the capacity of the authorities and humanitarian sector to provide protection, especially through mainstreaming protection into other areas of programming. Training will be completely integrated with other areas of work – for example, planned needs assessments, research on street children, water and sanitation provision, education, action against child abduction, programming for IDPs, work on behalf of abandoned infants and the demobilisation of child soldiers – and will include on-the-job methods and extensive follow up. The project will develop a cadre of skilled Sudanese trainers and protection specialists able to provide practical training and technical advice. Within UNICEF this will mean deploying additional protection officers in the field.

Second, the project will train counterparts and NGO officials to establish protection mechanisms. Trained persons will learn to conduct community workshops to raise awareness of the needs and rights of IDPs and host communities. When abuses occur, mechanisms will be activated to intervene to discuss the issue in
the community and to identify an appropriate solution. This approach is based on the successful community workshops and interventions undertaken by the OLS Humanitarian Principles Team. In addition, persons and institutions establishing mechanisms will learn to assess the protection needs of IDP communities, especially as they relate to separated children and abuses against women and girls.

Third, creation of an IDP database in southern Sudan in coordination with OCHA’s project on Information Management, and WFP and UNDP’s project establishing an IDP database in government-controlled Sudan. The protection mechanisms established above will be part of the information gathering system.

Special priority will be given to child protection, violence against women and girls and the protection of IDPs. Child protection training will address protection from violence, exploitation, abuse and neglect, discrimination and child participation, centering on developing an understanding of the practical application of the best interests of the child. Protection issues surrounding violence against women and girls and sexual abuse will be integrated, with UNFPA and UNICEF working in coordination on this issue. There will be a training focus on abducted and separated children (including abandoned infants), IDP children and child soldiers. Participatory studies on street children to be carried out in Wau and Malakal will be used as training vehicles on child protection. The wider protection of IDPs will be addressed through training on operationalising “do no harm” principles and the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. UNICEF will coordinate capacity building work on protection with OCHA, UNDP and other agencies involved in supporting IDPs through humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation.” (UN, November 2002, pp.142-143)

**UNICEF education programme for IDPs (Nov 2002)**

- Programme will support reconstruction of school infrastructures
- Ensure that at least 80% of enrolled pupils and IDPs stay in school

“The education programme will maintain capacity for emergency response to ensure restoration of education activities for children in those areas where natural calamities or conflict cause large scale human suffering. It will also focus on interventions required to meet the challenges of the post-conflict situation in the Sudan and to facilitate the achievement of the Education. The key themes of education interventions in southern Sudan will be local capacity building, girls’ education, alternate modes of delivery and inter-sectoral approach.

The programme will support physical rehabilitation / reconstruction of educational facilities as concrete peace dividends through close integration of other programmes such as water/sanitation and health as well as with active community support, especially in areas affected by conflict and in areas where children of IDPs/refugees would chose to stay. The programme will also support efforts aimed at building local capacity by training educational planners/administrators, teachers and head-teachers for enhancing educational access and quality, and mainstreaming grassroots peace building in all educational interventions, including peace education activities for promoting peaceful co-existence of all communities. Systematic assessment of needs in all parts of the country using common methodologies/instruments which could form the basis for both vulnerability assessment for immediate humanitarian action and medium and long-term development programming will constitute an important aspect of the programme.

**OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES**

Re-establish/restore learning opportunities for children in areas affected by war and enroll 300,000 primary school-age children, including about 120,000 girls, in schools in these areas;

Ensure learning opportunities for 120,000 children (about 48,000 girls) of IDPs/refugees returning to their places of origin/choice and continuation of primary education by 300,000 children (about 120,000 girls) in war-affected and drought stricken areas, including IDPs, with special focus on the creation of child-and learning friendly environments in schools;
Ensure retention of at least 80% of children enrolled in schools located in war-affected areas and in localities inhabited by IDPs/refugees returning to their places of choice/origin; Ensure attainment of acceptable levels of learning achievement by 80% of pupils in schools established for children in war-affected areas and for children of returning IDPs and refugees; and Introduce peace education activities into the curriculum for grassroots peace building and promoting peaceful co-existence of all communities and ensure introduction of life-skills education with special focus on prevention of transmission of HIV/AIDS.” (UN, November 2002, pp. 84-85)


- Rehabilitation and reconstruction of water supply in conflict areas where IDPs are located
- Capacity-building in maintenance and management of water supply and sanitation facilities
- Eradicate Guinea Worm affecting 1,200,000 people in endemic villages
- Targeting 120,000 IDPS and refugees returning to places of origin and 580,000 scattered IDPs
- Diarrhoea caused by poor hygiene and unsafe water sources kills 40% children under five

“The water and environmental sanitation (WES) programme will maintain capacity for emergency response to ensure restoration of water supply facilities in those areas where natural calamities or conflict cause large scale human suffering. Post-conflict situation in the Sudan would, in the short-term, require increased humanitarian assistance due to greater access to population groups hitherto unserved and the possible return of a significant proportion of IDPs and refugees to their places of origin/choice. The WES programme will support physical rehabilitation/reconstruction of water supply facilities as concrete peace dividends with active community support, especially in areas affected by conflict and in areas where IDPs/refugees would choose to stay. The programme will also support efforts aimed at building local capacity by training personnel involved in the rehabilitation/construction of water supply and sanitation facilities, including community leaders, to promote community-based operation, maintenance and management of water supply and sanitation facilities.

An additional aspect would be grassroots peace building by promoting shared utilisation, of water supply facilities by different communities, management of facilities by groups comprising members from various communities and community ownership of the established water supply and sanitation facilities for promoting peaceful co-existence of all communities. Systematic assessment of the coverage of safe water supply in all parts of the country using common methodologies/instruments which could form the basis for both vulnerability assessment for immediate humanitarian action and medium and long-term development programming to ensure access to safe water for all in a phased manner will constitute an important aspect of the WES programme.

OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES
Re-establish/restore water supply facilities in areas affected by war and drought and ensure access to safe water for 1,200,000 persons in these areas and guinea worm endemic villages.

Ensure access to safe water for 120,000 IDPs/refugees returning to their places of origin/choice and for 580,000 IDPs currently living in different parts of the country.

IOM multisectoral project for IDP return and reintegration (2003)

- Survey of IDPs information on home community and reintegration needs
- Establish mobile information and return registration offices in IDP camps
• Provide transport for about 100,000 returning IDPs

“With renewed presence in Sudan in 1998, IOM focused its activities on return and resettlement transportation for refugees, in close cooperation with UNHCR. At the request of the UNCT, IOM has expanded its activities to include IDP return, resettlement and reintegration programmes. The UNCT has linked community rehabilitation to sustainable return in their framework for population stabilisation. Programmes have already been initiated for the Nuba Mountains and Abyei in a collaborative effort by UN agencies, NGOs and CBOs to address conflict transformation and sustainable livelihoods.

With the advancement of peace negotiations, there is a corresponding increase in opportunities for larger scale return, resettlement and reintegrations of IDPs. Similar to efforts in Nuba and Abyei, a systemic approach will involve a process of assessment at the community level to determine the absorption capacity of return communities. Concurrently, return communities will require rehabilitation programmes to ensure that the social infrastructure for sustainable return is in place, which will require a well-coordinated conceptualisation of programmatic interventions, and linkage of international assistance.

Objectives
IOM will support the interagency effort, and OCHA IDP focal point responsibilities, by establishing a programme based on modular interventions complimentary to the inter-agency IDP operational framework:

Survey information of IDPs, where no survey has been conducted, including information pertaining home community and reintegration needs;
Establishment Mobile Information and Return Registration Offices in IDP camps;
Development of a return registration database;
Coordinated interagency return community assessments, including identification of QIPs, and initiate community sensitisation activities;
Development of a community assessment database;
Return transport, and distribution of reintegration kits;
Community rehabilitation projects and QIPs, emphasising employment activities for both community members and returnees.

The immediate objective of the interventions will be to identify the profiles and needs of the IDPs, in order to effectively implement sustainable return resettlement and reintegration programs. This objective is closely linked with the support of host communities, and in recognition of the need of income generation projects to support community absorption capacity for at least ten return communities. Return transportation assistance will be provided to an estimated 100,000 IDPs who belong to vulnerable groups based on agreed upon selection criteria. This figure is based on the assumption that approximately 2,000,000 IDPs will opt for return and resettlement, with 5% of that population meeting vulnerability definitions.” (UN, November 2002, p.177)

Multi-agency Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) (Nov 2002-3)

• This multi-agency cross-conflict programme aims to support long and short term need of the people from the Nuba Mountain
• Eight UN agencies and 11 NGOs and GoS and SPLM are involved in the programme
• Phase one was preparatory and met humanitarian needs
• Phase two focuses on longer term livelihoods development and self-reliance
• Phase three focuses on long-term development
“With the new opportunities and challenges presented by the current cease-fire, a large number of humanitarian organisations operating in the Nuba Mountains have come together with the aim of creating a more enabling environment in which appropriate interventions could be implemented. The NMPACT programme, a phased, multi-agency, cross-conflict programme of interventions that aims to support all stake-holders to contribute to a Nuba-led response to the short and long term needs of the people of the Nuba Mountains, has been specifically developed to respond to the special opportunities and challenges arising from the cease-fire agreement. It comprises a collection of integrated cross-conflict projects, implemented by organisations subscribing to agreed principles of engagement, that aim to contribute to the achievement of collective programme goals within a structured framework of support and coordination. The framework is designed to strengthen opportunities for component interventions to be complementary, coordinated, equitable and community-owned.

The overall strategic goal of NMPACT is: “To enhance the Nuba people’s capacity for self-reliance within a sustained process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves”.

The NMPACT Framework has been subscribed to by eight UN agencies and 11 INGOs. It has already been signed by the GoS and has now been sent to the SPLM for their written endorsement (they have however already publicly accepted the document). A Partners’ Forum has been established to ensure that the people of the Nuba Mountains and international agencies meet systematically for planning and monitoring NMPACT’s on-going role in conflict transformation. Additional support services are also provided by NMPACT to facilitate implementation by partner agencies, strengthen institutional learning, promote linkages to peace building processes and maximise opportunities for the Nuba to initiate their own longer term peace building process.

NMPACT is being implemented with a phased approach. Phase 1, implemented in 2002, has focused on carrying out preparatory activities and responding to long unmet humanitarian needs. [...] The overall strategic goal of the second and third phases of NMPACT is to enhance the Nuba people’s capacity for ending relief dependency and gradually but steadily shift towards self-reliance within a sustainable process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves. Phase 2, starting in January 2003, assumes some form of negotiated access is maintained but within a transitional context, with a greater focus on longer term livelihoods development and self-reliance. Phase 3, which could commence at any time thereafter, represents the objectives that could be addressed under a secure and consolidated cease-fire agreement towards a long term development strategy for the Nuba Mountains clearly linked to wider peace building processes in Sudan.

For NMPACT to gradually shift its focus from humanitarian assistance to transitional recovery initiatives during phase 2, additional funding will be required to target interventions that support sustained recovery of communities, while harnessing conditions for the post-war reconstruction of the region with a greater focus on longer-term livelihood development, return of IDPs and refugees and self-reliance for the Nuba people.” (UN, November 2002, p.184)

Ensure access to improved sanitation facilities and hygienic conditions for least 400,000 persons living in war-affected and drought-affected/prone areas and in localities inhabited by IDPs/refugees returning to their places of choice/origin.” (UN, November 2002, p.197-8)

**UNICEF activities in support of community-led peace building conflict transformation in Nuba Mountains (2003)**

- In Nuba Mountains focus will be on capacity-building of local actors to address structural causes of conflict
• UNICEF will promote dialogue and problem solving between communities

“In the Nuba Mountains conflict is “multi-tiered”. Local issues ranging from land access to administrative control have been exploited to mobilise marginalised communities from different ethnic groups as militia or supporters of either GoS or the SPLM. Meanwhile, indigenous and administrative methods of managing conflict have been undermined or made inoperable by the wider war. War has contributed to the widespread destruction of traditional livelihoods, already deeply affected by land appropriation for mechanised agriculture, and has caused large scale internal displacement. The ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains has improved possibilities for communities to engage with neighbours, the authorities and former adversaries to identify and resolve problems. Cross line initiatives are slowly becoming more possible.

The peace building component of the project aims to build the capacity of local actors living in the Nuba Mountains to address the structural causes of conflict and to strengthen community-led peace building and conflict management initiatives. UNICEF already has a history of engagement in support of community-led peace-building in Nuba (notably initiatives to address conflict between the Birrgid, Awdal Hilal and the Ajang Nuba in Dilling province, woman-to-woman dialogue between communities in the Lagowa area and a youth peace festival at Keilak involving Nuba and Arab pastoralists). Building on this experience, UNICEF will support initiatives to promote dialogue and problem solving between communities and to address the legacy of bitterness left by conflict. This will include strengthening the capacity of institutions (mainly CBOs and NGOs). UNICEF will use its WES, health and education programmes to support peace processes through service delivery. This project will be implemented in conjunction with UNICEF’s Grass-roots Peace Building project and will coordinate with other agencies involved in peace building in the nuba area.” (UN, November 2002, p. 144)

UNICEF and UNDP activities in support of community-led peace building conflict transformation and rehabilitation in Abyei (2003)

• In Abyei UNICEF will participate in a multi-agency programme in support peace building between Dinka Ngok and Misseriya Baggara tribes
• Rehabilitation of education and water and sanitation and health services to facilitate the return of IDPs will be supported
• UNDP will concentrate on facilitating equitable access to resources between the Dinka and Misseriya

“This project will take place within the multi-agency PACTA framework, within which UNICEF is the focal point agency for support to peace building, education and water and sanitation. Fighting in the Abyei area has devastated villages and cattle camps, destroyed services, restricted access to resources and caused extensive internal displacement. The main actors have been the Dinka Ngok and sections of the Misseriya Baggara tribes. The Ngok have been driven from their lands outside Abyei town, some to Twic, while the Misseriya have faced obstacles getting seasonal access to pasture and water to the south. After renewed clashes in late 2000, members of both communities, as well as Dinka from further south, came together to form a Peace Committee with the aim of addressing inter-community grievances and resolving conflict. A peace process started in 2001 and has involved several inter-community agreements between the Ajaira and Ngok. Both local government and the SPLM/A have since endorsed the process. IDPs are being attracted back to villages outside Abyei by the rehabilitation of services and facilities. In 2003, the communities plan to consolidate this process by extending the “zone of peace” into Twic Dinka country across the lines to the south of Abyei.

The focal point of the project will be the Abyei Peace Committee. UNICEF’s role in support to peace building is: a) to directly support inter-community problem-solving mechanisms, including meetings and
activities surrounding them designed to achieve reconciliation; b) to support targeted participatory rehabilitation of services in the fields of water and sanitation, health and education in Abyei and surrounding areas in order to consolidate peace. Participatory methodologies will ensure community management and ownership of services. Communities will receive training to support these activities. The project will coordinate with the State Government of West Kordofan, the authorities in Abyei Province, national counterparts, NGOs and other UN agencies active in the Abyei area and West Kordofan in general. The Abyei project will coordinate with UNICEF’s wider Grass-roots Peace Building Project.” (UN, November 2002, p. 146)

“The project, as a sub-project of the IDP Project (SUD 02/004) aims to support conflict transformation between the Dinka and Missiriya tribes by facilitating just, equitable and sustainable access to resources in the Abyei / Twic / Missiriya region. It will be implemented under the Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation in Abyei (PACTA) framework. PACTA is a multi-agency, cross-conflict collaborative intervention that aims to support the people to people peace process initiated in the Abyei region. Participating agencies are subscribing to a set of common programme goals, principles of engagement and strategies, which have been agreed upon through a consultative process involving community representatives and stakeholders involved in the conflict. A key focus of all interventions and external partners will be to support local leadership through institutional support and capacity building, to promote local ownership and management of the conflict transformation process and its benefits.

The project was prepared under the leadership of the Abyei Peace Committee (APC), and in collaboration with UN agencies, Sudanese NGOs, local authorities from Abyei, and Dinka and Missiriya representatives, building on local peace agreement between the Dinka and Missiriya. UNDP’s main role is to provide capacity-building and training for the Peace Committee and community groups, and to contribute to the overall coordination and collaboration in Abyei and between participating agencies in Abyei, Khartoum and Nairobi. PACTA is active in supporting and promoting the people driven peace process, through the Abyei Peace Committee, which is involved in promoting cooperation between opposing military forces, enhanced trade between communities, free movement of civilians, reconciling tribal competition over resources, and resolution of disputes and human rights violations, including abductions of women and children.

In 2003 the project will build on the opportunities resulting from the grassroots people to people peace agreements to promote the cross conflict, inter- and intra- tribal dialogues for conflict management and resolution. It will also support planning, implementation and monitoring of other thematic interventions promoting area rehabilitation to facilitate the return of IDPs and refugees. This will involve support to wider participation of civil society, which incorporates institutional strengthening and capacity building, so that local stakeholders would lead this conflict transformation process. In addition to supporting the leadership role of traditional tribal authorities in the local people to people peace, enhancement of the peace process is taking place through an ongoing pilot project to support the resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of Dinka IDPs in the Abyei region.

The project will be implemented in collaboration with UNICEF and will also support the Abyei Peace Committee and civil society organisations (CSOs) with human rights awareness, conflict transformation and peace building training. The dialogue, planning and monitoring of cross conflict processes will equip these communities to be guided by long term perspectives and shared political and socio-economic analyses. The local capacities of CSOs and the civilian populations would be re-enforced to address social and political exclusion, to enhance the potential for long-term success of the people to people peace process, and the return of IDPs and refugees from both the North and South, regardless of the progress in the wider Sudan peace process.” (UN, November 2002, p. 148)
UNDP activities in support of conflict transformation and recovery for IDPs in Upper Nile (2003)

- Purpose of the project is to expand the absorptive capacity of local communities
- Address needs for basic services to enable return and reintegration of IDPs
- Rehabilitate social infrastructure including schools, water and health facilities
- Support income-generating projects

“This project is being presented within the framework of the IDP programme and aims to undertake initiatives to enhance reconciliation and contribute to peace building in the region. It will target areas that have been hard hit by the conflict, and are now seeing a relative return to normalcy and stability. The area from Wadakona to Tonga on the west bank of White Nile, in Upper Nile State has been calm since the signing of Fashoda Agreement in 1997. Some 40,000 people have already returned and are now settled in the area. Many displaced persons who originate from this area have expressed the desire to return and reintegrate in the area. Two obstacles have thus far prevented their return; lack of water in the most productive areas away from the river and lack of access to education for their children. There are old hafirs, which can be rehabilitated. While there are sufficient (old) school buildings, there has not been administrative/institutional capacity to provide sustainable teaching services. The purpose of this project is to help expand the absorptive capacity of the communities already on the ground by addressing the need for basic services to support an enabling environment for peace and the return and reintegration of IDPs. This would include water source rehabilitation, support to education and support to local business development initiatives through the provision of technical assistance to local entrepreneurs interested in edible oil production. The rehabilitation services being provided will be highlighted in advocacy programmes to be broadcast over Radio Malakal as a means of peace promotion.

Supporting the reduction of the intra and inter-tribal conflicts in the Upper Nile Region is the foundation of this project. The implementation will utilise a four part strategy: a) supporting rehabilitation of the basic social infrastructure including schools, water facilities and health clinics to enable IDPs to return and re-integrate; b) capacity building of local authorities and civil society for sustaining basic services; c) supporting income generation projects for sustainable livelihoods and, d) advocacy, where the project will use the rehabilitation of basic services (noted as peace dividends) as material for peace advocacy radio broadcasts. Radio Malakal will broadcast the advocacy programmes in local languages and simple Arabic. […] The project will also support enhancing the capacity of the local peace committee in maintaining peace and mobilising the people for self-reliance in the project area. […]

UNDP will work to ensure strategic linkages are formed between existing UNICEF peace building and advocacy interventions in the area, UNDP’s Pastoralist and Farmers Conflict reduction project and this project. It is envisioned that a specific interagency task force on the ground would be established to coordinate peace building, advocacy and rehabilitation activities with authorities and other stakeholders in the region. The target beneficiaries are estimated at 150,000 persons over a three-year period including 30,000 who will benefit from the one-year pilot phase through facilitation of their voluntary return to the area. The second target group are those who carry arms in Upper Nile. The advocacy is directed at this latter group, which is estimated at 50,000 persons. The project will encourage the return of IDPs mainly from Khartoum and Kosti to the area by supporting the enabling environment in Upper Nile.

UNDP will establish a local project unit in Malakal and work with other UN agencies and NGO’s to ensure synergy with existing programmes, including food security, health, and education and water interventions. Engagement with authorities and community leaders will help UNDP develop an appropriate local strategy to achieve the project objectives. A capacity building focus with local authorities and partners to encourage sustainability will be a priority. A focus on supporting income generation activities including assistance to private entrepreneurs will aid in addressing the sustainability issue.” (UN, November 2002, p. 150)
UNDP multi-sectoral programme for return resettlement and reintegration of IDPs (2003)

- UNDP will train government and non-state actors as well as IDPs in the UN Guiding Principles as a mainstreaming effort
- Raise awareness about the fact that displacement is aggravated by major socio-economic consequences
- Support sustainable livelihoods with particular focus on women-headed households
- Prerequisite for this intervention will be local regional or national peace building initiatives
- Participation is the main principle guiding the project
- 5000 households expected to return to Abyei and similar number to Twic area during 2003

“The project will focus on community level recovery to support rehabilitation of IDP livelihoods and support to IDP policy development over a three year period to address development issues faced by the conflict affected IDPs in the Sudan. Ongoing dialogue, research and analysis of best practices and lessons learned will be applied to inform the development and implementation of policies of various levels of government, as well as the operational practices of agencies and organisations assisting IDPs. Training related to mainstreaming the UN Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement will be an important component and will be provided to Government and Non State actors, as well as the IDPs themselves.

Strategies for the protection and assistance of IDPs in Sudan must take into account that their displacement has been aggravated by major socio-economic implications. UNDP programming will integrate advocacy and institutional building measures at the national, state and local levels through an incremental approach. Advocacy and capacity building activities for state and non state actors are intended to promote improved understanding of economic, social and human security aspects with specific reference to the most disadvantaged communities where IDPs are returning, resettling, or integrating (governance and civil society at the meso-level). This will be accompanied by provision of technical assistance to promote enhanced capacity and commitment to the promotion of an enabling environment for providing sustainable solutions for internal displacement in Sudan. Equally important is achieving increased capacity at the national level to understand and plan the rehabilitation and recovery processes in rural economies through capacity building, training and support for national coordination structures.

The project will undertake various interventions to assist in the recovery of communities affected by internal displacement within two different scenarios: resettlement of IDPs into a new area and return of IDPs to their area of origin. In each case, UNDP involvement will be aimed at providing support to community level responses in rural areas to bridge the gap between humanitarian crisis and a recovery process. Supporting IDP households to return to self reliance through sustainable livelihoods will be the intended outcome, with a particular concern for woman headed households. In these pilot interventions, conflict transformation will provide the groundwork for the participatory planning, project design and implementation framework. Lessons learned from the pilot interventions will inform the policy development process.

Sustainable return, resettlement and reintegration of the displaced population cannot be achieved without taking into account the underlying causes of the displacement, of which insecurity and conflict are fundamental. Apart from the tribal conflicts and civil war, militias in the areas within and bordering the transition zone also have a serious impact on displacement. Local, regional and national peace building and conflict transformation initiatives will often be prerequisites or be supported as an underpinning framework of the application of return or resettlement strategies. UNDP will focus on a recovery approach that seeks to restore the capacity of authorities and communities to rebuild and recover from crisis. Programme initiatives will seek to build on previous humanitarian assistance to incorporate these inputs into as sets for rehabilitation and development.
Implementation of a conflict transformation and pilot resettlement project for the Dinka IDPs will continue assisting the voluntary resettlement of IDPs who have been living in Abyei town, into the surrounding villages of Noong, Todaj, and Awolnohm and others. The initiative was developed under the leadership of the Abyei Peace Committee and in collaboration with UN agencies, Sudanese NGOs and local authorities, as well as with representatives from both Dinka and Missiriya. An incremental approach would be employed, capitalising on the pilot phase to expand the project to provide forward linkages to community rehabilitation and recovery. An important focus for 2003 is the development of working linkages with counterparts and communities across the political conflict divide.

UNDP will promote and support a principled approach to cross conflict participation by the resident population, civil society organisations and NGOs in conflict transformation and sustainable return of IDPs. Additional funding in 2003 will be required to allow UNDP and its Government and non-government counterparts, along with other relevant agencies, to continue participatory assessments and then develop sub project documents together with the local partners. Up to 5,000 households are expected to participate in voluntary return in 2003 to the Abyei region from the north and a similar number of IDPs from SPLM/A areas may return to Twic areas. The pilot community level sub-projects would be closely monitored and analysed by UNDP, to ensure that lessons learned and best practices would be availed to other IDP programming actors, including the UN, NGOs and the authorities to promote replication or further expansion of assistance.

Similar interventions are planned to be initiated as pilot projects in Nuba Mountains, Equatoria, Upper Nile and Renk with NGO and UN agency partners. Participatory planning processes would be undertaken and support for a conflict transformation strategy would be the entry point.” (UN, November 2002, p.175)

**UNICEF and Fellowship For African Relief project for resettling IDPs in Northern Upper Nile (2003)**

- Rationale of the project is that Renk province attracted considerable numbers of displaced people as it is the second granary of the country
- Only 4% sanitation coverage in the area and global malnutrition at 27%
- UNICEF and FAR will enhance food security, water and sanitation and self-reliance of 10,000 IDPs
- Government of Upper Nile has made land available for this resettlement scheme
- FAO and UNDP will contribute with will participate by providing tools, seeds and support implementation of resettlement

“Northern Upper Nile (Renk Province), with its alluvial plains, is considered the second granary of the country in terms of size and productivity after Gedaref area. The mechanised farming was successfully introduced in the early 1960s with bountiful harvests of sorghum, millet and sesame. As a result, Renk, Gelhak, Geiger and Wad Akona towns attracted a large number of seasonal labour from the south and west in addition to IDPs fleeing the conflict areas of Kurmuk, Geisan and Yabus in Blue Nile.

The general sanitary condition in Renk town is very bad. Malaria is endemic. Visceral leishmaniasis is not uncommon and guinea worm cases are still reported from distant foci, as hafirs are the main source of drinking water in the agricultural schemes.

Fellowship for African Relief (FAR) conducted two assessments in Renk, Northern Upper Nile State in 2001 and 2002 (jointly with FAO/WFP, ADRA & HAC). The results indicated that sanitation coverage was 4% only, global malnutrition at a level of 27% and important needs in the areas of water, health education and food security. FAR integrated these findings in a proposal that was approved by CIDA in March 2002.
FAR is currently the only INGO providing multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable people of this area of Upper Nile State. During 2001 - 2002, FAR also became established in Kosti, White Nile State, with humanitarian assistance programs to IDPs. Kosti lies some 300 kilometers North of Renk and is the gateway to reach Renk.

FAR is considering implementing a multi-sectoral, multi-agency resettlement project for IDPs in the transitional zone of Northern Upper Nile. The overall objective is to support resettlement and enhance the food security, water and sanitation and the self-reliance of 10,000 IDPs. The Government of Upper Nile has made land available for this resettlement scheme. FAO and UNICEF have agreed to appeal too for this project and will be an implementing partner and to work in collaboration with FAR to reach the set objectives. UNDP has been contacted in order to facilitate and assist with the resettlement of IDPs and the preparation and implementation of this project. A first coordination meeting will be held at the end of September 2002 and other agencies interested, such as ADRA (planning to become operational in Renk late 2002) will also be invited. To date, FAO has made available fishing equipment and vegetable seeds and tools and is considering the provision of crop seeds and other agriculture inputs for the coming cropping season. UNICEF, through it’s sub-office in Malakal, is currently supporting Renk province by providing essential drugs kits, Insecticide Treated Bed Nets (ITNs) training of health workers on primary health care and also assisting a government unit promoting sanitation in Renk town.” (UN, November 2002, p.171)

**International response 2002**

**UN Rapporteur on Human Rights recommendations to ensure peace in Sudan (Nov 2002)**

- Human rights should be at the heart of the peace process and a cease-fire is a precondition for peace talks to proceed
- The oil issue exacerbating conflict should be solved by wealth-sharing arrangements in respect of the right to development
- In the context of Machakos protocol the UN should increase its involvement in Sudan by setting a new political structure, under a UN political office
- The peace negotiations are not involving all the warring parties, with potential danger of crystallizing the country in two parts
- Assistance need not only to be concentrate on emergency but developing coping mechanisms

“In my view, peace negotiations are not compatible with on-going hostilities. A comprehensive cease-fire is a pre-condition for the peace process to continue. Similarly, human rights abuses must be stopped, too. Indeed, human rights must be central to the peace process.

Accordingly, Machakos should be built on specific mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights. These must include the creation of independent internal institutions (1) as well as the establishment of an effective monitoring system from the outside. In the same vein, I noted with appreciation that the civil society is playing an increasingly active role. Human rights NGOs are more visible, organised and keen to participate actively in the peace process.

The country needs increased assistance to build up civil society, to prepare the population for peace and democratic governance. This includes civil administration and education. Specific human rights benchmarks should be envisaged in the peace process, within an established timeframe.

[...]
I repeatedly stated that oil is exacerbating the conflict, insofar as the war is the result of a fight for the control of power and resources. I refer to last year's debate on the use of oil revenues. I took note of the Government's stand whereby the use of oil revenues is a sovereign decision, not to be covered by my mandate. I responded by focusing on the oil issue in connection with the right to development, and more specifically the use of oil revenues and the need to develop a wealth-sharing arrangement with the South. […]

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I already referred to the role of the United Nations, particularly in the framework of the peace process. I believe that Machakos should be the starting point for a stronger involvement of the UN in the Sudan. Accordingly, while the existing humanitarian structure should continue to look at humanitarian issues, including access, a new political structure, under the direction of a UN political office should be envisaged to tackle more political issues, including those linked to the peace process and its outcome, in terms of a post-conflict scenario. Naturally, such a structure should include a human rights component, entrusted with the monitoring of the implementation of the peace process. […]

I heard the view that the Government seemed to be satisfied with the outcome of the first round of the peace talks and that therefore there was no need to continue to focus on human rights issues. In my view, human rights do not belong to the post-conflict scenario, but must be an integral part, indeed be put at the heart, of the peace talks, because with no consideration of human rights today there will never be a sustainable and just peace tomorrow.

Once again, I refer to those benchmarks that I mentioned at the beginning, which should be fully integrated in the peace negotiations as further guarantees for the post-conflict scenario. I also wish to reiterate that the peace talks should be a forum for all the parties in the conflict and as such cannot be exclusively linked to the Government and the SPLM/A, which has the further disadvantage of potentially crystallizing the country into two parts, besides making the resolution of the conflict itself more difficult.

I noted that assistance continues to be directed mainly to emergencies. More energies and resources should be devoted to prepare the population for peace and democracy. Assistance should be community-based, focusing on developing a sense of ownership by the local communities, thus ensuring their sustainability. Traditional means of conflict resolution, healing and reconciliation should be encouraged. Assistance should be targeted at developing coping mechanisms. The civil society as a whole, and women in particular, should be empowered to play an active role not only in the negotiations but also in the post-conflict scenario. Also, development aid should be closely linked to tangible progress in the field of human rights.

The link between peace, democracy and human rights should always be kept into account, with equal emphasis on civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. In this connection, relevant recommendations contained in the concluding observations of the Treaty Bodies should be the starting point for action, at both the national and international levels. Also, relevant provisions of the Durban Declaration and Program of Action stemming from the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance should be referred to as further guidance. A long-term, comprehensive, unified approach is the only way for any peace initiative to succeed. A political follow-up by the United Nations is therefore urgently needed to preserve the momentum.”

(UNHCHR, 12 November 2002)

**UNICEF to promote and information base gathering systematic information on IDPs in order to improve IDP protection (2002)**

- UNICEF to maintain systematic information base on IDPs
- UNICEF to promote advocacy and training on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- UNICEF will support efforts to better data collection on patterns of displacement and statistical data on IDPs in order to maximize humanitarian response
“Target beneficiaries 4 million IDPs throughout the country
There are an estimated 4 million IDPs in the Sudan who live in a highly fluid environment of movement, migration and renewed displacement according to circumstances. Effective protection of displaced populations requires interventions tailored to their situation. In the war zones a clearer picture needs to be obtained of displacement and migration patterns. To maintain a systematic information base about internal displacement in the Sudan, UNICEF will support joint efforts by the humanitarian community to gather baseline information and allow for continuous monitoring of migration, displacement and abuses. At the same time, UNICEF will increase advocacy and awareness raising efforts to enhance the protection of IDPs. To increase compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, UNICEF will raise awareness of human rights and humanitarian law among military personnel, counterparts and partners. This will include advocacy and training on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and their practical application in the context of delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced populations in the Sudan.”

“UNICEF will also support joint efforts by the humanitarian community to maintain a more systematic information base about internal displacement in the Sudan. This will provide a clearer picture of displacement and migration patterns and will facilitate continuous data collection and analysis. It will also increase the accuracy of estimates of numbers of beneficiaries, allowing for faster response. In order to strengthen the ability of host communities to receive and accommodate IDPs and returnees, UNICEF will increase support to communities likely to receive influxes of displaced. This will include capacity building for counterparts and local authorities on how to practically organize support and make better use of locally available resources. It will also include assistance to actual and potential host communities to enhance self-reliance through improved agricultural techniques.

Key activities:
- Provide technical support to counterparts.
- Compile baseline information relevant to displacement patterns in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile.
- Support the design and trial run of a prototype migration tracking database.
- Conduct special training courses on basic humanitarian principles and human rights related to the protection of IDPs.” (UNICEF January – December 2002)

Third mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons to Sudan (May 2002)

- Mission’s three main objectives: assess extent to which IDPs return can be supported, follow up September 2001 mission, discuss GoS responsibilities in return of IDPs
- Questions of when people cease to be categorized as displaced were raised to the Representative by members of international NGOs and the UN
- Status of southern IDPs in the north posed a challenge due to lack of non-exploitative integration opportunities in northern areas
- Creation of safe corridors to facilitate IDP movements between north and south was suggested to the Representative

“The Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, undertook his third mission to the Sudan from 16 to 26 May 2002, with three main objectives: to participate in a United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-sponsored mission to assess the potential for expanding support to return programmes for internally displaced persons (IDPs); to follow up on the September 2001 mission in regard to the development of government IDP policy; and to engage
in further discussions with the Government on its involvement and responsibilities in the return of programmes for IDPs.” (UNCHR, November 2002, p.6 par.1)

“In his dialogue with members of international NGOs and United Nations agencies […] Questions were raised by the participants concerning ongoing deliberations on the definition of an IDP, and when people would cease to be categorized as displaced. It was observed in particular that the status of many southern IDPs in the northern Sudan posed a challenge, owing to donor fatigue regarding relief assistance to those populations, coupled with the lack of opportunities for any substantial non-exploitative integration into the economy in the north. The participants also reminded the Representative of opportunities for cooperation across the conflict borders that could support sustainable IDP return and the need for the international community to support more effectively the creation and maintenance of safe corridors to facilitate freer movements of the IDPs. The potential for returning IDPs, some with new skills and exposure to modern ideas, could also be utilized as engines for development in a post-conflict environment […]

The potential for the transition zone to advance peace and coexistence or to promote conflict and competition over resources and ideologies was also reviewed. The prospects for a “buffer zone of peace” across the middle of the Sudan - Abyei, Nuba, Darfur, Ingressena Hills - which would reduce tensions and promote or help establish a framework of unity in diversity was discussed as a useful way of reinforcing the peace process.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.15-16, para 41; 47)

**Missions of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons to Sudan 1992 and 2001**

- Displaced around Khartoum forcibly relocated away from the city field marginalized (1992)
- Displaced settled close to their area of origin in Abyei enjoyed ‘sense of dignity’ despite insufficient assistance (1992)
- The Representative recommended three options for the IDPs: assisted return nearest to areas of origin, resettlement in area of their choice or enhanced accommodation in camps around Khartoum if wish to remain
- 2001 second mission of the Representative the three options recommendations remained valid
- Exceedingly slow implementation of Dinka return, started in January 2002 by UN task force

“During the Representative’s first visit to the Sudan, he found a significant contrast in the conditions of persons from the south displaced around Khartoum and those in Abyei, which became a transition zone for southerners fleeing northward and for the displaced in the north returning southward. While the displaced in the camps around Khartoum were provided with humanitarian assistance, they were forcibly relocated a significant distance from the city and the inhabitants felt alienated and marginalized as citizens. Those in the Abyei area, however, while not receiving significant assistance from any sources, enjoyed a sense of belonging and dignity in what in effect was their natural setting.

In comparing the two situations, the Representative recommended three options for the internally displaced in the country: to assist them to return to the areas nearest their natural setting and to give them support to reintegrate into those communities; to give them freedom as citizens to move to any area of their choice anywhere in the country; or to give them better accommodation and services in the displacement camps, if they chose to remain there.

During a second mission to the country in September 2001, nearly a decade later, the Representative found that although the conditions of those displaced in the north significantly improved, the options he had recommended earlier remained valid. In particular, there was a great deal of demand among the Dinka to return to their areas of origin in the south, especially areas where a degree of security had been restored. This was particularly the case with respect to the Ngok Dinka of Abyei. In agreement with several United
Nations agencies, the Representative decided to contribute the monetary value of the Rome Prize for Peace and Humanitarian Action which he had received to be used towards promoting people-to-people peace in the Abyei area and to facilitate a programme of return for the Dinka on both sides of the north-south border. A task force was established by the United Nations agencies to design the projects and an implementation strategy. The implementation of the return programme began in January 2002, with the establishment of three villages in which displaced populations from Abyei town were resettled. These included both Dinkas and Missiyyira Arabs. However, the process of implementation has been exceedingly slow and the wishes of the Dinka for massive return to their area has remained unmet.” (UNCHR, 27 November 2002, p.3)

Humanitarian response related to IDPs in Western Bahr al Ghazal and South Darfur (2001)

- 10,000 IDPs settled in unsuitable location in Ed Da'in school were relocated to enable better assistance delivery
- Rains hamper humanitarian access to 2,500 IDPs in El Radom
- IDPs safely evacuated out of war-affected areas with GoS trucks and police escorts
- UNICEF to provide teachers salaries to facilitate education among IDPs who are destitute and cannot afford education costs
- UNICEF taking the lead in family reunification

“The estimated number of IDPs either in the camps or still on the move may be as many as 20,000 and remain constantly in flux. IDPs, both still in the bush and in some camps such as Gemeiza near Buram, continued to move towards Nyala, Ed Da'in and Khartoum.

The total number of IDPs currently settled in camps in South Darfur State is 17,766 with 7,636 in Um Huerronia, 2,888 in El Ferdous, 2,868 in Gemeiza and 2,624 in El Radom. The number in Ed Da'in is unknown as over 70% have relocated. There are still 1,600 displaced persons in Timsaha and 150 in Firga. These two villages are about 90 miles north of Raja. Many have arrived in all of these locations by trucks, while many others have come on foot. Another 2,000 of the Raja displaced are in the government-controlled town of Wau in Western Bahr El Ghazal.

The school in Ed Da'in, where over 10,000 IDPs had taken shelter, was considered unsuitable for the IDPs. UN-OCHA received reports of sanitation and dehydration-related deaths, and scores had become ill. Agencies were faced with the dilemma of having to provide essential humanitarian assistance to a huge population settled in an unsuitable location. All IDPs have now vacated the school building and seven thousand plus have been relocated in Um Huerronia.

Gemeiza, which is 10 km from El Buram and currently hosting between four and five thousand IDPs, offers the IDPs some access to agricultural land. Problems however, include water shortages and lack of seed and tools for agricultural activities.

One of the major problems now is accessibility, as a result of the rains, to some of the areas especially the El Radom campsite where over 2,500 IDPs are in need of humanitarian assistance. This is depriving the IDPs of shelter and other relief supplies. Some are squatting under trees or in abandoned buildings. The IDPs have experienced acute food shortages and lack basic health care and proper sanitation facilities. Access to El Radom would require four wheel drive vehicles and/or airdrops. One other major issue in relation to the IDPs in El Radom is how to implement compulsory basic education in places where there are no schools for displaced children or where school fees are beyond the reach of their parents.

A team comprising HAC, UNICEF, UN-OCHA, IRC, SRC and GOAL visited El Radom from 19 - 21 July 2001 to assess the general situation of the IDPs and to identify their priority needs. Among the findings of
the team is the number of unaccompanied children in need of reunification with their families. These children are currently with extended family members whilst family tracing proceeds. There were reports of cases of malaria, diarrhoea, skin diseases, and acute respiratory infection from which two under-five children have reportedly died. 

[...] 

Humanitarian agencies and the GOS have been able to respond rapidly and in a coordinated manner to this recent emergency in South Darfur which developed as a result of the SPLA offensive in western Bahr El Ghazal.

Transportation of IDPs moving out of the war-affected areas was completed with the assistance of the GOS. UNICEF, WFP and UN-OCHA made financial contributions to the local emergency efforts for transportation funding. Government authorities provided trucks and armed police escorts for the protection of the IDPs against banditry and harassment.

The UN and NGOs have been assisting the Government at both federal and regional levels with the consolidation of the campsites, and the provision of a range of services to the IDPs in the camps. Inter-sectoral responsibilities include the Government of Sudan in water and environmental sanitation; WFP in food and support for registration; UNICEF in water and sanitation, health, shelter, nutrition and child protection, SC-UK in shelter, nutrition and child protection; Sudan Red Crescent in health and registration and Global Health Foundation in health. Discussions have started between IRC and UNICEF for education support with GOS taking the lead in ensuring salaries to the teachers. WFP, UNICEF, IRC and SC-UK also provide some food for work incentives. Tracing of family members, especially of unaccompanied minors, is ongoing.” (OCHA 9 August 2001)

Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) led by the US (2002)

- First report of the CPMR concluded GOS bombing of civilians in Equatoria on 21st Sept 2002 were accidental
- The doctrine of ‘collateral damage’ seems to be gaining ground
- CPMT is charged with investigating military attacks on civilians and violations of the Geneva Conventions by both parties
- There is plenty of evidences for the CPMT to collect from humanitarian workers on the ground

“US Brig Gen Herbert Lloyd and Sen Danforth are reportedly leading the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) to the Leer area at the request of the IGAD Special Envoy, Kenyan Lt Gen Lazaro Sumbeiywo. 

[...] 

The CPMT’s first report, on the bombing of civilians in Equatoria on 21st September, concluded that it was an accident and civilians were not deliberately targeted. There is an expectation that the CPMT should be able to respond immediately and make on-site investigations within hours of a reported attack on civilians. In this instance their first visit to the scene was in late November, nearly two months after the attack. Their conclusion that it was legitimate for GoS aircraft to attack SPLM/A artillery near a church will disappoint those who believe there is a duty to avoid harming civilians, but is unsurprising considering the development by the USA and others of a doctrine that permits “collateral damage” in order to justify their own actions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.” (SFP, January 2003, p.5)

“These abuses [September 2002 abuses in Southern Sudan] have taken place despite the agreement in March 2002 between Sudanese government and the SPLM/A (fostered by U.S. Special Envoy for Peace in Sudan former Senator John Danforth) in which each undertook not to target civilians or civilian objects in the war. In accordance with these agreements, the U.S. government has put in place a Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, based in Khartoum and the southern rebel-held town of Rumbek. The team is charged
with investigating military attacks by both sides targeting civilians and other violations of the Geneva Conventions. Both the Sudanese government and the SPLA agreed to permit this team to travel freely in southern Sudan.

"Now is the time for the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team to investigate the continuing abuses by both sides as they wage this war in areas susceptible to famine," said Rone. "At a minimum they should investigate the reports the staff on the ground have made that civilians were killed or injured in the fighting in September 2002, and the reported abuses by the SPLA in Torit in August-September 2002."” (HRW, 28 September 2002)

**IDP Protection Network for Southern Sudan (Nov 2002)**

- The Network aims at promoting protection through advocacy and education includes UNICEF, local NGOs, SARRA and RASS
- It is an effort to incorporate human rights standards into SRRA’s policy

“Gordon Guem, Protection Officer for the SRRA, reported on progress made in the creation of an IDP Protection Network ("the Network") for Southern Sudan. The Network includes UNICEF, local NGOs, the SARRA and RASS and is designed to promote protection through education and advocacy.

Like the SRRA’s consideration of the draft policy on internal displacement, Mr. Guem identified the SRRA’s participation in the Network as a sign of its commitment to incorporate international human rights standards into its policies and practices. In addition to educating internally displaced persons, SPLM/A officials, SPLA armed forces and community leaders, the Network would advocate with international and local institutions for better treatment of internally displaced persons. It would attempt to integrate its activities with those of international humanitarian organizations, for instance, by assisting organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Save the Children - UK in tracing missing family members of internally displaced persons.

Participants voiced their support for the new network and urged its members to coordinate closely with international humanitarian mechanisms. Participants also congratulated the SPLM/A on its willingness to encourage monitoring and advocacy by the Network, and encouraged it and the Network to take this function seriously.

Some participants called upon the SPLA to share more information with local NGOs to help them to protect the security of internally displaced persons. It was noted that displaced persons frequently do not receive crucial survival information. Mr. Malok responded that the SPLA had made an effort to share such information in the past.” (Brookings/ect, 25 November 2002, p.8)

**UNICEF promotes the creation of DB gathering systematic information on IDPs in order to strengthen protection (2002)**

- UNICEF to maintain systematic information base on IDPs
- UNICEF to promote advocacy and training on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
- UNICEF will support efforts to better data collection on patterns of displacement and statistical data on IDPs in order to maximize humanitarian response

"Target beneficiaries 4 million IDPs throughout the country"
There are an estimated 4 million IDPs in the Sudan who live in a highly fluid environment of movement, migration and renewed displacement according to circumstances. Effective protection of displaced populations requires interventions tailored to their situation. In the war zones a clearer picture needs to be obtained of displacement and migration patterns. To maintain a systematic information base about internal displacement in the Sudan, UNICEF will support joint efforts by the humanitarian community to gather baseline information and allow for continuous monitoring of migration, displacement and abuses. At the same time, UNICEF will increase advocacy and awareness raising efforts to enhance the protection of IDPs. To increase compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law, UNICEF will raise awareness of human rights and humanitarian law among military personnel, counterparts and partners. This will include advocacy and training on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and their practical application in the context of delivery of humanitarian aid to displaced populations in the Sudan.”

“UNICEF will also support joint efforts by the humanitarian community to maintain a more systematic information base about internal displacement in the Sudan. This will provide a clearer picture of displacement and migration patterns and will facilitate continuous data collection and analysis. It will also increase the accuracy of estimates of numbers of beneficiaries, allowing for faster response. In order to strengthen the ability of host communities to receive and accommodate IDPs and returnees, UNICEF will increase support to communities likely to receive influxes of displaced. This will include capacity building for counterparts and local authorities on how to practically organize support and make better use of locally available resources. It will also include assistance to actual and potential host communities to enhance self-reliance through improved agricultural techniques.

Key activities:
- Provide technical support to counterparts.
- Compile baseline information relevant to displacement patterns in Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Western Upper Nile.
- Support the design and trial run of a prototype migration tracking database.
- Conduct special training courses on basic humanitarian principles and human rights related to the protection of IDPs.” (UNICEF January – December 2002)

Inter-Agency mission to identify key areas to support potential return of IDPs (Dec 2002)

- Levels of international assistance will be conditioned to levels of cost sharing demonstrated by the GoS
- The issues addressed to support IDP return covered four main areas: human security, capacity-building, rehabilitation and recovery and return, and processes of return, resettlement and local integration
- To ensure protection of IDPs both statutory and customary legal institutions need strengthening
- UNCT would not support authorities’ initiative for transit-camps

“Rehabilitation and recovery of livelihoods

Despite expectations being unrealistically high, it is noted that in both the GOS’s and SPLM’s recently formulated IDP policies, the notion that the principal responsibility for support to IDPs rests with the national authorities is clearly enshrined. Consequently, it is incumbent upon the authorities of a post-peace Sudan, at both at the national and the emergent southern regional level, to allocate adequate resources to provide the necessary support for returnees. Levels of international assistance to the respective authorities will be conditioned to a considerable extent upon levels of cost sharing demonstrated by the GOS.
Moreover, these recent IDP policy statements developed by both parties, based upon the Guiding Principles, also commit the authorities to the principal of disparity reduction through area- and community-based interventions. Indeed, the IDP policy defined by the SPLM clearly states that all returnees, whether IDPs, refugees, demobilizing combatants or other migrants, should be supported on an equitable basis and in no way be seen as more ‘privileged’ than the communities among which they reintegrate. Particular attention must also be paid to the special needs of women and children as they have fewer options available to them and may have restricted access to land or fewer marketable skills, or they may be at greater risk of exploitation.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p. 14)

“Although the mission report focuses upon issues and constraints that will need to be addressed if a peace agreement produces return movements of many of the displaced, many of these issues also relevant to the current IDP situation and hence should be addressed irrespective of a peace being reached. Indeed, the mission notes that many of the recommendations it makes are equally relevant to addressing the needs of other non-displaced vulnerable groups. The report discusses four basic sets of issues.

Human security is seen by all as the key need that underpins all other dimensions of the displacement problem in Sudan. Many protection issues exist and even following a peace settlement, protection issues will remain a major determinant of who returns and whereto. National institutions that can provide for the rule of law are weak and often undermined by the various combatant groups. UN system support should be provided for strengthening both statutory and customary legal institutions so that they are better equipped to deal with dispute resolution when the displaced return.

Peace building initiatives must be increased and should be better coordinated between UN actors. The human rights monitoring capacity of the UN system should also be strengthened as a means of increasing human security. Physical security, especially if there is a large return movement, requires increased mine-action and education. There is also a risk of return movements contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS and hence heightened HIV/AIDS awareness is required for both the displaced and in areas of potential return.

Secondly, the lack of capacity among national, regional and local authorities and institutions seriously constrains the level and quality of support for the displaced and results in a heavy dependence upon the international community. Assisting a postpeace Sudan in strengthening good governance should be a high priority for the UNCT. Simultaneously, the UN actors should promote participatory approaches and strengthen community structures since most assistance to IDPs and returnees will likely be provided through such mechanisms.

Special attention should be given to the promotion of the return of skilled persons displaced by the war. Building the capacities of women and female-headed households among the displaced should also be given high priority in the UN’s strategy. In terms of infrastructure, plans should be prepared for early post-peace reconnection of the southern towns with their hinterlands to promote trade and income generation that will allow returnees to be better absorbed.

Third, planning for the return and reintegration of the displaced must be undertaken in close cooperation with GOS and SPLM authorities, including ascertaining their levels of potential resourcing for the displaced. The overarching framework for reintegration and return should be through area/community based interventions. At the same time, the UNCT should define the length and types of humanitarian assistance that will continue to be needed while returnees re-establish livelihoods or for those unable or unwilling to return.

A common reintegration package for rural returnees should be established and food assistance should, where practical, be delivered through community based food for work modalities. Urban returnees/IDPs should be assisted with livelihood recovery programming as part of overall programming for urban vulnerable groups. In this regard, planning for vocational training, micro-credit and revolving loan schemes should be strengthened. The mission noted that regional and local administrations appear unprepared for
the potential needs arising with a substantial return movement and hence recommends that an advisor be provided to the UNCT to assist in developing a comprehensive livelihood rehabilitation programme.

Lastly, the mission looked at the actual process of return. It noted the disconnect between both the GOS’s and SPLM’s assumptions that there will be massive return movement and that most of it will be to rural areas of origin, and the more likely reality of a partial and staged return with many returnees opting for urban locations.

While authorities expect assistance with transportation for returnees, the UN should limit this for special cases such as acutely vulnerable or as an incentive for much needed skilled persons. Likewise, while authorities expect support for transit-camps for the returning displaced, the UNCT should avoid being drawn into such ventures. Instead, it should explore how it can provide way-stations along principal return routes where basic en-route assistance can be provided. The potential overall mobility of population following a peace agreement requires close monitoring by the UN as well as the dissemination of information to enable potential returnees make informed decisions about their return.” (Inter-Agency Mission, 18 December 2002, p. 2-3)

Here are some of the most compelling concerns and recommendations from the Interagency mission to Sudan, (November 2002).

Impunity and human rights abuses were widespread and the judicial system very weak. Awareness of the Guiding Principles was non-existent among local authorities as well as IDP leadership.

Mine-risk education targeting IDPs needed to start before a peace deal was reached.

Mechanisms to monitor cease-fire violations and human rights also needed to be developed by the UNCT with the support of OHCHR.

Capacity-building and community-participatory approaches to recovery were paramount, considering that the South was almost entirely reliant on international aid for the provision of basic services. In addition agreements on oil-revenue sharing mechanisms were needed to generate employment and stimulate development in the south.

Rehabilitation of civil service structures was seen as a pre-requisite for peaceful and democratic referendum.

The UN would not support GoS plans to set up transit camps in the South.

The mission advised against assistance under the shape of ‘return packages’ and rather preconised livelihood reconstruction and capacity building.

Substantial response by OLS to 1998 famine conditions after overcoming funding and access constraints (July - December 1999)

- Widespread food shortages in Bahr El Ghazal predicted by OLS in January 1998
- WFP could not substantially increase aid deliveries until July 98, following a cease-fire agreed by both warring parties and an increase in funding
- Suggested that initial slow response to 1998 OLS appeal exacerbated impact of 1998 crisis

"There is no doubt that many of the problems WFP faced [in 1998] were a direct result of the extent of the crisis and the speed with which they had to scale up their operation. In the Annual Appeal for 1998, OLS predicted widespread food shortages as a result of continued attack, raiding, displacement and drought, particularly in Bahr El Ghazal. However, donor response to the Appeal was limited.

In 1998, South Sudan faced it’s most serious humanitarian crisis in 10 years. This followed Karebino’s attack on Wau in December 1997 and consequent population movements. An estimated 110,000 Southerners fled Wau town and more fled from GOS towns of Aweil and Gogrial. People previously displaced by Karebino returned to their home areas in NBEG. The crisis worsened as a result of GOS
suspension of OLS flights into BEG in February, during which time GOS conducted an aerial bombing campaign. At the end of February, GOS granted clearance to four locations, which exacerbated the crisis by drawing in people in search of relief. One of these sites, Ajiep, consequently experienced the greatest crisis in terms of malnutrition and mortality. Arab militia raiding continued in March and April 98.

WFP could not substantially increase aid deliveries until July 98, following a cease-fire agreed by both warring parties and an increase in funding. By the middle of 1998, however, the crisis in BEG was at its peak and was associated with significant loss of life.

It could be argued that with a greater response to the 1998 OLS Appeal and international pressure on GOS to comply with the OLS agreement the crisis would not have developed to the extent it did by the middle of 1998. As a result, of initial denial of access and limited funding, WFP had to scale up its air operation hugely in a very limited amount of time. Food aid delivered increased from a maximum of 2438 MT/month in June 1997, to a maximum of 12,746 MT by November 1998. Logistical capacity expanded from one C-130 to five C-130's and four Ilushins in two months. In addition, WFP increased its international field staff from 15 in 1997 to 54 by July 98. Any problems identified in this report should be seen in this context.” (Jaspars 12 April 1999, sect. 3.1)

“During a mission by the Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), OLS agreed to open a second logistics base in the Government town of Al Obeid located north of the transitional zone. On 6 June, the base became operational with one C-130 airdropping food into both Government and rebel-held areas of northern Bahr Al Ghazal. By mid-July, WFP was using 16 cargo planes from four bases as part of the largest humanitarian airdrop operation in UN history. OLS’ efforts to meet the crisis were bolstered in early June with the resumption of humanitarian activities by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which had suspended operations in November 1996 following a hostage-taking incident in Bahr Al Ghazal.

[…] During 1998, OLS mounted the most complex set of interventions in its ten-year history. By the end of November, WFP had delivered 88,000 MTs of food. At the height of the crisis, WFP was delivering an average of 15,000 MTs of food per month to an estimated one million beneficiaries using a combination of road, river and air corridors. OLS agencies provided supplementary and therapeutic feeding to more than 100,000 persons and conducted a major measles and polio vaccination campaign that successfully prevented outbreaks of these deadly diseases. OLS agencies also supported and coordinated programmes in primary health care and nutrition, HHFS, livestock, WES, emergency education, CEDC, gender and development, capacity-building, humanitarian principles, protection and child rights.

OLS was helped in its efforts to stabilise the famine by the unprecedented access granted by the Government of Sudan and the rebel movements. With the exception of the two-month flight ban over Bahr Al Ghazal imposed by the Government, OLS was able to access more locations per month than at any other time in its history. On average, 204 locations received flight clearance each month. During a stopover visit in Khartoum by the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Kofi Annan, in mid-May 1998, the Government of Sudan agreed to allow an assessment mission in rebel-held areas of the Nuba Mountains. This breakthrough followed a planned assessment in November 1997 from which the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) had withdrawn. By year-end, no date had been agreed on for the mission.” (UN January 1999, “Year in Review”)

“Though WFP launched the biggest humanitarian air-operation ever by mid 1998, and managed to deliver over 100,000 MT of relief food between January and November, of which some 73,000 MT were delivered between July and November 1998, the humanitarian crisis in Bahr el Ghazal and in several other areas is far from over. The nutritional situation is generally improving; but as many as 46% of the children are still malnourished in some areas and the daily death rates are still reaching the alarming rate of 2 per 10,000 people in worst hit locations. Although the 1998 harvest is better than 1997, with reported surpluses in Upper Nile, Western and Eastern Equatoria, the overall crop is not expected to compensate the shortfalls in several deficit regions. In addition, the 1998 surpluses cannot be transported to deficit locations due to poor
infrastructure and continued insecurity. Furthermore, large segments of the population living in surplus areas will face critical food shortages in 1999 due to lack of purchasing power. " (WFP 12 January 1999, para. 4)

**UN Response to IDPs in Khartoum characterised as "failure" by OLS review (1996)**

- Claimed that the incorporation of the Khartoum displaced under OLS has had little observable beneficial impact (1996)
- Attempts to increase access to IDPs and to enhance the protection function of humanitarian assistance has been hampered by a lack of organisational capacity, by the absence of a regular field presence of UNICEF and WFP for monitoring, and by the limited co-ordination function the UN is able to assert over NGOs

"The continuing crisis among war-displaced populations in Greater Khartoum, the largest concentration of internally displaced people in Sudan, represents the greatest failure of OLS in the Northern Sector. The incorporation of the Khartoum displaced under OLS has had little observable beneficial impact. Indeed, in 1995, three years after their formal incorporation, the nutritional status of displaced populations in the Khartoum was reported to be deteriorating […]."

The UN response to the needs of war-displaced in Khartoum has involved a three-pronged strategy: the provision of emergency relief assistance, technical support to the government for urban planning, and attempts to increase access and assistance. […] Aside from the provision of emergency relief, the UN's approach to war-displaced in Khartoum appears to have been informed by two parallel approaches. First, the idea that urban renewal is necessary to improve the environment for the displaced, but that the demolitions and relocations of war-displaced peoples this involves should be pursued in as humane and rational a manner as possible. This idea has underpinned various attempts by UNDP in particular to build the capacity of relevant GOS departments to implement urban development programmes. These attempts, however, have been hampered by a general decline in development assistance; more importantly, they have been compromised by the continued demolition of settlements by the GOS, involving the destruction of basic infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, and schools. Also, the failure to impose conditions on the GOS regarding the cessation of demolitions has destroyed donor confidence in UN proposals to assist the government.

Others argue, however, that the internally displaced in Khartoum are not simply part of a problem of urban development. Certain populations of war-displaced - and especially the Dinka - have been identified as having suffered disproportionately from GOS policies as a result of the political dimensions of internal warfare. Evidence to support this is drawn from GOS legislation which differentiates the rights of different groups of people to settle in Khartoum, and from the pattern of demolitions and relocations; in the case of the Ishish Fellata squatter area of Khartoum for example, people were moved "due to the economic and political base of the inhabitants"[…]. Consequently, the UNHCU in particular has attempted to increase access to these populations, and to enhance the protection function of humanitarian assistance. This approach has been hampered, however, by a lack of organisational capacity, by the absence of a regular field presence of UNICEF and WFP for monitoring, and by the limited co-ordination function the UN is able to assert over NGOs working in the displaced camps. More broadly, it has been undermined by the failure of UN OLS agencies to collectively work to carve out a distinct neutral humanitarian space for OLS Northern sector responses to the needs of the war-displaced." (Hendrie et al 1996, pp. 193, 196)

**Selected NGO activities**


Fellowship For African Relief reproductive health for urban IDPs (2003)

- Reproductive health of IDPs in Khartoum, Kosti and Renk Province will be targeted
- IDPs at high risk of STDs and HIV infections due to lower health and economic status
- 97% of detected HIV cases were infected through sexual transmission
- Correct condom use was less than 1%

“Within the context of urbanisation and the persistent conflict between northern and southern Sudan, many people have been displaced or migrated from their home areas to towns, the majority trying to get settled in suburban zones of Khartoum. It is estimated that more than 2,000,000 IDPs live in Khartoum state, of which many are in the four official IDP camps. The Khartoum IDPs typically face major problems including adaptation to an urban environment and the ability to secure employment. Trapped in a cycle of poverty, the IDPs typically suffer from a lower health and socio-economic status than the national average and are also at higher risk of STDs, including HIV/AIDS. Knowledge of how to prevent and treat STDs is generally poor, which adds to the health burdens of the IDPs and infected cases may have a significant impact on the socio-economic situation for the whole family. Long-term effects of untreated STDs can include infertility, heart and brain damage, death in adults and blindness and birth defects in infants, in addition to the dangers of HIV infection.

According to the SNAP, 97% of detected cases, estimated at 600,000, have been infected through sexual transmission. Yet, the national contraceptive prevalence (CP) is estimated to be only 9.9%, including less than 1% represented by correct condom use, and is much lower among disadvantaged populations such as the urban displaced. The lack of correct RH knowledge, attitudes and practices is reflected also in the MM ratio, which is 550 per 100,000 live births with the IMR being around 70 per 1,000 live births. The fertility rate is at about 5.4 children per woman and these figures have not significantly improved since the last decade (UNICEF 2001).

FAR has previously been providing integrated PHC services, including nutrition, for pregnant and lactating women and children under-five in Wad El Bashier (WEB) and Omdurman El Salaam (OES) displaced camps since the mid-1990s. In 2001-2002, similar initiatives were began in Kosti and Renk in White and Upper Nile State, respectively. In collaboration with UNFPA and other international and national agencies, FAR is planning to strengthen the RH and HIV/AIDS components of its health programmes including preventative as well as management and care measures for already infected cases. The estimated beneficiaries of the programme will include some 100,000, with a focus on women of childbearing age and children under-five, though men will also be targeted through gender and awareness raising trainings.

OBJECTIVES
Provision of integrated RH services for 15-49 year old women in four displaced camps in Khartoum and Kosti and for IDPs and the vulnerable host population in Renk town. Health services provided would include ante-natal care, intra-partum care, post-natal care, curative and prophylactic care for programme beneficiaries, etc. as well as measurements for strengthening sustainability of the services (cost recovery and TBAs income generation activities).

Provision of integrated quality health services for the infants in the four displaced camps and Renk town.
Improving RH knowledge, attitudes and practices through health education within the clinic services and the target communities.

STRATEGIES
Development of integrated RHS and infrastructure, including testing and treatment facilities for STDs.
Efficient training of the project staff and TBAs.
Raising of community awareness on RH issues , including STDs and HIV/AIDS, and healthy practices.
Initiating local services and health education within the target community (TBAs, home -deliveries, gender training for men etc).” (UN, November 2002, p. 129-130)” (UN, November 2002, p.129)
Dan Church Aid and Christian Aid IDP assessment in Rubkona, Western Upper Nile (March 2002)

- Dan Church Aid and Christian aid went to locations where most IDPs were, in areas where access was denied to OLS by GOS
- Accurate assessment impossible to effectuate given constant movement over large area
- The NGOs recommended increased international presence in WUN

Ignoring a recent agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), brokered by the US, the government of Sudan is deliberately targeting civilians in an attempt to rid the area of SPLA and secure control of the oil fields. The SPLA have declared oil installations a legitimate target for attacks, and have increased pressure on the government of Sudan as a result of a unity agreement between the two southern factions, the SPLA and Southern People's Democratic Front (SPDF). This has led to an intensification of the conflict, which, coupled with the presence of oil, is a deadly combination for the civilians of Western Upper Nile.

The assessment mission had three main objectives:
1. to assess the numbers, condition, needs and locations of the displaced people of Rubkona County, Western Upper Nile, southern Sudan;
2. to understand the reasons for the displacement and to document personal accounts of the attacks, the atrocities and the violations of humanitarian law that were perpetrated; and,
3. to provide this documentation to interested parties to be used for advocacy purposes.

After the attack on Bieh, joint OLS/non-OLS meetings were held to gather all the information coming out of Western Upper Nile, to analyse the situation and to co-ordinate any response that was clearly going to be necessary. All reports highlighted that people were on the move because of the increased government activity, and that these attacks had intensified from the occasional Antonov aerial bombardment to the use of far more threatening helicopter gunships supporting ground forces - including militia on horse back. This deliberate targeting of civilians to clear the area was pervasive over large parts of Rubkona County especially (also coinciding with what is known as Block 5A oil concession) and was leading to people fleeing in various directions. However due to this very insecurity it was difficult for international staff to get into the area to assess the reality on the ground - to verify the extent and range of the stories, to know the condition and needs of the people, and to ascertain where they were or where they were heading.

In mid-March, OLS agencies were finally able to access a limited number of locations to carry out a rapid assessment of the number of people displaced. This was mostly in areas outside Rubkona County, and unfortunately reports were coming out that indicated that most of the displaced people were located in areas where access by OLS agencies had been denied by the government. Therefore, most of the displaced people had not been seen during these rapid assessments.

Although a non-OLS agency had gone in to a couple of locations denied to OLS to deliver a small amount of food and medical assistance, they had not had the time (or inclination) on the ground to assess the situation fully. The agency did not get verifiable information on where the majority of displaced people had sought refuge, on how many people were actually displaced, or on their condition. There appears to be too great a reliance on broad Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) figures that cannot be clearly substantiated.

In the hope of clarifying the situation and needs for ourselves, Dan Church Aid and Christian Aid made a three to four day assessment mission to a part of WUN currently denied to the OLS agencies. The team of
four international agency representatives was accompanied by local partner, South Sudan Operation Mercy (SSOM), and the SRRA.

The team flew into Wicok on the morning of 28 March. Over the next three days, the team interviewed displaced people from a variety of locations and villages from Rubkona County. The team left Wicok early on 29 March and followed the path of some of the displaced people southwards for about six hours across seven streams, to a place called Chotchar, where they had moved in order to feel safe. After spending more than a day with them there, the team then walked on to Tuoc (two hours away) and Pam (a further two hour walk) looking for other internally displaced people in the vicinity. Interviews were conducted to elicit information on the tactics used by the government forces during the attacks, as well as to determine their condition and needs.

What follows are the findings of this short assessment trip, and some stories from the displaced people themselves. These are the voices of the newly dispossessed, the latest thousands forcibly chased from their homes with little or nothing - through the ongoing efforts of the Sudanese government to enable oil companies to exploit the oil riches of southern Sudan.

It is important to note that it is virtually impossible to make an accurate assessment of the numbers of people affected and their precise locations - given that there is constant movement over a very large geographic area. It should be said, though, that the assessment team has significant experience in Sudan over many years (one of the expatriate team members has over 20 years experience in the region), and the conservative estimates of numbers below are tempered and based around their knowledge and understanding of the context garnered over this time.

**Key findings:**

**The government of Sudan is deliberately targeting civilian populations**, resulting in the displacement of the majority of the people of Rubkona County - maybe as many as 50-60,000 people (though SRRA say 200,000). The government is using the same clearance tactics witnessed in Blocks 1 and 2, Ruweng County, in the area of the Unity and Heglig oilfields. (See section 2 of this report.)

**There is an immediate need to implement ‘preventive protection’ in the region**, using the presence of international personnel and other methods in an attempt to prevent further human rights abuses and displacement.

**These attacks have been conducted mostly out of sight of the international community**, due to the systematic denial of airstrips by the Sudanese government. The targeting of civilians, even at OLS relief centres, by the government has generally taken place without international witnesses as humanitarian workers have been denied access to the region.

**Any humanitarian intervention MUST incorporate some form of protection for civilians.** This could be an international monitoring body, or a group of ‘peace witnesses’, willing to be present in insecure locations to document and report any violations of human rights and humanitarian law. It is to be hoped that by announcing the presence of such persons, the Sudanese government would be forced to desist from its current practices.

**An intervention must happen immediately, before the onset of the rains at the end of May. The intervention must be comprehensive and include food security, shelter, healthcare, water and sanitation. Most importantly, it must include PREVENTIVE PROTECTION.** The health of the displaced people will deteriorate rapidly, due to the fact that they are now approaching the ‘Hunger Gap’ period, where grain and other food stocks are depleted and here are many months before any potential harvest. Without comprehensive intervention now, thousands of Nuer people may be forced to cross into Dinka areas of Bahr el Ghazal in search of safety, food and shelter. Such a massive movement of Nuer people could increase intertribal tensions over limited resources such as water and grazing lands.
The intervention must incorporate the needs of the host communities, who are already struggling to survive due to the continuing insecurity in WUN, yet are sharing what little they do have with the displaced people.” (Dan Church Aid/Christian Aid, 30 April 2002, pp 2–4)

Nuba Mountains Solidarity Abroad will support the reintegration of IDPs returning to the Nuba Mountains (2003)

- Support community efforts for improving basic services and needs assessment for IDP
- Data collection to determine willingness to return
- Train 100 community leaders on capacity-building for peace

“Contribute to the successful, sustainable return of IDPs to their original communities in the Nuba Mountains.

OBJECTIVES
Support sustainable basic services for the IDPs in their original communities, increase the economic sustainability of the returning IDPs in order to minimise dependency on relief aid, and preserve land, heritage, norms and re-activate the social-cultural life.

STRATEGIES
Capacity building at grass roots level to support local responsibility in operation, maintenance and management of water and sanitation.
Community mobilisation for the improvement of basic services for the IDPs.
Encourage inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations and support peaceful co-existence between all communities in the Nuba Mountains.

ACTIVITIES
Support the collection of data on IDP communities in order to identify those willing to return, and identify their home villages in the Nuba Mountains.
Conduct a survey in the Nuba Mountains to identify existing basic services and rehabilitation needs before the arrival of the IDPs.
Provide the returnees with essential food, medicine, clothing and shelter for a period to allow them to become self-reliant in collaboration with UN agencies and NGOs.
Provide seeds and agricultural hand tools to returnees.
Support and encourage cultural-social activities among all communities.
Support self-reliance activities such as agriculture, animal stock, trade and small industrial production.
Train 100 community leaders on capacity building for peace.

Water, sanitation and health services, agricultural hand tools, seeds, food for one month, shelter and school material will be provided by other partners such as UNICEF, WFP, WHO, UNDP, SC-US, SC-UK.

EXPECTED OUTCOME
Increased returnees’ involvement in the community and grass roots peace building activated.
Achieved economic sustainability through ownership of land and animal stock, and cultivation of sorghum, maize, beans, cotton, fruits.
Enhanced trade activities.
62,000 vulnerable returnees transported back to their places of origin.” (UN, November 2002, p. 173)
Selected ACT appeals for Sudanese IDPs (2002)

- CEAS to provide water, health, education, shelter and food to 57,000 IDPs in Mabia and Baikpa camps (Western Equatoria) who fled Raga (Nov 2002)
- CEAS to provide sorghum, seeds and tools to 12,000 dispersed IDPs and 12,000 host population (Southern Blue Nile)

Western Equatoria

“The Internally Displaced People in the camps of Mabia in Mupoi and Baikpa in Ezo in the Western Equatorial Region in southern Sudan have been facing hardships since being relocated to the camps around October 2001 after they fled fighting between the SPLA and the Sudan government army in the town of Raga, in Western Bahr el Ghazal. Over 57,000 were displaced and have been living in what has been described ‘very severe and desperate conditions’ by the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Rumbek in south Sudan.

CARE international and UNICEF has been the only organisations providing basic services to the IDPs in the two camps. But in an assessment carried out by the Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) in July 2002 to assess conditions of the IDPs in the two camps, it become apparent that the people were seriously lacking basic needs such as water, medical facilities, shelter, and food. CEAS therefore, proposes to take part in the assistance of the IDPs in the sectors of water, health, education, shelter, and food security through the provision of tools and seeds. This appeal describes clearly how CEAS will carry out their intervention in this program through its members, the Catholic Diocese of Tambura/Yambio, and the Episcopal Church of Sudan, diocese of Ezo.” (ACT, 1 November 2002)

Southern Blue Nile

“Twelve thousand internally displaced people (IDPs) in Kurmuk county in South Blue Nile, Southern Sudan are in desperate need of food. This is due to the current severe hunger brought about by a combination of factors such as the ongoing war between the Sudan government and the SPLA, and the successive dry season offensives in each of the last four years. The Southern Blue Nile Region is a hotly contested area and has changed hands between the Government of Sudan and the SPLA on several occasions during the last 19 years of the Sudan civil war. The area is strategically important for both the SPLA and the GoS because of its proximity to the Damazin hydroelectric scheme to the north and the Khor Adar Oilfields to the west. Extensive gold deposits also make it potentially rich in other respects.

In late May of this year, the GoS launched an offensive on the town of Geizan and its surroundings and in June 2002 it dropped 16 bombs in Yabus village where the CEAS has an office compound which was narrowly missed by one of the bombs. This led to a displacement of thousands of people in the surrounding areas.

[...]

ACT member Church Ecumenical Action in Sudan (CEAS) proposes to respond to the needs of the affected people through the provision of food for a three-month period, and will also distribute sorghum seeds and tools. The area of the proposed intervention is predominantly a Muslim area where the Sudanese Church is weak. CEAS therefore works in partnership with a local NGO called Relief Organisation of Fazugli (ROOF) which has been working in partnership with CEAS since 1999. Currently, CEAS and ROOF collaborate in the implementation of a number of development activities including food security, education, water and women’s activities.

[...]

Apart from desperation for food, non-food items and medical care, there is also need for seeds, tools and water in order to guarantee longer-term or future well being of the IDPs. Having arrived at the onset of the fighting, the IDPs, spread along both sides of the border scattered along 40 kilometers of the frontline, putting them in a vulnerable position. They fled here because of proximity to their homes, Ethiopia and security and to get support from their relatives. Thus the IDPs are not living in a camp situation but are interspersed with local civilians.
The location in which food and seeds and tools will be distributed will be Keli. However, seeds and tools will also be distributed to the settled population and to the displaced people from the oil fields around Yabus. The IDPs in Belatum will receive assistance with seed and tools under the auspices of the regular CEAS SBN programme. The emergency committee and local leaders will make the selection of families to be assisted, with supervision coming from the combined NGO representatives. Distribution of relief items will be managed by the NGOs with assistance from the civil authorities.” (ACT, 12 August 2002)

Catholic Relief Services activities for IDPs (Nov 2002)

- CRS provides food to 76,000 IDPs in southern Sudan
- CRS distributed food and non-food items in several IDP camps, Nimule, Labone, Momoria and Acholi

“CRS, in coordination with its partner organizations, is striving to meet the immediate food and necessities needs for war and drought-affected IDPs, returnees, and indigenous populations in south Sudan. The agency's main objectives include:
Providing food to 76,000 internally displaced persons in south Sudan in a timely manner.
Providing six months worth of half ration food for 45,000 people to protect their seed base should they experience drought, crop loss, etc.
CRS also has the capacity to provide 37,500 beneficiaries with full food rations for three months and emergency kits for up to 1,000 beneficiaries.

Over the last few months, CRS also:
Distributed food and vegetable oil to 81,042 IDPs in the Nimule and Labone camps.
Distributed food to 2,231 IDPs, and 516 survival kits in Ngaluma and Tsereteny.
Distributed food to 5,000 IDPs in the Momoria camp.
Distributed food and vegetable oil in the Momoria camp for a feeding program targeting 2,500 malnourished children and pregnant and lactating mothers.
Distributed food to 2,305 new arrivals displaced from the Acholpii camp that are now settled in Nimule and Labone.
Distributed food to 7,950 indigenous and 6,410 IDP populations in the Acholi area. In addition, 1,253 hoes and 1,253 survival kits were also distributed.” (CRS, 22 November 2002)

ACT, CAID and SUPRAID assisting IDPs relief and rehabilitation in Twic County (2002)

"Christian Aid (CAID) working through a local non governmental organisation called Sudan Production Aid (SUPRAID) carried out an assessment of humanitarian needs for the internally displaced people (IDPs) in Twic County, Southern Sudan in May and June 2001. It was found that there were significant numbers of returnees and IDPs from highly volatile conflict areas in the country. The assessment revealed that there were over 25,400 people who had been registered as returnees and IDPs and that the numbers were likely to rise to over 50,000 by the end of the year 2002. The returnees were reported to be in a very poor state as most families had lost all means of livelihood and had to depend on relief assistance for survival. Although a number of humanitarian organisations are working in Twic County, it was reported that none were providing shelter inputs and mosquito nets to control malaria infections. Also although the area has abundant fish stocks people do not have the means to harvest the fish which would provide them with good nutrition. CAID and SUPRAID have indicated that they are well placed to provide the returnees/IDPs with basic supplies for shelter construction, non food items, and fishing equipment.

[...]

**Project Completion Date:** 31 May 2002
Summary of Appeal Targets, Pledges/Contributions Received and Balance Requested

Total Appeal Target(s)  624,093

Current Situation

The last twenty months in Twic County have been relatively stable but two factors are threatening a serious humanitarian disaster. Firstly people who left Twic County over the last few years have begun to return in significant numbers and this has been compounded by the worsening social and economic situation in the north. Secondly the fighting between GoS and rebel troops (SPLA) has been intense causing large displacements of people from the fluctuating conflict areas. It is anticipated that over 50,000 returnees/IDPs might arrive in Twic County by the end of the year 2002.

The majority of those interviewed were living with relatives, which they felt was putting a strain on family relationships and resources. This can be noted in the wider context of Turalei. Turalei suffered from drought in 2000, which decreased the harvest leaving only small amounts of seed for 2001. Only small quantities of food were available on the market and the additional families in the county are exacerbating the food situation. Returnees are receiving limited assistance from relatives who are already extremely over stretched, late and erratic rains have compounded the problem. These problems are increasing dependency on food relief.

There is a fair chance that fighting will intensify in both Wau and Aweil. The total population in the two locations is around 700,000 and originate from the counties of Gogrial, Twic Aweil, Tonj, Rumbek, Wau, Raga and some Arab traders. If fighting erupts, most of the population shall flee Wau due to the threat of continued bombardment and looting. GoS are patrolling the surrounding bush whilst the SPLA are closing in and blocking all major routes in and out of Wau and Aweil. There is no movement of civilians between the two forces as it is too dangerous. The rains reduce SPLA threats to these towns, but the situation might change as land dries out and troop movements are easier.

Impact On Human Lives

As stated above the number of returnees between November 2000 to date is 25,495 and it is anticipated that a similar number could return between now and the onset of the rains in mid 2002. These people lack the basic means of survival such as shelter, bedding and cooking equipment and livelihood equipment to begin to rebuild their lives.

During the wet seasons the situation of the returnees is desperate. Most lack shelter and bedding needs such as mosquito nets, leaving them vulnerable to malaria. If supported with shelter, bedding and household utensils the beneficiary households would be able to begin to live a normal life. At present SUPRAID is beginning to work with local people to open up new and/or clear old farms in readiness for the 2002 farming season. Support provided through this programme will give returnees fishing equipment to enable them to utilise local fish stocks to generate some sort of food security.

Description of Damages

Twic county’s population is estimated to be over 500,000 (UN estimate). The people are engaged in mixed farming, fishing and the collection of wild plants and foods during the hunger season and times of famine. Before the onset of the civil war, labour migration from the mainly rural South to the urban centres in the North was a major coping mechanism during periods of food scarcity such as drought, famine, pest infestation and floods. The minimally functioning local market was the point of exchange and purchase of food grains like sorghum, traditional farming tools, fishing inputs, clothing, and drugs. The war has destroyed Twic County’s access to these services. Commodities are now smuggled into Twic County from government controlled areas, making them too expensive for the ordinary person to purchase. Poor purchasing power has been exacerbated by the lack of markets for local cattle owners to sell some of their stock for cash.
Sudan’s ongoing civil war has led to significant destruction in the area. Cattle, sheep and goats are looted on a regular basis and farmland, homes and granaries have been destroyed. Women and children have also been abducted into slavery. Figures do not exist to quantify such damages, but it is widely accepted that destruction has been extensive and is ongoing.

GOAL & OBJECTIVES

The main goal is to improve the situation of returnees and IDPs in Twic county.

Objectives:
To provide basic supplies to returnees/ IDPs to enable them to construct shelter
To provide bedding needs and mosquito nets to prevent malaria and other illness
To provide cooking equipment and jerry cans so people can store water safely and cook
To provide fishing equipment to allow returnees to immediately exploit the abundant local fish stocks as a source of nutrition

TARGETED BENEFICIARIES

SUPRAID and Christian Aid undertook a joint field visit and assessment in May/June 2001 to evaluate the needs of returnees. This assessment has since been supplemented by regular updates from gol leaders who keep accurate records of returnees, this data is verified by SUPRAID staff and regular meetings of the JRC. The target group has been identified as the returnee population, all of whom can be categorised as vulnerable. Therefore the proposal is to provide 8,500 families with survival kits (approximately 51,000 people). Working on the figures of the current returnee population and the anticipated arrivals during the first half of 2002 this project will attempt to cover all the returnees who need assistance. Assistance will enable returnees to set up temporary shelter. In addition households will receive fishing kits to enable them to utilise the rich fish stocks in local rivers.

The figure of 8,500 beneficiary families will allow SUPRAID a contingency stock of survival kits to enable timely response to developments in the predicted situation. These kits would still be targeted towards the returnee households.

SUPRAID prioritises a participatory approach and involves the community from assessment, for example through seeking advice on the location of the displaced population and likely movements to project evaluation through seeking an understanding of exactly how the community benefited. Through community dialogue the most vulnerable families are targeted. The gol leaders and elders among the affected community assist in the process of identification of those most affected.

Typically in times of trouble women are the main caretakers of the children and the most vulnerable members of the household. They collect water, firewood, and process food if available or look for wild food. Women tend to co-operate to assist the weak members of the community through sharing for survival. Men may be involved in collecting information about military movement and of possible secure places where the family could be relocated. The content of a survival kit is stocked to address the needs of the most vulnerable, are provided for are maximised.

PROPOSED EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE & IMPLEMENTATION

Description of Assistance
8,500 vulnerable households will receive survival kits. These will contain reinforced tarpaulin sheets, a mosquito net, a cooking pot, a 10-litre jerry can, a blanket and a container bag. In addition 50% of targeted households will receive hooks and spools to make fishing lines and materials to make casting nets.
SUPRAID has not yet been trained in the SPHERE standards however it is keen to gain skills in this area so that it can ensure assistance is being provided in line with these international standards in the future. Therefore SPHERE training will be incorporated into this project.

Transition from Emergency
Having effectively addressed the immediate shelter and survival needs of returnees/IDPs by the end of March 2002 SUPRAID will look into farming and fishing needs for the targeted group and the host/resident population in Twic county. The second phase of the programme will be the provision of fishing essentials to help the population begin to rehabilitate their livelihoods. This phase will take place during the latter part of the project period.

SUPRAID has an ongoing presence in the area and will be able to constantly monitor the situation to ensure that it can respond to local needs. Furthermore SUPRAID works on a number of long-term development programmes in the county, including water, education, promotion of civic rights and household food security and agricultural extension” (ACT 8 January 2002)

For more information on background and current situation see the "Patterns of Return and Resettlement” section of this profile

NGO withdrawal from Southern Sudan due to SPLM-MOU disagreement had a negative impact on the delivery of humanitarian assistance (2000)

- WFP concerned that withdrawal of implementing partners would negatively impact food aid, health and nutrition programmes
- European Commission suspend funding for humanitarian operations in areas controlled by the SPLM because of the MOU issue (March 2000)
- At least 140,000 “food insecure” persons in Tonj and Gogrial Counties are adversely affected by the VVI withdrawal (July 2000)
- Save the Children Fund (SCF) obtained special approval to participate in seed distribution
- UN expect malnutrition to increase and early warning systems to be weakened because of NGO withdrawal

See "Disagreements with SPLM make NGOs withdraw from Southern Sudan (March 2000)" for the background to this matter.

"In 1998, malnutrition rates were exceptionally high in the Sudan, particularly in most parts of the Bahr El Ghazal region, which faced a famine-like crisis with global malnutrition rates reaching as high as 45%. Over the next two years, however, global malnutrition rates declined to less than 10% in most of Bahr El Ghazal due to prompt and adequate assistance. Unfortunately, by mid-2000, the rate began to increase particularly in Bahr el Ghazal (10 – 20%) for areas outside garriss on IDP camps, where a massive withdraw of NGO’s occurred resulting in withdrawal of essential services.” (UN November 2000, p. 25)

"WFP is targeting 76,383 persons through the food-for-seeds project during the year 2000. Save the Children-UK and Oxfam-UK were the main implementing partners in 20 locations. Additional WFP staff will be required to assist with implementation of the project following withdrawal of the two NGOs. By 1 March, only 27% of the food aid had been exchanged against seeds, so 73% of project is still to be completed. Delays or cancellation of the project could reduce this year’s harvests. Agricultural production is also likely to be impacted by the absence of agencies normally involved in seed multiplication and provision of agricultural inputs such as tools."
The NGO withdrawal will also affect the health and nutrition programmes supported by WFP. These include nutrition monitoring and primary health care managed by MSF-Holland in Aweil East, as well as a similar programme and food distribution in Tonj, Gogrial and Yambio counties managed by World Vision. Supplementary and therapeutic feeding programmes, general nutrition monitoring and primary health care programmes run by MDM in Yirol and Aweil East counties are also affected. A minimum of 80,450 people will be affected by the lack of these services. This could lead to increased incidence of disease-related malnutrition, compounded by reduced nutritional monitoring as an early warning system. Worst affected will be women and children. With the withdrawal of World Vision from Tonj County and Pathuon Payam of Gogrial County, WFP may have to provide food aid for 140,000 targeted food insecure persons.” (WFP March 2000)

"The [European] Commission decided on March 1 to suspend funding for humanitarian operations in areas controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/SPLA), following the expulsion by the SPLA of non-governmental organisations that had refused to sign an SPLA-sponsored Memorandum of Understanding. The Commission, Member States and NGOs concerned decided that the terms of the Memorandum would severely restrict operations on the ground and set a dangerous precedent. In a declaration of the Member States of the European Union and the Commission, grave concern was expressed at the conditions imposed by the SPLM/SRRA on NGO's working in Southern Sudan. The EU has urged the SPLM/SRRA to resume negotiations with the objective of creating conditions that will allow NGO's to carry out humanitarian operations unhindered and in accordance with international humanitarian law.

If, however, the Commission and its implementing partners are able to make progress in a way that enables NGOs to resume implementing assistance according to humanitarian principles, this decision could be reconsidered during the nine-month life of this plan.” (ECHO 23 March 2000)

"Many of the OLS NGOs have reported funding difficulties, particularly in respect of the suspension of ECHO funds for rebel Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)-controlled territory. Unless funds are received for the second half of the year, several planned projects and activities will not take place.

 [...] This withdrawal of NGOs did create significant gaps, both sectorally and in specific areas, which could not be filled by other OLS agencies. Locations in Bahr el Ghazal and Lakes suffered most, and activities in the Household Food Security sector were particularly affected. For example, it is clear that at least 140,000 “food insecure” persons in Tonj and Gogrial Counties are adversely affected by the WVI withdrawal from these areas. WFP will have to identify additional resources if it is to adequately replace WVI operations in those areas. Throughout southern Sudan, WFP is faced with reduced technical capacity to manage its “food-for-work and training” projects, which in turn will decrease the number of projects WFP can launch in 2000 in this field.

Where gaps were deemed to be life-threatening, resources were redirected to meet needs. For example, annual seeds distribution has to be completed by end May, otherwise severe consequences can result for the following year. Several of the NGOs who withdrew were involved in this process. Save the Children Fund (SCF) obtained special approval from the SRRA to carry on, while UNICEF assumed responsibility for the purchase of seeds from small farmers in Western Equatoria.

The difficulties were compounded by the decision of some major donors, such as Germany, Canada and ECHO, to suspend all assistance to SPLM/A-areas as a result of NGOs’ withdrawal for not signing the MoU. So far [July 2000], this decision remains in place.

 [...] The withdrawal of NGOs from the southern sector has led to decreased coverage in selective feeding and food-for-work activities. Many of the NGOs which withdrew were running health care, supplementary/therapeutic feeding programmes, and nutrition monitoring and assessment programmes. As
a result, it is expected that malnutrition will increase and early warning systems weakened. Food-for-seed exchange targets will not be met in time for the agricultural planting season.” (UN July 2000, pp. 1, 4, 7)

Outlines of NGOs operating in Sudan (2002)

The outlines of NGOs below have been compiled from the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 2002 (UN November 2001, pp. 147-155). The IDP database has not been able to single out those NGOs which primarily direct their activities towards IDPs. Please consult the Appeal Document (pp.177-180) for a breakdown of NGO activities and needs by sector and geographical region.

Action Contre La Faim

Action Contre La Faim has been working in the Sudan for fifteen years. Currently, it has programmes in three areas: Khartoum, Wau (Bahr Al Ghazal) and Juba (Equatoria). ACF has similar programmes in these three locations consisting of therapeutic feeding centres, mother and child clinics, health centres and latrine and borehole construction. For the next year, ACF plans to continue these types of programmes, and to extend the programme in Wau.

Action Against Hunger USA

Action against Hunger USA, is an international, humanitarian, non-religious relief and development agency. The organisation has earned respect around the world as one of the leaders in the fields of nutrition, health, water and sanitation and food security. Currently in southern Sudan, it has programmes in: Central Upper Nile, Phou State, in 2001 this has included the distribution of seeds, tools, fishing equipment and Non-Food items to the most vulnerable and IDPs within the location. Nutritional surveys have been conducted within Upper Nile and Bahr Al Ghazal to assess the malnutrition rates and provide recommendations for response. For the next year, ACF USA plans to continue and develop on these types of programmes, and to extend its activities within nutritional surveillance, training, coordination and emergency preparedness and response.

Adventist Development and Relief Agency

Although ADRA’s preference is to work in development it is also very much involved in relief where needed. In the north of the Sudan, ADRA is involved with development projects for the Nomads who have had to change their lifestyle due to severe droughts and desertification. An irrigation desert farming programme is operating in Um Jawasir, resettling the Nomads as Agro-pastoralists. In Merowe the Nomads are involved in an integrated development programme including health, income generation, live stock banking, agricultural activities and water and sanitation.

In Khartoum ADRA has a programme in literacy and micro-finance. ADRA’s Water and Sanitation is responsible for health and hygiene education integrated with the installation of hundreds of hand pumps, water yards and thousands of latrines within the camps and settlement areas.

In Kosti ADRA, with its partners, is conducting a health and nutrition programme together with a programme in water and sanitation. The beneficiaries will be assisted and encouraged towards a sustainable livelihood and food security.

In southern Sudan, activities are focussed on education, health, water and sanitation. Primary teacher training and primary school support is being done in Yambio County, Western Equatoria; Twic County, Bahr El Ghazal; and Luakpiny County, Upper Nile. A secondary/vocational school project is being supported in Maridi County, Western Equatoria. Primary and veterinary health support, with a food security programme, is offered in Luakpiny County, Upper Nile. In the same location there is a major water and sanitation project.

African Society for Humanitarian Development
ASHAD is a non-government sectarian, non-religious humanitarian development organisation. ASHAD was founded in 1990 and is registered with the Ministry of Social Welfare. Since its foundation, ASHAD has been active in extending aid to groups affected by man-made and natural disasters as well as other displaced needy groups, helping in their resettlement and training them to be self-sufficient.

Aktion Afrika Hilfe
OLS southern sector: AAH works in the health sector in the Western Equatoria locations of Yei, Mundri and Maridi. Activities include: provision of primary health care services; training of essential health workers; and maintenance and rehabilitation of existing PHC facilities. AAH also supports the local hospital in Maridi through the provision of drugs and medical equipment, incentives to local staff and rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure.

Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development
ACORD is an International Operational Non Governmental Organisation its programmes are dedicated to the rebuilding of social linkages, particularly in remote places, which are still scarred by tension or conflict.

The first intervention in the Sudan was in 1974 when ACORD started a number of training and rehabilitation programmes in Equatoria region. ACORD works in the field of development and rehabilitation. Currently it has four programmes, in Port Sudan and Kassala (Micro-finance Development programmes) The Red Sea Hills (Rural-Urban linkages programme) and Juba (Multi-sectoral Emergency programme).

The fifth one was in Khartoum (1994-1999) for the support of IDPs. ACORD is now preparing project document concerning IDPs, based on researches for future intervention in Khartoum State. ACORD is also a member of OLS operating in southern Sudan.

American Refugee Committee
OLS southern sector: ARC implements relief and rehabilitation activities for internal displaced in Bamurye, Kerewa, and Mangalatore Displaced Camps, and also to the indigenous population of Kangapoi, Kangapo II, and Livolo Payams in Kajo Keji County. In the area of Primary Health Care, ARC support 11 PHCUs and 2 PHCCs. This includes EPI, MCH, and CHW activities. In the area of Water, Environment, and Sanitation, ARC is involved in the construction hand dug shallow wells and latrines, clay cookstoves, and planting/distribution of tree seedlings. All of ARCs activities are community-based and focus on self-reliance and sustainability.

AMREF
OLS southern sector: AMREF trains health workers in its training centre in Maridi in Western Equatoria.

Association of Christian Resource Organisations Serving Sudan
OLS southern sector: ACROSS operates community health programmes in Rumbek county, Bahr Al Ghazal and South Bor county in Jonglei. ACROSS also conducts teacher training, veterinary programmes and water and sanitation programmes in Upper Nile.

Catholic Relief Services
OLS southern sector: CRS operates in a wide geographic area of southern Sudan, with many sectors areas overlapping or integrated depending on the location. Food security programmes, which include general food relief distributions, combined with longer-term seeds and tools with agriculture extension training comprise the bulk of work done on the east bank of the Nile River in Eastern Equatoria. Other programmes here include food for work for displaced and drought-affected and primary health care/nutrition. On the West Bank of the Nile in both Eastern and Western Equatoria, CRS’ main focus is on economic governance and income generation programmes, building local capacities and institution to carry our rehabilitation and development projects. In the Lakes State of Bahr Al Ghazal, CRS operates agriculture with health and WES projects as well as longer-term development programmes with Sudanese counterparts. In addition,
CRS works with the 5 Dioceses that cover all of southern Sudan on issues directly related to project support plus those support the institutions themselves.

**CARE International**

CARE began exploring development-programming initiatives in the Sudan in 1979. CARE Sudan’s first projects were in the areas of water supply, forestry and energy conservation in eastern Sudan, primarily to assist with the large influx of Eritrean refugees. CARE Sudan then focused on the Kordofan region of northern central Sudan, where it has worked since the famine of 1983/84. Currently CARE operates in the states of North Kordofan, West Kordofan, Khartoum, South Kordofan, Wau and Unity State, undertaking a variety of activities, including health food security, water, sanitation and emergency response. CARE continues to support Sudanese people throughout the country to alleviate suffering and assist in enhancing livelihoods.

OLS southern sector: CARE is currently implementing an education, agriculture, relief, and primary health care projects in the counties of Tambura (Western Equatoria), Bor (Jonglei) and Latjor state (Eastern Upper Nile). In Tambura, the education project aims at increasing student enrollment and improving the quality of education in sixteen primary schools within the county. CARE’s agricultural projects focus on strengthening the local extension service systems in addition to promoting the production and transfer of local cereals and seed from surplus to deficit areas of southern Sudan in order to promote self-reliance. Working in partnership with Sudan Medical Care in North Bor county, CARE is working with SMC to provide primary health care to 105,000 individuals and improve their health status. In Latjor state, CARE is providing urgently needed seeds, tools, and fishing equipment for the displaced populations to improve food security.

**Christian Mission Aid**

OLS southern sector: CMA operates health and nutrition programmes in Upper Nile.

**Comitato Collaborazione Medica**

OLS southern sector: CCM implements health activities in Adior, Billing, Rumbek and Yirol in the Lakes area. The CCM health programme includes mother and child health, immunisation, and control of endemic diseases such as guinea worm, onchocerca culculous (OV), tuberculosis and leprosy.

**Coordinating Committee for Voluntary Service**

OLS southern sector: COSV implements health, nutrition and water and sanitation programmes in Western Upper Nile. COSV operates a primary health care centre in Nyal and four primary health care units. COSV is also involved in immunisation and guinea worm eradication.

**Cruz Roja Española -Spanish Red Cross**

CRE has a permanent delegation in the country since October 1998. It operates through the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and supports the ICRC and IFRC appeals. Sectors and geographical areas: Rehabilitation: water and sanitation (Northern State and North Darfur); Humanitarian aid (IDPs): health, water and sanitation (South Darfur); Development: capacity building, community development (South and North Darfur)

**Disaster Management and Refugees Studies Institute**

Established in 1994 and registered as an NGO, purposely to provide high quality training and studies in the area of disaster management (preparedness response and mitigation) beside studies of refugees & internally displaced. Issues of conflict resolution, peace building and human rights are of major concern. The training is provided either as postgraduate level courses (Diploma or Master degrees) or as short courses, seminar, workshops, as high quality training, mainly for NGOs personnel. Other objectives of DIMARSI are like raising awareness and capacitate the community leaders at grassroots level and community based organisations. DIMARSI also aims at establishing links with local, regional and global entities with similar goals.
Enfants du Monde - Droits de l'Homme

EM-DH is a French NGO that started working in the Sudan in the aftermath of the 1998 Bahr el Ghazal famine. In 1999, it established a psychosocial relief centre for vulnerable children in Wau providing health care (physical and psychological), food, relief items as well as recreational activities. Since January 2000, EM-DH operates a rehabilitation programme in the Omdurman prison for women aimed at upgrading the conditions of living as well as the nutritional status of the detainees and their children.

Fellowship for African Relief

Fellowship for African Relief (FAR) has been operational in northern Sudan since 1984. FAR currently has programmes in three displaced camps in Khartoum State addressing the nutritional, health and environmental sanitation needs of IDPs, and a sustainable livelihoods programme in Omdurman Es Salaam camp. The latter will involve income generation, skills and vocational training and education. A capacity building initiative with a local CBO plans on providing environmental sanitation and health education to 1000 households in a replanned area in Khartoum North. FAR implements programmes addressing household water needs and household food security of vulnerable populations in Dilling Province, South Kordofan State, and in the Provinces of Sheikan and Um Ruwaba in North Kordofan State. Health and Hygiene education is a focus in all of these initiatives.

FAR will continue its programming focus on health education, nutrition and sanitation in the IDP camps it is involved in Khartoum State, but will also develop a plan for handing over those activities to local NGO’s by 2003. FAR has also expanded its activities in Khartoum State to include Peace Building and Conflict Resolution. In addition, FAR continues operating an integrated community development programme (health, water, sanitation, agriculture and food security) in South Kordofan as well as does some follow up on previous activities in North Kordofan. Following a needs assessment, FAR plans to expand its activities to the Renk area in 2002.

German Agro Action

GAA operational area is Rub-Kona (including Bentiu), Mayom and Pariang Provinces in Unity State and Abyei Province in West Kordofan.

In 2000 GAA trained over 300 vegetable and rice growers and 150 CAEWs (Community Agricultural Extension Workers) and provided agricultural tools and seeds to 10,000 households (Debub in West Kordofan 3,200, Pariang 3,200 and Rub-Kona 3,600) respectively. Rice was introduced as a pilot project in Pariang and Rub-Kona provinces in Unity State and conditions found suitable. GAA received funding for fishing equipment (hooks, lines and spears) for 3,000 fishermen in Unity State. Some 8,500 war affected households received non-food assistance in form of family packages during 2000.

GAA has local partners in North Darfur. GAA co-funds with the German government Kutum Agricultural Extension and Development Society (KAEDS), a local NGO in Kutum in an Integrated Food Security Project. GAA supports an Agricultural Extension Project in Kebkabeya, which is implemented by Kebkabeya Smallholder Charity Society (KSCS), in North Darfur.

Global 2000, The Carter Centre

Global 2000, The Carter Centre, operational in the Sudan since 1995, collaborates closely with UNICEF, WHO and other organisations in the eradication of guinea worm. Global 2000 serves as the Secretariat to MOH for the national Sudan Guinea Worm Eradication Programme (SGWEP). The agency plans to continue support to the SGWEP, currently operational in 18 of the 26 States where guinea worm is endemic, including the provision of materials, training of volunteers in each endemic village and implementation of interventions to prevent transmission. Global 2000 also serves as the collaborating NGO with MOH in the control of onchocerciasis (river blindness), which is endemic in the Bahr Al Ghazal and Equatoria regions.
OLS southern sector: Global 2000 provides technical assistance and lead coordination for OLS in guinea worm eradication in southern Sudan. Global 2000 works with NGOs as implementing partners.

**GOAL**

GOAL has been operating health, sanitation, relief and education programmes in the Sudan since 1985. In Khartoum State, GOAL operates one PHC clinic, sanitation activities, woman's literacy and microfinance programme. GOAL also implements flood preparedness programmes and provided support to centres for street children. In Upper Nile State it is in its second year of PHC, community health promotion and nutrition programme in Malakal while in Kassala State clinics provide PHC in five IDP camps in Kassala since July 2000 and a fuel efficient stoves/tree planting project in two of the camps in addition to completing a similar programme in one refugee camp in Kassala early 2001. As part of GOAL’s response to emergencies, a feeding programme for the drought affected in North Darfur, emergency shelter programme for the newly displaced in South Darfur and a flood mitigation project in Kassala were run during the second half of 2001.

**HealthNet International**

OLS southern sector: Since 1996 HealthNet International has been the coordinating agency for onchocerciasis control in southern Sudan. The programme files applications for all implementing agencies for the drug Mectizan (ivermectin), which is donated by the manufacturer.

**HelpAge International (HAI) – Sudan Programme**

Operational in the Sudan since 1985, HAI seeks to support and implement, with partners, projects which support the elderly directly, or those who care for the elderly. The current programme has three key components; an integrated social development project for the elderly in Carton Barona with SRC; an assistance programme in Juba, implemented with partner NGO’s; and an Information and Advocacy Programme implemented with the Sudanese Society for the Care of Older People. HAI also supports the National Committee for International Year of Older People, chaired by the Ministry of Social Planning. HAI programmes for 2000 include a new ophthalmic project with the Leprosy Mission/IARA in West Darfur, a programme of training for Assessment of Nutritional Status in Elderly, livelihood support protects, and research.

**Hôpital Sans Frontières**

HSF is a French INGO working in the Sudan since 1996 in Malakal supporting the civic hospital, improving hospital structure, management and hygiene, and upgrading staff. HSF works in partnership with GOAL, IRC and MSF Holland.

**International Aid Sweden**

OLS southern sector: IAS operates water, health, education and relief programmes in Equatoria.

**International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**

IFRC has been implementing major relief operations in the Sudan since 1985 in conjunction with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society (SRCS). The cooperation is focusing on disaster response/assistance to refugees and IDPs, disaster preparedness including drought and floods mitigation, early warning and stockpiling of non-food items, health services including malaria control, reproductive health and community based child health care, promotion of humanitarian values and concerns and building capacities in SRCS’ state branches and its headquarters.

**International Medical Corps**

OLS southern sector: IMC implements health programmes in Tambura county, Western Equatoria, focusing on material support to the health care infrastructure. IMC supports the Tambura hospital through the provision of staff incentives, medical supplies and drugs and by training all hospital personnel.

**International Rescue Committee**
IRC, operational in the Sudan since 1981, works in the sectors of Primary Health Care, Reproductive Health, Water and Sanitation, Women in Development, Gender and Capacity Building. These activities provide emergency and long-term assistance to IDPs and other war-affected populations in the IDP camps and Squatter areas of Khartoum, Bahr El Ghazal State, Upper Nile State and Kassala State. Plans exist to expand into South Kordofan State and Equatoria. In 1999 and 2000 IRC provided emergency assistance to victims of civil conflict in Blue Nile State and to Eritrean refugees in Kassala State.

IRC has developed pilot programmes in Human Rights, Peace Building, Conflict Prevention and Sexual Gender Based Violence, which momentarily are in process of being tested and mainstreamed in ongoing programmes.

OLS southern sector: IRC implements health and water programmes in Upper Nile, Bahr Al Ghazal, and Lakes areas. IRC helps local communities gain access to basic and essential PHC services by supporting primary health care units and centres. IRC also trains and supports traditional birth attendants and local EPI teams. IRC implements small-scale, community-based water and sanitation programmes.

Islamic African Relief Agency
IARA is a national NGO founded in 1981operationed in the fields of health, emergency relief and community development. The agency is active in displaced and refugees services in 5 camps.

The agency has 10 sub-offices in Khartoum, Upper Nile, Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria, South Kordofan, White Nile, Blue Nile, River Nile, Darfur and North Kordofan, activities conducted are health and social welfare programmes.

However, the agency programmes are targeting the IDPs and vulnerable groups in the rural and peripheral areas by implementing such type of projects.

Medair
MEDAIR is a relief and rehabilitation humanitarian organisation dedicated to assisting communities in crisis situations in order to alleviate suffering caused by wars and natural disasters. Established in 1988 as a Swiss registered NGO, MEDAIR is a signatory to the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGO’s in Disaster Relief”. MEDAIR began operating in the OLS southern sector in 1995 and in the northern sector since February 2000. MEDAIR identifies a people group or region that is particularly hit by a crisis. Community needs may be in the area of health, water, sanitation, reconstruction, rehabilitation, household and food security. MEDAIR’s core expertise in the Sudan is primary health care, water and sanitation and household security. In spite of the emergency mode of its operations, built into all MEDAIR’s programmes is an element of training and empowerment of local communities. Thus an overall objective is to increase a community’s capacity to manage in times of crisis and improve their coping mechanisms. MEDAIR will continue to build on and develop its existing projects through 2002, while maintaining and expanding its capacity and preparedness to respond to other emergency situations as and when they arise in the Sudan.

OLS southern sector: Medair operates health, nutrition, water and sanitation, household food security and education programmes in Upper Nile, Lakes and Jonglei regions. The agency provides health services including primary health care centres and units, Kala-azar control, EPI as well as training of community health workers.

Médecins Sans Frontières – Holland
Médecins sans Frontières-Holland (MSF-H) is a humanitarian, non-governmental organisation providing medical and public health assistance to populations in danger. Founded in 1984, MSF-H shares the mandate and guiding principles of the MSF movement, namely, humanity, impartiality, independence, neutrality, and commitment to medical ethics, international human rights and humanitarian law. MSF is a signatory to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.
MSF-H began working in the Sudan in 1985 in response to the needs of Chadian refugees and Sudanese in western Sudan. Since then, MSF has implemented various emergency health and water & sanitation projects, among others in Khartoum (IDP camps), Renk (Hospital), Malakal (PHC), Blue Nile (IDPs), Kassala (Refugees), West Darfur (Meningitis).

Currently, MSF-H manages three projects in the GoS-controlled area:

Wau (since 1998): MSF-H runs the pediatrics ward in Wau State Hospital and focuses on training of the hospital staff. Furthermore, MSF supports community-based PHC’s in Buserre village and Lokoloko area. Emergency-preparedness and monitoring the humanitarian situation in Wau and the IDP camps are the two other main components of the programme.

Kala-Azar in Gedaref: MSF-H responded to a Kala-Azar epidemic in 1997-99, and has so far treated more than 17,000 people. The programme re-structured by integrating Kala-Azar control into the existing SMoH health facilities.

Drought-response in West Darfur: MSF-H conducted a measles vaccination campaign in June 2001 and monitored the nutritional status of the population until August.

MSF-H is planning to set up a Kala-Azar and TB treatment programme in Malakal, Upper Nile in Nov. 2001.

Norwegian Church Aid

NCA has been operating in the Sudan since early nineteen seventies. In 1975, a large Sudan Programme was established, and it continued until mid eighties. The organisation is today working closely with local partners in relief, rehabilitation and long-term development assistance in Khartoum State, Bahr al Jebel, Eastern Equatoria and Bahr al Ghazal. The main emphasis is on relief and rehabilitation, local capacity building education and food security. NCA is also supporting income generating activities and an AIDS programme. In Wau NCA, in cooperation with local churches, has established 3 camps for 15,000 IDPs, emphasising on sustainability and a participatory approach in the running of the camps. In 2001, NCA will continue to strengthen the capacity of partners in order to give them increased responsibilities, and make the different programmes more sustainable. Increased attention will also be given to emergency preparedness, as well as peace building and conflict handling.

OLS southern sector: NCA implements integrated health, seeds and tools distribution programmes and provides emergency non-food support in Torit County, Eastern Equatoria and Gogrial County, Bahr Al Ghazal. NCA’s health activities include revitalisation of and support to the health infrastructure through support to 35 PHCUs and training of health personnel involved in EPI, leprosy/TB and Guinea Worm programmes. In the education sector, NCA provides teacher training and supplies equipment to over 30 schools. NCA’s water programme provides safe water through drilling of new bore holes, installation of pumps, training of pump repair teams, and water catchment and spring protection.

Ockenden International, Sudan

O.I. has been operational in the Sudan since 1982, working with refugees, displaced persons and local communities. O.I. has run programmes in Port Sudan, Garora, Khashm Al Girba, and Kilo 26 refugee camp. O.I. works in partnership with DUGAP/SDA in Gedaref in implementing a skill training programme targeting refugees and displaced persons. O.I. is currently running skills training programme in Port Sudan. The main components of the programme are, formal and informal training and training for income generation and credit targeting over 2,500 persons.

Organismo Di Volontariato Per La Cooperazione Internazionale

OVCI La Nostra Famiglia (Volunteers’ Organisation for International Cooperation) is a NGO approved by the Italian Ministry of foreign Affairs and is working in Juba, since 1983 in the field of health. The project's title is Ussratuna and it is devoted to the rehabilitation of handicapped children. The beneficiaries of the programme are children with disabilities caused by neurological, neuromotor, physical and sensorial
disabilities. The Centre provides for detection, diagnosis and programmes for rehabilitation. Working in close connection with governmental agencies and departments, it develops information activities for the prophylactics, prevention and early detection of disabilities caused by birth-risk or subsequent illness (e.g. poliomyelitis, meningitis).

**OXFAM (GB)**

Oxfam GB, operational in the Sudan since 1983, has a field presence in Khartoum, Kassala, Red Sea, N- and S-Darfur, Upper Nile and Bahr El Jebel States where it implements development, rehabilitation and emergency projects. Oxfam works primarily with Sudanese partner organisations, but is operational if no appropriate partner organisation can be identified. Oxfam aims to improve household food security and access to basic services such as safe drinking water and basic education, supports civil structures and aims to contribute to peace building. Target communities are subsistence farmers in marginalised areas, (agro-)pastoralists, urban poor and displaced people. Oxfam gives special emphasis on gender equity in all its work

OLS southern sector: OXFAM GB operates water, food security, health, nutrition gender, conflict resolution and peacebuilding programmes in a variety of locations, including Mundri, Rumbek, Cuibet, Bor and Central Upper Nile.

**Rädda Barnen, Swedish Save the Children**

Rädda Barnen (RB), operational in the Sudan since 1983, focuses on sponsorship of indigenous NGOs working with marginalised children. Street children and children in conflict with the law are the main target groups for RB sponsored activities. Training and dissemination of information on the UN CRC to the judicial system, education, police, army, social welfare and community constitutes another area for RB supported activities. Landmine awareness for children and other community members started in Kassala area will continue to cover other areas in southern Sudan.

OLS southern sector: Rädda Barnen provides psycho-social support to children affected by ware and conflict in Bahr El Ghazal, Upper Nile and Eastern Equatoria. RB works toward establishing community-based and sustainable development programmes. Activities include tracing, reunification, follow-up, demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegation of child soldiers, advocacy on protection, support to basic education, development of community-based rehabilitation for children with disabilities, promotion of girls education and, capacity building of community-based psychosocial structures.

**Save the Children – UK**

SCUK plans to remain operational in the following areas of the Sudan during the year 2002: Khartoum, Bahr al Ghazal, Darfur. SCUK will be appealing for funds for work in the following sectors: Child protection, principally in relation to separated children, Health, mainly PHC/MCH/EPI, Education, mainly support to basic education, Food security, assessment, emergency preparedness and response. Where appropriate, reconciliation and conflict resolution will form a component of projects. Work will focus on communities and partnerships with national NGOs, CBOs and local government bodies. Where we have the capacity and can mobilise support, SCUK will intervene in emergency work within or outside these areas but our continued focus will be on reconstruction and rehabilitation."

OLS southern sector: Save the Children UK operate in Bahr Al Ghazal, Upper Nile and Jonglei regions of south Sudan. Projects are: household food security which includes a veterinary project, fishing equipment distribution and monitoring, and fish preservation and marketing, collaboration with WFP on Food Economy Assessment, Community Trade Initiative, and a seeds and tools project. Other project areas include Education, Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances (CEDC), Water and Public Health, and a major component of emergency preparedness and relief.

**Save the Children - US**

Save the Children /US (SC-US), founded in 1932, is a non-profit non-sectarian organisation operating in 44 nations including the United States. Its mandate is self-help programmes to address issues of health,
education, economic opportunities, and humanitarian response. Its mission is to make lasting positive change in the lives of children in need.

Save the children is operational in the Sudan since 1985, currently works in Kordofan region implementing emergency relief, rehabilitation, and development programmes targeting the drought-affected population, and war-affected displaced persons. Current programme interventions include: In North Kordofan, EPI, basic education and improvement of water supply in the drought affected areas, and a package of emergency relief activities in Sidra camp, being implemented through Umrwaaba office. In South Kordofan, through three sub-offices based in Dilling, Abu-Gebeha and Kadugli towns, SC-US have been implementing EPI, emergency relief programmes targeting war-affected IDPs and host communities, women literacy project in Tolodi. SC has started a Reproductive Health programme in collaboration with UNFPA and CARE in South Kordofan A multi-sector package of interventions is provided. SC-US plans to maintain its current geographical presence and programmatic focus with possible expansion on basic education and reproductive health. SC is involved with other partners e.g. WFP, OLS, UNICEF, WHO, FAO, UNDP for activities related to the Consolidated Appeal Proposal

Sudan Council of Voluntary Agencies
SCOVA is a non-governmental Organisation established in 1979. It was meant to be an umbrella for the NGOs and includes in its membership national and international NGOs working in the Sudan. It has several objectives the most important of which are; to provide a forum for the NGOs through which they exchange data and coordinate their plans, means and goals, to promote the efficiency of NGO staff through continuous training, and to provide a link between the NGOs and governmental institutions UN agencies and counterpart NGOs at the regional and international levels.

Sudanese Red Crescent
The SRCS was established according to the Council of Ministers Decree No. 869 on April 1956 and in the same meeting the Council passed a resolution upon which the Government agreed to sign the Geneva Conventions August 1949. The International Movement of the Red Cross and Red Crescent recognised SRCS as member of the Movement on October 1957. SRCS is working as an auxiliary to the public authorities in the field health, disaster preparedness and response, Relief, social welfare and development.

In the year 1996 SRCS has embarked on decentralisation process where by an autonomous 21 state branches were established. SRCS is a grassroots organisation; it has now a total enrolment of 250000 volunteers.

SRCS has developed a five-year strategic work plan (2000-2004) with very clear mission "To alleviate the suffering and strengthen the capacity of the most vulnerable groups of the community through emergency relief and development programmes."

Tearfund UK
Tearfund UK has funded partner agencies in both northern and southern sectors of the Sudan in a range of relief, development and capacity building activities since 1972. In response to the Bahr Al Ghazal famine in 1998, Tearfund established an emergency response operation in the southern sector of OLS. In 2002 Tearfund will continue to support partner agencies both for development and emergency operations. It will also maintain its operational response, focussing on areas of recurrent insecurity and displacement, seeking to save lives, reduce suffering and increase the resilience of communities to further disaster. Tearfund’s operational response will focus on nutritional support, food security activities, non-food item relief distributions, water supply, construction and basic community health education.

Vétérinaires sans Frontières-Belgium
OLS southern sector: VSF-B’s project aims to increase household food security through improved access to livestock products in pastoralist communities. The agency operates in Bahr Al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Jonglei. VSF-B collaborates closely with VSF-G.
Vétérinaires sans Frontières - Switzerland

Vétérinaires sans Frontières-Suisse (VSF-Suisse) is a humanitarian, politically and religiously neutral organisation with headquarters in Bern, Switzerland. The organisation was born in 1988. In 1989, VSF-Suisse joined eight other European VSF organisations in founding the umbrella organisation VSF-Europa. This network facilitates transfer of knowledge, human resources management and harmonisation of approaches in the livestock sector.

VSF-Suisse currently operates in both West Africa and East Africa as well as in Eastern Europe. The regional office of Nairobi coordinates activities in the Horn of Africa where VSF-Suisse currently implements projects in southern Sudan, north eastern Kenya and Somalia.

The Southern Sudan Veterinary Relief Programme started in 1994. VSF-Suisse serves the people of Aweil East and Twic counties in BeG and Mayom and Rubkona counties plus Nyal and Ganyiel in Western Upper Nile. Activities include capacity building of veterinary professionals as well as community animal health workers, disease surveillance, logistical support for the delivery of veterinary services and vaccination campaigns. VSF-Suisse has developed specific programmes for women to ensure equal opportunities, is involved in the water sector and is an actor in the eradication of Rinderpest in Africa.

World Vision International

OLS southern sector: WVI operates health, water, nutrition, household food security and emergency relief programmes in Gogrial and Tonj counties in Bahr Al Ghazal and Yambio county in Western Equatoria.

Other NGOs

In addition to INGOs, there are numerous Sudanese NGOs, community-based organisations and religious organisations, which provide humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations in the Sudan.

(UN November 2001, pp. 147-155)

Selected activities of the Red Cross movement

IFRC Appeal 2003-2004

- Five national societies operate in Sudan
- Primary health care and reproductive health activities in Kassala State
- The Federation supports the pilot project for HIV/AIDS reproductive health for IDPs in White Nile
- German Red Cross built health centers in IDP squatter areas of Khartoum

“Efforts at the national, regional and international level to bring peace to the Sudan have so far ailed, despite diplomatic pressure and a growing grassroots movement for peace and reconciliation. Some modest successes at peace have been achieved in the Nuba Mountain area where some internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home. However, peace talks held in Machakos, Kenya, between the government of Sudan and rebel Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA/SPLM) that were anticipated to bring a wider peace settlement and political solution to the war collapsed at the last minute, leading to renewed aggression.

[…] Currently, five national societies implement bilateral programmes in the Sudan: Danish Red Cross supports health, education and agriculture in the Red Sea Hill. The German Red Cross is supporting emergency health activities for IDPs in Khartoum State, and water and sanitation in Sinnar State. Netherlands Red
Cross is providing support for primary health care in Khartoum, North Kordofan and Kassala States. Norwegian Red Cross is providing support in water and sanitation, agriculture and capacity building. Spanish Red Cross is supporting emergency interventions projects in water, sanitation and health, longer term development and capacity building in North, South and West Darfur.

The ICRC is mainly focusing on the conflict areas in South Sudan where they undertake a wide range of programmes including war surgery, primary health care, orthopaedics, relief assistance, water and sanitation, protection, family reunification, and dissemination. Some of these programmes are implemented jointly with the National Society volunteers. The ICRC also offers financial assistance to the National Society’s headquarters and branches and gives technical support to the National Society’s programmes in First Aid, family reunification, and dissemination of humanitarian law.

Background and achievements/lessons to date

Sudan Red Crescent provides preventive and curative health services to the community and runs social mobilisation for routine immunisation, conducts clean up campaigns, and disseminates health information/messages to control communicable diseases. Many branches operate primary health care for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and a reproductive health project for IDPs and refugees in Kassala State. The National Society is also implementing a long-term reproductive health project in Khartoum state in partnership with Family Planning International Assistance that is providing curative and preventive health services through eight health facilities.

Currently the Federation supports projects in malaria control, reproductive health and home-based child health care in collaboration with WHO, UNICEF and the Federal Ministry of Health. The Federation also supports the development of a five-year HIV/AIDS strategic plan and the piloting of an HIV/AIDS reproductive health programme for IDPs in While Nile state in view of implementing integrated and targeted grassroots interventions. Sudan Red Crescent is an active member of SAN, a consortium of NGOs working on HIV/AIDS control, linked with the Sudan National AIDS control programme (SNAP) and the UNAIDS country theme group on HIV/AIDS.

Several bilateral programmes are being implemented in Sudan. The Netherlands Red Cross has been supporting a community-based primary health care programme in three locations in Khartoum State, Kassala, River Nile and Northern Kordofan aimed at improving the health status in the area through a series of interventions in which community health volunteers play a significant role. Through a long-standing cooperation with the German Red Cross, health centers have been constructed in IDP camps and squatter areas outside Khartoum. In 2001, German Red Cross worked with the National Society’s Raja branch as an ICRC project delegation. Cooperation with Spanish Red Cross in the field of health is concentrating on water supply and sanitation, and in 2001 a project was launched to support IDPs in Southern Darfur. The Danish and Norwegian Red Cross Societies are involved in community development projects in Red Sea state. The projects include provision of safe drinking water and the improvement of health and sanitation facilities.

The health and well being of internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in camps is improved. Morbidity and mortality rates among beneficiaries in IDP camps have been reduced. Provision of comprehensive primary health care services and rational drugs use within the IDPs camps has been ensured. Self-reliance skills and awareness among women headed household has been enhanced; standard of living for displaced women has been improved. Water availability and accessibility in accordance to Sphere Standards has been assured. Community participation in the maintenance of water system is established and hygiene practices has been enhanced.” (IFRC, 12 December 2002, p.1, 4, 5, 8)

IDPs unacceptable humanitarian situation a priority in IFRC Appeal 2002-2003

• Main objective is to improve living conditions of IDPs especially women-headed families

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• General objectives are to reduce morbidity and mortality and increase access to safe water in IDP camps
• Reduce pregnancy-related health problems among displaced women
• Address the needs of elderly IDPs and highlight their potential in conflict resolution and health education for younger generations

"It is obvious that with such a large IDP problem in the country, SRCS and Federation give priority to assisting the displaced, with a priority given to women headed households. New IDPs need help, but in some areas the problem has all characteristics of a forgotten disaster. For years 2002 and 2003, the SRCS will continue and intensify assisting IDPs in the camps outside Khartoum, Kassala and Kosti (White Nile), mainly in the field of health care, safe water and shelter.

Goal To improve living conditions of Internally Displaced People, especially among women-headed families, protecting humanitarian values and supporting endeavors towards durable future solutions among the vulnerable people themselves.

[...]

**Objective 1** To decrease morbidity and mortality rates in the IDP camps.
Activities to achieve objective 1 are:
Implement Home Visiting Programmes in the camps
Carry out First Aid Trainings, health education sessions and hygiene campaigns
Provide Primary Health Care by maintaining health clinics in IDP camps

[...]

**Objective 4** To increase and secure access to potable water, provide hygiene promotion and improve community engagement in the care and maintenance of the water supply system for displaced persons in El Salam and Wad El Bashir camps, Khartoum
Activities to achieve objective 4 are:
Maintain and operate the water supply systems inside Wad El Bashir and El Salam camps and maintain and improve the water distribution systems in both camps in order to increase accessibility of potable water.
Conduct the PHAST participatory hygiene and sanitation transformation process in the community, provide the project staff and volunteers with new models and methods of hygiene behavior, take samples from the bore holes, distribution points and houses in the two camps for water testing purposes and initiate or participate in regular meetings with other organizations to streamline the health education messages.
Conduct discussions with camp residents on how to strengthen the water system management at the community level and maintain a system that will increase the responsibility of the users for the up-keeping of the water distribution.
Establish and legalize the water committees at Wad El Bashier camp and involve them in the management of the water supply systems;
Define roles and responsibilities of the water committees and different stakeholders.
Develop and implement a mechanism for cost sharing;
Oversee the newly formed water committees and provide all needed technical and material support.
Establish a close monitoring and documentation of the project to facilitate an ongoing evaluation of the progress of the system.
Carry out discussions with the relevant government authorities about them assuming full responsibility for the continued running of the water distribution in the camps.

[...]

**Health Activities**

**Objective 1** To reduce the suffering among displaced women from pregnancy related health problems.
Activities to achieve objective 1 are:
Conduct KAP baseline survey to assess the behaviors of the population with regard to the RH.
Train midwifery services providers on quality RH services.
Train the project personnel and the volunteers on health management and supervision.
Strengthen the referral system of the obstetric emergencies.
Train the volunteers and the community leaders to clarify the importance of and increase the awareness of the community on reproductive health.
Train the volunteers and the community leaders on RH issues.
Train the TBAs and VMWs on IEC and health education messages.
Conduct community based IEC sessions.
Hold meetings with the community groups, women, youth and village committees.
Provide educational materials to strengthen the IEC messages on RH.
Activate/establish IEC units within the state branches.
Provide all health centers with statistical clerks for regular registration of information.
[…]

The elderly: a resourceful but neglected group
The elderly in the Sudan as well as in other countries in Africa is a growing group. Their needs, especially among internally displaced are not adequately addressed. Their role in the displaced community is not always identified and their potential to contribute not fully recognized.

However, experience from working among elderly in IDP areas outside Khartoum has told that there are ways to empower the elderly and make them participating in activities aimed at reinforcing cultural values and traditions in the community. Activities of the project known as "Carton Barona" include health education, nutrition and income-generating activities but the overall aim is participate in social services and to "advocate on behalf of the most vulnerable to maintain dignity and safeguard human rights". The Carton Barona project has had a special appeal to women. In fact, elderly women heading families as well as those living alone, are the main target group of the elderly project.

There is an interesting link between the social activities of the elderly and efforts to encourage conflict resolution and reconciliation. By providing a forum for them (weekly gatherings known as "coffee ceremonies"), they reach the younger generations and are listened too. They become messengers of important issues, e.g. on peaceful cooperation between communities and health education with HIV/AIDS information.
[…]

Objective 3 To bring about improvements in the quality of life of vulnerable elderly in poor and displaced communities.

Activities to achieve objective 3 are:

Provide health education and basic health care for the elderly.
Provide a nutritional support for those without family support, who are malnourished.
Carry out health education training of volunteers in community health for older people.
Provide a social needs, peace-building and reconciliation programme to enhance the awareness of the skills and needs of the elderly.

With priority to women-headed families, provide opportunities for income generation (small scale agriculture, handicraft, traditional hand loom and sewing, traditional food preservation and fish processing), to enable the elderly to pay for food, fuel and medical treatment." (IFRCRCS 13 January 2002)

ICRC activities for southern Sudan IDPs (2001)

- Raja IDPs in Ed Daein provided with safe water
- 43,234 Red Cross Messages distributed to civilians separated by conflict

"Residents and IDPs
The ICRC also focuses on assistance to conflict-affected residents and IDPs, remaining at the ready to launch a swift emergency response, by providing assistance in the form of medical supplies, non-food
items, seed and tool kits and fishing equipment, and by putting in place water and sanitation contingency plans and stocks.

Following the influx of IDPs from Raja into Ed Dein, the ICRC supplied safe water to El Firdous camp (2,500 people) and Um Herona camp (8,000 people). One tank (70 m3) was erected in each camp and tap stands were installed. Three additional plastic reservoirs (5 m3 bladder tanks) were installed in Um Herona. Sudan Red Crescent Society (SRCS) volunteers, formerly trained by the ICRC, actively participated in these activities. Co-ordination takes place with UN agencies and NGOs involved in water and sanitation activities. In Bentiu, the ICRC continued to support the supply of safe water (15,000 residents and 20,000 IDPs) by the temporary water treatment plant built with Oxfam tanks. Chemicals, fuel, reagents for water analysis, etc. are provided.

During the past year, seeds and tools have been distributed to over 23,000 families in Sudan. Plantings in most areas have taken place, the possibility of harvesting has been dependant on the fighting and on raids.

By the end of September approximately 25'000 families had received three mosquito nets, a cooking pot, a bucket, 50 fishing hooks and a roll of fishing twine. These goods were distributed to enable the families to supplement their food stocks.

A total of four Agricultural Demonstration Plots have been established in Tam, Thonyor, Yirol and Wau with a control plot in Lokichokio. On average there are 28 different vegetables and fruits, with 90% showing good germination results. Four new bore holes were completed in the Chelkou area. In the Yirol area, activities focused on the promotion and hygiene and on hand-pump repair/maintenance.

Protection and preventive action
Protection activities and preventive action are the other focus of the ICRC's activities and involve visiting people detained in connection with the conflict, tracing and reuniting family members separated by the conflict, and disseminating international humanitarian law (IHL) to the government forces, the SPLA and other bearers of weapons.

[...] Maintaining family links
The ICRC volunteer network in southern Sudan and the SRCS volunteers in government-controlled areas continue to distribute a large number of RCMs on behalf of civilians separated by the conflict. During the first nine months of the year, a total of 43,234 RCMs were collected from civilians and 40,147 distributed. From Lokichokio, the ICRC co-operated with around 112 tracing volunteers in southern Sudan and five tracing volunteers in the Kenyan Kakuma refugee camps where numerous southern Sudanese were living.

The fighting in Raja and the surrounding villages in June 2001 caused a huge influx of IDPs in South Darfur, including children who had been separated from their families. At the end of September the number of unaccompanied children registered by the ICRC in the three main camps set up in South Darfur was 543; these cases are currently being followed up and families traced with a view to reunification." (ICRC 30 November 2001)

Donor response

Lack of funding cited as most significant operational constraint (Nov 2002)

- Revised appeal requested US$ 274 million for 2002
- Only 18.4% pledged contributions received by June 2002 compared to 48% for Afghanistan
- CA 2002 was funded 45%
- Water and sanitation and health sectors remain dangerously underfunded at 33% and 14% respectively
- Clear donor preference for food sector which received 90% coverage
“As at 31 December the CAP 2002 had received approximately 48% of the USD 274 million requested. In order to take advantage of the unimpeded access achieved, and to cover affected communities in newly accessible areas, agencies are appealing for USD 26,486,058 for three-months (November 2002-January 2003). WFP announced a USA contribution of US$ 35 million.” (OCHA, 23 December 2002)

“Increased requirements: The 2002 CA for Sudan was first launched in November 2001 with estimated total requirements of US$ 194 million. Needs were subsequently revised to US$ 274 million, with the difference being attributable to the ceasefire agreement in the Nuba Mountains and renewed access, adjusted food aid requirements following the annual post-harvest food needs assessment in December 2001, drought in Kordofan, Darfur, the Butana Plains and Red Sea Hills, and increased delivery costs resulting from insecurity, impeded access and a consequent reliance on air-drops, although current delivery cost has decreased relative to previous years.

Funding levels for the Sudan: Although impeded access and insecurity posed major difficulties for humanitarian intervention, “inadequate funding” was cited by all agencies as the most significant operational constraint in 2002. Of the total requirement of US$ 274 million, US$ 50.4 million or 18.4% had been pledged or contributed as of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) end-May 2002. More disturbing was the fact that only 15% and 4% of the food aid and non-food requirements had been physically transferred and made available in-country by end-July 2002. At the time of this submission, nine months into the CA timeframe, CA response had risen to US$ 124 million or 45% compared with 50.5% for all CA countries.

Factors influencing worldwide CAP response: As the table below illustrates, funds channelled through CAs have decreased worldwide. The trend is partially attributable to the overall increase in civilians affected by armed conflict. There has been a proliferation of new agencies, which has resulted in increased competition for scarce resources. Increased awareness of the importance of combining humanitarian and transitional activities has resulted in more agencies including their transition programmes in the CA, particularly as total Official Development Assistance (ODA) has fallen over the past decade. Few funding facilities have arisen to cover such activities.

By end May, response to the Afghan Crisis had already achieved 48% compared with 18.4% for Sudan. Yet, the skewed attention given to Afghanistan was influenced by the events of 11 September 2002 which were highly irregular.

Summary of Requirements and Contributions 1993-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sudan Requirements</th>
<th>Sudan Contributions</th>
<th>Contribution %</th>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>251,970,846</td>
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<td>274,581,481</td>
<td>123,973,0365</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes carry-over

Contributions to Sudan as a proportion of worldwide response actually rose from an average 4.62% (1993-97) to an average 13.3% (1998-01) and in many cases there were peak funding levels achieved for the Sudan when larger crises elsewhere experienced troughs or steep reductions. Meanwhile, requirements for
the Sudan, which averaged US$ 142 million (1993-97) rose 40% to an average US$ 198 million during the four-year period 1998-01. Between 2000 and 2001 alone, requirements leaped 92% from US$ 131.5 million to 251.9 million. Funding remained steady during the period (US$ 198 million in 1999, US$ 107 million in 2000, and 155 million in 2001), and did not rise in response to the increased requirements which resulted in a corresponding decrease in CAP response from 93% in 1998 to 62% in 2001.

Causal factors specific to the Sudan: Donors were consistent in attributing the lack of response in Sudan to several causal factors. The problems they highlighted, whether real or perceived, reflected consensus amongst the donor community and lessons drawn have heavily influenced the direction and scope of the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and Appeal for 2003.

Impeded access, including flight bans, flight denials and travel restrictions;
General donor scepticism concerning increased levels of need without adequate analysis and justification;
Failure on the part of CAP participants to distinguish between optimal response and minimum response and to accordingly establish and adhere to self-imposed prioritisation criteria; apparent inability of agencies to agree on those projects to be excluded from the CAP and to decide between competing demands and interests. This reduces the CAP to a “wish list” and undermines donor confidence and trust;
Similarly, agencies are accused of having a tendency to “cry wolf” and to exaggerate needs, indicating that ‘x’ number of people will die of starvation or disease if ‘y’ amount of funding is not provided. Donors cover only a proportion of the stated requirement;
Concern over lack of cost sharing by local authorities. Increased oil revenue should result in increased funding of humanitarian intervention by local authorities and to reduced levels of external funding;
There are political constraints to supporting transitional and rehabilitation activities in the CAP which many Donors fear could be misinterpreted as a “reward.” Most donors consider it appropriate to withhold transitional assistance until parties have demonstrated their willingness to pursue a lasting peace;
CA reviews are being undertaken primarily in donor capitals where information on the relative needs of each country is lacking;
Lump sum funding not tied to any specific country or CA project but tied broadly to the region with recommendations that requirements in Sudan be given due consideration;
High turn-over in staff of Bilateral Aid Missions and lack of continuity;
The donor budget year and CA period are not always synchronised, resulting in contributions not being received until the end of the CAP timeframe;
Departmental differences between home ministries, political and aid sections and within aid missions.
[…]
Assistance flows by sector: While funding decisions are influenced by a number of criteria, the long-term trend (1993-2001) has been a concentration of resources on four main sectors, specifically Food Assistance, Health/Nutrition, Education and Refugee Assistance while food security has been systematically underfunded. During the past four years (1998-2001) CAP response for Coordination and for Protection/Human Rights has been on the ascendancy due to increased awareness of needs in these two sectors. There has been a clear donor preference for the food sector, which has maintained a 90% coverage rate in the Sudan, while all other sectors have averaged 37%. Worldwide CA response for the food and non-food assistance has averaged 85 and 58%, respectively.
[…]
WFP, which relies upon voluntary donor support for its food operations, has cited the importance of balanced sectoral funding and repeatedly highlighted the fact that food aid alone, while saving lives, does not prevent malnutrition caused by a lack of access to clean water and health care. The Water and Sanitation and Health sectors, which are normally assigned high priority by donors, remain dangerously under funded at 33% and 14%, respectively. The Education sector, which has received an average 62% response in recent years, remains as malnourished as its intended beneficiaries with only 18% of requirements met thus far. There is need on the part of agencies and donors to seriously review and correct present sectoral imbalances and funding levels.” (UN, November 2002, p.5 ; 6 ; 7 ;8)
ECHO adopts Euros 20 million for humanitarian assistance in Sudan (Jan 2003)

- ECHO pledged to continue delivering humanitarian assistance according to needs
- EC formal assistance could not be implemented since the 1990s due to concerns about human rights violations
- EC Response Strategy will focus on IDP food security and education in areas of resettlement
- Lack of transparency in EU benchmarks and sudden flood of aid may destabilize the peace process
- Norway donates US$250,000 to support the peace process in Sudan

“The European Commission has reaffirmed its commitment to the victims of the ongoing crisis in Sudan with the adoption of a Global Plan for 2003 worth €20 million which will help meet humanitarian needs in the largest country in Africa. This decision will enable the Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), through partner organisations working in the field, to provide assistance to the most vulnerable population groups throughout 2003.

[…]
If the peace process fails and fighting resumes, continued humanitarian aid will be necessary. Regardless of political developments, ECHO will continue covering the whole territory according to needs, and in strict respect of internationally recognised humanitarian principles.

[…]
From 1993 to 2002 ECHO has allocated over €176 million to Sudan, making it one of the largest donors of humanitarian aid to the country.” (ECHO, 28 January 2003)

“EC formal assistance could not be implemented in the Sudan since March 1990, due to concerns about lack of respect for human rights and democracy, and to the civil conflict. In November 1999, the EU and the Sudan engaged in a formal Political Dialogue, aimed at addressing those concerns. In December 2001, the two parties agreed on the need to pursue and intensify the Dialogue, in the framework of Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, while at the same time aiming at gradual normalisation of relations, conditional upon progress with the commitments for 2002 agreed with the Government during the EU Troika to Khartoum in December 2001. The assessment of progress in the dialogue should be done by the end of 2002.

[…]
Because of the context of the Sudan, the strategy should address basic needs at local levels. The EC Response Strategy will focus on two main sectors: Food Security and Education, targeting the resettlement of IDPs with a strong element of capacity-building for Governance. It could also be oriented for demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration operations, including mine clearance, training of the security forces and other actions for which provision is made under Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement. In addition, other issues could be addressed such as human rights, good governance, and the rule of law; direct support to the peace process and to peace building initiatives, and the strengthening of civil society and health.” (ECHO, 3 October 2002, p.3)

“An EU troika led by Denmark visited Khartoum in December. While expressing some concern about the human rights situation, they nevertheless underlined that they were ready to start full development cooperation and release the Lome/Cotonou funds as soon as a peace agreement is signed. There has always been concern at the lack of transparency in EU “benchmarks” for GoS progress on peace, democratisation, the rule of law and human rights, and the fact that these benchmarks are arbitrarily set by the EU without reference to Sudanese civil society. The sudden flood of aid funding may adversely affect the stability of the peace process. There are also early indications that, in an apparent rerun of the situation post-1972, aid may be concentrated in Equatoria to the detriment of more needy but less accessible areas such as Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal.” (SFP, January 2003, p.8)
“Norway will donate 500,000 dollars (467,000 euros) to help pay for peace talks in Kenya aimed at ending internal conflicts in Sudan and Somalia, Norway's International Development Minister Hilde Johnson said here Monday.

"We are pleased with the role Kenya is playing in the Sudan and Somali peace talks and we are coming in to assist with 250,000 dollars each for both Sudan and Somali peace processes," Johnson said during a meeting with Kenyan Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka." (AFP, 17 February 2003)

"The European Commission has reaffirmed its commitment to the victims of the ongoing crisis in Sudan with the adoption of a Global Plan for 2002 worth €17 million in humanitarian aid. [...] ECHO's general objective is to prevent a further deterioration in the conditions of the most vulnerable sections of the population, with a special focus on IDPs. Priority areas include health/nutrition, water/sanitation, food security and emergency preparedness. ECHO is also maintaining its commitment to "Operation Lifeline Sudan", the UN-led consortium that coordinates humanitarian operations in Sudan. This includes support for air transport and for security measures designed to protect humanitarian personnel who are striving to deliver relief in a very difficult working environment.

In the field of health/nutrition, resources are being allocated to a wide range of actions including primary health care, disease control, therapeutic feeding, the provision of medicines and training for local staff. It is estimated that more than 660,000 people will benefit from these operations. A further 355,000 people will be assisted through water and sanitation projects, focusing on districts where water shortages are most acute. In the area of food security, livestock support services are to be strengthened for some 35,000 pastoralists and displaced families in the north and up to 700,000 people in the south." (ECHO 23 January 2002)

**Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

**Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as of March 2002)**

- References to the Guiding Principles Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

**Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

None

**Other references to the Guiding Principles**

- SPLM/A draft policy on internal displacement
- SPLM/A policy on internal displacement was developed by a working group at the training workshop on the Guiding Principles in
Rumbek, September 21–23, 2002, facilitated by the IDP Unit of OCHA, Brookings – SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and OCHA Nairobi. Participants, displaced themselves at least once, included the SRRA, the RASS and representatives of the emerging judiciary branch of the SPLM/A.

Objectives of the policy:
- “Ensuring that all internally displaced persons enjoy proper protection and dignified treatment by SPLM/A authorities according to international human rights and humanitarian law.
- To promote and facilitate the search for durable solutions for those internally displaced in the SPLM/A controlled areas and those returning from the (GoS) controlled territories. To enable the internally displaced to enjoy the same rights and freedoms as all citizens under areas controlled by SPLM/A.
- To clarify the role of all actors including that of the internally displaced, SPLM/A civilian authorities, intergovernmental organizations and local and international NGOs operating in the area with clear rules and principles to guide their response to the internally displaced.
- To promote the inherent capacities and productivity of the internally displaced to lead a dignified life. In this connection, internally displaced must be given access to land during the period of their displacement.” (IDP Unit, 5 October 2002, p.5)

Source: SPLM/A, a working group at the training workshop, facilitated by the OCHA IDP Unit, Brookings – SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and OCHA Nairobi.

Date: 23 September 2002

Document: Draft Policy to Address the Needs of Internally Displaced Persons in SPLM/A Controlled Areas

To access the full document click on URL:
http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/docs/reports/WorkshopRumbek0902.pdf

Discussion on the development of a national policy on internal displacement:

“Francis M. Deng, the UN Secretary-General’s Representative for Internally Displaced Persons, raised the issue during his visit to the country from 11 to 18 September, when he held official meetings with President Omar al-Bashir and other senior officials to discuss the development of a national policy and strategy on internal displacement, including the establishment of a national focal point and an institution with a specific mandate for meeting the needs of all those affected.

Members of the Government expressed support for this approach and agreed to undertake a comprehensive study that would review current Government policy and develop cooperative strategies in light of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and UN institutional arrangements.

The Government also agreed to use the study as the background document for an international conference to be held next year [2002] in Khartoum which would provide a forum in which the Government, UN agencies, international and non-governmental organizations, the donor community and the internally displaced themselves could discuss the national response to internal displacement and develop ways of enhancing that response with the support and collaboration of the international community.” (UN DPI 20 September 2001)

UN to assist in the dissemination of the Guiding Principles in Arabic:

“The Representative was also informed that the discussions with the Director of the Peace Unit also addressed the possible role of the United Nations, specifically UNDP, in supporting this process. While further discussion was required, a number of areas in which UNDP could potentially support the process were outlined, including wide dissemination of the Guiding Principles in Arabic and English and financial and logistical support to the process. In this regard, UNDP has suggested that the process as a whole could benefit from an agreed upon strategy rather than addressing constraints at each step.” (UNCHR 5 February 2002, para. 40)

Sudan joins a consensus in favour of resolution 56/164 to disseminate the application of the Guiding Principles:

“Subsequent to the mission, at the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly and during the Third Committee’s consideration of the draft resolution on internally displaced persons, the representative of the Sudan to the Third Committee expressed concerns that the Guiding Principles had not been formally adopted by an intergovernmental forum, but, in the spirit of cooperation and support for the work of the Representative, agreed to join a consensus in favour of a resolution (56/164) that encourages the further dissemination and application of the Principles, including holding regional and other seminars on internal displacement. In the subsequent meeting with delegations, hosted by the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to promote dialogue between Governments and the
Representative of the Secretary-General, the delegate of the Sudan reiterated the support of his Government for the work of the Representative and their commitment to seeking ways of promoting dialogue with a view to reaching a consensus in support of the Guiding Principles, an approach to which the Representative is equally committed. 


Source: UN DPI; UNCHR
Date: 20 September 2001; 5 February 2002

Documents: Specific Groups and individuals: Mass exoduses and displaced persons
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54

Availability of the Guiding Principles

The Guiding Principles have been translated in Arabic
Source: UNCHR
Date: 11 April 2001
Document: To access the Arabic document click on URL: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/principles_arab.pdf

Training on the Guiding Principles

Sudan IDP Policy Training Workshop (Sept 2002)

The OCHA IDP Unit workshop was to start consultation process for a national-driven formulation of an IDP policy
To enable implementation of the policy of attention to IDPs data collection and early warning systems were needed

“Our August 28 and 29 the Government of Sudan held a workshop to discuss the formulation of an IDP Policy. The workshop, facilitated by the IDP Unit of OCHA included participants from several ministries involved in responding to internal displacement. The purpose of the workshop was to assist the Government of Sudan identify possible elements of an IDP policy by providing facilitated disseminated training on key human rights law and humanitarian law as it applied to internally displaced. The purpose of the workshop was not to produce policy nor begin the consultation process with concerned stakeholders but, to provide a forum for national officials to brainstorm and discuss both the process and possible contents of a policy. The Guiding Principles were used, inter alia, as a framework for discussion.

[...] the Commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Dr. Sulaf El Din Salih made it clear the development of the policy was going to be Sudanese-owned and driven process.” (OCHA IDP Unit, 5 September 2002, p.2, 5, 11-12)

Implementing partners would be: the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Ministries of Interior, Social Planning and Culture and Ministry of Housing at the state level as well as international organizations national and international NGOs, as well as civil society and the traditional chiefs and social/political leaders of the displaced communities.
Training workshop on the Guiding Principles with the SPLM/A, SRRA and RASS, facilitated by OCHA IDP Unit and Brookings-SAIS Project, the 21-23 September 2002, in Rumbek, Sudan.

On September 21-23 the SPLM/A held a training workshop on the Guiding Principles in Rumbek. The workshop was facilitated by the IDP Unit of OCHA, Brookings – SAIS Project on Internal Displacement and OCHA Nairobi. All participants had been displaced themselves at least once, and they included the SRRA, the RASS and representatives of the emerging judiciary branch of the SPLM/A.

The main objectives included: Develop a policy on internal displacement, based on the GP, human rights law, humanitarian law, for IDPs in SPLM/A controlled areas. Provide general training on human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law by analogy. (IDP Unit, 5 October 2002, p.2)

Some selected recommendations of the workshop: Participants pledged to promote IDP protection and address their needs. In order to ensure voluntariness, safety and dignity of return, or resettlement, participants proposed creation of joint structure between representatives of the GOS and SPLM/A to facilitate coordination and information sharing. Underlined was the need for comprehensive assessment and survey of IDPs in Sudan to clarify their number, location and needs. Participants considered persons displaced within oil-rich areas to be conflict-induced displaced. In the event of successful peace talks it was recommended that a national commission representing both GoS and SPLM/A be established with the mandate to harmonize existing policies on IDPs.

Source: OCHA IDP Unit
Date: 5 October 2002
Document: SPLM/A IDP Policy Training Workshop – South
To access full document click on URL:

Sudan IDP Policy Training Workshop (Sept 2002)

The OCHA IDP Unit workshop was to start consultation process for a national-driven formulation of an IDP policy. To enable implementation of the policy, attention to IDPs data collection and early warning systems were needed.

“On August 28 and 29 the Government of Sudan held a workshop to discuss the formulation of an IDP Policy. The workshop, facilitated by the IDP Unit of OCHA included participants from several ministries involved in responding to internal displacement. The purpose of the workshop was to assist the Government of Sudan identify possible elements of an IDP policy by providing facilitated disseminated training on key human rights law and humanitarian law as it applied to internally displaced. The purpose of the workshop was not to produce policy nor begin the consultation process with concerned stakeholders but, to provide a forum for national officials to brainstorm and discuss both the process and possible contents of a policy. The Guiding Principles were used, inter alia, as a framework for discussion. […] the Commissioner of the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Dr. Sulaf El Din Salih made it clear the development of the policy was going to be Sudanese-owned and driven process.” (OCHA IDP Unit, 5 September 2002, p.2, 5, 11-12)
Implementing partners would be: the Ministry of International Cooperation and the Humanitarian Aid Commission, Ministries of Interior, Social Planning and Culture and Ministry of Housing at the state level as well as international organizations, national and international NGOs, as well as civil society and the traditional chiefs and social/political leaders of the displaced communities.

Source: OCHA IDP Unit
Date: 5 September 2002
Document: Sudan IDP Policy Training Workshop – North
To access the full document click on URL.
http://www.reliefweb.int/idp/docs/reports/Workshop-Khartoum-09-02.pdf

OCHA workshop in Juba focused on the Guiding Principles (May 2001):

"Other seminars on the Guiding Principles are being prepared for Wau and Khartoum (May or June 2002)" (Email OCHA Khartoum 19 March 2002).

No report of the May 2001 workshop has been forwarded to us at 20 March 2002.

Mission of the UN representative for internally displaced as well as workshop no internal displacement postponed in May 2001 due to government's perceived infringement on sovereignty:
Workshop on Internal Displacement seen as an infringement on sovereignty by the Government of Sudan (May 2001)
However the Representative reiterated that sovereignty carries responsibilities towards citizens
"The May [2001] mission was to have been combined with a workshop on internal displacement, to be held in Khartoum, which was agreed to by the Government ...
[...]
The approach taken by the Representative in this and all his country missions, and one which was particularly pertinent to concerns of the Government of the Sudan regarding national sovereignty, rests on the recognition that internally displaced persons fall within the domestic jurisdiction and therefore within the national sovereignty of the States concerned. It is also based on the fundamental assumption that national sovereignty carries with it responsibilities towards the citizens and that under normal circumstances Governments discharge that responsibility. When, for a variety of reasons, Governments are unable to provide their citizens with adequate protection and assistance, they are expected to invite, or at least welcome, international cooperation to supplement or complement their own efforts." (UNCHR 5 February 2002, summary)

Source: OCHA; Email OCHA Khartoum; UNCHR
Date: 31 May 2001; 19 March 2002; 5 February 2002

Documents: Specific Groups and individuals: Mass exoduses and displaced persons
Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis Deng, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2001/54
Addendum
## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>AAH</td>
<td>Aktion Afrika Hilfe</td>
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<td>Action Contre La Faim</td>
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<td>ACORD</td>
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<td>Association of Napata Volunteers</td>
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<td>Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against women</td>
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<td>Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances</td>
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<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<td>Al Da’wa Al Islamiyya</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo (ex-Zaïre)</td>
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<td>Emergency Preparedness and Response</td>
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